Karnataka High Court
Mr Jagadeesh Rao H vs Mr R Nagabhushan Rao on 28 January, 2021
Author: H.P.Sandesh
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 28TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2021
BEFORE
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE H.P. SANDESH
CRIMINAL PETITION No.2749/2020
BETWEEN:
1. MR. JAGADEESH RAO H.
S/O. LATE R PRABHAKARA RAO
AGED 57 YEARS
RESIDING AT "ANNAPOORNA"
KUDWA COMPOUND
KUNTALPADI
KARKALA TALUK
UDUPI DISTRICT - 574 102
2. MR. DINESH RAO
S/O. LATE R PRABHAKARA RAO
AGED 52 YEARS
R/AT "SRI DURGA
K S R TOWNSHIP
2ND LANE, BAJAL
MANGALURU, D.K-575 007
3. MR. R. SATHEESH RAO
S/O. LATE R PRABHAKARA RAO
AGED 49 YEARS
R/AT "ANNAPOORNA HOUSE"
MAYRE KATTE, BILIORE VILLAGE
PERNE POST
BANTWAL TALUK, D.K.-574 241
4. SMT. USHA
D/O. LATE R PRABHAKARA RAO
W/O. MR VADIRAJ
AGED 47 YEARS
2
VASANTHA NIVAS
OPP. MAHALINGESHWARA TEMPLE
UDUPI DISTRICT - 574 102 ... PETITIONERS
(BY SRI. ANANDARAMA K., ADVOCATE)
AND:
1. MR R.NAGABHUSHAN RAO
S/O. LATE R SHYAMA RAO
AGED ABOUT 86 YEARS
RESIDING AT MANASA
HALEKOTE
BELTHANGADY KASABA VILLAGE
BELTHANGADY TALUK
D K-574 214
2. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
-CUM-SUB-DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE
MANGALURU SUB DIVISION
MANGALURU - 575 027 ... RESPONDENTS
(BY SRI. K.S. PRASAD, ADVOCATE FOR
SMT. ARCHANA MURTHY P., ADVOCATE FOR R1
SRI. K.S. ABHIJITH, HCGP FOR R2)
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482
OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER DATED 31.10.2015
(ANNEXURE-A) PASSED BY THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER
CUM SUB DIVISIONAL MAGISTRATE, MANGALURU SUB
DIVISION 2ND RESPONDENT HEREIN U/S.133 OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE CODE, 1973 IN CASE NO.MAG.S.R.NO.14/2015-16,
QUASH THE ORDER DATED 10.03.2016 (ANNEXURE-B) PASSED
BY THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER CUM SUB DIVISIONAL
MAGISTRATE MANGALURU SUB DIVISION 2ND RESPONDENT
HEREIN UNDER SEC.136 OF CRPC 1973, IN CASE
NO.MAG.S.R.NO.14/2015-16.
THIS CRIMINAL PETITION HAVING BEEN HEARD AND
RESERVED FOR ORDERS ON 12.01.2021, THIS DAY, THE COURT
PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:
3
ORDER
This petition is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. praying
this Court to quash the order dated 31.10.2015 vide Annexure-A
passed by respondent No.2 exercising the powers under Section
133 of Cr.P.C. and so also to quash the order dated 10.03.2016
vide Annexure-B passed by respondent No.2 exercising the
powers under Section 136 of Cr.P.C. in case
No.MAG.S.R.No.14/2015-16 and to grant such other reliefs as
deems fit to grant in the interest of justice and equity.
2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners,
learned counsel for respondent No.1 and the learned High Court
Government Pleader for respondent No.2.
3. The factual matrix of the case is that respondent
No.1 approached respondent No.2 by filing the
petition/application under Section 147 of Cr.P.C. claiming certain
easementary rights over the land in Sy.No.161/1 measuring 1.73
acres and Sy.No.161/2 measuring 2.96 acres of Rayee Village of
Bantwal Taluk, as a result, the case has been registered as
MAG.S.R.No.14/2015-16. The said petition was filed on
25.10.2014 during the pendency of the suit filed for partition by
the parties, who are the co-owners. It is the case of the
petitioners herein that one Mr.Ramesh Rao, who is the brother of
these petitioners has been arrayed as respondent in the said
proceeding and these petitioners have not been arrayed as
parties in the said proceedings though they are co owners of the
schedule property. It is also their contention that one Mr.
Shyama Rao was the propositus. He held several immovable
properties and the schedule property including its larger extent.
One Mr. Prabhakar Rao, who is the father of these petitioners
had five children. Respondent No.1 is also the son of the said
propositus Mr. Shyama Rao. Ramesh Rao, who had been arrayed
as respondent is one of the sons of Prabhakar Rao. The suit was
filed by other two sons of the said propositus Mr. Shyama Rao in
the year 2013 itself. It is also averred that even no notice has
been issued to Mr. Ramesh Rao, who has been arrayed as
respondent in the said proceedings. The impugned orders at
Annexures-A and B are obtained behind the back of the
petitioners herein and also the said Ramesh Rao. It is also
contended that suit was compromised by filing the compromise
petition on 04.03.2017 and also preliminary decree was drawn in
terms of Annexure-E. It is also contended that the RTC
pertaining to the schedule property at Annexure-F also does not
disclose any pathway. It is also contended that consequent upon
this order, the respondent trespassed the property of the
petitioners and also tried to make use of the pathway. As a
result, the case was registered in terms of Annexure-G. Learned
counsel appearing for the petitioners also produced at Annexure-
H, the copy of the petition/application filed before respondent
No.2 by respondent No.1 in terms of Annexure-H.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would
submit that these petitioners are the co-owners along with
Mr.Ramesh Rao in respect of the subject matter of the property
in question. It is also contended that respondent No.2, in the
absence of said Ramesh Rao, obtained the report from Tahsildar
and the police and passed the impugned orders, though there
was no phodi in respect of the subject matter of the land. It is
also contended that this order is passed in the absence of these
petitioners, which amounts to violation of principles of natural
justice. The other contention of the learned counsel for the
petitioners is that respondent No.2 has exercised his power
without jurisdiction.
5. Learned counsel relying upon the provisions of
Sections 147, 145, 133 of Cr.P.C. and so also Sections 137 and
138 of Cr.P.C., would submit that under Section 147 of Cr.P.C.
the easmentary rights cannot be considered by exercising the
powers vested under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. As envisaged under
Section 133 of Cr.P.C., the alleged nuisance is not a public
nuisance. Learned counsel would further submit that no evidence
has been recorded though the procedure is quashi judicial in
nature. Hence, respondent No.2 has not applied his mind. When
the subordinate officials have prepared the note passing the
conditional order vide Annexure-A, the same has been made
absolute vide Annexure-B. The order has been passed even
without service of notice against the said Ramesh Rao, who has
been arrayed as respondent in the said proceedings and directed
to cause removal of obstructions in respect of the propertyies
bearing Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2. These petitioners are the
owners in respect of Sy.No.161/1 and the matter had already
been compromised before the Civil Court. The dispute is only in
respect of Sy.No.161/3. It is further submitted that on perusal of
the impugned orders at Annexures - A and B, it is clear that
respondent No.2 exercised his power without jurisdiction.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of his
arguments, relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the
case of Kachrulal Bhagirath Agrawal & Others v. State of
Maharashtra & Others reported in (2005) 9 SCC 36 and
brought to the notice of this Court para Nos.10, 11 and 13.
Learned counsel referring to para No.10 would contend that the
Apex Court has observed that there are three remedies under
the criminal law. The first relates to the prosecution under
Chapter XIV of IPC. The second provides for summary
proceedings under Sections 133 to 144 of the Code, and the
third relates to remedies under special or local laws. Sub-section
(2) of Section 133 postulates that no order duly made by a
Magistrate under this Section shall be called in question in any
Civil Court. The provisions of Chapter X of the Code should be so
worked as not to become themselves a nuisance to the
community at large. Although every person is bound to so use
his property that it may not work legal damage or harm to his
neighbour, yet on the other hand, no one has a right to interfere
with the free and full enjoyment by such person of his property,
except on clear and absolute proof that such use of it by him is
producing such legal damage or harm. Therefore, a lawful and
necessary trade ought not to be interfered with unless it is
proved to be injurious to the health or physical comfort of the
community. Proceedings under Section 133 are not intended to
settle private disputes between different members of the public.
They are in fact intended to protect the public as a whole against
inconvenience. A comparison between the provisions of Sections
133 and 144 of the Code shows that while the former is more
specific, the latter is more general. Therefore, nuisance specially
provided for in the former section is taken out of the general
provisions of the latter section. The proceedings under Section
133 are more in the nature of civil proceedings than of criminal
nature.
7. Learned counsel brought to the notice of this Court
para No.11 of the judgment, wherein the Apex Court held that
the guns of Section 133 go into action wherever there is public
nuisance. The public power of the Magistrate under the Code is a
public duty to the members of the public who are victims of the
nuisance, and so he shall exercise it when the jurisdictional facts
are present. "All power is a trust - that we are accountable for
its exercise - that, from the people, and for the people, all
springs and all must exist." The conduct of the trade must be
injurious in praesenti to the health or physical comfort of the
community. There must, at any rate, be an imminent danger to
the health or the physical comfort of the community in the
locality in which the trade or occupation is conducted. Unless,
there is such imminent danger to the health or physical comfort
of that community or the conduct of the trade and occupation is
in fact injurious to the health of the physical comfort of that
community, an order under Section 133 cannot be passed. A
conjoint reading of Sections 133 and 138 of the Code discloses
that it is the function of the Magistrate to conduct an enquiry
and to decide as to whether there was reliable evidence or not to
come to the conclusion to act under Section 133.
8. Learned counsel further brought to the notice of this
Court para No.13 of the judgment, wherein the Apex Court held
that to bring in application of Section 133 of the Code, there
must be imminent danger to the property and consequential
nuisance to the public. The nuisance is the concomitant act
resulting in danger to the life or property due to likely collapse,
etc. The object and purpose behind Section 133 of the Code is
essentially to prevent public nuisance and involves a sense of
urgency in the sense that if the Magistrate fails to take recourse
immediately, irreparable danger would be done to the public.
9. Learned counsel relied upon the judgment of this
Court in the case of Manjayya Hegde v. Mahabala Shetty and
Others reported in ILR 1968 (Mysore) 147, wherein this
Court held that when an application is filed under Section 133 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure on the ground that a certain
person has put up an obstruction on a path, which is alleged to
be a public path, the Magistrate should send a show cause notice
to the counter-petitioner and when he or his representatives
appears, the Magistrate should question him as to whether he
denied the existence of the public way; and if he did, the
Magistrate has to enquire into the matter and if he finds reliable
evidence in support of the denial, he should stay the proceedings
until the question is decided by a competent Civil Court. If, on
the other hand, he finds that there is no reliable evidence in
support of the denial, he has to proceed under Section 137 of
the Criminal Procedure.
10. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment of
this Court in the case of Fakirappa Bharamappa
Machanahalli v. Gouskhan Soudagar by L.Rs. reported in
ILR 1968 (Mysore) 150 and brought to the notice of this Court
para No.13 referring to Section 133(1)(b), wherein it is held that
the conduct of any trade or occupation should be injurious to the
health or the physical comfort of the community for taking action
under Chapter X-B. Expression 'community' is used in its larger
and more popular meaning. It would mean 'public' or
'neighbours' 'residents of the entire locality' and not an individual
or the residents of a house. An individual or the member of his
house, hold certainly would not constitute 'community' in its true
sense. So the argument advanced by Sri. S.K.Joshi that the 2nd
respondent and the members of his house-hold do constitute
'community' within contemplation of Section 133 (1) Cr.P.C. as
they being part of the community may not hold water for the
simple reason that the expression 'community' is not used with
such a narrow meaning.
11. Learned counsel also relied upon the judgment in the
case of Chindaiah v. Gopala Iyengar reported in ILR 1986
Kar. 1222 and brought to the notice of this Court para No.3
referring to Section 133(1) of Cr.P.C., wherein it is held that if,
on taking evidence, he thinks fit and considers such obstruction
or nuisance should be removed, then he has to make, in the first
instance, a conditional order requiring the person causing such
obstruction or nuisance of any of the descriptions mentioned
above to remove the same or desist and stop from doing any of
such things as enumerated in sub-clauses (i) to (vi) of Clause (f)
of Section 133(1) of the Code within a time to be fixed in the
order or if he objects so to do, to appear before himself or some
other Executive Magistrate subordinate to him at a time and
place to be fixed by the order and show cause why the order
should not be made absolute.
12. Referring to these judgments, learned counsel would
vehemently contend that the order has been passed without
jurisdiction and no evidence has been recorded and so also the
impugned order is passed behind back of the respondent, who
has been arrayed and also in the absence of these petitioners,
who are the co-owners of the property. Hence, it requires
interference of this Court.
13. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.1 would submit that the allegation is made
against one Ramesh Rao, who caused the obstruction. Hence,
the application was filed to remove the obstruction caused by
him and accordingly, these petitioners have not been arrayed as
parties to the proceedings. Learned counsel also would submit
that the dispute is in respect of Sy.No.161/3 and not in respect
of Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2. The obstruction has been caused in
respect of the property bearing Sy.No.161/3. Hence, the
proceedings was initiated and the conditional order was passed
and thereafter, final order came to be passed vide Annexure-B.
These petitioners have no locus standi to file the petition under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It is also contended that respondent, who
has been arrayed in the said proceedings has already
approached the Revisional Court for exercising the criminal
revisional jurisdiction in Crl.R.P.No.33/2020 and the same is
pending for consideration.
14. Learned counsel also would submit that the person,
who has been arrayed before respondent No.2 did not appear
and contest the matter and these petitioners are not the owners.
Hence, they cannot find fault with the impugned orders. In reply
to the arguments of the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.1, learned counsel for the petitioners would
submit that on perusal of Annexures-A and B, it is clear that the
order has been passed in respect of Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2.
The fact that these petitioners are the co-owners in respect of
the property is not in dispute and also in the compromise
petition, which had been entered in the civil suit is in respect of
the property bearing Sy.No.161/1, which is allotted in favour of
these petitioners. It is also contended that no phodi work was
taken place and no where in the RTCs it is mentioned that the
land is kharab land. Learned counsel also would submit that
under Section 137 of Cr.P.C., the petitioners have to deny the
same, if the same is not made and they cannot deny the same in
future. Hence, the present petition is filed on three grounds
mainly. The first ground is that the order has been passed
without jurisdiction and the second is that these petitioners have
not been arrayed as parties to the proceedings, but their rights
have been violated by passing the order in respect of the
properties of all these petitioners. It is also contended that
respondent No.2 has exercised the power in respect of private
property and the same is not a public nuisance as envisaged
under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. and the order passed by the
respondent is without jurisdiction. Hence, it requires interference
of this Court.
15. The learned High Court Government Pleader
appearing for the State would submit that respondent No.2 has
exercised its jurisdiction within the scope and ambit of Sections
133, 136, 144, 145 and 147 and the same is in accordance with
law.
16. Having heard the arguments of the learned counsel
for the petitioners and the learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.1 and so also the learned High Court Government
Pleader appearing for respondent No.2, the points that would
arise for the consideration of this Court are:-
i) Whether the impugned orders passed in case
No.MAG.S.R.No.14/2015-16 at Annexures-A
and B are sustainable in the eye of law?
ii) What order?
Point No.(i):-
17. Having heard the learned counsel for the
respondents and also the grounds urged in the petition, before
going to consider the grounds urged in the petition, it is
appropriate to consider the contents of the representation given
by the first respondent before the second respondent. On
perusal of Annexure-H, the representation of the first respondent
given before the second respondent, the sum and substance of
the petition is that the first respondent and his brother are joint
owners of the property bearing Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2. The
first respondent had purchased the property bearing
Sy.No.161/3P1 of Rayee Village from his aunt Smt. Seethamma.
In order to connect the house property of the family situated in
Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2, there is a road way. The property
bearing Sy.No.161/3P1 is situated in the eastern side of the
family property bearing Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2. To connect the
family property and the house therein, a road way has been
passed in Sy.No.161/3P1 and the said road way is in use and
enjoyment since more than 80 years. At the time of purchase of
the property Sy.No.161/3P1, the road was in existence. It is
also his case that the said property was sold in favour of said
Ramesh Rao in the year 1999 and that he orally admitted, he
would not cause any obstructions to family property. However,
he had planted rubber plants in Sy.No.161/3P1 measuring 3.40
acres and he had put the gate with the consent of the family
members. It is the case of the first respondent before the second
respondent that the road way connecting the family property of
the respondent and the property sold in favour of the said
Ramesh Rao in Sy.No.161/3P1 deviates from Moodubidre-B.C.
Road P.W.D Road at a place called 'Koila'. The said road is
popularly known as Koila-Horangala road. A portion of the said
road up to the place called "Palla" is maintained by the Rayee
Gram Panchayath. After that the said road way passes in the
property of one Sri. Nagaraj Shetty. The said owner never
obstructed the enjoyment of the road way and the said road
deviates towards west to the family property of the first
respondent and the road proceeds in the northern side connects
to the house of one Ms.Leela and proceeds up to a stream.
18. It is contended that road way is not only required for
the beneficial enjoyment of the respondent No.1 but also to the
properties of others. However in the first week of October 2014,
the said Ramesh Rao had caused obstruction to the enjoyment
of the road way by locking the gate. Hence, he had approached
the second respondent. The grievance of the petitioners herein is
that they were not arrayed as parties to the proceedings before
the second respondent. On perusal of the entire contents of the
petition filed under Section 147 of Cr.P.C. by the first respondent
herein, his grievance is against the said Ramesh Rao that he had
blocked the pathway, which is in existence in Sy.No.161/3P1.
There is no averment in the petition that road was blocked in
Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2.
19. The petitioners are claiming that they are the owners
of the property bearing Sy.No.161/1 to the extent of 1.43 acres.
On perusal of the entire contents of the petition of the first
respondent, the grievance is only against the said Ramesh Rao
that he is causing obstruction by blocking the pathway
connected to Sy.No.161/3P1. The contention of these petitioners
is that they were not arrayed as parties to the proceedings and
behind their back, the order has been obtained. It is also the
contention that the said Ramesh Rao was also not served in the
said proceedings.
20. Having perused the Annexure-B, the order dated
10.03.2016, in the bottom of the order, it has been specifically
stated that inspite notice was given to said Ramesh Rao through
the Revenue Inspector and the same was served, he did not
choose to appear before the second respondent. Hence, the first
contention that no notice was served on the said Ramesh Rao,
cannot be accepted. It is also pertinent to note that these
petitioners in an ingenious method have not arrayed the said
Ramesh Rao as a party to this proceedings. It is also pertinent to
note that the said Ramesh Rao already has filed the Revision
Petition before the District Court challenging the order passed by
the second respondent and the same is pending.
21. The three grounds of arguments before this Court
are that they were not arrayed as parties in the proceedings
before the second respondent even though they are co-owners.
The said contention cannot be accepted for the reason that the
grievance is against the said Ramesh Rao in respect of
Sy.No.161/3P1 that he is blocking the road, which is in existence
and connects the property bearing Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2. It is
the claim of the petitioners that they are the owners of the
property in Sy.No.161/1 and also relied upon the decree passed
in the civil suit in terms of the compromise. The claim of the first
respondent herein is not in respect of Sy.No.161/1. That apart
his claim is that the road is blocked in Sy.No.161/3P1 which
connects to the property in Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2. When such
being the case and the contention of the first respondent is also
beneficial to the present petitioners in respect of Sy.No.161/1
and 161/2 and so also that the claim is made in respect of path
way pertaining to both the Sy.Nos, nothing is on record to show
that how these petitioners have been effected.
22. The grievance is only against the said Ramesh Rao
and hence, the very contention that they have not been arrayed
as parties, cannot be accepted. If the grievance is in respect of
the property bearing Sy.No.161/1, then there would have been
force in the contention of the petitioners herein.
23. Learned counsel would vehemently contend that in
the order Annexures-A and B, a reference has been made in
respect of Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2. On meticulous reading of
both the orders, a reference has been made by the second
respondent in connection with Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2. The
road was blocked by the said Ramesh Rao, who is the owner of
the property in Sy.No.161/3P1 and in order to clear the path
way in respect of Sy.Nos.161/2 and 161/1, the order has been
passed. Hence, I am of the opinion that the present petitioners
have no locus standi to approach this Court without their rights
having not been effected and also that the direction was given
against the said Ramesh Rao, who blocked the road.
24. The other contention of the petitioners herein relying
upon the several judgments before this Court is that the second
respondent cannot adjudicate the matter invoking Sections 133
and 136 of the Cr.P.C. and the same is in respect of private
properties and it is not a public nuisance. No doubt, with regard
to the principles laid down in the judgments referred to by the
petitioners, there is no dispute that the authority can invoke
Section 133 of Cr.P.C, if it is in respect of public nuisance as held
by the Apex Court (supra). However, it is to be noted that it is
the claim of the first respondent herein before the second
respondent that the road not only leads to the property bearing
Sy.Nos.161/1 and 161/2 but also connects to Moodubidre-B.C.
Road P.W.D Road at a place called 'Koila'. The said road is
popularly known as Koila-Horangala road and the other owners
of the property have not blocked the road. The said Ramesh Rao
though orally admitted that he would not block the road, with
the consent had put the gate. But he blocked the road by locking
the same. As a result, the same would not amounts to nuisance
to the general public. The grievance of the petitioners before
second respondent is that the said road is used from last 80
years not only by the first respondent herein but also the publics
are using the same since long ago. The same is required for the
beneficial enjoyment of the property of the first respondent
herein and also to the property of other general public. When
such being the contention raised in the application in terms of
Annexure-H, the very contention of the petitioners that the
private rights of the parties have been effected, cannot be
accepted. I have already pointed out that these petitioners have
no locus standi to raise the issues as the very rights have not
been effected and the said direction was given against the said
Ramesh Rao, who blocked the road which is in existence in
Sy.No.161/3P1.
25. The third contention of the second respondent is that
the evidence has not been recorded and the second respondent
has not applied his mind though it is a quasi judicial body. The
records also would reveal that inspite notice was issued to the
said Ramesh Rao, he did not choose to appear and contest the
matter, the second respondent passed the conditional order
under Section 133 of Cr.P.C. and thereafter, having obtained the
report from Tahsildar and also the from the police has come to
the conclusion that the road was in existence prior to that and
publics are using the same and an order has been passed. Now
the matter is ceased before the District Court by filing the
revision petition before the District Court by the said Ramesh
Rao. The appropriate Court has to take a decision as to whether
the order passed by the second respondent is in accordance with
law or not. This Court by exercising the powers under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. cannot decide the same and the same has to be
decided before the appropriate forum. This Court also cannot
from any opinion when the matter is pending before the District
Court.
26. Having perused the application filed by the
respondent before second respondent and considering the orders
passed by the second respondent, even though it was the
contention of the petitioners that they have not been arrayed as
parties, as I have already pointed out that they are not the
necessary parties before the second respondent. The grievance
of the first respondent before the second respondent is that the
said Ramesh Rao blocked the road and there is no grievance
against these petitioners. Hence, it is held that these petitioners
have no locus standi to invoke Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and also
there is no need to make them as parties to the proceedings
before the second respondent. The other contention that the
second respondent ought not to have invoked Section 133 of
Cr.P.C. is a matter of fact in issue to be decided by the
appropriate authority when the matter is ceased of in the District
Court with regard to invoking of the said provisions. The third
contention is also with regard to no enquiry. When these
petitioners have no locus standi, they cannot raise the said
contention before the Court in the proceedings under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. It is also pointed out by this Court that the said
Ramesh Rao was not arrayed as party in this proceedings and an
ingenious method has been adopted to deviate the same and
when the said Ramesh Rao was a party in the proceedings
before the second respondent, the petitioners ought to have
made him as a party to this proceedings.
27. Having considered the material on record and also
the orders passed by the second respondent vide Annexure-A
and B and also taking into consideration of all the materials on
record, it is not a fit case to exercise powers under Section 482
of Cr.P.C. to quash the order of the second respondent. The
Revision petition is also pending before District Court which has
been questioned by the said Ramesh Rao and the same has to
be decided in accordance with law.
28. In view of the discussion made above, I pass the
following:-
ORDER
The petition is dismissed.
In view of dismissal of the main petition, I.A.No.1/2020 for
stay does not survive for consideration and the same stands
disposed of.
Sd/-
JUDGE
PYR/cp*
