Smt Pramila Mehra vs Yogesh Kapoor
2021 Latest Caselaw 4 Kant

                                      Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011
                            1




     IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

        DATED THIS THE 4TH DAY OF JANUARY 2021

                         BEFORE

         THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE K.S.MUDAGAL

     CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION No.1076/2011

BETWEEN:

SMT. PRAMILA MEHRA
W/O. SRI PRAMOD MEHRA
AGED ABOUT 61 YEARS
R/AT NO.124, X CROSS
INDIRANAGAR, I STAGE
BENGALURU-560 038                          ...PETITIONER

(BY SRI M.M.ASHOKA, ADVOCATE)

AND:

1.     YOGESH KAPOOR
       S/O. SRI RAM MURTHY KAPOOR
       AGED ABOUT 45 YEARS

2.     VIKRANT KAPOOR
       S/O. SRI RAM MURTHY KAPOOR
       AGED ABOUT 42 YEARS

       R1 & R2 ARE R/AT
       NO.212/56, AJNAL ROAD
       JULHAR SINGH AVENUE
       GALLI NO.-4, OPP. GURUDWAR
       GUMTALA LINK ROAD
       AMRITSAR, PUNJAB-143 001

3.     STATE OF KARNATAKA
       REP. BY INSPECTOR OF POLICE
       INDIRANAGAR POLICE STATION
       BENGALURU-560 038               ...RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI C.R.ABDUL RASHEED, ADVOCATE FOR R1 & R2;
    SRI H.R.SHOWRI, HCGP FOR R3)
                                             Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011
                               2




      THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION IS FILED UNDER
SECTION 397(1) READ WITH SECTION 401 OF CR.P.C PRAYING
TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 26.09.2011 PASSED BY III
ADDITIONAL CHIEF METROPOLITAN MAGISTRATE, BENGALURU
IN C.C.NO.8275/2001.

     THIS CRIMINAL REVISION PETITION HAVING BEEN
HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 10TH DAY OF
DECEMBER 2020, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT OF
ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:

                               ORDER

Aggrieved by the order of III Additional Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru in C.C.No.8275/2001

discharging accused Nos.1 and 3 from taking up trial, the

petitioner has preferred the above revision petition.

2. The petitioner was the complainant and

respondent Nos.1 and 2 were accused Nos.1 and 3 in

C.C.No.8275/2001 on the file of III Additional Chief

Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru. For the purpose of

convenience, the parties will be referred to henceforth with

their ranks before the trial Court.

3. The complainant is the sister of accused Nos.1,

3 and accused No.2 Vikas Kapoor. They inherited a house

named Ranjitha Avenue situated in Amritsar, Punjab from

their parents. On 20.09.1997, the complainant executed Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

registered General Power of Attorney in Bengaluru in

favour of accused Nos.1 to 3 to manage, develop and

alienate the said property. Accused sold the said property

to one Madhusharma under the registered sale deed dated

29.10.1997. The sale consideration quoted in the sale deed

was Rs.3,00,000/-.

4. The complainant filed complaint under Section

200 of Cr.P.C. in PCR No.156/2000 before the trial Court

against the accused alleging that on obtaining General

Power of Attorney without her knowledge and consent they

sold the property for consideration of Rs.36,00,000/-. She

further alleged that the accused suppressed the said fact

of sale with the dishonest intention to deprive her share in

the said property. She claimed that on learning about the

same, she issued notice dated 25.11.1999 demanding her

share of Rs.9,00,000/- (1/4th share) which was not

complied, thereby the accused have committed the

offences punishable under Section 403 and 120 of IPC.

5. The trial Court acting under Section 156(3) of

Cr.P.C. referred the said complaint to Indiranagar police

for investigation. The said police on investigation Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

submitted 'B' report to the Court stating that the matter is

in the nature of civil dispute. The complainant filed protest

petition to the 'B' report. The trial Court on recording the

sworn statement of the complainant and on hearing the

complainant, by order dated 10.09.2001 took cognizance

for the offence punishable under Section 403 of IPC,

registered the case in C.C.No.8275/2001 and summoned

accused Nos.1 to 3.

6. Pending the complaint, accused No.2 Vikas

Kapoor died. Therefore, the case against him was abated.

Since the case was registered otherwise than on the police

report, on appearance of the accused, the trial Court

posted the matter to hear before charge and recorded the

evidence under Section 244 of Cr.P.C. On hearing the

parties, the trial Court by order dated 13.10.2008 accepted

the 'B' report exercising the power under Section 203 of

Cr.P.C. and dismissed the complaint.

7. The complainant challenged the said order in

Crl.R.P.No.561/2008 before the Presiding Officer, Fast

Track Court-VI, Bengaluru City. The Sessions Court by

order dated 17.12.2009 allowed the revision petition and Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

set aside the order of the trial Court dated 13.10.2008 on

the ground that after taking cognizance of offences, the

trial Court cannot dismiss the complaint under Section 203

of Cr.P.C. The Sessions Court remanded the matter to the

trial Court to proceed in accordance with law.

8. After such remand, the complainant adopted the

evidence led by her prior the order dated 13.10.2008. At

that stage, accused filed application under Section 245 of

Cr.P.C. seeking discharge on the ground that the dispute is

civil in nature and only the Court at Amritsar have the

jurisdiction to try the case. The complainant filed

objections to the said application.

9. The trial Court on hearing the parties by the

impugned order dated 26.09.2011 allowed the application

and discharged the accused on the following grounds:

(i) The General Power of Attorney relied on by the

complainant does not contain clause regarding sharing of

the sale proceeds and does not state that the complainant

has share in the sale proceeds of the property. Therefore, Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

case of entrustment attracting Sections 403 and 405 of IPC

are not made out;

(ii) Since the accused disputed the complainant's

1/4th share in the sale proceeds, she has to get her share

declared by filing the suit before the Civil Court;

(iii) The complainant has not produced any record to

show that she has 1/4th share in the sale proceeds and the

dispute is civil in nature;

(iv) The complainant claims that the property was

sold for Rs.36,00,000/-. The copy of the sale deed

produced by her itself says that property was sold only for

Rs.3,00,000/-.

(v) Ex.P6 the report of the Government Valuer

shows that the structure was valued at Rs.21,57,670/- and

not at Rs.36,00,000/- and it was not her case that the

property was undervalued to deprive her share;

(vi) There is unexplained delay of two years in

demanding her share.

(vii) There was variation in the sale consideration

mentioned in the sale deed and the complaint;

Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

(ix) In coming to such conclusion, the trial Court

relied on the following judgments:

         (a)     Bal Kishan Das vs. P.C.Nayar1

         (b)    M/s.LMJ International Ltd. Rep. By its Director
                & Ors. vs. State of Karnataka & Ors2.

         (c)    M/s REPLE Ltd. & Ors. vs. ICDS Ltd Rep. By its
                G.P.A. Holder & DGM, Manipal & Anr3

10. Sri M.M.Ashoka, learned Counsel for the

complainant/petitioner seeks to assail the impugned order

on the following grounds:

(i) The trial Court can discharge the accused under

Section 245 of Cr.P.C. only if no case is made out against

the accused;

(ii) The evidence of PWs.1 and 2 and Ex.P1 General

Power of Attorney, Ex.P2 Sale deed, Exs.P4 and P5 notice

and reply, Ex.P6 valuation report were not controverted;

(iii) In Ex.P1 general power of attorney there is

mention that the complainant has share and the same is

referred to in Ex.P2 sale deed also;

AIR 1991 SC 1531

ILR 2007 KAR 3665

ILR 2008 KAR 3541 Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

(iv) There is nothing on record to show that accused

had paid any share in the sale consideration either in

Rs.3,00,000/- or Rs.36,00,000/-. Thereby there was

criminal breach of trust and misappropriation.

(v) Under Ex.P6 the report of the Government

Valuer, only the structure was valued and the value of the

land under that was not valued. Therefore, it was too early

for the learned Magistrate to hold that the value of the

property is below Rs.36,00,000/-.

(vi) The material on record clearly showed that

there was case to go for trial. Therefore, the order of the

trial Court in discharging the accused is perverse;

(vii) When an act of a person amounts to offence

under the criminal law as well as breach of civil right of the

party, the aggrieved party shall not be compelled seek the

remedy before the civil court only. The complainant had

option to proceed under the criminal law also;

(viii) The complaint was not barred by time;

(ix) Having regard to Section 181 of Cr.P.C., the

trial Court did have the jurisdiction to try the case.

Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

11. In support of his contention, learned Counsel

for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments:

(i) State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nahata4

12. Per contra, Sri C.R.Abdul Rasheed, learned

Counsel for respondent Nos.1 and 2/accused seeks to

justify the impugned order on the following grounds:

(i) There was unexplained delay in issuing notice

and filing the complaint;

(ii) The material on record and the evidence

adduced by the complainant itself show that there was no

ground to proceed against the accused;

(iii) If the complainant has any share in the

property, her remedy was to file the civil suit and she

cannot turn such dispute into a criminal case;

(iv) Since the accused were residing at Amritsar

and the sale deed was effected in Amritsar, the trial Court

was justified in holding that it has no jurisdiction;

(v) As rightly held by the trial Court, the sale was

only for Rs.3,00,000/-. The recitals in the sale deed to that

AIR 2005 SC 3401 Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

effect was contrary to the allegations of the complaint and

it was sufficient to discharge the accused; &

(vi) At the stage of consideration of the application

under Section 245 of Cr.P.C., the trial Court was not

expected to hold a mini trial;

(vii) This Court cannot in the revisional jurisdiction

re-appreciate the evidence and reverse the order of the

trial Court.

13. In support of his contentions, he relies upon

the following judgments:

(i) G.Hanumaiah v. The State of Karnataka5

(ii) S.A.Kumar & Ors. Vs. State and Ors.6

(iii) State of Maharashtra vs. Jagmohan Singh Kuldip Singh Anand & ors.7

(iv) B.Radhakrishnan Nair vs. State of Kerala8

(v) V.Y.Jose v. State of Gujarat9

(vi) Pepsi Foods Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Special Judicial Magistrate & Ors.10

Crl.R.P.No.906/2011 (DD 23.10.2020)

Crl.O.P.No.24291/2017 C/w Crl.M.P.No.14034/2017 (DD 30.11.2020)

AIR 2004 SC 4412

Crl.R.P.No.611/2013 DD 20.08.2013

(2009) 3 SCC 78

MANU/SC/1090/1998 Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

14. Having regard to the rival contentions of the

parties, the point that arises for consideration of this Court

is "In discharging the accused whether the trial

Court exercised its power in accordance with Section

245 of Cr.P.C.?".

15. The impugned order of discharge is passed

purportedly exercising the power under Section 245(1) of

Cr.P.C. which reads as follows:

"245. When accused shall be discharged.- (1) If, upon taking all the evidence referred to in section 244, the Magistrate considers, for reasons to be recorded, that no case against the accused has been made out which, if unrebutted, would warrant his

conviction, the Magistrate shall discharge him."

16. In the light of the above provisions, this Court

has to examine whether unrebutted material/evidence

placed by the complainant was sufficient to draw the

inference of conviction of the accused.

Reg. The complainant making out case against the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 403 and 120B of IPC:

17. The trial Court has taken cognizance for the

offence punishable under Section 403 of IPC. The Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

complainant sought prosecution of the accused for the

offences punishable under Sections 403 and 120B of IPC.

In the complaint, she also narrated that the accused while

acting as her agent under General Power of Attorney

executed by her, without her knowledge sold the property

and misappropriated the funds, her such allegations

attracts Section 409 of IPC also.

18. Sections 403 and 409 of IPC read as follows:

"403. Dishonest misappropriation of property.-- Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any movable property, shall be punished

with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.

409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent.--Whoever, being in

any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public

servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine."

Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

19. Section 120B of IPC deals with punishment for

the criminal conspiracy as defined under Section 120A of

IPC. Sections 120A and 120B of IPC read as follows:

"120A. Definition of criminal conspiracy When two or more persons agree to do, or cause to be done. --

(1) an illegal act; or (2) an act which is not illegal by illegal means, such an agreement is designated a criminal conspiracy:

PROVIDED that no agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such agreement in pursuance thereof.

Explanation: It is immaterial whether the illegal act is the ultimate object of such agreement, or is merely incidental to that object.

120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy. (1) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall, where no express provision is made in this Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.

(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punishable with Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

imprisonment of either description for a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both."

20. To show that there was material to proceed

against the accused for trial of the aforesaid offences, the

complainant relied on the evidence of herself (PW.1) and

her husband (PW.2) recorded under Section 244 of Cr.P.C.

and Exs.P1 to P6. Those were all admitted documents.

21. Admittedly, the complainant and the accused

inherited the house property named as Ranjith Avenue

situated at Amritsar from their parents. In the General

Power of Attorney Ex.P1 as well as in Ex.P2 the sale deed

dated 29.10.1997 there is mention of the complainant

having share in the property.

22. The fact of execution of the General Power of

Attorney Ex.P1 to enable the accused to sell the property

itself shows that she had interest in the property. The

General Power of Attorney Ex.P1 was executed on

20.09.1997. The property was sold on 29.10.1997. The

complainant in Ex.P4 her notice dated 25.11.1999 alleged

that during her visit to Amritsar she came to know that the Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

accused have sold the property, suppressed that fact and

have not given her share in the sale proceeds, thereby

they have cheated her.

23. In Ex.P5 the reply to the notice Ex.P4, the

accused disputed only the quantum of sale consideration.

They claimed that property was sold for Rs.3,00,000/-

only. In the reply they very evasively denied the

complainant's share, either in Rs.36,00,000/- or in any

amount.

24. The complainant relying on Exs.P1 to P6 and

her deposition states that by selling the property without

her knowledge and utilizing the sale proceeds for

themselves without giving her share, the accused have

committed criminal breach of trust and misappropriation.

25. The other defence of the accused in their

application under Section 245 of Cr.P.C. was that after the

death of their father, they took care of the complainant

and spent huge, countless money on her and to

reciprocate the same, the complainant voluntarily executed Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

General Power of Attorney Ex.P1 in their favour to deal

with the property as they deemed fit.

26. The evidence of PWs.1 and 2 was not even

rebutted by cross-examination. The unrebutted evidence

showed that the complainant had share/interest in the

property sold and such sale was on the basis of General

Power of Attorney. Whether the accused gave her share of

money to her or the General Power of Attorney executed

was in consideration for the amount already allegedly

spent by them on her were the matter of defence of the

accused in trial. As rightly argued by learned Counsel for

the accused at that stage the trial Court was not expected

to put itself in the armchair of adversary and hold mini

trial.

27. In Basant Nahata's case referred to supra

relied upon by learned Counsel for the petitioner, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court held that the power of attorney is

executed to enable the agent to act on his behalf and the

agent cannot use the General Power of Attorney for his

own benefit. It was further held that the Power of Attorney

Holder acts in a fiduciary capacity and an act of infidelity Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

against the interest of the principal/executants of the

power of attorney amounts to breach of trust.

28. Perusal of the unrebutted evidence of PWs.1

and 2 and Exs.P1 to P6 show that the trial Court acted in a

perverse manner, contrary to Section 245 of Cr.P.C. and

judgment in Basant Nahata's case in holding that no case

against the accused was made out.

Reg.Limitation:

29. The trial Court discharged the accused on the

ground that there was unexplained delay of two years from

the date of sale in issuing notice and filing the complaint,

thereby the trial Court impliedly says that the complaint

was time barred.

30. The law that deals with limitation in taking

cognizance for the offences under the Indian Penal Code is

Section 468 of Cr.P.C. which reads as follows:

"468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.-(1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation.

Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

(2) The period of limitation shall be-

(a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only;

(b) One year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year;

(c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, but not exceeding three years.

(3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment."

31. Section 469 of Cr.P.C. deals with

commencement of the period of limitation. For the purpose

of this case, Section 469(1)(b) is relevant which reads as

follows:

"469. Commencement of the period of limitation.-(1) The period of limitation, in relation to

an offender, shall commence,-

(b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to

any police officer, whichever is earlier; or"

Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

32. In the case on hand, the sale deed was

executed on 29.10.1997. The complaint was lodged on

12.05.2000 that was after two years six months. The

offence under Section 403 of IPC is punishable with

imprisonment upto two years. The allegations were that

the accused being entrusted with her share of property as

the General Power of Attorney holders dishonestly

misappropriated her share of consideration, thereby

committed criminal breach of trust.

33. The said allegations of breach of trust by

attorney/agent attract the offence under Section 409 of

IPC which is punishable with imprisonment for life or

imprisonment up to ten years. Under section 468(1)(c) of

Cr.P.C. no time limitation is prescribed for the said offence.

34. Even for the offence under Section 403 of IPC,

the period of limitation prescribed is one year. Having

regard to Section 469 of Cr.P.C., the period of limitation

has to be reckoned from the date of the knowledge of the

complainant of such offence. In the notice, the

complainant claimed that she gained knowledge of such Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

sale, soon before the said notice. The accused had not

denied her statement to that effect by cross-examining

her. Therefore, whether she had knowledge of sale prior to

that was the matter of trial. Under the circumstances, the

trial Court was in error in discharging the accused on the

ground of delay.

Reg: Dispute being civil in nature:

35. The trial Court held that the complainant is

claiming that, by virtue of her share in the property, she

was entitled to 1/4th of the sale consideration, but the

accused disputed her share, therefore, her remedy was

before the civil Court by way of suit for partition and she

cannot prosecute the accused for the offences under the

Indian Penal code. To come to that conclusion, the trial

Court relied on the judgment of this Court in M/s.LMJ

International Ltd.'s case and the judgment of the

Supreme Court in Bal Kishan Das's case.

36. The judgment in Bal Kishan Das's case arose

out of the arbitration agreement which was commercial

dispute. It was held that the matter was purely of civil Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

nature. Therefore, the said judgment is not applicable to

the facts of this case.

37. The judgment in M/s.LMJ International Ltd.'s

case was rendered relying on the judgment of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India

Ltd.11.This Court has extracted the judgment of the Indian

Oil Corpn.'s case and the trial Court in turn reproduces the

same. In the very judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

further held that genuine complaint for criminal

prosecution should not be thrown out of the Court only

because two remedies were available.

38. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in para 12(v) of

the judgment in Indian Oil Corporation's case held as

follows:

"12(v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the

(2006) 6 SCC 736 Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not."

(Emphasis supplied)

39. Similarly in para 14 it was held that no one

with a legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented

from seeking remedies available in the criminal law.

Therefore, it was clear that merely because civil remedy is

also available to the complainant or availed is not a ground

to oust the party from the criminal prosecution.

40. In the case on hand also, the complainant

alleged that persuading her for the purpose of selling the

property accused obtained the General Power of Attorney

from her, sold the property without her knowledge,

suppressing the fact of sale utilized her share of money

with dishonest intention. She had the right to pursue both

the complaint for criminal breach of trust and

misappropriation as well as to file the suit for

partition/recovery of her share of money.

Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

41. When the power of attorney and the sale deed

themselves had the recitals that she had a share in the

property simply because the accused denied her share, she

should not be compelled to go to the Civil Court. Actually,

in the reply notice the accused had not even denied her

share. In their application, first time it was contended that

they had spent on her and to reciprocate that, the

complainant had executed the power of attorney.

Therefore, they had to prove their defence. Again that was

a matter of trial. Under such circumstances, the trial Court

was not right in saying that her remedy was only by way

of civil suit.

Reg: Territorial jurisdiction of the trial Court:

42. The accused sought discharge on the ground

that the property in question situated at Amritsar and was

sold at Amritsar, therefore, the trial Court lacked

jurisdiction to proceed against them. The trial Court by the

impugned order accepted the said contention and

discharged the accused.

Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

43. Admittedly the cognizance was taken on the

complaint other than the police report. In such case, if the

Court finds it lacks jurisdiction the course open to it as per

Section 201 of Cr.P.C. was to return the complaint for

presentation to the proper Court with endorsement to that

effect and not to discharge the accused under Section 245

of Cr.P.C. Section 245 of Cr.P.C itself does not contemplate

discharge on the ground of want of jurisdiction.

44. As per Section 181(4) of Cr.P.C, the offence of

criminal misappropriation or breach of trust may be

inquired into or tried by the Court within whose jurisdiction

the offence was committed or any of the property which is

the subject matter of the offence was received or retained,

or was required to be returned or accounted for by the

accused persons.

45. Further the complaint was for the offences of

breach of trust and misappropriation. According to the

complainant, the accused obtained General Power of

Attorney from her with dishonest intention of

misappropriation of sale proceeds and to cheat her.

Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

According to the complaint, since the accused obtained

General Power of Attorney at Bengaluru, they were

required to account her share of sale consideration and

return that at Bengaluru. The trial Court in holding that it

has no jurisdiction failed to examine the application with

reference to Section 181(4) of Cr.P.C, thereby committed

jurisdictional error.

Reg. Power under Section 397 of Cr.P.C.:

46. Learned Counsel for respondent Nos.1 &

2/accused contended that the order of discharge amounts

to acquittal and this Court in the revisional/supervisory

jurisdiction cannot interfere with the same on

re-appreciating the evidence. It is no doubt true that the

scope of interference in the revisional jurisdiction is

limited. However, the language in Section 397 of Cr.P.C.

itself says that the Court can examine the correctness,

legality or propriety of the findings of the trial Court. In

other words, if the findings of the trial Court are found

patently incorrect, illegal and improper, there is always

scope for the revisional Court to interfere with the same.

Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

47. As already discussed, the trial Court acted

contrary to Sections 245, 468, 469 of Cr.P.C and the

judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Indian Oil

Corpn.'s case referred to supra in discharging the accused.

Therefore, the judgments relied upon by learned Counsel

for the accused in that regard are not applicable. For the

aforesaid reasons, the impugned order of discharge is

liable to be set aside and the matter requires to be

remanded to the trial Court.

48. As could be seen from the records, the

complainant was 61 years as on the date of filing of this

revision petition in 2011. The complaint was filed in the

year 2001. By this time, 20 years have elapsed. The

complainant has crossed 70 years as on the date. One of

the accused has already passed away pending the

proceedings. Therefore, the matter requires to be

expedited. The petition is allowed.

The impugned order of discharge passed by the trial

Court is hereby set aside. The application of the accused

for their discharge is hereby rejected.

Crl.R.P.No.1076/2011

The matter is remanded to the trial Court to proceed

from the stage where the impugned order interdicted

them. The accused shall appear before the trial Court on

18.01.2021 without further notice. The trial Court shall

frame the charges, conclude the trial and dispose of the

matter uninfluenced by the observations made in this

order, within three months from the date of appearance of

the parties before it.

Sd/-

JUDGE KSR