[Cites 3, Cited by 0]
Jharkhand High Court
The State Of Jharkhand vs Santosh Kumar Singh on 3 February, 2026
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
2026:JHHC:2672-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 56 of 2025
With
I.A. No. 1063 of 2025
---
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Principal Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
3. The Special Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
4. The Deputy Secretary, Road Construction Department,
Government of Jharkhand, Ranchi
... ... Appellants
Versus
Santosh Kumar Singh, son of Late Dr. Basant Kumar Singh,
resident of Village & P.O.- Jai Prakash Nagar (Sitabdiara), P.S.-
Bariya, District- Balia (U.P.), presently residing at Flat No. B/4,
Roopmati Apartment, North Office Para, Doranda, P.O. & P.S.-
Doranda, District- Ranchi .... ... Respondent
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
---
For the Appellants : Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar, A.C. to A.A.G.-III
For the Respondent : Mr. Raj Vardhan, Advocate
---
Reserved on 28.01.2026 Pronounced on 03.02.2026
Per : Rajesh Shankar, J. :
1. The present appeal has been preferred against the order/judgment
dated 18.01.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(S)
No. 2686 of 2016 whereby the notification dated 23.08.2013
issued by the Deputy Secretary, Department of Road Construction,
Government of Jharkhand has been quashed/set aside with an
observation that the writ petitioner (the respondent herein) will be
entitled to all consequential benefits.
2. Since the present appeal is barred by limitation, it is appropriate to
first consider the application filed on behalf of the appellants
seeking condonation of delay.
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3. The present interlocutory application has been filed on behalf of
the appellants/applicants seeking condonation of delay of 289 days
in filing the present appeal.
4. Learned counsel for the applicants submits that the information
with regard to passing of the impugned judgment dated
18.01.2024 came to the knowledge of the concerned department
on 12.06.2024. The file pertaining to the present case was
thereafter put up by the Administration Officer before the Under
Secretary on 23.09.2024 for further necessary action. The Under
Secretary, then made his endorsement on 01.10.2024 to take legal
opinion in the matter.
5. It is also submitted that the Principal Secretary of the department
accorded his approval on the said endorsement on 04.10.2024 and
the file was sent to the Department of Law, Government of
Jharkhand which was then marked to the office of the Advocate
General on 07.10.2024.
6. Learned counsel for the applicants further submits that the file
pertaining to the present appeal was received by the office of the
Advocate General on 18.10.2024 and on the same date, the
opinion was given to file the appeal. Accordingly, the file was sent
back to the Department of Road Construction, Government of
Jharkhand. On 21.10.2024, the file was put up for sending the
matter to the retainer for preparation of grounds of appeal. The
retainer thereafter prepared the grounds of appeal and submitted
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it to the department which was put up for approval vide notesheet
dated 23.10.2024. After according approval vide notesheet dated
28.10.2204, the file was sent to the Law Officer for filing the
appeal.
7. It is also submitted that the file was thereafter forwarded to the
concerned Law Officer to prepare the memo of appeal against the
impugned judgment dated 18.01.2024. Though the appeal was
drafted by the Law Officer, however the pleadings of the writ
proceeding were required. After making the entire writ court
proceedings available to the concerned Law Officer, the appeal
was filed on 12.11.2024.
8. It is thus contended by the learned counsel for the applicants that
though considerable delay occurred in filing the present appeal,
however the same cannot be said to be inordinate as some time
was consumed at different levels in the concerned department.
Since the said delay in filing the present appeal is primarily
attributed to the procedural formalities, the same may be viewed
leniently and the present application seeking condonation of delay
in filing the appeal may be allowed.
9. On the contrary, learned counsel for the writ petitioner/respondent
vehemently opposes the contention of learned counsel for the
applicants by submitting that no cogent ground has been made
out in the present application seeking condonation of delay. The
writ petitioner, who has superannuated from service way back on
31.08.2016, is made to suffer due to lethargic attitude of the
authorities of the State of Jharkhand as he has not yet been able
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to obtain the fruits of the impugned judgment 18.01.2024.
10. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the content of
the present interlocutory application.
11. Though the impugned judgment was passed by the learned writ
court on 18.01.2024, it has been averred by the applicants in the
present interlocutory application that the concerned department
came to know about the said judgment on 12.06.2024. Thus, the
period of about 05 months consumed between the said dates
remains unexplained in the interlocutory application.
12. It has further been averred in the present application that the file
was put up by the Administrative Officer before the Under
Secretary of the concerned department on 23.09.2024 for further
action. It is thus evident that the delay of about more than three
months caused after 12.06.2024 has also not been explained.
13. The further averments made in the present interlocutory
application would clearly suggest that the file concerning the
present case kept on hopping in the department from one desk to
another which cannot be said to be sufficient cause so as to
condone the delay. The applicants, rather on superficial and
frivolous grounds, have sought the condonation of delay in filing
the instant appeal.
14. The applicants being the State and its officers were well aware of
the time period for filing the appeal challenging the order of the
writ court which is only 30 days, however the laxity on their part is
apparent particularly as the reason for delay of about 05 months
occurring between 18.01.2024 and 12.06.2024 as well as for about
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more than three months consumed between 12.06.2024 and
29.03.2024 remains completely absent.
15. So far as the issue of consideration of an application filed on
behalf of the State seeking condonation of delay is concerned, it
seems appropriate to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court rendered in the case of Postmaster General and others
Vs. Living Media India Limited and another reported in
(2012) 3 SCC 563, wherein it has been held as under:
"25. We have already extracted the reasons as
mentioned in the "better affidavit" sworn by Mr.
Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting
Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the
said affidavit, the Department has itself mentioned
and is aware of the date of the judgment of the
Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief
Postmaster v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009.
Even according to the deponent, their counsel had
applied for the certified copy of the said judgment
only on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the
Department on the very same day. There is no
explanation for not applying for the certified copy of
the impugned judgment on 11-9- 2009 or at least
within a reasonable time. The fact remains that the
certified copy was applied for only on 8-1-2010 i.e.
after a period of nearly four months. In spite of
affording another opportunity to file better affidavit
by placing adequate material, neither the Department
nor the person-in-charge has filed any explanation
for not applying the certified copy within the
prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the
affidavit which we have already extracted, clearly
show that there was delay at every stage and except
mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the
decision taken, there is no explanation as to why
such delay had occasioned. Though it was stated by
the Department that the delay was due to
unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties,
the fact remains that from day one the Department or
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the person/persons concerned have not evinced
diligence in prosecuting the matter to this Court by
taking appropriate steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned
were well aware or conversant with the issues
involved including the prescribed period of limitation
for taking up the matter by way of filing a special
leave petition in this Court. They cannot claim that
they have a separate period of limitation when the
Department was possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of
plausible and acceptable explanation, we are posing a
question why the delay is to be condoned
mechanically merely because the Government or a
wing of the Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a
matter of condonation of delay when there was no
gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of
bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to
advance substantial justice, we are of the view that
in the facts and circumstances, the Department
cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions.
The claim on account of impersonal machinery and
inherited bureaucratic methodology of making
several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available. The
law of limitation undoubtedly binds everybody,
including the Government."
16. In the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. Jahangir Byramji
Jeejeebhoy (D) through his LR reported in 2024 SCC OnLine
SC 489, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under: -
"25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private
party or a State or Union of India when it comes to
condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If
the litigant chooses to approach the court long after
the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant
provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and
say that no prejudice would be caused to either side
by the delay being condoned. This litigation between
the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in
2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till
date the respondent has not been able to reap the
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fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice
if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and
once again ask the respondent to undergo the
rigmarole of the legal proceedings.
26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which
the court must take into consideration while
considering whether the delay should be condoned or
not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants,
it appears that they want to fix their own period of
limitation for instituting the proceedings for which
law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is
held that a party has lost his right to have the matter
considered on merits because of his own inaction for
a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
delay and in such circumstances of the case, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice
deserves to be preferred as against the technical
considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the court must not start with
the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty
to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if
the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally balanced that
the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter
for the purpose of condoning the delay.
27. We are of the view that the question of limitation
is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of
limitation are based on the principles of sound public
policy and principles of equity. We should not keep
the 'Sword of Damocles' hanging over the head of the
respondent for indefinite period of time to be
determined at the whims and fancies of the
appellants.
35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has
been said that delay should not be excused as a
matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is
not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The
appellants have failed to prove that they were
reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this
vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in
this case."
17. In a recent judgment rendered in the case of Shivamma (dead)
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by LRs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board & Others, reported in
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1969, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
as under:
"261. Thus, for the reasons aforesaid, the impugned
order of the High Court deserves to be set aside.
Before we proceed to close this judgment, we deem it
appropriate to make it abundantly clear that
administrative lethargy and laxity can never stand as
a sufficient ground for condonation of delay, and we
want to convey an emphatic message to all the High
Courts that delays shall not be condoned on frivolous
and superficial grounds, until a proper case of
sufficient cause is made out, wherein the State-
machinery is able to establish that it acted with bona
fides and remained vigilant all throughout. Procedure
is a handmaid to justice, as is famously said. But
courts, and more particularly the constitutional
courts, ought not to obviate the procedure for a
litigating State agency, who also equally suffer the
bars of limitation from pursuing litigations due to its
own lackadaisical attitude.
262. The High Courts ought not give a legitimizing
effect to such callous attitude of State authorities or
its instrumentalities, and should remain extra
cautious, if the party seeking condonation of delay is
a State-authority. They should not become surrogates
for State laxity and lethargy. The constitutional
courts ought to be cognizant of the apathy and pangs
of a private litigant. Litigants cannot be placed in
situations of perpetual litigations, wherein the fruits
of their decrees or favourable orders are frustrated at
later stages. We are at pains to reiterate this
everlasting trend, and put all the High Courts to
notice, not to reopen matters with inordinate delay,
until sufficient cause exists, as by doing so the courts
only add insult to the injury, more particularly in
appeals under Section 100 of the CPC, wherein its
jurisdiction is already limited to questions of law.
263. Limitation periods are prescribed to maintain a
sweeping scope for the lis to attain for finality. More
than the importance of judicial time, what worries us
is the plight of a litigant with limited means, who is
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to contest against an enormous State, and its
elaborate and never-exhausting paraphernalia. Such
litigations deserve to be disposed of at the very
threshold, because, say if a party litigating against
the State, for whatever reason, is unable to contest
the condonation of delay in appeal, unlike the present
case, it reopens the lis for another round of litigation,
and leaves such litigant listless yet again. As courts of
conscience, it is our obligation that we assure that a
litigant is not sent from pillar to post to seek justice.
264. No litigant should be permitted to be so
lethargic and apathetic, much less be permitted by
the courts to misuse the process of law."
18. It is thus well settled that a government department cannot claim
a separate period of limitation. The claim on account of impersonal
machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology of making
several notes cannot be accepted in view of the modern
technologies being available and used. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everyone, including the government and its
instrumentalities.
19. The appellants/applicants have not been able to carve out
sufficient cause so as to condone the delay of 289 days in filing
the present Letters Patent Appeal, which otherwise in our view is
inordinate.
20. We are also mindful of the fact that the writ petitioner/respondent
herein has superannuated from service on 31.08.2016 itself and
has certainly been made to suffer due to lethargic and casual
attitude of the appellants/applicants in filing the present appeal
after inordinate delay of 289 days.
21. The writ petitioner/respondent is not supposed to wait for
indefinite period to obtain the fruit of the order passed by the writ
court at the whims and fancies of the state authorities i.e., the
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appellants/applicants herein, to file an appeal as per their own
convenience. If such an attitude of the state authorities is taken
lightly, the same will certainly cause serious prejudice to the writ
petitioner who is a senior citizen and will amount to granting
undeserving latitude to them in deliberately delaying filing of the
appeal without setting out any cogent explanation.
22. Under the aforesaid circumstance, we are of the view that the
explanation offered by the appellants/applicants in the present
application is not sufficient to condone an inordinate delay of 289
days in preferring the present appeal.
23. Accordingly, the present interlocutory application is dismissed.
24. Consequently, the L.P.A. is also dismissed.
25. pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands dismissed.
(M.S. Sonak, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
February 03, 2026
Ritesh/A.F.R.
Uploaded on 03.02.2026
