Sri Prabhu Shankar vs State Of Karnataka
2021 Latest Caselaw 3310 Kant

                            1



       IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

         DATED THIS THE 8TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2021
                                                         R
                          BEFORE

           THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P. SANDESH

              CRIMINAL PETITION NO.2389/2020

BETWEEN:

SRI PRABHU SHANKAR
S/O MUNIYAPPA
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS
ASST. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
RESIDING AT NO.1160
17TH MAIN, 20TH CROSS
'A' BLOCK, SAHAKARANAGAR
BENGALURU-560 092.                             ... PETITIONER

         (BY SRI A.S.PONNANNA, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
              SMT.LEELA P.DEVADIGA, ADVOCATE)
AND:

1.     STATE OF KARNATAKA
       REPRESENTED BY COTTONPET
       POLICE STATION
       CHICKPET SUB DIVISION
       BENGALURU CITY-560 001.

2.     THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
       CRIME-II, CITY CRIME BRANCH
       BENGALURU CITY-560 009.

3.     SRI ADIL AZEEZ
       S/O ADIL MAHMOOD
       RESIDING AT NO.37
       PRESTIGE ARCADE, BURLIN STREET
                                  2




        LANGFORD TOWN, SHATINAGAR
        BENGALURU-560 025.                       ... RESPONDENTS


           (BY SRI V.M.SHEELVANT, SPP-I FOR R1 & R2;
             SRI RAVI B. NAIK, SENIOR COUNSEL FOR
            SMT.VIJETHA R. NAIK, ADVOCATE FOR R3)


        THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE FIR DATED 12.05.2020 IN
CRIME NO.64/2020 REGISTERED BY THE 1ST RESPONDENT
POLICE AND THE COMPLAINT DATED 07.05.2020 PRODUCED AS
ANNEXURES-A       AND    B   RESPECTIVELY    AND    ALL   FURTHER
PROCEEDINGS PURSUANT THERETO.



        THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 30.07.2021 THROUGH 'VIDEO
CONFERENCE' THIS DAY, THE COURT PRONOUNCED THE
FOLLOWING:
                              ORDER

This petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. praying

this Court to quash the FIR dated 12.05.2020 in Crime

No.64/2020 registered by the first respondent-police based on

the statement of respondent No.3 dated 07.05.2020 on the file

of 31st Additional CMM Court, Nrupathunga Road, Bengaluru

City.

2. The factual matrix of the case is that this petitioner

was working as the Assistant Commissioner of Police, in the

Central Crime Branch ('CCB' for short), Bengaluru City. He was

a Supervisory Officer of the Economic Offences Wing in the CCB.

A case is registered against this petitioner, based on the

statement dated 07.05.2020 of one Adil Azeez, who is

respondent No.3 herein. In the statement, he has stated that he

is the distributor of ITC Company Cigarettes. Due to Covid-19

Pandemic, the Government had declared lockdown in the month

of March and April, 2020. He was having 100 employees, who

used to supply cigarettes in the cycle and grocery items to

different shops and due to lockdown, the employees were facing

difficulties. Hence, in April, 2020 he contacted one Sri Babu

Rajendra Prasad explaining the difficulties faced by his

employees. The said Babu Rajendra Prasad told him to

introduce the petitioner herein. After some time, he called and

informed him to go along with one Bhushan to the office of this

petitioner and he had already spoken to him. Hence, himself

and said Bhushan went and met the petitioner and this petitioner

introduced the other Inspector Ajay. When he was talking to

this petitioner, the said Bhushan went away from the room. He

spoke to him for 15 minutes in the presence of said Ajay and he

told him to contact the said Inspector and gave the number of

the Inspector. It is his statement that, in between 22.04.2020

to 28.04.2020, he has sent whatsapp message to the said

Inspector regarding unethical practice of six to seven distributors

in selling the cigarette and their location and photos.

3. That on 20.04.2020, the said Babu Rajendra Prasad

told him that he had discussed with this petitioner and will you

make settlement and hence, he told him that he will enquire with

the other distributors. Thereafter, he has discussed with the

other distributors also. He told the other distributors that said

Babu Rajendra Prasad would deal with this petitioner for

unlawful circulation of cigarettes. The said Babu Rajendra

Prasad demanded Rs.15 lakhs from each of the distributors but,

on negotiation, it was agreed for Rs.14 lakhs which becomes to

Rs.70 lakhs. The said Babu Rajendra Prasad told him to make

payment of first installment before 30th April and second

installment in the first week of May. Accordingly, he made the

payment of Rs.32.5 lakhs and Rs.30 lakhs to said Babu Rajendra

Prasad to make payment to this petitioner. The said Babu

Rajendra Prasad told him that in two installments, Rs.62.5 lakhs

was paid to this petitioner and an amount of Rs.5 lakhs was paid

to the concerned jurisdictional police.

4. That on 04.05.2020, the said Babu Rajendra Prasad

called him and told him to meet this petitioner in the CCB office.

Accordingly, he met him and this petitioner called Inspector Ajay

and Niranjan Kumar and instructed him to write the details of

the payment made and accordingly, as per the instructions of

Ajay, in the presence of this petitioner and Inspector Niranjan

Kumar, he gave the slip mentioning the payment of Rs.28.5

lakhs to Babu Rajendra Prasad and an amount of Rs.5 lakhs to

the station and Rs.2.5 lakhs to Bhushan.

5. That on 07.05.2020, the said Babu Rajendra Prasad

called him to come near to his house and at that time, this

petitioner and Inspectors Ajay and Niranjan Kumar were also

there. Thereafter, ITC company Manager Govindaraj also

arrived to his house. The said Babu Rajendra Prasad instructed

him and Govindaraj to accompany the police officers to go to

Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime-II and accordingly, all of

them went to Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime-II office and

he enquired them separately. They had shown red and black

mixed rexin bag and he identified the money and the said

amount was given to Bhushan earlier and he identifies and says

that said bag was given to Bhushan. The Deputy Commissioner

of Police, Crime-II told him that this petitioner handed over the

money telling that he had collected Rs.25 lakhs. Hence, case

has been registered against this petitioner and also other

accused.

6. In this petition, it is contended that a strange story

was concocted, claiming that certain moneys had been paid by

the said Adil Azeez to this petitioner and two other Inspectors of

Police in the CCB. In this background, it is emerged that the

Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime-II, who is one of the

heads of the second respondent, was issued with an order on

06.05.2020 by the Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime) to

enquire into certain allegations said to have been carried in

some daily newspaper. The Deputy Commissioner of Police,

Crime-II in the course of his enquiry, records the statement of

the third respondent, who is an accused in the crime registered

in K.R.Puram Police Station. On the basis of the statement, the

second respondent writes a letter to the Police Inspector,

Cottonpet Police Station dated 12.05.2020 annexing the

statement of third respondent, with a request to take

appropriate legal action. Based on the same, present Crime

No.64/2020 for the offence punishable under Section 384 read

with Section 34 of IPC has been registered.

7. It is contended that the police have registered the

case in Crime No.167/2020 and the same was under

investigation. Based on the statement of the third respondent,

FIR has been registered. The accused, who was subjected to

investigation, has given a statement as a counter blast to the

investigation process and to get away from the arm of law by

implicating the police officers, who are investigating the case. If

this were to be permitted, then every accused would make

allegations against the Investigating Officer and criminal process

will have to be set into motion against all of them. The

investigation having commenced on 30.04.2020 was in progress

and there was no need for the third respondent or any other

Superior Officer to interfere in the investigation. The entire

mode adopted is only to deviate from the original tract of

investigation by taking away the investigation from the

concerned officers, with the sole intention of maliciously

implicating the petitioner.

8. The other contention of the petitioner is that case

has been registered for the offence punishable under Section

384 of IPC and in order to constitute an office of extortion under

Section 384 of IPC, the necessary ingredients would be to

intentionally put any person in fear of any enquiry to that person

or to any other and dishonestly induce the person so put in fear

to deliver any property. In the absence of these fundamental

and necessary ingredients, the offence under Section 384 of IPC

cannot be made out. In the present case, a plain reading of the

statement do not indicate any ingredients of the offence under

Section 384 of IPC. Hence, the very registration of the case for

the offence punishable under Section 384 of IPC is bad in law.

9. The learned counsel for the petitioner would also

submit that the complaint and the FIR registered against this

petitioner suffer from malafides, is a gross abuse of process of

law, besides being illegal and without jurisdiction. The

allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their

face value and accepted in its entirety, do not prima facie

constitute any offence, much less the offence alleged against the

petitioner. The three complaints and FIRs registered against the

petitioner is virtually on the same cause of action. The manner

in which the complaints have been filed and registered and the

manner in which the petitioner was arrested and subjected to

detention leaves no doubt that the criminal proceedings are

manifest with malafides and the entire proceedings are

maliciously instituted with ulterior motives for wrecking

vengeance on the accused with a view to spite him due to the

grudge held against him by the complainants.

10. The counsel also would vehemently contend that it is

well settled position of law that in order to get jurisdiction under

Section 154 of Cr.P.C. , enabling the Police to register a FIR,

fundamental and mandatory requirement is that the complaint or

information available before the Officer-in-charge of Police

Station, must disclose the commission of a cognizable offence.

If no such material discloses any cognizable offence, FIR cannot

be registered and the criminal law cannot be set in motion. In

the case on hand, when the statement of the third respondent

does not disclose commission of an offence under Section 384 of

IPC, it is nothing but an abuse of process and no ingredients of

Section 384 of IPC which intentionally puts any person in fear of

any injury to that person or to any other and dishonestly induce

the person so put in fear to deliver any property. Nowhere in

the statement of the third respondent any ingredients of the

offence under Section 384 of IPC is made out and hence, it is

nothing but an abuse of process.

11. The counsel would vehemently contend that there is

a violation of provisions of Section 154 of Cr.P.C. and there is no

ingredients of offence under Section 384 of IPC and case has

been registered only at the instance of the Deputy

Commissioner, who directed the Police Officer to register the

case and case has been registered without any material and

hence, it requires interference of this Court.

12. The learned counsel for the petitioner in support of

his argument relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in

Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others

reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 wherein, the Apex Court in

paragraph Nos.37 to 39, 49, 57 to 67, 70 to 72, 93, 94 and 97

has categorically held that to invoke Section 154 of Cr.P.C., the

statement must disclose commission of a cognizable offence and

registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of Cr.P.C. if

the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and

no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation. The

Apex Court further held that this is a general rule and must be

strictly complied with.

13. The Apex Court has also discussed with regard to

Section 154 of Cr.P.C. in paragraph No.37 of the judgment that

information must disclose commission of a cognizable offence.

Chapter XII of the Cr.P.C. also sets out the procedure to be

followed during the investigation. The objective to be achieved

by the procedure prescribed in the said Chapter is to set the

criminal law in motion and to provide for all procedural

safeguards so as to ensure that the investigation is fair and is

not malafide and there is no scope of tampering with the

evidence collected during the course of investigation.

14. The counsel also brought to the notice of this Court

paragraph No.49 wherein, the scope of Section 154 (1) of

Cr.P.C. had been discussed using the word "shall". The counsel

also brought to the notice of this Court paragraph Nos.57 to 67

wherein it is observed that information received should be

entered in the dairy. The Apex Court also held that registration

of FIR is mandatory and also that it is to be recorded in the FIR

book by giving unique annual number to each FIR to enable

strict control and track over each and every registration of FIR

by the supervisory police officers.

15. The counsel also brought to the notice of this Court

paragraph No.93 of the judgment with regard to the significance

and compelling reasons for registration of FIR at the earlier point

of time and so also paragraph No.97. The counsel referring this

judgment would contend that when the complaint does not

disclose commissioner of any cognizable offence, the

respondent-Police ought not to have registered a case and no

preliminary inquiry is also necessary, since the complaint does

not disclose commission of cognizable offence and the same is

missing in the case on hand.

16. The learned counsel for the petitioner also relied

upon the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Haryana and

Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others reported in 1992 Supp (1)

SCC 335 and brought to the notice of this Court paragraph

No.23 of the judgment wherein, the Apex Court has observed

with regard to the contention of non-application of mind on the

part of the police officials. Further, in paragraph No.102 of the

said judgment, the Apex Court has held that while exercising the

extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers

under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and

reproduced in certain categories of cases by way of illustrations

held that such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse

of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice. The counsel referring the said seven illustrations would

vehemently contend that the present case is aptly applicable to

the case on hand wherein, an abuse of process of law has been

made.

17. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the

respondent No.3 vehemently contends that the Police have

rightly registered the case against the petitioner, who indulged

in extracting the money from him. The respondent No.3 has

also filed the statement of objections and along with the

statement of objections, certain documents are also enclosed

i.e., Annexures-R1 to R14. It is contended by the respondent

No.3 that the complaint is an information to the Investigating

Officer which sets the law into motion for an investigation. It is

not an encyclopedia and it cannot be expected that every minute

details of the offence is to be disclosed in the complaint. The

documents of copy of PF, panchanama, mahazar and report of

the Deputy Commissioner are annexed along with the objection

statement. It is contended that statement of Bhushan is very

clear that he took money and handed over the same to the

petitioner. While invoking Section 482 of Cr.P.C., the Court has

to take note of the fact whether the information disclose

commission of cognizable offence and if it does not disclose the

same, Section 482 of Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked.

18. The learned counsel for respondent No.3 in support

of her argument, relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in

Superintendent of Police, CBI and Others vs. Tapan Kumar

Singh reported in (2003) 6 SCC 175 wherein, the Apex Court

has held that, it is not necessary that FIR must disclose all facts

and details relating to the offence reported. What is required is

that the information given must disclose the commission of a

cognizable offence and must provide a basis for the police officer

to suspect the commission of such an offence. If it is so, the

police officer is bound to record the information and conduct an

investigation. Mentioning of all the ingredients of the offence in

the FIR, held, not essential where the facts stated in the General

Diary entry recorded on the basis of a telephonic information

were that the respondent was a corrupt official and was in the

habit of accepting illegal gratifications, that he had demanded

and accepted cash to the tune of rupees one lakh approximately,

and that he would be carrying with him the said amount while

going to a particular place by a particular mode on a particular

date, held, a cognizable offence under Section 13 of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was clearly made out. The

counsel referring this judgment would contend that the

statement made by respondent No.3 discloses commission of a

cognizable offence.

19. The State Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent

Nos.1 and 2-State in his argument vehemently contends that

Section 44 of IPC defines with regard to the 'injury' which

denotes any harm whatever illegally caused to any person, in

body, mind, reputation or property. Hence, the very contention

that it does not fulfils the ingredients of Section 383 of IPC

cannot be accepted and even the threat also attracts the offence

under Section 383 of IPC. He would also submit that an amount

of Rs.30 lakhs was recovered from the petitioner and hence, the

proceedings cannot be quashed against the petitioner herein.

20. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the

petitioner, learned State Public Prosecutor appearing for

respondent Nos.1 and 2 and also the learned counsel appearing

for respondent No.3, this Court has to consider the material

available on record, whether it is a fit case to exercise the

powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Before considering the

material placed on record, this Court would like to refer the FIR

which is produced at Annexure-C, wherein the offence invoked

against the petitioner is under Section 384 read with Section 34

of IPC.

21. Now, this Court would like to extract Sections 383

and 384 of IPC which reads as follows:

"383. Extortion.--Whoever intentionally puts any person in fear of any injury to that person, or to any other, and thereby dishonestly induces the

person so put in fear to deliver to any person any property or valuable security, or anything signed or sealed which may be converted into a valuable security, commits "extortion".

Illustrations

(a) A threatens to publish a defamatory libel concerning Z unless Z gives him money. He thus induces Z to give him money. A has committed extortion.

(b) A threatens Z that he will keep Z's child in wrongful confinement, unless Z will sign and deliver to A a promissory note binding Z to pay certain monies to A. Z signs and delivers the note. A has committed extortion.

(c) A threatens to send club-men to plough up Z's field unless Z will sign and deliver to B a bond binding Z under a penalty to deliver certain produce to B, and thereby induces Z to sign and deliver the bond. A has committed extortion.

(d) A, by putting Z in fear of grievous hurt, dishonestly induces Z to sign or affix his seal to a blank paper and deliver it to A. Z signs and delivers the paper to A. Here, as the paper so signed may be converted into a valuable security. A has committed extortion.

384. Punishment for extortion. --

Whoever commits extortion shall be punished with

imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both".

22. Having perused the ingredients of Section 383 and

penal provisions of Section 384 of IPC, the Court has to take

note of the fact whether registration of FIR is an abuse of

process and it leads to miscarriage of justice. In order to arrive

at such a conclusion, it is appropriate to consider the contents of

the statement of respondent No.3 which is at Annexure-A.

Having read the contents of Annexure-A-statement dated

07.05.2020, it is clear that the respondent No.3 had approached

one Babu Rajendra Prasad for selling cigarettes and other

groceries due to the lockdown imposed by the State since, his

100 employees were having no work. Having read the contents

of Annexure-A-statement in toto, it is clear that he had

approached the said Babu Rajendra Prasad. But, in the

statement, the name of this petitioner has been referred stating

that the said Babu Rajendra Prasad had spoken to this

petitioner. In turn, Babu Rajendra Prasad collected money from

the respondent No.3 and other distributors. In turn, the said

Babu Rajendra Prasad sent the amount to this petitioner through

one Bhushan. It also discloses that respondent No.3 came to

know that money has been handed over to this petitioner

through Bhushan and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime-

II has revealed that this petitioner handed over the money to

him.

23. Having considered the statement of respondent

No.3, it is very clear that he had collected money from other

distributors and paid the same to said Babu Rajendra Prasad,

Bhushan and also to the local police station which is reflected in

para No.4 of the statement. It is not his case that he paid the

money to this petitioner and it is also important to note that,

nowhere in his statement, he has stated that this petitioner had

put him in fear to depart money, except stating that he went

along with Bhushan and spoken to him and no any statement

that this petitioner threatened him or put him in fear. The

statement also does not disclose that money has been directly

handed over to this petitioner. But, only he comes to know

through the Deputy Commissioner that amount was recovered

from the petitioner herein. It is also important to note that only

name of this petitioner has been referred and there is no

demand and acceptance by this petitioner and the demand is

made by Babu Rajendra Prasad. No doubt, the respondent No.3

has placed some of the documents along with the statement of

objections at Exs.R1 to R14 and contends that money has been

handed over to the petitioner, none of the documents reflect that

this petitioner had received the money. However, the document

at Annexure-R3 discloses that an amount of Rs.25 lakhs and

Rs.5 lakhs was produced at the instance of one Sri Anjan Kumar,

Police Inspector, CCB on 30.05.2020 in the presence of panchas

and the same is subjected to P.F.No.49/2020 and not from the

petitioner herein.

24. Though in the document at Annexure-R5 it is

mentioned that this petitioner has handed over the money to the

tune of Rs.5 lakhs on 09.05.2020 in the office of the Deputy

Commissioner of Police, Crime-II, the said document states

otherwise that the amount has been seized in the presence of

panch witness and not from the petitioner herein and only

seizure mahazar was drawn in the presence of panchas and so

also in the document at Annexure-R7, it is stated that an

amount of Rs.25 lakhs was produced by this petitioner and the

same was seized in the presence of panch witness and none of

the documents contains the signature of the petitioner herein.

Further, there is no material on record to show that recovery has

been made at the instance of this petitioner. However, it is the

case of the learned State Public Prosecutor for the respondent

Nos.1 and 2 that an amount of Rs.30 lakhs and Rs.32.5 lakhs

was handed over on two different dates. But recoveries are

made on different dates.

25. Having considered all these material available on

record, no doubt the principles laid down referred by the

respondent No.3 is clear that, in order to register a case,

information should disclose cognizable offence, but, in the case

on hand, I have already pointed out that nowhere in the

statement at Annexure-A, an allegation is made against this

petitioner that he demanded and accepted money or caused any

threat to the complainant. The demand and acceptance is by

the other persons i.e., Babu Rajendra Prasad and the recovery is

also not at the instance of this petitioner, except preparing the

document of seizure mahazar in the presence of panchas and the

document does not disclose the presence of the petitioner while

making alleged recovery at the instance of the petitioner. The

photos relied upon also does not disclose that petitioner carried

the money. It is strange that the petitioner being the Police

Officer carried the amount and produced in the office of Deputy

Commissioner of Police, Crime-II, that too after ten days after

the alleged receipt.

26. Having considered the material on record, it is a fit

case to exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and the

same comes within the purview of the illustrations as

enumerated in paragraph No.102 of the judgment in Bhajan

Lal's case (supra) which reads as hereunder:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they

are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where

the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge".

27. Having read the illustrations extracted by the Apex

Court in the judgment of the Bhajan Lal's case (supra) in

paragraph No.102, it is clear that the Apex Court, in the

backdrop of interpretation of relevant provisions of the Code

under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this

Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the

extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers

under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and

reproduced above has given the categories of cases by way of

illustration wherein the Court can exercise such power to prevent

abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of

justice held that, though it may not be possible to lay down any

precise clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of

myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

28. The first illustration of the Apex Court in Bhajan

Lal's case (supra) is aptly applicable to the case on hand, where

the allegations made in the first information report or the

complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and

accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any

offence or make out a case against the petitioner. I have

already pointed out that, none of the ingredients under Section

384 of IPC are present in the statement of respondent No.3

which is at Annexure-A to the petition.

29. The second illustrative circumstance is also aptly

applicable to the case on hand, where the allegations in the first

information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the

FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an

investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code

except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code amounts to an abuse of process.

30. The fourth illustration of the Apex Court is that,

where the allegation in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable

offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no

investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of

a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

The other circumstance is that, where the allegations made in

the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on

the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just

conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against

the accused which amounts to an abuse of process.

31. In the case on hand, I have already pointed out that

the allegations made in the statement of respondent No.3 does

not constitute the offence under Section 384 of IPC and not

comes within the definition of Section 383 of IPC since, no such

fear as enumerated under Section 383 of IPC is created in the

mind of respondent No.3 and nowhere in his statement, he has

stated that this petitioner has put him in fear and collected

money but, only reference was made to his name that he met

him. It is also not his case that he demanded and accepted the

money or put him under any threat. Hence, the question of

invoking offence under Section 384 of IPC for extortion does not

arise. Hence, it is clear that criminal proceedings are manifest

with malafides and the entire proceedings are maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motives for wrecking vengeance on the

accused with a view to spite him due to the personal and private

grudge.

32. It is also important to note that, it is the case of the

learned State Public Prosecutor appearing for the State that

investigation has been started based on the newspaper report

and the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime-II conducted an

internal enquiry and recorded the statement of respondent No.3.

On perusal of the statement of respondent No.3 also, it does not

disclose commission of offence under Section 384 of IPC. The

learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.3 also relied

upon the statement of Bhushan. But, in order to prove the fact

that the amount was recovered from this petitioner also, no

material, except the documents of seizure mahazar and

panchanama.

33. I have already pointed out that the respondent No.3

states that he came to know through the Deputy Commissioner

of Police, Crime-II that money has been recovered by the

petitioner and this petitioner is not a witness to the recovery of

the said amount. Hence, it is clear that, as contended, a case

has been registered at the instance of the Deputy Commissioner

of Police, Crime-II, since a direction was given to the Inspector

to take legal action, based on the statement of respondent No.3.

As already pointed out, the statement of respondent No.3 does

not disclose commission of any cognizable offence and none of

the ingredients of offence under Section 384 of IPC. No doubt,

the offence under Section 384 of IPC is a cognizable and non-

bailable offence, but the statement does not disclose commission

of cognizable offence. Hence, the judgment relied upon by the

learned counsel appearing for the third respondent will not come

to the aid of third respondent.

34. Having considered the material on record,

registration of FIR is nothing but a malicious prosecution against

this petitioner with an ulterior motive to wreck vengeance

against the accused with a view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge. It is nothing but an infight between the

officers of the department and due to vengeance, the criminal

prosecution is instituted which is a serious matter.

35. This Court also would like to refer the judgment of

the Apex Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and

others reported in (1977) 2 SCC 699. The Apex Court while

exercising the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. held that in

exercise of wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash

the proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the

proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the

Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding

ought to be quashed. It is also observed that, while exercising

the jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C, consideration

justifying the exercise of inherent powers for securing the ends

of justice naturally vary from case to case and a jurisdiction as

wholesome as the one conferred by Section 482 ought not to be

encased within the straight jacket of a rigid formula and the

Court has to consider whether the material wants prosecution of

a person.

36. This Court would also like to refer the judgment of

the Apex Court in Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel vs. State of

Gujarat and Others reported in (2018) 3 SCC 104 wherein, it

is held that the Court can exercise the powers under Section 482

of Cr.P.C. after examining the question involved in the matter

and the contents of the complaint/FIR has to be looked into. If

the Court finds that FIR does not disclose prima facie

commission of any cognizable offence, then the Court can invoke

Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings which otherwise

amounts to abuse of process and leads to miscarriage of justice.

If complaint discloses commission of cognizable offence, then

only the Investigating Officer can unearth the crime. In the case

on hand, complaint does not disclose commission of cognizable

offence.

37. Having considered the principles laid down in the

judgments referred supra, it is very clear that the Court can

exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. wherein the

complaint does not disclose committing of any cognizable

offence and the same is filed with an ulterior motive for wrecking

vengeance against the accused with a view to spite him due to

private and personal grudge, the Court can exercise the powers

under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. In the case on hand, not only one

case has been registered against this petitioner, in all, six cases

have been registered invoking other penal provisions at the

instance of the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Crime-II. When

criminal proceedings are manifest with malafides and has been

initiated maliciously with an ulterior motives for wrecking

vengeance with a view to spite him due to the personal and

private grudge, it is the duty cast upon the Court to prevent the

abuse of process which leads to miscarriage of justice. Hence, it

is appropriate to invoke Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It is also

pertinent to note that law cannot be set in motion as a matter of

course and the Court has to carefully scrutinize the material on

record.

38. I have already pointed out that the none of the

ingredients of the offence under Section 383 of IPC has been

made out in the statement of respondent No.3 and therefore,

the question of proceeding against the petitioner for the offence

under Section 384 of IPC is nothing but an abuse of process

which leads to miscarriage of justice. Hence, it is appropriate to

exercise the powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. to quash the

proceedings.

39. In view of the discussions made above, I proceed to

pass the following:

ORDER

(i) The criminal petition is allowed.

(ii) The impugned FIR registered against the petitioner herein in Crime No.64/2020 dated 12.05.2020 for the offence punishable under

Section 384 read with Section 34 of IPC on the file of 31st Additional CMM Court, Nrupathunga Road, Bengaluru City is hereby quashed.

Sd/-

JUDGE

ST