Karnataka High Court

Sri Chandrashekar vs The State Of Karnataka on 22 December, 2021

Bench: S.Sujatha, S Vishwajith Shetty

                          1

 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

   DATED THIS THE 22ND DAY OF DECEMBER, 2021

                      PRESENT

       THE HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE S.SUJATHA

                         AND

  THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S.VISHWAJITH SHETTY

       WRIT PETITION No.22936/2021 (S KSAT)

    C/W WRIT PETITION No.22940/2021 (S KSAT)

IN W.P.22936/2021

BETWEEN:

SRI M. VENKATESH
S/O. LATE. VENKATAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 49 YEARS,
WORKING AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
TALUK PANCHAYATH,
YELHANKA TALUK,
BANGALORE URBAN DISTRICT,
NOW UNDER ORDERS OF SUSPENSION,
R/O. NO. 754, 13TH MAIN ROD,
2ND BLOCK, YELAHANKA NEW TOWN,
BANGALORE 560064.                        ... PETITIONER

(BY SMT. SUSHEELA, SR. COUNSEL FOR
    SRI RAGHAVENDRA. G. GAYATRI, ADV.)

IN W.P.22940/2021

BETWEEN:

SRI CHANDRASHEKAR
S/O SHIVANDRAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 58 YEARS,
WORKING AS EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
TALUK PANCHAYATH,
BANGALORE NORTH TALUK,
YELHANKA,
NOW UNDER ORDERS OF SUSPENSION
                            2


R/O NO.1, 2ND CROSS, 1ST MAIN,
CHIKKAVENKATAPPA LAYOUT,
DODDABOMMASANDRA,
BANGALORE - 560 064.                     ... PETITIONER

(BY SMT. SUSHEELA, SR. COUNSEL FOR
    SRI RAGHAVENDRA. G. GAYATRI, ADV.)

AND:

1.     THE STATE OF KARNATAKA
       REP. BY ITS PRINCIPAL SECRETARY,
       DEPARTMENT OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND
       PANCHAYAT RAJ, M.S. BUILDING,
       BENGALURU 560001.

2.     THE CHIEF EXEUCITIVE OFFICER,
       BANGALORE URBAN ZILLA PANCHAYATH,
       KANAKAPURA ROAD, BANASHANKARI,
       BENGALURU 560050.      ... COMMON RESPONDENTS

(BY SRI B.RAJENDRA PRASAD, HCGP FOR R1;
    SRI MAHESH. R. UPPIN, ADV. FOR R2)

      THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLE
226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO
ISSUE A WRIT OR ORDER IN THE NATURE OF CERTIORARI
AND TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED 03.12.2021 IN
APPLICATION NO. 5654/2021 AND 5655/2021, PASSED BY
THE    KARNATAKA   STATE  ADMINISTRATIVE   TRIBUNAL
(ANNEXURE - A) AND TO ALLOW THE SAID APPLICATION AS
PRAYED FOR, AND ETC.

     THESE PETITIONS COMING ON FOR PRELIMINARY
HEARING IN B GROUP THIS DAY, VISHWAJITH SHETTY J.,
MADE THE FOLLOWING:

                       ORDER

These two writ petitions arise out of the order

passed by the Karnataka State Administrative

Tribunal, Bangalore (for short "the Tribunal"), in the

Application Nos.5654/2021 and 5655/2021, which

were disposed of by the Tribunal by a common order

dated 3rd December 2021 and therefore, these two writ

petitions are clubbed together and a common order is

passed.

2. The petitioners herein were working as

Executive Officers of the Taluka Panchayat, Yelahanka

Taluk and Executive Officer, Taluka Panchayat,

Bangalore North Taluk respectively. The Department

of Urban Development had issued notifications

declaring the area of Hunasamaranahalli including

Sonnappanahalli Grama Panchayat of Jala Hobli,

Yelahanka Taluk and Chikkabanavara of Bangalore

North Taluk as a "Smaller Urban Area" and further

specifying such an area to be the "Town Municipal

Council" area of Hunasamaranahalli and

Chikkabanavara respecitvely. Thereafterwards, the

petitioners were asked to hand-over the charge in

respect to the said panchayat areas to be the Chief

Officers of the Town Municipal area. The petitioners

even thereafterwards, allegedly issued khatas in

respect of various properties coming within the limits

of Grama Panchayat area, which were included in the

Town Municipal area, by using login facilities of the

Grama Panchayat and it is on these allegations, the

petitioners were kept under suspension vide order

dated 18.11.2021. Being aggrieved by the same, the

petitioners had approached the Karnataka State

Administrative Tribunal under Section 19 of the

Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 in Application

Nos.5654/2021 and 5655/2021 respectively and the

Tribunal by its order dated 03.12.2021 had dismissed

the said applications and it is under these

circumstances, the petitioners are before this court.

3. Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of

the petitioners submits that the charges levelled

against the petitioners are not very serious, which

would result in termination of their service and

therefore, there was no justification for suspending

them pending enquiry. She further submits that there

is no application of mind by the authority concerned

before passing the order of suspension and therefore,

the suspension order is bad. She also submits that

during the pendency of the writ petitions, the

suspension orders of the Panchayat Development

Officers of the respective Panchayat have been revoked

and therefore, there is no justification in continuing

the order of suspension against the petitioners herein.

4. In support of her contentions, she has relied

upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the

case of Union of India and Another -vs- Ashok

Kumar Aggarwal1.

5. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for

respondent No.2 and also the learned High Court

Government Pleader have argued in support of the

impugned order passed by the Tribunal and they

submit that there are serious allegations against the

petitioners herein and therefore, the Tribunal has

rightly dismissed their applications. They further

submit that having regard to the post occupied by the

(2013) 16 SCC 147

petitioners, there are all chances of they are likely to

tamper with the material evidence and therefore, no

interference is called for against the impugned order.

6. We have carefully considered the rival

arguments addressed on both sides and also perused

the material available on record.

7. It is not in dispute that after the issuance of

the Government Notifications dated 26.03.2021 and

31.03.2021 declaring the panchayat areas coming

within the Taluk Panchayat areas where the

petitioners were working as Executive Officers, as

"Smaller Urban Area" / "Town Municipal Council", the

consequences as provided under Section 357 of the

Karnataka Municipalities Act, 1964 would come into

effect. Therefore, after issuance of notifications dated

26.03.2021 and 31.03.2021, the petitioners had no

jurisdiction to issue khatas in respect of the properties

which come within the panchayat areas, which were

converted into "Smaller Urban Area" / "Town

Municipal Council".

8. The allegation against the petitioners herein is

that petitioner No.1 has issued as many as 259 e-

khatas and petitioner No.2 has issued 92 e-khatas

after coming into existence of the notifications dated

26.03.2021 and 31.03.2021 respectively. A perusal of

the material on record would go to show that the e-

khatas were issued by the petitioners after such

notifications were issued, which is a serious

misconduct. The competent authority after

appreciating this aspect of the matter has passed the

order of suspension against the petitioners herein.

The Tribunal while dismissing the petitioners'

applications, in paragraphs-10 and 11 has observed as

follows:

"10. Regarding the scope of the judicial review of the suspension orders are concerned, I am referring to the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court reported in (2013) 16 SCC 147 rendered in the case of Union of India and Another Vs. Ashok Kumar Agarwal, paragraphs 26 & 27 are relevant and it read as under:

"26. The scope of interference by the Court with the order of suspension has been examined by the Court in a large number of cases, particularly in State of M.P. v. Sardul Singh, (1970) 1 SCC 108; P.V. Srinivasa

Sastry v. Comptroller & Auditor General of India, (1993) 1 SCC 419; Director General, ESI & Anr. v. T. Abdul Razak, AIR 1996 SC 2292; Kusheshwar Dubey v. M/s Bharat Cooking Coal Ltd. & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2118; Delhi Cloth General Mills vs. Kushan Bhan, AIR 1960 SC 806; U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad & Ors. v. Sanjeev Rajan, (1993) Supp. (3) SCC 483; State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 417; Secretary to Govt., Prohibition and Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan, (1996) 3 SCC 157; and Allahabad Bank & Anr. v. Deepak Kumar Bhola, (1997) 4 SCC 1, wherein it has been observed that even if a criminal trial or enquiry takes a long time, it is ordinarily not open to the court to interfere in case of suspension as it is in the exclusive domain of the competent authority who can always review its order of suspension being an inherent power conferred upon them by the provisions of Article 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and while exercising such a power, the authority can consider the case of an employee for revoking the suspension order, if satisfied that the criminal case pending would be concluded after an unusual delay for no fault of the employee concerned. Where the charges are baseless, mala fide or vindictive and are framed only to keep the delinquent employee out of job, a case for judicial review is made out. But in a case where no conclusion can be arrived at without examining the entire record in question and in order that the disciplinary proceedings may continue unhindered the court may not interfere. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the authority is not proceeding expeditiously as it ought to have been and it results in prolongation of sufferings for the delinquent employee, the court may issue directions. The court may,

in case the authority fails to furnish proper explanation for delay in conclusion of the enquiry, direct to complete the enquiry within a stipulated period. However, mere delay in conclusion of enquiry or trial can not be a ground for quashing the suspension order, if the charges are grave in nature. But, whether the employee should or should not continue in his office during the period of enquiry is a matter to be assessed by the disciplinary authority concerned and ordinarily the court should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed in mala fide and without there being even a prima facie evidence on record connecting the employee with the misconduct in question.

27. Suspension is a device to keep the delinquent out of the mischief range. The purpose is to complete the proceedings unhindered. Suspension is an interim measure in aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the delinquent may not gain custody or control of papers or take any advantage of his position. More so, at this stage, it is not desirable that the court may find out as which version is true when there are claims and counter claims on factual issues. The court cannot act as if it an appellate forum de hors the powers of judicial review"

I am referring to another decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court so far as the scope of the judicial review of suspension order reported in (1994) 4 SCC 126 rendered in the case of State of Orissa through Principal Secretary, Home Department Vs. Bimal Kumar Mohanthy. I am also referring to another decision of Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, order dated 28.10.2011 passed in W.P.No.34465/2011 (S-RES) rendered in the case of Dr.M.Shankar Vs. The Karnataka State Small Industries

Development Corporation Limited & another (ILR 2012 Kar 685).

11. Perusing the suspension orders under Annexure-A2, it cannot be said that there is no mental application by the authority who passed the suspension orders. Perusing the entire materials, the requirement of Rule 10(3), so also Rule 10(1)(d) of KCS (CC&A) Rules, 1957 are complied with."

9. The judgment referred to by the learned senior

counsel has been referred to by the Tribunal. A

reading of the judgment referred to by the learned

senior counsel in the case of Ashok Kumar Agarwal

would go to show that the scope of judicial review as

against the suspension orders is very limited. Learned

senior counsel had sought reliance on the said

judgment to contend that the consequences of

petitioners' misconduct are not very serious. We are

afraid at this stage any finding could be given as to the

consequence of the misconduct alleged against the

petitioners, even before the disciplinary proceedings