[Cites 15, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
Farah Tabassum Age 28 Years vs Mohammad Mojmail Haque on 10 February, 2026
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No.255 of 2023
------
Farah Tabassum Age 28 years, w/o, Mohammad Mojamil
Haque daughter of, Mazhar Jamil, Resident Of Sector 12/B,
Qrs. No. 1037, P.O. and P.S., Sector-12, B.S City, District-
Bokaro, Jharkhand. ...... Appellant/Defendant
Versus
Mohammad Mojmail Haque, s/o Basir Ansari, Resident of
Oman Market Near Madrasa Goush Nagar, Bharra, P.O &
P.S. Chas, District-Bokaro, Jharkhand.... ....
Respondent/plaintiff
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
.....
For the Appellant : Mr. Hemant Kr. Shikarwar, Advocate
: Mr. Tushar, Advocate
For the Respondent : None
.....
C.A.V. on 02.02.2026 Pronounced on 10/02/2026
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer:
1. The instant appeal under section 19(1) of the Family
Courts Act, 1984 is directed against the judgment dated
28.08.2023, decree signed on 05.09.2023, passed in Original
Suit No.451 of 2021 by learned Principal Judge, Family
Court, Bokaro whereby and whereunder the petition filed by
the petitioner-husband (respondent herein) under Section
281 of the Mohammedan Law, for restitution of conjugal
rights has been allowed.
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case of the petitioner/husband
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(respondent herein) as narrated before the learned Family
Court, is that his marriage with the respondent (appellant
herein) was solemnized on 25.11.2017 as per Muslim rites
and custom at Bokaro.
3. After marriage, they lived together as man and wife.
They have no issue from the wedlock. It is the case of the
respondent/ plaintiff/ husband that the appellant/
defendant/wife lived few days properly in her matrimonial
home. After that, she on some pretext or the other, insisted
to go to her parents' home, for which she became aggressive.
She does not want to live in his joint family. She pressurized
him to live separately from his family, for which she used to
quarrel.
4. On 14.05.2019, she sent her all belongings with her
uncle, including all ornaments and on 15.05.2019, she on
her own will went to her parents' home with her father, for
which husband had made online information to Chas Police
Station on the same day.
5. After mediation in Mahila Thana, Bokaro, on
19.05.2019, they started living separately in a rented house.
In spite of that there were no changes in her behaviour.
Lastly, on 09.02.2021, she again went to her parents' home
with her father. After that, he left no stone unturned to
bring her back but she denied.
6. On 13.02.2021, she had filed Bokaro Mahila P.S.
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Case No. 08 of 2021 against them under Dowry Prohibition
Act, which is still pending. In spite of living separately with
the respondent, from his family members, she denied to live
with him. He is still ready to keep her with him with full
honour and dignity.
7. Consequent to issue of notice, wife/defendant
(appellant herein) had filed written statement wherein she
had stated that she wanted to live with her in-laws but her
in-laws did not want to keep her with them. The plaintiff
(respondent herein) assaulted her brutally in presence of her
uncle on 14.05.2019 and even tried to kill her on
15.05.2019, for which she had filed Mahila P.S Case No.
08 of 2021. The Petitioner (respondent herein) hatched
conspiracy, tried to kill her on fire, confined her in a room.
The Petitioner/husband is man of cruel nature. She
apprehends her life in the hands of the petitioner. Therefore,
the instant suit of the Petitioner is liable to be dismissed.
8. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, following
issues have been framed by the learned Family Judge for
just and final decision of the case :-
(i) Is this suit maintainable in its present form?
(ii) Whether the petitioner has valid cause of action for the
suit?
(iii) Whether the petitioner has been able to prove that the
respondent has withdrawn herself from the society of
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the petitioner without any reasonable cause?
(iv) Whether the petitioner is entitled for Decree of
restitution of conjugal rights against respondent?
(v) Whether the Petitioner is entitled to get the relief as
prayed for?
9. In order to substantiate his case, the petitioner
(respondent herein) has been examined as PW-1.
10. Further, the documentary evidence has been
produced on behalf of the petitioner (respondent herein), i.e.
-
Sl. Exhibit Number Description
No.
1 Marked - X for Photocopy of Award of Lok Adalat
identification
2 Marked - X/1 Photocopy of application
for identification addressed to the S.P., Bokaro
3 Marked - X/2 Photocopy of FIR Balidih P.S.
for identification Case No.51 of 2021.
4 Marked - X/3 Photocopy of photograph of
for identification respondent with the petitioner.
11. On the other hand, respondent (appellant herein)
has produced and examined altogether two witnesses on her
behalf, i.e., R.W.-1, Farah Tabassum (appellant herself) and
R.W.-2 Khurshid Alam, father of the appellant herein.
12. The respondent-wife (appellant herein) has also filed
documentary evidence on her behalf, i.e., -
Sl. Exhibit Number Description
No.
1 Marked - Y for Photocopy of compromise paper
identification dated 19.05.2019.
2 Marked - Y/1 for Photocopy of FIR No.8 of 2021
identification
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3 Marked - Y/2 for Photocopy of application dated
identification 15.05.2019 by Bimla Hansda,
A.S.I., Mahila P.S. Bokaro,
addressed to the Civil surgeon,
Sadar Hospital, Bokaro.
13. Learned Family Judge, after institution of the said
case, taking into consideration the pleadings of the parties
have decided the lis by granting a decree for restitution of
conjugal rights in favour of the petitioner-husband
(respondent herein).
14. The aforesaid judgment by which the decree for
restitution of conjugal rights has been granted in favour of
the petitioner-husband (respondent herein) is under
challenge by filing the instant appeal.
Submission advanced on behalf of the appellant-wife
15. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant-wife has
taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned
judgment:
(i) There is an apparent error in the impugned judgment,
since, each and every aspect of the matter has not been
taken into consideration and the learned trial Court
has failed to take into consideration the evidences
available on record.
(ii) It has been contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant-wife that the learned Family Judge has
committed serious illegality in passing the impugned
judgment.
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(iii) It has been contended that the respondent-husband
has not taken sincere steps to restore his married life,
rather, committed his wife with torture and cruelty
leading to filing of criminal case being Mahila P.S Case
No. 08 of 2021.
(iv) The respondent-husband has neglected his wife by all
means. He is a person of very rude nature.
(v) The learned family court has not appreciated the fact
that the appellant was subjected to cruelty by the
petitioner/husband and there was valid reason for
denial of conjugal life with the husband/petitioner.
(vi) The learned court has also not appreciated the fact
that the husband/petitioner, on false assurance,
compromised the previous case and again indulged in
said activities.
(vii) The learned court below has failed to take into
consideration that the appellant has apprehension of
being killed at the hands of her husband/petitioner.
(viii) The learned Family Judge ought to have considered the
filing of criminal case by the wife which itself shows
that the respondent-husband is not maintaining his
wife.
(ix) It has been submitted that learned Family Judge ought
to have considered the deposition of R.W.-2, namely,
Khurshid Alam, who happens to be the father of the
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appellant/wife. In his entire testimony, he has deposed
that he has made sincere efforts and requested the
respondent/husband to keep his daughter(appellant)
in a dignified manner.
16. The learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid
grounds, has submitted that the impugned judgment and
decree, therefore, requires interference.
Submission advanced on behalf of the respondent-
husband
17. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-
husband has taken the following grounds in defending the
impugned judgment: -
(i) There is no error in the impugned judgement as the
learned Family Judge has considered the entire issue
and on the basis of evidence as led by the respondent-
wife (appellant herein) has passed the order impugned,
as such, same may not be interfered with.
(ii) It has been contended by the learned counsel for the
respondent-husband that since beginning of the
marriage, the appellant was not co-operative, she always
used to tease him for her higher education and also
pressurized him to live separately from his parents.
(iii) It has also been contended that the respondent-wife
(appellant herein) was withdrawn from the society of the
petitioner-husband (respondent herein) and she left the
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house of the petitioner-husband without any cogent
reason.
(iv) It has been submitted that the petitioner-husband
(respondent herein) had made several attempts to bring
the appellant/wife but she always refused to come and
join the society of the petitioner-husband (respondent
herein).
(v) It has also been submitted that the learned Family
Court after taking into consideration the material
available on record has found that the conduct of the
appellant-wife has never been towards salvaging the
institution of marriage as it is she who has refused to
come and join the society of the respondent-husband
(respondent herein) and, therefore on the pretext of the
aforesaid categorical finding of the Family Court, the
impugned order requires no interference.
18. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds,
has submitted that the learned Family Judge has rightly
recorded its finding that the respondent-husband is
bonafidely since beginning always tried his best to lead a
happy conjugal life but it is the appellant-wife who at every
moment of time avoided him, hence, the impugned judgment
cannot be said to suffer from an error.
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Analysis:
19. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the
parties and gone through the impugned judgment as well as
the Trial Court Records, as also the testimonies of the
witnesses and evidences available on record.
20. Sub-section (1) to section 19 of the Family Courts
Act provides that an appeal shall lie from every judgment or
order not being an interlocutory order of a Family Court to
the High Court "both on facts and on law". Therefore,
section 19 of the Family Courts Act is parallel to section 96
of the Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of which has been
dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in catena of
judgments.
21. The law is well settled that the High Court in a First
Appeal can examine every question of law and fact which
arises in the facts of the case and has powers to affirm,
reverse or modify the judgment under question. In "Jagdish
Singh v. Madhuri Devi" (2008) 10 SCC 497 the Hon'ble
Supreme Court observed that it is lawful for the High Court
acting as the First Appellate Court to enter into not only
questions of law but questions of fact as well and the
appellate Court therefore can reappraise, reappreciate and
review the entire evidence and can come to its own
conclusion. For ready reference the relevant paragraph of
the said judgment is being quoted as under:-
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"It is no doubt true that the High Court was exercising
power as the first appellate court and hence it was
open to the Court to enter into not only questions of
law but questions of fact as well. It is settled law that
an appeal is a continuation of suit. An appeal thus is a
rehearing of the main matter and the appellate court
can reappraise, reappreciate and review the entire
evidence--oral as well as documentary--and can come
to its own conclusion."
22. Now we are proceeding to the factual aspects of the
case.
23. The admitted fact herein is that the suit before
learned Family Court has been filed by the respondent
husband under Section 281 of the Mohammedan Law for a
decree of restitution of conjugal rights wherein altogether
five issues have been framed by the learned Family Court,
for ready reference, the same are being quoted hereinbelow:-
(i) Is this suit maintainable in its present form?
(ii) Whether the petitioner has valid cause of action for the
suit?
(iii) Whether the petitioner has been able to prove that the
respondent has withdrawn herself from the society of the
petitioner without any reasonable cause?
(iv) Whether the petitioner is entitled for Decree of restitution
of conjugal rights against respondent?
(v) Whether the Petitioner is entitled to get the relief as
prayed for?
24. The learned Family Judge has taken into
consideration the foremost issue, i.e., issue no.(iii)-
"Whether the petitioner has been able to prove that the
respondent has withdrawn herself from the society of the
petitioner without any reasonable cause?"
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25. The learned Family Judge has considered the
evidence adduced on behalf of the parties for deciding the
issues involved in the said suit.
26. During the trial, on behalf of the petitioner/husband
only petitioner-husband (respondent herein) has been
examined as P.W.1.
27. P.W.-1 Mohammad Mojamil Haque (Petitioner before
the learned Family Court) has stated in his examination-in-
chief filed on oath that his marriage with the respondent
was solemnized on 25.11.2017 as per Muslim rites and
custom at Bokaro. Since beginning of the marriage, the
respondent was not co-operative, she always used to tease
him for her higher education. She also pressurized him to
live separately from his parents. On 14.05.2019, after
quarreling with his family members, she called her uncle
and maternal uncle and sent her clothes and jewelleries to
her parents home and then on 15.05.2019, she called her
father and went to her parents home. She has filed a false
case against him in Mahila Police Station. That case was
compromised on 19.05.2019. After that, they started living
in a rented house separately from his parents. He had filed
Original Suit No. 324 of 2019 u/S. 281 of Mohammadan
Law for restitution of conjugal rights, which was
compromised and since 17.07.2019 they were living together
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in a rented house. On 09.02.2021, due to heavy workload,
he returned home in night, but the respondent did not open
the door and abused him. He returned to his shop and slept
there. On next morning he returned home and found doors
of his house locked. On query, he came to know that at
about 11:00 pm last night, the respondent has gone to her
parents home. Thereafter, he has given an information to
Chas Police Station. Several times, he tried to bring her back
but of no use. On 16.02.2021, the respondent with her
family members has tried to kill him for which he has filed
Balidih P.S. Case No. 51 of 2021. The respondent has filed a
case under Dowry Prohibition Act against them which is
pending. Further, he states that he does not know that his
protest petition in Balidih P.S. Case No. 51 of 2021 was
rejected. He has given an information against the father of
the respondent in SAIL.
28. During the trial, two witnesses have been examined
on behalf of the respondent-wife (appellant herein) who
herself has been examined as R.W.1 and her father
Khurshid Alam as R.W.2.
29. RW-1 Farah Tabassum (respondent) has stated
about her marriage with the petitioner and also subjecting
her with cruelty and torture due to non-fulfillment of
demand of dowry. Panchayati was held on 14.05.2019 and
before her uncle, the petitioner has assaulted her and on
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15.09.2019 before her father, he tried to strangulate her.
She has filed a complaint in Mahila Police Station, which
was compromised. It has been stated that the petitioner
tried to kill her by pouring kerosene oil. When she has filed
Mahila P.S. Case No. 08 of 2021. The Petitioner was taken
into custody. The Petitioner pressurized her to sign on blank
stamp paper and on plain paper. She has filed Original
Maintenance Case No. 202 of 2021, in which the petitioner
of this case was ordered to pay Rs.3,000/- per month
towards her maintenance, but the Petitioner of this case is
not paying her regularly. Further, she states that the case
was compromised in the year 2019 in Police Station. In that
year, the Petitioner has filed a case for restitution of
conjugal rights against her. In her cross-examination, she
has admitted that in April 2023, she has received
Rs.10,000/- as maintenance.
30. RW-2 Khurshid Alam (Father) has supported the
case of the respondent/ appellant herein and in his
examination-in-chief filed on oath and has further states
that the Petitioner/ respondent herein has demanded dowry
from the respondent and he was informed by the respondent
within 1-2 days of her marriage. There was a Panchayati in
the house of the petitioner, but he could not recall the day
and time. For the last time, he went to the house of the
Petitioner with the respondent and the petitioner was
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standing outside of his house.
31. From the aforesaid factual aspect, it is evident that
Respondent-husband's case was that his appellant/wife left
matrimonial home without any lawful ground and further
even without informing anyone. All the efforts to bring back
the wife failed, in view of the above circumstances, the
husband instituted a family suit invoking Section 281 of the
Mohammedan Law for the restitution of the conjugal rights.
32. The learned Family Court allowed the suit and
passed a decree for restitution of conjugal rights in favor of
the husband against which present appeal has been filed.
33. It needs to refer herein that Section 281 of the
Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law deals with the
aspect of the restitution of conjugal rights but does not
throw any light as to in what circumstances, a decree for
restitution of conjugal rights can be granted or declined, for
ready reference Section 281 from the Principles of
Mohammedan Law by Mulla 20th edition at page 367
which reads as under: -
"Where a wife without lawful cause ceases to cohabit
with her husband, the husband may sue the wife for
restitution of conjugal rights."
34. The aforesaid would indicate that there is no such law
for seeking the relief of restitution of conjugal rights. The
parties will be governed by their personal law. It needs to
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refer herein that a marriage between Mohammedans is a
civil contract and a suit for restitution of conjugal rights is
nothing more than an enforcement of the right to
consortium under this contract.
35. It is equitable proposition of law that in a suit for
restitution of conjugal rights by a husband against his wife,
if the Court after a review of the evidence feels that the
circumstances reveal that the husband had been guilty of
unnecessary harassment caused to his wife or of such
conduct as to make it inequitable for the Court to compel
his wife to live with him, it will refuse the relief.
36. In the instant from factual aspect, it is evident
that Respondent-husband's case was that his appellant/wife
left matrimonial home without any lawful ground and
further even without informing anyone.
37. Per contra the appellant/wife who had been
examined as RW-1 has stated before the learned Family
Court about her marriage with the respondent/husband and
she had further stated that she is subjected with cruelty and
torture by the respondent husband due to non-fulfillment of
demand of dowry. She had further stated that on
14.05.2019 before her uncle, the respondent/husband has
assaulted her and on 15.09.2019 before her father, he tried
to strangulate her.
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38. She had also stated that on 09.02.2021, the
petitioner/husband (respondent herein) tried to kill her by
pouring kerosene oil and when she has filed Mahila P.S.
Case No. 08 of 2021, the respondent/husband was taken
into custody. It has further been stated that the Petitioner
pressurized her to sign on blank stamp paper and on plain
paper.
39. Thus, from the aforesaid fact it is evident the appellant
wife has alleged serious instances of cruelty and the same
was substantiated by the statement of his Father who had
been examined as RW.2.
40. At this juncture in the aforesaid context, it would be
apt to refer Section 14 of the Family Courts Act, 1984.
Section 14 reads thus;
"14. Application of Indian Evidence Act, 1872-A Family
Court may receive as evidence any report, statement,
documents, information or matter that may, in its
opinion, assist it to deal effectually with a dispute,
whether or not the same would be otherwise relevant
or admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872."
41. Thus, from the aforesaid it is evident that the
consideration of evidence by a Court in the matrimonial
matter is not restricted by the rules of relevancy or
admissibility provided under the Evidence Act. The Court is
left free to receive any evidence or material which assists it to
deal effectually with a dispute and the provisions of the
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Evidence Act would not be applicable in toto. Further the
Court deals with disputes concerning the family and should
adopt an approach different from that adopted in any
ordinary civil proceedings.
42. Thus, it is considered view of this Court that in the
cases of the present type, more particularly, matrimonial
disputes, the Family Court owes a duty to read something in
between the lines so as to try to understand the root cause of
the discord between the parties rather than going by the
strict rules of evidence.
43. Admittedly as discussed hereinabove the appellant wife
has alleged serious act of cruelty against the respondent
husband and had particularly stated about the pouring of
kerosene oil upon her by the respondent husband.
44. It needs to refer herein that for cruelty, there must be
violence of such a character as to endanger personal health
or safety or there must be reasonable apprehension of it. A
simple chastisement on one or two occasions would not
amount to such cruelty. The Mohammedan law on the
question of what is legal cruelty between man and wife does
not differ materially. A good deal of ill-treatment, even if it is
short of cruelty, may amount to legal cruelty.
45. It appears from the materials on record and, more
particularly, the case put up by the appellant-wife before this
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Court that she was being compelled to leave the matrimonial
house. It is evident from oral evidences that this is not a case
in which it could be said that the appellant wife left her
matrimonial home along with her own will and without any
compulsion. It is more than clear having regard to the
evidence on record that the wife was not comfortable at her
matrimonial home on account of various domestic issues. If
on account of all such problems, one fine day if she decided
to walk out of her matrimonial home, could it be said that the
husband straightway is entitled to have a decree for
restitution of conjugal rights.
46. It has to be borne in mind that the decision in a suit
for the restitution of conjugal rights does not entirely depend
upon the right of the husband. The Family Court should
also consider whether it would make it inequitable for it to
compel the wife to live with her husband. Our ideas of law in
that regard have to be altered in such a way as to bring
them in conformity with the modern social conditions.
Nothing has been shown before this Court in the form of any
rule or otherwise which compel the Courts to always pass a
decree in a suit for restitution of conjugal rights in favour of
the husband. As long as there is no such rule, it would be
just and reasonable for the Court to deny the said relief to
the plaintiff-husband (respondent herein) if the surrounding
circumstances indicate that it would be inequitable to do so.
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47. It is settled position of law that if cruelty in a degree
rendering it unsafe for the wife to return to her husband's
dominion were established, the Court might refuse to send
her back.
48. In Anis Begum v. Muhammad Istafa Wali
Khan, 1933 SCC OnLine All 138 : (AIR 1933 All 634)
Sulaiman, C.J., observed as follows:
"Their Lordships of the Privy Council in the case
of Moonshee Buzloor Ruheem v. Shumsoonnissa
Begum, 11 Moo IA 551 (PC) observed that a suit for
restitution of conjugal rights, though in the
nature of a suit for specific performance is in
reality a suit to enforce a right under the
Muhammadan law and the Courts should have
regard to the principles of Muhammadan law.
The observation of their Lordships was directed to
emphasising the point that Courts should not exercise
their discretion in complete supersession of the
Muhammadan Law, but that in exercise of their
discretion they should refer to that law. But the
principle was fully recognised that in passing a decree
for the restitution of conjugal rights, the Court has
power to take into account all the circumstances of the
case and impose terms which it considers to be fair
and reasonable."
49. It follows, from the aforesaid that in a suit for
restitution of conjugal rights by a Muslim husband against
his wife, if the Court after a review of the evidence feels that
the circumstances reveal that the husband has been guilty of
unnecessary harassment caused to his wife or of such
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conduct as to make it inequitable for the Court to compel his
wife to live with him, it will refuse the relief.
50. Even in the absence of satisfactory proof of the
husband's cruelty, the Court will not pass a decree for
restitution in favour of the husband if, on the evidence, it
feels that the circumstances are such that it will be unjust
and inequitable to compel her to live with him.
51. It is considered view of this Court based upon the
aforesaid discussion and also from perusal of the impugned
judgment that the learned family Court has not taken into
consideration the entire factual aspect and evidences
available on record in right prespective and further the
evidence laid by appellant wife wherein it has been alleged
that she has apprehension about danger of her life as one
day the respondent husband tried to pour kerosene oil upon
her, has not properly been considered therefore, the
impugned order/judgment suffers from perversity.
52. It needs to refer herein the interpretation of the
word "perverse" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex
Court which means that there is no evidence or erroneous
consideration of the evidence.
53. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs.
State [Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr.,
(2009) 10 SCC 206 while elaborately discussing the word
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perverse has held that it is, no doubt, true that if a finding
of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant
material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material
or if the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from
the vice of irrationality incurring the blame of being
perverse, then, the finding is rendered infirm in law.
Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27 of the
said judgment reads as under:
"24. The expression "perverse" has been dealt with
in a number of cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman
Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this Court observed that
the expression "perverse" means that the findings of
the subordinate authority are not supported by the
evidence brought on record or they are against the
law or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry
& Co. Ltd. [AIR 1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that
"perverse finding" means a finding which is not only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber &
Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994
SC 1341] the Court observed that this is not a case
where it can be said that the findings of the
authorities are based on no evidence or that they are
so perverse that no reasonable person would have
arrived at those findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977
Kant 58] the Court observed that any order made in
conscious violation of pleading and law is a perverse
order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331] the
Court observed that a "perverse verdict" may
probably be defined as one that is not only against
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the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence.
In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court defined
"perverse" as turned the wrong way, not right;
distorted from the right; turned away or deviating
from what is right, proper, correct, etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by
various dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of
Current English, 6th Edn.
"Perverse.--Showing deliberate determination to
behave in a way that most people think is wrong,
unacceptable or unreasonable."
2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English,
International Edn.
Perverse.--Deliberately departing from what is
normal and reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998
Edn.
Perverse.--Law (of a verdict) against the weight of
evidence or the direction of the judge on a point of
law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the
English Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.--Purposely deviating from accepted or
expected behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward;
stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words &
Phrases, 4th Edn.
"Perverse.--A perverse verdict may probably be
defined as one that is not only against the weight of
evidence but is altogether against the evidence."
54. Thus, the expression "perverse" means that the
findings of the subordinate authority are not supported by
2026:JHHC:3570-DB
the evidence brought on record or they are against the law
or suffer from the vice of procedural irregularity. A perverse
verdict may probably be defined as one that is not only
against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence.
55. Thus, from the perusal of the impugned order, it is
evident that the learned family Judge while allowing the
appeal in favour of the plaintiff/petitioner (respondent
herein) has not appreciated properly the factual aspect and
further without applying the test of reasonableness, has
passed the order of restitution of conjugal rights.
56. Thus, on the basis of discussion made hereinabove,
this Court is of the considered view that it is a case where it
can be said that the findings of the learned Family Court are
based on no evidence and the order of restitution of conjugal
rights has been passed without due deliberation of the entire
factual aspect along with the proper appreciation of
evidences laid by both the parties, and therefore there is
perversity in the order/judgment of the learned Family
Court.
57. The upshot of the whole discussion, therefore, is
that this appeal succeeds and the impugned judgment dated
28.08.2023, decree signed on 05.09.2023, passed in
Original Suit No.451 of 2021 by learned Principal Judge,
Family Court, Bokaro is hereby quashed and set-aside.
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58. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed.
59. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also
stands disposed of.
I agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Date: 10/02/2026
Birendra / A.F.R.
Uploaded on 11.02.2026
