The State Of Jharkhand vs Chandan Kumar Prasad
2026 Latest Caselaw 2242 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

The State Of Jharkhand vs Chandan Kumar Prasad on 23 March, 2026

Author: Rajesh Shankar

Bench: Rajesh Shankar

                                                          2026:JHHC:8092-DB




     IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                      L.P.A. No.752 of 2023
                               With
                     I.A. No.11761 of 2023
                                -----

1. The State of Jharkhand

2. Director General, Home Guard, Jharkhand, Rajendra Chowk, P.O. & P.S. Doranda, Ranchi.

3. Commandant, Home Guard Headquarter, Jharkhand, Project Building, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa, Ranchi.

4. Deputy Commissioner, Bokaro.

5. Superintendent of Police, Bokaro.

6. District Commandant, Home Guard, Bokaro.

7. The District Election Officer-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Palamau.

.......... Appellants.

-Versus-

Chandan Kumar Prasad, son of Late Jaglal Prasad, resident of City Center, Sector IV/B, P.O. & P.S. Sector IV, District Bokaro.

.......... Respondents.

-----

       CORAM :           HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
                     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
                                -----
       For the Appellants :        Mr. Manish Kumar, Sr. SC-II
                                   Mr. Ashwini Bhushan, AC to Sr. SC-II
       For the Respondent:         Mr. Ranjan Kumar, Advocate
                                -----
       Order No.11                                Date: 23.03.2026

1.     Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. I.A. No.11761 of 2023 seeks condonation of delay of 306 days in

instituting the letters patent appeal.

3. The original application contained no reasons whatsoever offering

any explanation to show sufficient cause. Therefore, liberty was

granted to the appellants to file supplementary affidavit.

4. The supplementary affidavit was filed on 23rd September, 2025

but upon perusing the same, we are satisfied that mostly routine

and some irrelevant circumstances have been roped in to make

2026:JHHC:8092-DB

out a case that there was sufficient cause for condoning this

delay.

5. There are several gaps in the original application as well as the

supplementary affidavit purporting to support the I.A. for

condonation of delay.

6. The period up to the issuance of a certified copy of the order may

be excluded. However, after the certified copy was received on

25th February, 2023, it was forwarded to the Principal Secretary,

Department of Home, Jail and Disaster Management,

Government of Jharkhand, on 29th March, 2023, seeking

instructions in the matter. This was responded to after almost five

months, i.e. on 2nd August, 2023. The response was also neither

positive nor negative. The response only required the furnishing

of grounds of appeal.

7. Thereafter, the file has been moved back and forth unnecessarily.

One of the reasons given concerns elections in Madhya Pradesh,

where some Home Guards had to be sent for election duty. Now,

this reason has nothing to do with the filing of the present appeal.

It is not as if the Home Guards were themselves involved in either

preparing the appeal memo or filing the appeal.

8. Routine administrative reasons, which inspire no confidence

whatsoever, have been cited to explain the substantial delay. The

averments are casual and do not constitute sufficient cause.

9. In the case of Postmaster General and Others Vs. Living

Media India Limited and Another, reported in (2012)3

SCC 563, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-

2026:JHHC:8092-DB

"25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr. Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent, their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very same day.

There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy of the impugned judgment on 11-9- 2009 or at least within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months.

26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by taking appropriate steps.

27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the Government is a party before us.

28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the

2026:JHHC:8092-DB

view that in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government."

10. In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji

Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR, reported in 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 489, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-

"25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses to approach the court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings.

26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for

2026:JHHC:8092-DB

condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants.

35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case."

11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the rules of limitation

are based on the principles of sound public policy and equity. The

length of the delay is a relevant consideration in the condonation

of delay in filing an appeal. If it is found that the delay in filing

the appeal has arisen due to the party's own negligence and

casual attitude, the delay may not be condoned on the grounds

of doing substantial justice.

12. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has also held that it is trite law that

a government department cannot claim a separate period of

limitation. The law of limitation undoubtedly binds everyone,

including the Government. The claim for condonation of delay on

2026:JHHC:8092-DB

account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic

methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view

of the modern technologies available and in use. If it is found

from the record of a particular case that the department(s) or the

officials concerned were not diligent in prosecuting the matter in

the Court by taking appropriate steps, the application for

condonation of delay is liable to be rejected.

13. In Shivamma (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. Karnataka Housing Board

& Ors., reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has once again made it abundantly clear that

"administrative lethargy and laxity" can never stand as a sufficient

ground for condonation of delay. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in

para 261 observed "we want to convey an emphatic message to

all the High Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous

and superficial grounds, until a proper case of sufficient cause is

made out, wherein the State-machinery is able to establish that

it acted with bona fides and remained vigilant all throughout.

Procedure is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But

courts, and more particularly the constitutional courts, ought not

to obviate the procedure for a litigating State agency, who also

equally suffer the bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due

to its own lackadaisical attitude."

14. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further observed that the High Courts

ought not give a legitimising effect to such callous attitude of the

State authorities or their instrumentalities, and should remain

extra cautious if the party seeking condonation of delay is a State

2026:JHHC:8092-DB

authority. They should not become surrogates for State laxity and

lethargy. The constitutional courts ought to be cognizant of the

apathy and pangs of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed

in situations of perpetual litigation, wherein the fruits of their

decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at later stages.

15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed: "We are at pains to

reiterate this everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to

notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay, until

sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts only add insult

to the injury, more particularly in appeals under Section 100 of

the CPC, wherein its jurisdiction is already limited to questions of

law".

16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has further observed that limitation

periods are prescribed to maintain a sweeping scope for the lis to

attain for finality. More than the importance of judicial time, what

worries is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is to

contest against an enormous State, and its elaborate and never-

exhausting paraphernalia. Such litigations deserve to be disposed

of at the very threshold, because, say, if a party litigating against

the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest the

condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present case, it

reopens the lis for another round of litigation, and leaves such

litigant listless yet again. As courts of conscience, Courts are

obligated to ensure that a litigant is not sent from pillar to post

to seek justice. No litigant should be permitted to be so lethargic

2026:JHHC:8092-DB

and apathetic, much less be permitted by the courts to misuse

the process of law.

17. For all the above reasons, we decline to condone the delay for

want of any sufficient cause. I.A. No.11761 of 2023 is dismissed

without any order for costs.

18. As a consequence of the dismissal of the aforesaid I.A., the

accompanying appeal does not survive and is disposed of.

(M. S. Sonak, C.J.)

(Rajesh Shankar, J.) 23rd March, 2026 Sanjay/AKT Uploaded on 24.03.2026