Union Of India vs Mr. Prahlad Jangannavar,
2021 Latest Caselaw 2567 Kant

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     IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

         DATED THIS THE 2ND DAY OF JULY 2021

                         PRESENT

         THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE

                           AND

 THE HON'BLE MR.JUSTICE HEMANT CHANDANGOUDAR

              W.A. NO.1401 OF 2014 (S-DE)
                          IN
               W.P. No.4874/2010 (S-DE)

BETWEEN:

1.    UNION OF INDIA
      MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS
      NEW DELHI-110 001
      REPRESENTED BY ITS SECRETARY.

2.    COMMANDANT
      109 BN, CRPF, SPUN SILK MILL
      JAGI ROAD, MORI GOAN DISTRICT
      ASSAM-782 410.

3.    DEPUTY COMMANDANT
      AND ENQUIRING OFFICER
      109 BN, CRPF, SPUN SILK MILL
      JAGI ROAD, MORI GOAN DISTRICT
      ASSAM-782 410.

4.    DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
      CRPF, YELAHANKA BANGALORE-560 064.

5.    INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE
      CRPF, HYDERABAD-500 033.
                                           ... APPELLANTS
(BY MR. RAJASHEKAR, CGC FOR A1-A5)
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AND:

MR. PRAHLAD JANGANNAVAR
NO.903023564
S/O SHIVAPPA JAGANNAVAR
AGED ABOUT 39 YEARS
HQ/109 BN, CONSTABLE
CRPF, YELAHANKA
BANGALORE-560 064.
                                       ... RESPONDENT
(BY MR. H. MALATESH, ADV.,)
                              ---

     THIS W.A. IS FILED UNDER SECTION 4 OF THE KARNATAKA
HIGH COURT ACT, PRAYING TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER PASSED IN
THE WRIT PETITION 4874/2010 DATED 29.07.2013.

     THIS W.A. COMING ON FOR FINAL HEARING, THIS DAY,
ALOK ARADHE J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:

                       JUDGMENT

In this intra Court appeal filed under Section 4 of

the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961, the appellants have

assailed the validity of the order dated 29.07.2013

passed by the learned Single Judge, by which writ

petition preferred by the respondent, in which challenge

was made to the order of dismissal of service of

respondent has been disposed of and punishment of

dismissal from service is modified as 'compulsory

retirement'.

2. Facts leading to filing of this appeal briefly

stated are that respondent joined as a constable in

Central Reserve Police Force on 05.12.1999. At the

relevant time, respondent was serving as a constable

and was posted in Morigaon District, Assam. A

departmental enquiry was conducted against respondent

No.1 in respect of the following charges of misconduct:

Article-I - That the said NO.903023564 CT/GD P.Jagannavar of F/109 Bn CRPF presently attached with Hqr Jagi Road Distt. Marigaon while functioning as CT/GD has committed an act of misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force under Section 11 (1) of CRPF Act 1949 in that he went out of Hqr/109 Bn Camp Jagiroad on 19.05.2007 at 2030 hrs without permission of competent authority, which is prejudicial to the good order and discipline of the Force.

Article-II - That the said No.903023564 CT/GD P. Jagannavar of F/109 Bn CRPF presently attached with Hqr Jagi

Road Distt. Marigaon while functioning as CT/GD has committed an act of misconduct in his capacity as a member of the Force under Section 11(1) of CRPF Act 1949 in that he entered into the house of Miss Moni Devi, D/o Late Balu Chakraborty at about 2200 hrs on 19.05.2007 and tried to outrage her modesty, which is prejudicial to good order and discipline of the Force.

3. Thereafter, a departmental enquiry was

conducted against respondent No.1. In the aforesaid

departmental enquiry, the victim was examined in

presence of respondent No.1. However, respondent No.1

neither cross-examined her nor examined himself. The

respondent No.1 did not adduce any evidence before the

enquiry officer. During the course of enquiry, the

respondent No.1 admitted the first charge leveled

against him. The enquiring authority on the basis of the

material available on record submitted the enquiry

report. The disciplinary authority by an order dated

28.09.2007 after agreeing with the finding of the

enquiry officer held that respondent is guilty of

misconduct and that the Article of charges to be proved

as against the respondent No.1 . Accordingly, penalty of

dismissal from service was imposed on the respondent.

The respondent preferred an appeal before the Deputy

Inspector General of Police who by an order dated

13.03.2008 dismissed the appeal preferred by the

respondent. The respondent thereafter filed a

representation before the Inspector General of Police

who by an order dated 16.01.2009 affirmed the order

passed by the appellate authority. The respondent

thereupon challenged the aforesaid orders in a writ

petition before the learned Single Judge. The learned

Single Judge by an order dated 29.01.2013 inter alia

held that no First Information Report was filed against

the respondent. It was further held that from perusal of

the statement of the complainant, it is evident that she

was alone at the time of incident and therefore, the

possibility cannot be ruled out that second charge has

been leveled against the respondent for different

reasons. It was also held that the punishment of

dismissal from service is disproportionate to the gravity

of charges. Accordingly, the order of dismissal was

modified and was substituted with penalty of compulsory

retirement as a measure of punishment. In the aforesaid

factual background, this appeal has been filed.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted

that the learned Single Judge grossly erred in modifying

the penalty imposed on the appellant. It is further

submitted that ought to have appreciated that

respondent had admitted the first charge and the

disciplinary proceedings was conducted against the

respondent in accordance with law, in which he was

given opportunity to putforth his case. It is further

submitted that the finding recorded by the learned

Single Judge that the complaint has been made against

the respondent for different reasons is perverse. On the

other hand, learned counsel for the respondent has

supported the order passed by the learned Single Judge

and has submitted that the learned Single Judge has

taken a pragmatic view of the whole issue and the order

passed by the learned Single Judge does not call for any

interference.

5. We have considered the submissions made

by learned counsel for the parties and have perused

the record. Before proceeding further, we may refer to

the well settled principles with regard to scope of judicial

review of interference with the disciplinary proceeding.

In 'STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH ORS. VS. S.SREE

RAMA RAO', AIR 1963 SC 1723 it was held that high

court in a proceeding under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India does not sit as a court of appeal

over the decision of the authorities holding a

departmental enquiry. It is only concerned to determine

whether the enquiry held by an authority competent in

that behalf and according to the procedure prescribed in

that behalf and whether the rules of natural justice have

been followed. It has also been held that where there is

some evidence which the authority entrusted with the

duty of holding an enquiry has accepted and which may

support the conclusion. It is not the function of the high

court to review the evidence and to arrive at an

independent finding on the evidence. Similar view was

reiterated in 'B.C.CHATURVEDI VS. UNION OF INDIA

AND ORS.', (1995) 6 SCC 749. In 'HIGH COURT OF

JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY THROUGH ITS

REGISTRAR VS. SHASHIKANTH S. PATIL AND

ANOTHER', (2000) 1 SCC 416, it was held that

interference with the decision of the departmental

authorities is permitted if such authority has held the

proceedings in violation of the principles of natural

justice or in violation of statutory regulations providing

the mode of departmental enquiry. [Also See: PRAVIN

KUMAR VS. UNION OF INDIA, (2020) 9 SCC 471].

6. In 'STATE BANK OF BIKANER AND

JAIPUR VS. NEMICHAND NALWAYA', (2011) 4 SCC

584, it has been held that no interference shall be made

in a disciplinary proceeding on the ground that another

view is possible on the basis of material on record. If the

enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the

findings are based on evidence, the question of

adequacy of evidence and reliable nature of evidence

will not be a ground for interfering with the findings. In

'STATE OF BIHAR VS. PHULPARI', (2020) 2 SCC

130, it has been held that standard of proof in the

criminal proceeding and the departmental enquiry is

different. In criminal case, the standard of proof is

beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in the departmental

enquiry the charges have to be proved on the basis of

preponderance of probabilities.

7. It is equally well settled in legal proposition

that the question of choice of quantum of punishment is

within the jurisdiction and discretion of the disciplinary

authority. The court can while undertaking the judicial

review of the matter is not supposed to substitute its

own opinion on reappraisal of facts. In exercise of

power of judicial review, the court can interfere with the

punishment imposed when it is found to be totally

irrational or is outrageous in defiance of logic. This

limited scope of judicial review is permissible and

interference is available only when the punishment is

shockingly disproportionate, suggesting lack of good

faith. Otherwise, merely because in the opinion of the

court lesser punishment would have been more

appropriate, cannot be a ground to interfere with the

discretion of the departmental authorities. [See:

'DADRA & NAGAR HAVELI VS. GULABHIA M. LAD',

(2010) 5 SCC 775, 'CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,

KRISHNA DISTRICT COOPERATIVE CENTRAL BANK

LTD. AND ORS. VS. K.HANUMANTHA RAO AND

ORS.', (2017) 2 SCC 528].

8. In the backdrop of aforesaid well settled

principles, the facts of the case in hand may be

examined. Admittedly, the departmental enquiry has

been held in accordance with law and in accordance with

the procedure prescribed in the Rules. It is not the case

of the respondent that he has not been heard. Therefore

the departmental enquiry has been conducted against

him in infraction of statutory procedure. The respondent

was given an ample opportunity of being heard in the

departmental enquiry. The victim's statement was

recorded in the departmental enquiry on 08.09.2007

and in the presence of the respondent and respondent

was given ample opportunity to cross-examine her. But

the respondent failed to cross-examine her. It is also

pertinent to note that the respondent even did not

examine himself in the departmental enquiry before the

enquiry officer. The respondent did not adduce any

evidence in support of his defence that he has been

falsely implicated. The findings have been recorded by

the enquiry officer on the basis of meticulous

appreciation of evidence adduced before it. The

aforesaid findings have been affirmed by the disciplinary

authority as well as by the appellate and revisional

authority. The aforesaid findings of fact have not been

demonstrated to be perverse. Therefore, this court in

exercise of powers of judicial review cannot sit in appeal

over the finding recorded in the disciplinary proceedings

and arrive at a conclusion in respect of the punishment

when no evidence has been adduced by respondent

No.1. Therefore, the finding recorded by the learned

Single Judge that possibility cannot be ruled out that

allegation against the respondent have been made for

different reasons is perverse and cannot be sustained in

the eye of law. The CRPF is an armed force wherein

discipline is the utmost criteria. The question of

quantum of punishment is well within the jurisdiction of

the disciplinary authority and the same cannot be said to

be disproportionate merely because according to the

learned Single Judge a lesser punishment could have

been imposed.

In view of preceding analysis, the order passed by

the learned Single Judge cannot be sustained in the eye

of law. It is accordingly quashed. In the result, the

appeal is allowed.

Sd/-

JUDGE

Sd/-

JUDGE

SS