Jharkhand High Court

Ajay Turi vs The State Of Jharkhand on 23 September, 2025

Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad

Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad

[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 840 of 2025
----------
Ajay Turi, son of Dinesh Turi, age-24 yrs., Resident of House No. 98,
village-Hoti, P.O. & P.S.-Chandra, District-Latehar (Jharkhand).
... ... Appellant
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. National Investigation Agency, through Superintendent of Police, NIA,
Branch-Ranchi, Sector-2, Dhurwa, P.O.-Dhurwa, P.S.-Jagganathpur,
District-Ranchi.
... ... Respondents
-------
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Vishnu Prabhakar Pathak, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate
Mr. Saurav Kumar, Advocate
----------------------------
rd
Order No.06/Dated: 23 September, 2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J .

1. At the outset, it has been pointed out that due to typographical error in the

order dated 28.08.2025 the heading of the case number mentioned below

paragraph-5 has wrongly been mentioned as "Criminal Appeal (D.B.)

No.840 of 2024" instead of "Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.840 of 2025".

2. Accordingly, the order dated 28.08.2025 is modified to the extent that the

heading of the case number mentioned below paragraph-5 as "Criminal

Appeal (D.B.) No.840 of 2024" be read as "Criminal Appeal (D.B.) No.840

of 2025". The remaining part of the order shall remain intact.

3. The instant appeal preferred under Section 21(4) of the National

Investigation Agency Act, 2008 is directed against the order dated

30.08.2024 passed by learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-XVI-cum-

Special Judge, NIA, Ranchi in Misc. Cr. Application No. 2114 of 2024,

whereby and whereunder the prayer for bail in connection with NIA Case

RC-01/2021/NIA/RNC arising out of Balumath P.S. Case No. 234 of 2020

1
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

for the offence punishable under Sections 147, 148, 149, 353, 504, 506, 307,

427, 435, 386, 387, 120B and 212 of the Indian Penal Code; Section

25(1)(b), 26, 27 and 35 of the Arms Act; Section 3 & 4 of Explosive

Substance Act; Section 17 of CLA Act, 1908 and; Section 16(1)(b), 20 and

23 of UP(P) Act, has been rejected.

Factual Matrix:

4. The prosecution case is based on the information received by Balumath

police station that at about 19 hours on 18.12.2020, some unknown persons

were burning vehicles by firing indiscriminately near check post no.1 near

Tetariakhand colliery. Assailants fired on the police party that had rushed to

the spot. Accused persons had burnt four trucks one motorcycle and injured

four civilians. The remnants of the burnt vehicles, fragments of a cane bomb

with wire, a white colour empty gallon of approx 02 liters, spent cartridges

and three hand written pamphlets containing threats to the transporters and

coal companies, involved in the mining area signed by one Pradip Ganjhu

(A-3) were found from the spot. Upon further inquiry it was revealed that

gangster Sujit Sinha(A-1) and Aman Sahu @Aman Sao(A-2) had conspired

with accused Pradeep Ganjhu (A-3) and his associates namely Santosh

Ganjhu, Bihari Ganjhu, Sakendra Ganjhu, Pramod Ganjhu and others to

collect extortion from CCL transporters, contractors, DO holders and

disruption of legitimate works. Accordingly, Balumath PS case no 234/2020

dated 19.12.2020 was registered u/s 147, 148, 149, 353, 504, 506, 307, 427,

435, 386, 387 and 120B of IPC section 27 of Arms Act, Section 3/4 of the

Explosive Substance Act, against Sujit Sinha, Aman Sahu @ Aman Sao,

Pradeep Ganjhu, Santosh Ganjhu, Bihari Ganjhu, Pramod Ganjhu, and 5- 6

other unknown accused persons.

2
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

The ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) Government of India in

view of the gravity of the offence and its cross border and international

ramification issued orders in exercise of the powers vested under Section

5(5) read with section 8 of the NIA Act 2008 vide F. No.

11011/01/2020/NIA dated 07.01.2020, directing the NIA to take up the

investigation of the aforesaid case. On the direction of the Ministry of Home

Affairs, NIA re-registered case no 01/2021/NIA-RNC dated 4.3.2021 under

section 147, 148, 149, 353, 504, 506, 307, 427, 435, 386, 387, 120B, 121A,

216 of IPC Section 25(1)(b), 26, 27 and 35 of Arms Act section of Explosive

Substance Act section 17 CLA Act and section 10, 13, 16(1), (b), 20 and 23

UA(P) Act.

After investigation NIA submitted chargesheet against Sujit Sinha

(A 1), Aman Sahu (A 2), Pradip Gajhu alias Mandalji alias Premji (A-3),

Santosh Gajhu (A 4), Bihari Ganjhu alias Bahira (A 5), Sakendra Ganjhu (A

6), Pramod Ganjhu (A7), Babulal Turi alias Prabhatji alias Prabhatji alias

Guruji alias Avinashji alias Shankarji (A 8), Ajay Turi (A 9)(petitioner),

Santosh Kumar alias Banti Yadav alias Banti Yadav (A 10), Prabhat Kumar

Yadav alias Dimple Yadav (A 11), Pritam Kumar alias Chinku (A 12),

Santosh Kumar Yadav (A13), Jasim Ansari (A14), Wasim Ansari (A15),

petitioner Majibul Ansari (A16) and Jahiruddin Ansari alias Guddu (A17)

u/s 147, 148, 149, 353, 504, 506, 307, 427, 435, 386, 387, 120B, 121A, 216

of IPC, section 25(1) (6), 26, 27, 35 of Arms Act, section 3/4 of Explosive

Substance Act, section 17 of CLA act, 1908 and section 10, 13, 16(1) (b),

20, 23 of Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.

It appears from the material available on record that on the basis of

the written report Balumath P.S. Case no 234/2020 dated 19.12.2020 was

registered u/s 147, 148, 149, 353, 504, 506, 307, 427, 435, 386, 387 and

3
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

120B of IPC section 27 of Arms Act, Section 3/4 of the Explosive Substance

Act.

5. The Central Government, taking into consideration the gravity of the offence

in exercise of power conferred under Section 5(5) read with section 8 of the

NIA Act 2008, directed the NIA to take up the investigation of the aforesaid

case and accordingly, the NIA re-registered case no 01/2021/NIA-RNC

dated 04.03.2021 and took up the charge of further investigation of the

instant case.

6. The appellant has been apprehended and taken into custody on 07.02.2021,

i.e., prior to the taking over the investigation by the NIA and, as such, prayer

for bail was made but the same had been rejected vide order dated

04.01.2023 against which appeal was preferred being Cr. Appeal (DB) No.

133 of 2023 which has also been dismissed vide order dated 17.05.2023.

7. Thereafter, the appellant preferred Special Leave Petition (Crl. Appeal)

No.16471/2023) before the Hon'ble Supreme court, against the order dated

17.05.2023, which was dismissed vide order dated 22.01.2024.

8. Thereafter, the present appellant again preferred Misc. Cr. Application No.

2114 of 2024 which has been dismissed vide order dated 30.08.2024 against

which the present appeal has been preferred.

Submission of the learned senior counsel for the Appellant:

9. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that earlier to the present

appeal, the present appellant had moved before this Court filing criminal

appeal being Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 133 of 2023 which was dismissed vide

order dated 17.05.2023 and thereafter, the present appeal has been

preferred by the appellant against the order dated 30.08.2024 by which

the prayer for grant of bail has been rejected.

4
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

10. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that the appellant has

been falsely implicated in this case as he is having no nexus with the

member of the terrorist gang and has been made scapegoat to ease the

burden of investigation.

11. The submission has been made that the allegation as leveled by the NIA

in the chargesheet that the assailants had fired on the police party and

when the police party had rushed to the spot, the accused persons had

burnt four trucks, one motorcycle and injured four civilians but there is no

evidence to that effect as has been gathered having not been mentioned in

the chargesheet.

12. It has been contended that the allegation against the appellant is that the

gang members dropped threatening pamphlets asking the targets to

manage the said gang by means of paying extortion money. But the said

pamphlets were sent before the Forensic Science Laboratory for matching

of the hand script but the FSL has not found the script of the said

pamphlets written by the appellant.

13. The ground of custody has also been taken since the appellant is

languishing in judicial custody since 07.02.2021, as such, the present

appeal is fit to be allowed so that the appellant be released on bail.

Submission of the learned senior counsel for the Respondent:

14. Per contra, Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel appearing for the NIA, has

submitted that it is incorrect on the part of the appellant to take the ground

that there is no allegation against him, rather, ample materials have come

against the appellant of having in collaboration with the members of

5
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

terrorist gang, as would appear from the various paragraphs of the

supplementary chargesheet.

15. Further submission has been made that so far as the ground taken by the

appellant that the hand script contained in the pamphlets has not been

matched with the sample of script of the appellant is not sufficient ground

to release the appellant from judicial custody, since, other than pamphlets,

there are other incriminating materials against him, as has been disclosed

by various witnesses in course of their examination.

16. Learned counsel appearing for the NIA has also filed a counter affidavit

giving therein the details of the allegations as surfaced and referred in the

chargesheet.

17. He has further submitted that the evidence collected against the appellant

during the course of investigation was pointed out before the learned

court below and the learned trial court while rejecting the prayer for bail

has taken into consideration all the aspects in entirety and as such, has not

committed any error.

18. Learned counsel for the respondent-NIA has also submitted that on

earlier occasion the prayer for grant of bail of the present appellant had

already been rejected by this Court, on merit, vide order dated

17.05.2023 in Criminal Appeal (DB) No. 133 of 2023 and thereafter,

against the said order, the appellant preferred SLP being the Hon'ble

Supreme Court being Special Leave Petition (Crl. Appeal)

No.16471/2023) which was dismissed vide order dated 22/01/2024.

19. It has also been pointed out that prayer for bail of the co-accused

persons, namely, Babulal Lal Turi; Kundan Kumar; Prabhat Kumar

6
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

Yadav and; Pradeep Ganjhu have already been rejected by this Court

vide orders dated 08.09.2023; 30.06.2023; 18.01.2023 and; 15.02.2024

passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 549 of 2023; Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 298 of

2023; Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 191 of 2023 and; Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 781

of 2023 respectively.

20. Learned counsel for the respondent has also submitted that no fresh

ground, on facts as well as on law, has been agitated herein by renewing

the prayer for grant of bail, hence, the instant appeal is also fit to be

dismissed.

Analysis:

21. We have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the material

available on record as also the finding recorded by the learned trial court

in the impugned order.

22. This Court, before proceeding to examine as to whether the appellant has

been able to make out a prima facie case for enlarging him on bail, deems

it fit and proper that the requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of

the - Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 is required to be

considered herein.

23. Section 43(d)(5) mandates that the person shall not be released on bail if

the court is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for believing

that the accusations made are prima facie true apart from the other

offences the appellant is accused of committing offences under Sections

17, 18 and 21 of the UA(P) Act, 1967.

24. The requirement as stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the UA(P) Act,

1967 in the matter of grant of regular bail fell for consideration before the

7
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v.

Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali [(2019) 5 SCC 1] wherein at paragraph 23 it

has been held by interpreting the expression "prima facie true" as

stipulated under Section 43D(5) of the Act, 1967 which would mean that

the materials/evidence collated by the investigation agency in reference to

the accusation against the accused concerned in the First Information

Report, must prevail until contradicted and overcome or disproved by

other evidence, and on the face of it, shows the complicity of such

accused in the commission of the stated offence.

25. It has further been observed that it must be good and sufficient on its face

to establish a given fact or the chain of facts constituting the stated

offence, unless rebutted or contradicted. The degree of satisfaction is

lighter when the Court has to opine that the accusation is "prima facie

true", as compared to the opinion of the accused "not guilty" of such

offence as required under the other special enactments. For ready

reference, paragraph 23 of the aforesaid judgment is required to be quoted

herein which reads hereunder as :-

"23. By virtue of the proviso to sub-section (5), it is the duty of the Court to
be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusation against the accused is prima facie true or otherwise. Our
attention was invited to the decisions of this Court, which has had an
occasion to deal with similar special provisions in TADA and MCOCA. The
principle underlying those decisions may have some bearing while
considering the prayer for bail in relation to the offences under the 1967 Act
as well. Notably, under the special enactments such as TADA, MCOCA and
the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the Court is
required to record its opinion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accused is "not guilty" of the alleged offence. There is a
degree of difference between the satisfaction to be recorded by the Court
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is "not
guilty" of such offence and the satisfaction to be recorded for the purposes
of the 1967 Act that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the
accusation against such person is "prima facie" true. By its very nature, the
expression "prima facie true" would mean that the materials/evidence

8
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

collated by the investigating agency in reference to the accusation against
the accused concerned in the first information report, must prevail until
contradicted and overcome or disproved by other evidence, and on the face
of it, shows the complicity of such accused in the commission of the stated
offence. It must be good and sufficient on its face to establish a given fact or
the chain of facts constituting the stated offence, unless rebutted or
contradicted. In one sense, the degree of satisfaction is lighter when the
Court has to opine that the accusation is "prima facie true", as compared
to the opinion of the accused "not guilty" of such offence as required under
the other special enactments. In any case, the degree of satisfaction to be
recorded by the Court for opining that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation against the accused is prima facie true, is
lighter than the degree of satisfaction to be recorded for considering a
discharge application or framing of charges in relation to offences under
the 1967 Act...."
26. It is, thus, evident from the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex

Court in the case of National Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad

Shah Watali (supra) that while considering the ground of delay under

Section 43D(5) it is the bounden duty of the Court to apply its mind to

examine the entire materials on record for the purpose of satisfying itself,

whether a prima facie case is made out against the accused or not.

27. This Court, on the basis of the aforesaid position of law as has been

settled by Hon'ble Apex Court is proceeding to examine as to whether the

accusation is prima facie true as compared to the opinion of accused not

guilty by taking into consideration the material collected in course of

investigation by the NIA.

28. This Court had directed the NIA to file counter affidavit, as would appear

from the order dated 28.08.2025 and in pursuance thereto the counter

affidavit has been filed.

29. Before entering into the merit of the case, it would be apt to refer herein

that the prayer for bail was made before the learned trial court by

preferring Misc. Criminal Application No. 234 of 2022 but the same had

been rejected vide order dated 04.01.2023 against which appeal was
9
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

preferred being Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 133 of 2023 which has also been

dismissed vide order dated 17.05.2023.

Thereafter, the appellant preferred Special Leave Petition (Crl. Appeal)

No.16471/2023 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, against the order

dated 17.05.2023, which was dismissed vide order dated 22.01.2024.

30. Thereafter, the present appellant again preferred Misc. Cr. Application

No. 2114 of 2024 which has been dismissed vide order dated 30.08.2024,

against which the present appeal has been preferred.

31. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that this Court which rejecting the

prayer for bail of the present appellant vide order dated 17.05.2023 has

already expressed its view on merit of the case by taking into

consideration the settled proposition of law. For ready reference, the

relevant paragraph(s) of the said order is being referred as under:

"15. This Court, after taking into consideration the aforesaid allegation
and considering the fact that it has come in course of investigation that the
appellant is the active member of the Sujit Sinha and Aman Sahu gang and
had gone to the shop for purchase of electric wire, battery of motorcycle
and petrol with gallons which has been corroborated by the shopkeepers.
Further, he has been apprehended from the forest along with other
member of the gang as has come in the supplementary chargesheet.
16. This Court, on the basis of the material available in the
chargesheet/supplementary chargesheet, is of the opinion that the
accusation against the appellant is prima facie true, as compared to the
opinion of accused not guilty of such offence which is being claimed on the
basis of no conclusive report of the Central Forensic Science Laboratory
for ascertaining the hand script over the pamphlets.
17. This Court, after having discussed the factual aspect as above and
coming back to the order impugned wherefrom it is evident that the
learned trial court has considered the material available against the
appellant in the chargesheet as also by taking into consideration the
statement of PW-25 and PW-26 (the protected witnesses A and B), list of
documents Annexure-B, list of witnesses Annexure-C and list of articles
Annexure-D as also the fact that other prosecution witnesses have
supported the case of the prosecution against the appellant, as also by
taking into consideration the provision as contained under Section 43D(5)
of the Act, 1967, has come to the conclusion that the accusation against

10
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

the appellant is prima facie true in comparison to the opinion of the
accused not guilty and in that view of the matter, the learned trial court
has not been satisfied to extend the benefit of regular bail.
We are also in agreement with the aforesaid finding based upon the
material of accusation of the appellant and not prima facie satisfied by
taking into consideration the entire material on record and, hence, we are
not inclined to interfere with the impugned order.
18. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed."
32. Now coming to the contention made by the learned counsel for the

appellant, wherefrom it appears that no fresh ground has been raised

except the ground of custody and personal liberty since the appellant is

languishing in judicial custody since 07.02.2021.

33. At this juncture, it would be appropriate to refer herein that only the long

incarceration is not the ground to be looked into for enlarging the accused

on bail rather the accusation so made against the accused persons as also

societal impact is also to be taken care of.

34. The Hon'ble Apex Court in a judgment rendered in Gurwinder Singh Vs

State of Punjab and Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 109

while taking into consideration the judgment as rendered in National

Investigation Agency v. Zahoor Ahmad Shah Watali (supra) has

observed that, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a

complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an

accused on bail and lays down that if the Court, 'on perusal of the case

diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure', is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for

believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards commission

of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter VI of the UAP

Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not be released on bail

or on his own bond.

11
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

35. The Hon'ble Apex Court further observed that the conventional idea in

bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary penal offences that the discretion of

Courts must tilt in favour of the oft-quoted phrase - 'bail is the rule, jail is

the exception' - unless circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any

place while dealing with bail applications under UAP Act and the

'exercise' of the general power to grant bail under the UAP Act is

severely restrictive in scope.

36. In the aforesaid context it has further been observed by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court that the Courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive

task on hand and in dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the

courts are merely examining if there is justification to reject bail and the

'justifications' must be searched from the case diary and the final report

submitted before the Special Court.

37. In the aforesaid background the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that the test

for rejection of bail is quite plain and Bail must be rejected as a 'rule', if

after hearing the public prosecutor and after perusing the final report or

Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion that there are reasonable

grounds for believing that the accusations are prima facie true. It has

further been observed that it is only if the test for rejection of bail is not

satisfied - that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in

accordance with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing witnesses,

tampering with evidence).

For ready reference following paragraphs of the aforesaid

Judgment are being quoted herein under:

"27. A bare reading of Sub-section (5) of Section 43D shows that
apart from the fact that Sub-section (5) bars a Special Court from

12
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

releasing an accused on bail without affording the Public Prosecutor
an opportunity of being heard on the application seeking release of an
accused on bail, the proviso to Sub-section (5) of Section 43D puts a
complete embargo on the powers of the Special Court to release an
accused on bail. It lays down that if the Court, 'on perusal of the case
diary or the report made under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure', is of the opinion that there are reasonable grounds for
believing that the accusation, against such person, as regards
commission of offence or offences under Chapter IV and/or Chapter
VI of the UAP Act is prima facie true, such accused person shall not
be released on bail or on his own bond. It is interesting to note that
there is no analogous provision traceable in any other statute to the
one found in Section 43D(5) of the UAP Act. In that sense, the
language of bail limitation adopted therein remains unique to the
UAP Act.
28. The conventional idea in bail jurisprudence vis-à-vis ordinary
penal offences that the discretion of Courts must tilt in favour of the
oft-quoted phrase - 'bail is the rule, jail is the exception' - unless
circumstances justify otherwise - does not find any place while dealing
with bail applications under UAP Act. The 'exercise' of the general
power to grant bail under the UAP Act is severely restrictive in scope.
The form of the words used in proviso to Section 43D (5)- 'shall not
be released' in contrast with the form of the words as found in
Section 437(1) CrPC - 'may be released' - suggests the intention of
the Legislature to make bail, the exception and jail, the rule.
29. The courts are, therefore, burdened with a sensitive task on hand. In
dealing with bail applications under UAP Act, the courts are merely
examining if there is justification to reject bail. The 'justifications' must
be searched from the case diary and the final report submitted before the
Special Court. The legislature has prescribed a low, 'prima
facie' standard, as a measure of the degree of satisfaction, to be
recorded by Court when scrutinising the justifications [materials on
record]. This standard can be contrasted with the standard of 'strong
suspicion', which is used by Courts while hearing applications for
'discharge--"

38. In this background, the test for rejection of bail is quite plain. Bail must

be rejected as a 'rule', if after hearing the public prosecutor and after

perusing the final report or Case Diary, the Court arrives at a conclusion

that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations are

prima facie true. It is only if the test for rejection of bail is not satisfied

that the Courts would proceed to decide the bail application in accordance

with the 'tripod test' (flight risk, influencing witnesses, tampering

with evidence). This position is made clear by Sub-section (6) of Section

13
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

43D, which lays down that the restrictions, on granting of bail specified in

Sub-section (5), are in addition to the restrictions under the Code of

Criminal Procedure or any other law for the time being in force on grant

of bail.

39. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment after textual reading

of Section 43D(5) UAP Act, has formulated the guideline which was

summarized in the form of a twin-prong test. For ready reference the

relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:

"31. On a textual reading of Section 43 D(5) UAP Act, the inquiry that
a bail court must undertake while deciding bail applications under the
UAP Act can be summarised in the form of a twin-prong test:
1) Whether the test for rejection of the bail is satisfied?
1.1 Examine if, prima facie, the alleged 'accusations' make out an
offence under Chapter IV or VI of the UAP Act
1.2 Such examination should be limited to case diary and final report
submitted under Section 173 CrPC;
2) Whether the accused deserves to be enlarged on bail in light of the
general principles relating to grant of bail under
Section 439 CrPC ('tripod test')?"
40. In the backdrop of the aforesaid settled proposition of law, this Court is

now adverting to the order dated 30.08.2024 passed by the learned trial

court in Misc. Criminal Application No. 2114 of 2024 which is under

challenge herein.

41. The learned trial court in the said order dated has taken into consideration

that the present appellant had earlier filed Misc. Criminal Application

No.234 of 2022 which had been rejected against which the appellant

preferred appeal before the High Court which had also got rejected vide

order dated 17.05.2023 passed in Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 133 of 2023 and

thereafter, against the said order SLP was preferred before the Hon'ble

14
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

Supreme Court being Special Leave Petition (Crl. Appeal)

No.16471/2023) which also got rejected vide order dated 22.01.2024.

42. The learned trial court has observed in the order impugned herein that a

prima facie case is being made out against the appellant on the basis of

evidence collected by the NIA during investigation. It has been taken note

therein that the appellant has taken active part in the criminal conspiracy.

On the alleged date of occurrence he committed recce, gave information

to the other accused persons who came to the place of occurrence and

fired indiscriminate bullet and appellant was also present there. There is

also allegation that while investigation country made pistol and four live

cartridges was recovered from his possession. Hence, the learned trial

court taking into consideration the seriousness of the crime and role

played by the petitioner in preparation of terrorist attack at Tetariakhand

colliery, has rejected the prayer for bail of the present appellant vide order

dated 30.08.2024 passed in Misc. Criminal Application No. 2114 of 2024

against which the present appeal has been preferred for grant of regular

bail.

43. Thus, from the aforesaid factual aspect it is evident that earlier this Court

has already considered the prayer for bail of the appellant, on merit, vide

order dated 17.05.2023 and the said order has already been upheld by the

Hon'ble Apex Court. However, the Hon'ble Apex Court while rejecting

the prayer for bail of the petitioner has given liberty to the petitioner to

file a fresh application for bail in the event the trial does not proceed

further. For ready reference, order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court

is being referred as under:

"UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
15
[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

ORDER

We find no reason to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. The Special Leave Petition is, accordingly, dismissed. However, liberty is given to the petitioner to file fresh bail application in the event if trial does not proceed further.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of."

44. Herein, the learned counsel for the respondent NIA has submitted at Bar

that the trial in the instant case is in progress and charges have already

been framed against the present appellant and further substantial number

of witnesses have already been examined.

45. In the light of the aforesaid submission of the learned counsel for the NIA

this Court is of the view that since in the instant case trial is in progress,

therefore, the liberty as granted by the Hon'ble Apex Court is now not

available to the appellant. Further, this Court has already expressed its

view on the merit in earlier appeal which has been filed by the appellant

with prayer for bail and since no fresh ground is available for the

appellant, therefore, it is considered view of this Court that it is not

required for this Court to reiterate its view on merit.

46. So far, the long incarceration of the appellant is concerned it is relevant to

state that the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Gurwinder Singh v. State

of Punjab (supra) taking into consideration the ratio of judgment of

Union of India vs. K.A. Najeeb, (2021) 3 SCC 713 has observed that

mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the

instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail, for ready reference

the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:

"46. As already discussed, the material available on record indicates the involvement of the appellant in furtherance of terrorist activities backed by members of banned terrorist organisation involving exchange of large quantum of money through different channels which needs to be deciphered and therefore in such a scenario if the appellant is released on bail there is every likelihood that he will influence the key witnesses of the case which

[2025:JHHC:29525-DB]

might hamper the process of justice. Therefore, mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences as one involved in the instant case cannot be used as a ground to grant bail. Hence, the aforesaid argument on behalf of the appellant cannot be accepted."

47. Thus, on the basis of the aforesaid settled position of law it is evident

that mere delay in trial pertaining to grave offences, as one involved in

the instant case, cannot be used as a ground to grant bail.

48. Thus, taking into consideration that this Court has earlier expressed its

view, on merit, with regard to the prayer for grant of bail of the present

appellant as also there is no change in circumstances as no fresh ground

has been agitated herein as also taking into consideration the

submission advanced on behalf of the respondent-NIA that the trial is

going on, this Court is of the view that the order impugned dated

30.08.2024 passed in Misc. Criminal Application No. 2114 of 2024

requires no interference.

49. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.