Moni Kumari vs Vikash Kumar
2026 Latest Caselaw 555 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Moni Kumari vs Vikash Kumar on 2 February, 2026

Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad

          IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI

                             F.A No.87 of 2025
                                      -----

     Moni Kumari                            ....... ...  Appellant
                                  Versus
     Vikash Kumar                           ...       ... Respondent
                                   -------
     CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
                                   -------
     For the Appellant  : Mr. Kumar Harsh, Advocate

For the Respondent : Sanjay Kumar Chamaria, Advocate (through V.C)

------

nd Order No.12/Dated: 2 February, 2026

I.A No.5507 of 2025

1. The instant interlocutory application has been filed under section 5 of

the Limitation Act, 1963 by the appellant-wife to condone the delay of 231

days in filing First Appeal No.87 of 2025.

2. The grounds have been taken for condoning the delay, primarily, that

the impugned judgment is an ex-parte. As such, the appellant-wife could

not be able to know about the pending matrimonial proceeding and the

moment she came to know about the pending matrimonial proceeding, the

present appeal has been filed, therefore, delay of 231 days has been caused.

3. It has been stated in the said application that the information about

the final outcome of pending proceeding, subject matter of the present

appeal, was provided by the clerk of the Dhanbad Civil Court on

03.02.2025 and thereafter the brother of the appellant-wife rushed to

Dhanbad and received the certified copy of the judgment and decree on

18.02.2025.

4. The reference of the order dated 23.01.2024 passed in the proceeding

by the learned Family Judge has been made and by taking the same for the

purpose to explain the delay, the submission has been made that "the Presiding Officer has been transferred. The petitioner is present.

Respondent is present. Put up on 22.02.2024 for filing W.S."

5. The learned counsel for the appellant-wife has submitted that what is

the basis to make reference of the presence of the learned counsel for the

respondent when no Vakalatnama has been executed in favour of any of

the counsel which can be verified from the original record.

6. The present interlocutory application has been filed on 25.04.2025,

copy thereof has already been supplied to the learned counsel for the

respondent-husband who has filed the counter affidavit/objection on

29.10.2025 and opposition has been made to condone the delay of 231

days.

7. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent-husband that FIR

was lodged on 17.07.2023, i.e., after issuance of notice to the appellant-

wife and publication in newspaper for appearance in Original Suit No.349

of 2023 filed by the respondent-husband.

8. It has also been submitted by taking aid of the statement made at para-

11 of the counter affidavit that the notice was served upon the appellant by

the order of the Hon'ble Patna High Court passed in Criminal Misc.

No.56869 of 2024 arising out of Lakhisarai Mahila P.S Case No.63 of

2023 dated 17.07.2023 wherein the said judgment was annexed by the

respondent-husband as Annexure-3 in Criminal Misc. No.56869 of 2024.

The submission, therefore, has been made that the appellant-wife was well

knowing about the pending matrimonial proceeding and, as such, it is

incorrect on the part of the appellant-wife to take the ground that the delay

of 231 days has been caused as she was not knowing about the pending

matrimonial proceeding.

9. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties.

10. This Court is now proceeding to deal with the delay of 231 days

which has been caused in filing the appeal said to be sufficiently explained

making out the reason for condoning the delay of 231 days. The sufficient

cause is the basic factum for assessing the issue of condonation of delay.

11. We are conscious with the fact that the delay is to be condoned in

exercise of power conferred under section 5 of the Limitation Act

depending upon the sufficient cause if shown by the party seeking

condonation of delay.

12. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of 'sufficient

cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient cause' has been made

in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC

81], wherein, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9

to 15 hereunder:-

"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior

purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v. Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A. Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v. Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC 1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012 SC 1629] .

10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a "sufficient cause"

and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".

11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v. Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .

12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute.

13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale. According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:

"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale

claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence."

An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v. SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 907] .)

14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC 578 :

2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .

15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature."

13. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party

should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona

fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot

be alleged that the party has "not acted deliberately" or "remained

inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford

sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for

the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be

exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was

prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and unless a

satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the

application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether

the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover the ulterior

purpose as has been held in Manindra Land and Building Corporation

Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin

Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2 SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti,

(2011) 3 SCC 545 and Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal

Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.

14. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the expression

'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that

substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack

of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not

sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a

particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this

regard may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court

in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs. Gobardhan Sao & Ors.,

(2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:-

"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject the petition

by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner. However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to pass upon the parties either way."

15. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal

Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held that merely

because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts of the given case,

there is no right to the appellant to have delay condoned. At paragraph-12,

it has been held as hereunder:

"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to consider

the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14. Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section 14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion, is not a valid ground."

16. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation

application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient cause

for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant as to whether it

is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the period of limitation, a

right is accrued in favour of the other side and as such, it is necessary to

look into the bona fide motive of the litigant and at the same time, due to

inaction and laches on its part.

17. It is also evident from the aforesaid judgment that the sufficient

cause, as per the interpretation, will be the circumstances which indicates

that there is no dereliction or no casual approach having been taken by the

party concerned in approaching the higher Forum by preferring an appeal

against the impugned judgment/decree.

18. The parties to the litigation are to be vigilant, but if no idea of the

pending proceeding, then the same is to be taken into consideration for the

purpose of condoning the delay so that the culmination of the suit may not

prejudice in the interest of the party concerned, in whose absence the

judgment/decree has been passed. Equally, it is also to be seen that the

party may not be allowed to take the ground as luxury in order to misuse

the judicial proceeding causing prejudice to the other side. The Court is to

assess both the aspects of the matter.

19. There is no dispute that the issue of limitation is to be taken into

consideration liberally unless the contesting party is in a position to show

that the delay is deliberate one.

20. We are dealing with the matrimonial dispute. The opposition which

has been taken by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-

husband as per the pleadings made in the counter affidavit/objection filed

to the interlocutory application filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act,

1963 is the deliberate non-appearance by the appellant-wife. The reference

of the order dated 23.01.2024 has been made wherein the reference of the

presence of the respondent-wife is there.

21. This Court, in order to appreciate the fact about the appearance of the

learned counsel representing the litigant concerned, the respondent to the

suit who is the appellant-wife herein, has called for the Trial Court Records

to see the strength of the appearance of the concerned respondent through a

counsel and whether such appearance is supported by any execution of

power by the litigant concerned, i.e., the appellant-wife herein.

22. It is evident from the entire record that no Vakalatnama has been filed

on behalf of the appellant-wife, the respondent to the matrimonial suit. The

fact about non-availability of the Vakalatnama in the Trial Court Records

has fairly been accepted by the learned counsel appearing for the

respondent-husband by submitting that Vakalatnama is not available in the

record.

23. Now, the question is that what is the sanctity of the appearance by a

counsel to represent the cause of the litigant concerned in absence of

Vakalatnama. The concept of Vakalatnama has been bearing by

conferring/delegating/to represent the cause of the litigant to be

represented through the counsel in whose favour Vakalatnama is being

executed by the litigant concerned and in absence thereof if any counsel is

appearing, then it cannot be said to be the version of the litigant concerned

in absence of such Vakalatnama.

24. In the reference which has been made about the appearance of the

appellant-wife as in the order dated 23.01.2024 will be accepted as is being

argued by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent-husband, then

the same will be very peculiar and a system jeopardizing the dispensation

of the justice delivery system. Since in such situation, there will be a

chance of mischief by the party representing the contesting litigant and any

counsel will appear before the concerned Court and will make submission

said to be on the instruction received by the litigant concerned for which

the appearance is being shown. In such situation, the Court is to grant time

to the concerned counsel to come with the proper executed Vakalatnama

on whose behalf the representation is being made of the party or the

litigant by adjourning the matter. But in absence of any Vakalatnama the

appearance of the litigant cannot be accepted and if it is being accepted,

then according to our considered view, it cannot come under the fold of the

fairness and transparent system under which our entire foundation of

judicial system depends. Since, fairness and transparency is the core of the

better dispensation of the justice.

25. We are not disputing, since, it is already available in the order dated

23.01.2024 showing the appearance of the respondent-wife, but there is no

basis, as no Vakalatnama has been filed on behalf of the appellant-wife to

the suit.

26. This Court has further gone through the subsequent orders that if the

appellant-wife has already been appeared as has been taken note by the

learned Family Judge in the order 23.01.2024, then why the alternative

mode of service of notice has been taken recourse by asking the party

concerned to take steps for paper publication. Both cannot go together. If

the Court has come to the conclusion that the respondent has already

appeared, then there should not be an order for substituted service of notice

by asking the litigant concerned to go for the paper publication.

27. This Court has further proceeded and has found from the order dated

03.04.2024 that the learned Family Court has found the petitioner present

on that day, but the respondent has been shown to be absent. The

attendance on behalf of the respondent to the matrimonial suit through

lawyer was filed on 23.01.2024, but due to non-appearance of the

respondent physically in the case nor any power filed on her behalf, the

matter was posted for ex-parte hearing against the respondent to the

matrimonial suit (the appellant herein).

28. The aforesaid order does reflect that the Court has again taken into

consideration by making reference of the order 23.01.2024, the day when

the respondent to the suit was said to represent the appellant-wife in

absence of Vakalatnama as has been referred hereinabove and the basis

upon which the Court has gone into the presumption even no Vakalatnama

is available by taking note in the order dated 03.04.2024 that the

respondent to the suit did not appear physically in the case nor any power

filed on her behalf. As such, the proceeding is fixed for ex-parte hearing

against respondent-wife. It is thus evident that from the order dated

03.04.2024 also, no Vakalatnama has been filed, then on what basis the

Court has come to the conclusion posting the case for ex-parte hearing and

how the Court has come to conclusion that it is a case of not participating

in the proceeding even after due appearance.

29. Although, the Court has gone into the substituted service of notice as

would be evident from the order dated 15.07.2023 and in compliance of the

aforesaid order newspaper publication cutting published in the "Prabhat

Khabar" Lakhisarai Edition, dated 23.07.2023 has been taken note as in the

order dated 18.08.2023. The order dated 23.01.2024 wherein the reference

of the presence of the respondent-wife is there, but no Vakalatnama having

been filed, then how can it be said to be the appearance on the part of the

respondent-wife even though the steps for substituted service of notice has

been taken.

30. We are dealing with the matrimonial dispute and effective steps was

required to be taken for securing the appearance of the appellant-wife so as

to consider that no prejudice is to be caused to the appellant-wife in the

matter of dissolution of marriage or any nature thereof.

31. Since the aforesaid fact has been explained in the delay condonation

application, although the same has been objected by filing the objection

thereto, but this Court is of the view that the ground shown for

condonation of delay of 231 days if will not be condoned, then the

appellant-wife will suffer to irreparable loss and injury which will not be

compensated in any way.

32. In the matter of condoning the delay, the period of delay is not the

consideration, rather irrespective of the period of delay if the cause has

been shown said to be sufficient, then the delay whatever may be its

longability is to be condoned.

33. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions and considering the

cause shown in the instant interlocutory application to be sufficient, is

hereby condoning the delay of 231 days in preferring the appeal being First

Appeal No.87 of 2025.

34. Accordingly, I.A No.5507 of 2025 is hereby allowed.

35. Admit.

36. Since the respondent-husband has already appeared in the present

appeal, hence, there is no need to issue notice.

(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)

(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)

Dated: 02/02//2026 Sudhir NAFR