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Employers In Relation To The Management ... vs Their Workman Dasrath Gope
2026 Latest Caselaw 633 Jhar

Citation : 2026 Latest Caselaw 633 Jhar
Judgement Date : 3 February, 2026

[Cites 5, Cited by 0]

Jharkhand High Court

Employers In Relation To The Management ... vs Their Workman Dasrath Gope on 3 February, 2026

Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
                                                        2026:JHHC:2841
   IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                     W.P.(L) No. 3866 of 2012
                                 .........

Employers in relation to the Management of M/s Central Coalfields Limited having its registered office at Darbhanga House, P.Ο.-Darbhanga House, P.S.- Kotwali, District - Ranchi; through Sri Birendra Trivedi, son of Late H.N.Trivedi, Deputy Chief Manager (Personnel), Administration, M/s C.C.L., Resident of - Flat No. 2D-1, Koyla Vihar, Burdwan Compound, P.O. - GPO, P.S. -- Lalpur, District - Ranchi.

..... Petitioner (s) Versus Their Workman Dasrath Gope, son of Deonath Gope, resident of Village-Mohli Bandh, P.O. Kathara, P.S. Gomia, District-Bokaro. ..... Respondent(s) .........

 CORAM:          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
                                 .......
         For the Petitioner(s)               : Mr. A.K.Mehta, Adv
                                               Mr. Shubham Malviya, Adv
         For the Respondent(s)               : Mr. Saurabh Shekhar, Adv
                                             .........

C.A.V. ON 09/01/2026                         PRONOUNCED ON:03/02/2026
   1.     Heard learned counsel for the parties.

2. The instant writ petition has been filed by the

Management of M/s Central Coal Fields Limited (CCL)

seeking to quash the award dated 23/11/2011 passed by

the Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1,

Dhanbad (hereinafter referred to as the "Tribunal") in

Reference No. 279 of 2000. By this award, the Tribunal

directed the reinstatement of the Respondent - Workman,

Dasrath Gope, with 50% back wages from the date of his

dismissal until his reinstatement, along with all

consequential benefits.

2026:JHHC:2841 Factual Background:

3. The facts of the case are in a narrow compass. The

Respondent, Shree Dasrath Gope, was allegedly appointed

as a Trainee in Category 1 by an appointment letter dated

10/13/1995 under the Land Loser Scheme. He represented

himself as the grandson of Sahdeo Kurmi, the landowner

whose property was acquired by CCL for mining. However,

the Management later discovered that the Respondent had

entered service by providing incorrect information and

committing fraud, as he was not related to Sahdeo Kurmi.

In fact, Sahdeo Kurmi's son, Sohrai Kurmi, had already

been appointed in exchange for the land acquired by CCL

through another appointment letter dated 02/12/1995.

4. Following this discovery, the Petitioner served a charge

sheet dated 08/10/1997 to the Respondent, seeking his

explanation. In his response, the Respondent denied being

appointed under the Land Loser Scheme. He claimed that

his name was sponsored by the local employment exchange

and that he underwent the selection process, which

included a written examination and interview, after which

he was found eligible and selected for employment as a

trainee. He denied any fraudulent act or misconduct that

would warrant disciplinary action.

5. The Management conducted a domestic enquiry, and

2026:JHHC:2841 the disciplinary authority, after supplying a copy of the

enquiry report and considering the finding of guilt in the

enquiry, dismissed the Respondent from service.

Subsequently, the Respondent raised an industrial dispute,

and conciliation proceedings were undertaken. The

resolution through conciliation efforts failed, leading to the

following reference under Section 10(1)(d) of the Industrial

Disputes Act, 1947:

"Whether the action of the Management of Central Coal Fields Limited, P.O. Kathara, District Bokaro to dismiss Shree Dasrath Gope, workman category 1 from service is legal and justified? If not, to what relief is the workman concerned entitled?"

6. The Tribunal registered this reference as Reference No.

279 of 2000. Given that the dispute involved termination

for alleged misconduct, the validity of the Management's

enquiry was taken up as a preliminary issue. The Tribunal

followed the proper procedure by first determining whether

the domestic enquiry was fair and proper.

Tribunal's Proceedings and Findings:

7. By order dated 08/03/2011, the Tribunal found the

domestic enquiry to be fair and proper. After reaching this

conclusion, it obviously did not call for any additional

evidence. The Tribunal then purportedly, exercised its

2026:JHHC:2841 jurisdiction under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes

Act, 1947. However, at this point, rather than evaluating

the proportionality of the punishment, the Tribunal

comprehensively re-appreciated the evidence from the

enquiry and concluded that the punishment order was

illegal and unsustainable. Thus, despite holding the

enquiry to be fair and proper, the Tribunal once again

revisited the enquiry process and ultimately found in the

award that a second show cause notice had not been

issued to the Respondent - Workman.

Petitioner's Submissions:

8. The Petitioner contends that the Tribunal's procedure

was outside the scope of Section 11A and that the Tribunal

exceeded its jurisdiction by setting aside the punishment

order and directing reinstatement with 50% back wages

and consequential benefits. The Management also argues

that, upon finding the enquiry to be fair and proper, the

Tribunal could only review whether the punishment

imposed was disproportionate to the charges, not re-

appreciate the evidence or act as an appellate authority and

examine the sufficiency or quality of evidence led in the

domestic enquiry. The Tribunal is not empowered to

overturn the findings of the enquiry officer but is limited to

examining the proportionality of the penalty.

2026:JHHC:2841 Respondent's Submissions:

9. Per contra, the Respondent fully supports the

Tribunal's award, asserting that there is no illegality as the

Management failed to prove the charges during the enquiry

proceedings. The Respondent maintains that the

Management did not establish that he was appointed under

the Land Loser Scheme and claims he was selected through

a competitive process, not by misrepresentation. He denies

ever submitting any application claiming to be the

grandson of a landowner whose property was acquired by

CCL.

10. The Respondent emphasizes that Section 11A of the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, vests wide discretionary

powers in the Tribunal, including the authority to re-

appreciate evidence and reach conclusions different from

the enquiry officer, citing relevant Supreme Court decisions

to support this position viz. Workmen v. Balmadies Estates,

(2008) 4 SCC 517 (116), FLR 731 (SC) and 2010 (125) FLR

187 (SC).

Legal Framework:

11. This case turns on the interpretation and application

of Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which

provides:

"11A. Powers of Labour Courts, Tribunals and National Tribunals to give appropriate relief in case of discharge or dismissal of workmen.--

2026:JHHC:2841 Where an industrial dispute relating to the discharge or dismissal of a workman has been referred to a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal for adjudication and, in the course of the adjudication proceedings, the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified, it may, by its award, set aside the order of discharge or dismissal and direct reinstatement of the workman on such terms and conditions, if any, as it thinks fit, or give such other relief to the workman including the award of any lesser punishment in lieu of discharge or dismissal as the circumstances of the case may require: Provided that in any proceeding under this section the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be, shall rely only on the materials on record and shall not take any fresh evidence in relation to the matter."

12. The object and reason for inserting Section 11A was to

incorporate the recommendations of the International

Labour Organization (ILO) on the termination of

employment. The ILO recommended that any aggrieved

worker should be able to challenge termination before a

neutral body such as an arbitrator, court, or tribunal.

Before Section 11A was enacted, the role of Labour Courts

and Tribunals was limited. The Supreme Court in Indian

Iron and Steel Company Limited and Others vs. Their

Workman AIR 1958 SC 138 held that such bodies could

only interfere with dismissal or discharge if there was

evidence of bad faith, victimization, or unfair labour

practice, and not by substituting their own judgment for

that of the Management.

13. The pivotal case following the insertion of Section 11A

is Workman vs. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Company,

1973 (1) SCC 813. The Supreme Court held that after

Section 11A, the Industrial Adjudicator is not restricted to

interfering with punishment only in limited circumstances.

2026:JHHC:2841 The Tribunal has the discretion to examine the

proportionality of the punishment, mould the relief, and

even award lesser punishment if warranted. The Labour

Court or Tribunal has a duty to assess whether the

punishment is disproportionate to the charges proved. The

decision summarises the principles of law in paragraph no.

32 which is reproduced below:-

"32. From those decisions, the following principles broadly emerge:

"(1) The right to take disciplinary action and to decide upon the quantum of punishment are mainly managerial functions, but if a dispute is referred to a Tribunal, the latter has power to see if action of the employer is justified.

(2) Before imposing the punishment, an employer is expected to conduct a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. The enquiry should not be an empty formality.

(3) When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer, and the finding of misconduct is a plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence, adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified only when the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide.

(4) Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, had to give an opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it.

It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action, and it is open to the employee to adduce evidence contra.

(5) The effect of an employer not holding an enquiry is that the Tribunal would not have to consider only whether there was a prima facie case. On the other hand, the issue about the merits of the impugned order of dismissal or discharge is at large before the Tribunal and the latter, on the evidence adduced before it, has to decide for itself whether the misconduct alleged is proved. In such cases, the point about the exercise of managerial functions does not arise at all. A case of defective enquiry stands on the same footing as no enquiry.

(6) The Tribunal gets jurisdiction to consider the evidence placed before it for the first time in justification of the action taken only, if no enquiry has been held or after the enquiry conducted by an employer is found to be defective.

(7) It has never been recognised that the Tribunal should straightaway, without anything more, direct reinstatement of a dismissed or discharged employee, once it is found that no domestic enquiry has been held or the said enquiry is found to be defective.

(8) An employer, who wants to avail himself of the opportunity of adducing evidence for the first time before the Tribunal to justify his action, should ask for it at the appropriate stage. If such an opportunity is asked for, the Tribunal has no power to refuse. The giving of an opportunity to an employer to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal is in the interest of both the management and the employee

2026:JHHC:2841 and to enable the Tribunal itself to be satisfied about the alleged misconduct.

(9) Once the misconduct is proved either in the enquiry conducted by an employer or by the evidence placed before a Tribunal for the first time, punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is so harsh as to suggest victimisation.

(10) In a particular case, after setting aside the order of dismissal, whether a workman should be reinstated or paid compensation is, as held by this Court in Management of Panitole Tea Estate v. Workmens [(1971) 1 SCC 742] within the judicial decision of a Labour Court or Tribunal."

14. There is no dispute regarding the legal principle that

the Labour Court can interfere with a punishment order if it

is found to be disproportionate or excessive. The Tribunal

ignored the mandate that "When a proper enquiry has been

held by an employer, and the finding of misconduct is a

plausible conclusion flowing from the evidence, adduced at

the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in

judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate

body."

15. The Respondent is heavily banking on the decision in

the case of Workmen v. Balmadies Estates, reported in

(2008) 4 SCC 517 Paragraph no. 10 is the fulcrum of the

defence and reads as follows:-

"10. It is fairly well settled now that in view of the wide power of the Labour Court it can, in an appropriate case, consider the evidence which has been considered by the domestic tribunal and in a given case on such consideration arrive at a conclusion different from the one arrived at by the domestic tribunal. The assessment of evidence in a domestic enquiry is not required to be made by applying the same yardstick as a civil court could do when a lis is brought before it. The Evidence Act, 1872 (in short "the Evidence Act") is not applicable to the proceeding in a domestic enquiry so far as the domestic enquiries are concerned, though principles of fairness are to apply. It is also fairly well settled that in a domestic enquiry guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt and the proof of misconduct would be sufficient. In a domestic enquiry all materials which are logically probative including hearsay evidence can be acted upon provided it has a reasonable nexus and credibility."

2026:JHHC:2841

16. In this case, the Tribunal has delved into the

procedure of enquiry and non-production of documents

which could be grounds for holding that the enquiry was

not fair. Even otherwise, the decision cited above has to be

read in the context of powers conferred by Section 11A of

the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The power to draw a

different conclusion has to be read in the context of

proportionality of punishment. In exceptional cases where

there is complete or manifest perversity, the Tribunal can

surely interfere. However, the Tribunal cannot in one stroke

hold that the enquiry of the Management was fair but the

conclusion that the workman is guilty is incorrect. The

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Standard Chartered

Bank v. R.C. Srivastava, (2021) 19 SCC 281 has held

that in the disciplinary proceedings, the tribunal cannot

convert itself into court of appeal and also cannot revisit the

evidence and in excess of its jurisdiction conferred

by Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.

Relevant Paragraphs of the Judgment are reproduced

hereunder:

"9. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that after the domestic enquiry was held to be fair and proper, the Tribunal has a limited scope to interfere with the findings recorded in the domestic enquiry and unless the finding is perverse and not supported by a piece of evidence, it was not open for the tribunal to interfere within the scope of Section 11-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter being referred to as "the 1947 Act").

10. However, in the instant case, the Tribunal converted itself into a court of appeal and has not only revisited the evidence in toto

2026:JHHC:2841 but has proceeded on the assumption that the management has to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt and despite the material evidence of three officers, who were abused by respondent workman in drunkenness condition, have been completely disowned on the premise that one Watchman (DW 1) and an ex-employee of the Bank (DW 2) have stated in their deposition that such incident has not occurred and to justify it, a document was placed on record i.e. the attendance register of the time in question and to confront it further with the fact that the delinquent had not appeared in the domestic enquiry and still a finding has been recorded by the Tribunal that such incidence has not occurred is something which has appeared from blue and without there being any iota of the factual foundation, the interference made by the Tribunal in the finding of guilt recorded in the course of enquiry is not only perverse but is unsustainable in law.

11. The scope of judicial review in the matter of domestic enquiry is to examine whether the procedure in holding domestic enquiry has been violated or the principles of natural justice has been complied with, or any perversity in the finding of guilt recorded during the course of domestic enquiry has been committed. The basic error which was committed by the Tribunal in its impugned award has not been appreciated even by the High Court and dismissed the writ petition without appreciating the finding recorded in the domestic enquiry keeping into consideration the principles laid down by this Court of preponderance of probabilities while holding guilt in the domestic enquiry and exceeded in its jurisdiction defined under Section 11-A of the 1947 Act. To the contrary, the officers with whom the alleged occurrence of gross misconduct has been committed have been put to notice that their allegation on the face of it is unfounded, baseless and has not at all occurred which is something beyond imagination. More so, when it was established during the course of enquiry after affording an opportunity of hearing to the delinquent respondent, enquiry officer held the charges proved and confirmed by the disciplinary authority followed with the penalty of dismissal upon the respondent.

17. In this case the Tribunal did not consider whether the

punishment was disproportionate. Instead, the Tribunal re-

appreciated the entire evidence and material from the

enquiry and concluded that the charge was not proved as

the enquiry was defective. Once such a conclusion is

reached, the enquiry itself becomes improper and Section

11A requires that the Management be given another

opportunity to prove the charges directly before the

Tribunal. A defective enquiry is the same as no enquiry and

the workman does not succeed at this stage as the charges

2026:JHHC:2841 can be proved directly in the Tribunal. In this case, no such

opportunity was provided. The Management was

unprepared, as it did not anticipate having to prove the

charges again after the enquiry was found to be fair and

proper. When a finding is recorded that charges are not

proved in the enquiry, the Management must be given a

second chance to establish the charges before the Tribunal.

Moreover, the Tribunal's contradictory findings--first

upholding the enquiry as fair and proper, then finding fault

with it by recording a finding that the second show cause

notice was not given--cannot be sustained in law. The

award cannot record that there was procedural error in not

serving second show cause notice to the delinquent

workman. The Tribunal has committed grave error, and the

award deserves to be quashed as there is a manifest

jurisdictional error. The award is liable to be quashed.

18. Consequently, the writ application stands allowed.

Pending I.A.s, if any, also stands disposed of.

(Deepak Roshan, J.) Dated:03 /02/2026 Amardeep/ A.F.R

Uploaded 05.02.2026

 
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