Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 1874 Kant
Judgement Date : 6 April, 2021
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU
DATED THIS THE 6TH DAY OF APRIL 2021
PRESENT
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ALOK ARADHE
AND
THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.G.S. KAMAL
I.T.A. NO.307 OF 2018
BETWEEN:
1. PR. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX-7
BMTC COMPLEX, KORAMANGALA
BANGALORE.
2. THE DY. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX
CIRCLE-12(4), BANGALORE.
... APPELLANTS
(BY SRI. T.N.C. SRIDHAR, ADV., FOR
SRI. JEEVAN J. NEERALGI, ADV.,)
AND:
M/S. TALLY INDIA PVT. LTD
NO.331-336, RAHEJA ARCADE
3RD FLOOR, KORMANGALA
BENGALURU-560095.
... RESPONDENT
(BY SRI. PERCY PARDIWALLA, SR. COUNSEL A/W
MS. MANASA ANANTHAN, ADV., FOR
SRI. T. SURYANARAYANA, ADV.,)
---
THIS I.T.A. IS FILED UNDER SEC. 260-A OF INCOME TAX
ACT 1961, ARISING OUT OF ORDER DATED 11.10.2017 PASSED
IN IT(TP)A NO.1213/BANG/2013 FOR THE ASSESSMENT YEAR
2008-09, PRAYING TO DECIDE THE FOREGOING QUESTION OF
LAW AND/OR SUCH OTHER QUESTIONS OF LAW AS MAY BE
FORMULATED BY THE HON'BLE COURT AS DEEMED FIT AND SET
2
ASIDE THE APPELLATE ORDER DATED 11.10.2017 PASSED BY THE
INCOME TAX APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, 'A' BENCH, BENGALURU, IN
APPEAL PROCEEDINGS NO.IT(TP)A NO.1213/BANG/2013 FOR
ASSESSMENT YEAR 2008-09, AS SOUGHT FOR IN THIS APPEAL
AND TO GRANT SUCH OTHER RELIEF AS DEEMED FIT, IN THE
INTEREST OF JUSTICE.
THIS I.T.A. COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY,
ALOK ARADHE J., DELIVERED THE FOLLOWING:
JUDGMENT
This appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax
Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for short)
has been preferred by the revenue. The subject matter
of the appeal pertains to the Assessment year 2008-09.
The appeal was admitted by a bench of this Court vide
order dated 19.03.2020 on the following substantial
questions of law:
"(i) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in holding that the operation of the provisions of Section 153(3)(ii) presupposes and existing assessment order and the same cannot be applied for making an assessment order for the first time?"
(ii) Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Tribunal was correct in computing limitation period for giving effect to the directions of the Court in a writ petition, which is by way of other than an appeal or reference under the Act, by resorting to provisions of Section 153(1)(a) of the Act rather than considering the provisions of Section 153(3)(ii) of the Act?".
2. Facts leading to filing of this appeal briefly
stated are that the assessee is a private limited
company and is engaged in the business of license of
software, customization of software, support fees,
education and training. The assessee filed its return of
income for the Assessment Year 2008-09 on
30.09.2008. The case of the assessee was selected for
scrutiny and a notice under Section 143(2) of the Act
was issued to the assessee on 08.09.2009. Thereafter,
the case was referred to the Transfer Pricing Officer
(TPO) for computation of Arms Length Price (ALP) under
Section 92C of the Act on 11.01.2011. This court in
W.P.No.45313/2011 by an order dated 08.12.2011
restrained the Transfer Pricing Officer from proceeding
to pass a draft assessment order for a period upto
07.03.2012 i.e., approximately 3 months. The writ
petition was disposed of by a bench of this court vide
order dated 07.03.2012 remitted the matter to the
Assessing Officer and directed the assessee to appear
before the Assessing Officer on 21.03.2012. It was also
clarified that all other contentions are kept open.
3. The Transfer Pricing Officer by an order dated
13.06.2012 after affording an opportunity to the
assessee passed an draft order of assessment on
05.07.2012 and forwarded the same to the assessee on
11.07.2012. The assessee filed an objection before the
Dispute Resolution Panel on 09.08.2012. Thereafter, the
Dispute Resolution Panel passed an order on
22.04.2013. The Assessing Officer passed a final order
on 31.05.2013. The assessee thereupon preferred an
appeal before the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal
(hereinafter referred to as 'the tribunal' for short) . The
tribunal by an order dated 11.10.2017 inter alia held
that draft assessment was completed by the Assessing
Officer on 05.07.2012, which was beyond the period of
limitation. After considering and excluding all the time
period provided under Section 153(1)(a) read along with
second proviso and explanation. Accordingly, the draft
assessment and consequential assessment dated
31.05.2013 were held to be barred by limitation and
were accordingly quashed. In the aforesaid factual
backdrop, this appeal has been filed.
4. Learned counsel for the revenue submitted
that the tribunal erred in computing the period of
limitation for giving effect to directions of the court in a
writ petition by resorting to provisions of Section
153(1)(a) of the Act rather than considering Section
153(3)(ii) of the Act. It is further submitted that all the
time limits have been adhered to as prescribed in
Sections 153, 92CA and 144C of the Act and therefore,
the order passed by the tribunal deserves to be
quashed. In support of aforesaid submissions, reliance
has been placed on decision of this court in
'COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LTU VS. ASTRA
ZENECA PHARMA INDIA LTD.,(2020) 117
TAXMANN.COM 533 (KARNATAKA).
5. On the other hand, learned Senior counsel for
the assessee submitted that the draft assessment order
ought to have been passed on 06.05.2012, whereas, the
same has been passed on 05.07.2012, which is beyond
the period of limitation. It is contended that Section
153(2A) of the Act applies if the order of assessment is
set aside in entirety by the appellate authority, whereas,
Section 153(3)(ii) applies to the case where any
direction is issued either by appellate authority,
revisional authority or any other authority to decide an
issue. It is also pointed out that in the instant case, no
direction / finding has been issued by this court in the
order dated 07.03.2012 passed in W.P.No.45313/2011
and a direction issued to remit the matter and asking
the assessee to appear before the Assessing Officer on a
particular date does not tantamount to either issuing a
direction / finding within the meaning of Section
153(3)(ii) of the Act. In support of aforesaid
submissions, reliance has been placed on decisions of
the Supreme Court in 'INCOME-TAX OFFICER VS.
MURLIDHAR BHAGWAN DAS', (1964) 52 ITR 335
(SC), 'RAJINDER NATH VS. COMMISSIONER OF
INCOME-TAX', (1979) 2 TAXMAN 204 (SC) and a
decision of the Allahabad High Court in
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, AGRA VS.
CHANDRA BHAN BANSAL', (2014) 46
TAXMANN.COM 108 (ALLAHABAD).
6. We have considered the submissions made
by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the
record. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to take
note of relevant extract of statutory provisions as were
invoked at the relevant time viz., Section 153(1)(a) and
1st proviso, 2nd proviso and clause (i) and (ii), Section
2(A), relevant extract of Section 153(3) of the Act,
which reads as under:
153. Time limit for completion of assessments and reassessments.
(1) No order of assessment shall be made under Section 143 or Section 144 at any time after the expiry of -
(a) two years from the end of the assessment year in which the income was first assessable; or
Provided that in case the assessment year in which the income was first assessable in the Assessment Year commencing on the 1st day of April, 2004 or any subsequent Assessment Year, the provisions of clause (a) shall have effect as if for the words :two years", the words "twenty-one months" had been substituted.
Provided further that in case the assessment year in which the income was first assessable is the assessment Year
commencing on the 1st day of April, 2005 or any subsequent assessment year and during the course of the proceeding for the assessment of total income, a reference under Sub-Section (1) of Section 92CA -
(i) was made before the 1st day of June 2007 but an order under sub-Section (3) of that Section has not been made before such date or
(ii) is made on or after the 1st day of June 2007.
The provisions of clause(a) shall , notwithstanding anything contained in the first proviso, have effect as if for the words 'two years', the words "thirty -three months" had been substituted.
(2A) 1 Notwithstanding anything contained in sub- sections (1) and (2), in relation to the assessment year commencing on the 1st day of April, 1971 , and any subsequent assessment year, an order of fresh assessment under section, 146 or in pursuance of an order, under section 250, section 254, section 263 or section 264, setting aside or cancelling an assessment,
may be made at any time before the expiry of two years from the end of the financial year in which the order under section 146 cancelling the assessment is passed by the 2 Assessing Officer or the order under section 250 or section 254 is received by the 4 Chief Commissioner or Commissioner or, as the case may be, the order under section 263 or section 264 is passed by the 4 Chief Commissioner or Commissioner.
(3) The provisions of sub- sections (1) and (2) shall not apply to the following classes of assessments, reassessments and recomputations which may, 5 subject to the provisions of sub- section (2A),] be completed at any time-
(i) [..............]
(ii) where the assessment, reassessment or recomputation is made on the assessee or any person in consequence of or to give effect to any finding or direction contained in an order under section- 250, 254, 260, 262, 263 or 264 6 or in an order of any court in a proceeding otherwise than
by way of appeal or reference under this Act];
Explanation 1 - In computing the period of limitation for the purposes of this section -
(i) the time taken in reopening the whole or any part of the proceeding or in giving an opportunity to the assessee to be re-heard under the proviso to Section 129 or
(ii) the period during which the assessment proceeding is stayed by a order or injunction of any court, or
(iia) the period commencing from the date on which the Assessing Officer intimates the Central Government or the prescribed authority, the contravention of the provisions of clause (21) or clause (22B) or clause (23A) or clause (23B) or sub- clause (iv) or sub-clause(v) or sub-clause
(vi) or sub-clause (via) of clause (23C) of Section 10, under clause (i) of the proviso to sub-section (3) of Section 143 and ending with the date on which the copy of the order withdrawing the approval or rescinding the
Notification as the case may be, under those clauses is received by the Assessing Officer.
Provided that where immediately after the exclusion of the aforesaid time or period, the period of limitation referred to in sub- Sections (1), (1A), (1B), (2), , (2A) and (4) available to the Assessing Officer for making an order of assessment, reassessment or recomputation, as the case may be, is less than sixty days, such remaining period shall be extended to sixty days, such remaining period shall be extended to sixty days and the aforesaid period of limitation shall be deemed to be extended accordingly.
7. A bench of this court by an order dated
07.03.2012 disposed of the writ petition viz.,
W.P.No.45313/2011 in the following terms:
3. Having regard to the submission made by both the counsel, there is no option but to accept the writ petition, set aside the impugned order and remit the matter to the 1st respondent-Assessing Officer.
4. The petitioner shall take these proceedings as notice to them and shall appear before the 1st respondent on 21st March 2012. The petitioners are not entitled for any fresh notice.
8. The Supreme Court in 'RAJINDER NATH VS.
COMMISSIONER OF INCOME-TAX', (1979) 2
TAXMAN 204 (SC) and 'INCOME-TAX OFFICER VS.
MURLIDHAR BHAGWAN DAS', (1964) 52 ITR 335
(SC), supra has held that a finding given in an appeal,
revision or reference arising out of an assessment must
be a finding necessary for disposal of a particular case.
Similarly, a direction must be an expressed direction
necessary for disposal of the case before authority of
court and must also be a direction which the authority of
court is empowered to give while deciding a case before
it. Thus, it is evident that the order dated 07.03.2012
passed by learned Single Judge of this court neither
contains any finding nor any direction.
9. The proceedings were stayed for a period
from 08.12.2011 to 07.03.2012 i.e., for a period of 103
days and if period of 103 days is added, and a period of
60 days as prescribed in proviso to Section 153(4) is
added, the draft order ought to have been passed by the
Assessing Officer upto 06.05.2012, whereas, in the
instant case, the draft order has been passed on
05.07.2012 and therefore, the draft order is barred by
limitation and no fault can be found with the finding of
the tribunal.
In view of preceding analysis, the substantial
questions of law are answered against the revenue and
in favour of the assessee. In the result, we do not find
any merit in the appeal, the same fails and is hereby
dismissed.
Sd/-
JUDGE
Sd/-
JUDGE ss
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