Jharkhand High Court
Pritam Jaiswal vs The State Of Jharkhand on 23 September, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No.3985 of 2025
------
Pritam Jaiswal, aged about 49 years, son of Dinanath Jaiswal,
resident of Village Lakrapahari, P.O. Lakrapahari, P.S. Jama, District
Dumka, PIN-814101 (Jharkhand).
.... .... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand, through its Secretary, Department of
Mines and Geology, having its office at Yojna Bhawan (Nepal
House), P.O. and P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand, PIN-
834002.
2. The Mines Commissioner, Ranchi, Department of Mines and
Geology, having its office at Yojna Bhawan (Nepal House), P.O.
and P.S. Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand, PIN-834002.
3. Deputy Commissioner, Pakur, having its office at District
Collectorate, Pakur, P.O. & P.S. Pakur, District Pakur, Jharkhand,
PIN-816107.
4. District Mining Officer, Pakur, having its office at District
Collectorate, Pakur, P.O. & P.S. Pakur, District Pakur, Jharkhand,
PIN-816107. ..... .... Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
------
For the Petitioner : Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate
Mr. Ranjeet Kushwaha, Advocate
Ms. Shruti Shekhar, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Rajiv Ranjan, Advocate General
Mr. Mohan Kr. Dubey, AC to AG
C.A.V. on 29.08.2025 Pronounced on 23/09/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India seeking therein for the following reliefs: -
(i) For issuance of an appropriate writ/order/direction,
including Writ of Certiorari for quashing/setting aside
the order contained in Memo No. 1212/MC, Ranchi
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
dated 10.07.2024 [Annexure-11] passed by Mines
Commissioner, Ranchi in Revision Case No. 103 of
2023, wherein direction has been given to petitioner
to deposit 50% of the disputed demand for further
hearing of Revision Application as being wholly
without jurisdiction and contrary to the provisions of
Rule 62 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession
Rules, 2004.
(ii) For issuance of further appropriate
writ/order/direction, including Writ of Mandamus,
directing Respondent-Mines Commissioner, Ranchi
to hear and dispose of the Revision Application of
petitioner without insisting for deposit of 50% of the
disputed demand amount, especially because in
terms of statutory provisions contained under Rule
62 of the Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession
Rules, 2004, there is no requirement of making any
pre-deposit for maintainability and hearing of
Revision Application before Mines Commissioner,
Ranchi.
(iii) In alternative to prayers no.(i) and (ii) above,
petitioner prays for issuance of appropriate
writ/order/direction including Writ of Certiorari for
quashing/setting aside order contained in Letter No.
1279/M dated 26.05.2018 [Annexure-3] passed by
District Mining Officer, Pakur, wherein in alleged
exercise of power under Rule 54(6) of Jharkhand
Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004, penalty
amounting to Rs. 1,47,52,440/- being twice the
value of mineral allegedly illegally extracted by
petitioner has been imposed and, further, penalty
under Rule 42(1) of the JMMC Rules, 2004 of Rs.
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
3,98,000/-has been imposed for allegedly filing
incorrect monthly returns.
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ
petition, required to be enumerated, which read as under: -
(i) It is the case of the writ petitioner that the petitioner
was having a mining lease pertaining to already
broken mines for the period 08.09.2011 to
07.09.2021 over a piece of land situated at Mouza
Phatehpur, Thana Hiranpur, Survey No. 110, Plot
No. 228/P, having total area of 4 acres.
(ii) The petitioner was carrying out its mining activity
strictly in accordance with law but a notice was
issued to petitioner whereby petitioner has been
informed that inspection and demarcation of his
mining lease area would be undertaken for the
period 07.04.2018 upto 12.04.2018.
(iii) An inspection-cum-demarcation of mining lease
area of petitioner was undertaken by a team of
Respondent authorities and during the said
inspection, no alleged illegal mining was found and,
on the contrary, it was only observed that certain
pillar and fencing work in the mines area have not
been undertaken and petitioner was issued a notice
vide letter no. 940/M dated 23.04.2018, wherein
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
petitioner was directed to carry out work of pillaring
and fencing of its mining lease area within a period
of one week, failing which, it was stated that mining
activity of petitioner would be stopped.
(iv) It is the further case of the petitioner that the
petitioner subsequent to the aforesaid notice,
undertook the work of pillaring and fencing of its
mining premises and there is no dispute in respect
to the same. However, a demand order contained in
letter no. 1279/M dated 26.05.2018 was issued to
the petitioner wherein it was alleged that during
inspection, it was found that out of total 4 acres of
mining lease area of petitioner, petitioner has done
mining only upon 1.59 acres of land and has only
excavated quantity of 15,92,989 cubic feet of stone,
whereas in the monthly return, total excavation of
stone was reflected as 25,01,970 cubic feet.
(v) Thus, it was alleged that petitioner excavated
9,08,981 cubic feet of stone from some place other
than its mining lease area and has illegally
transported the same. On the basis of the above,
penalty under Rule 54(6) of JMMC Rules being
twice the value of mineral amounting to Rs.
1,47,52,440/- was imposed upon petitioner and,
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
further, penalty @ Rs. 2,000/-per month, total
amounting to Rs. 3,98,000/- for incorrect filing of
monthly returns was imposed upon petitioner under
Rule 42(1) of JMMC Rules, 2004.
(vi) Thereafter, petitioner filed writ petition before this
Hon'ble Court being W.P.(C) No. 4986 of 2018
challenging demand notice dated 26.05.2018 issued
by Respondent-District Mining Officer, Pakur,
however, the said writ petition was disposed of by
this Hon'ble Court giving liberty to petitioner to file
Revision Application before Mines Commissioner,
Ranchi.
(vii) Thereafter, petitioner preferred Revision Application
in the Court of Mines Commissioner, Ranchi which
was registered as Revision Case No. 26 of 2019;
but the said Revision Application was dismissed on
the ground of limitation vide order contained in
Memo No. 1561/MC, Ranchi dated 19.07.2023.
(viii) Thereafter, petitioner again preferred writ application
before this Hon'ble Court being W.P.(C) No. 4143 of
2023 and the said writ petition was allowed by this
Hon'ble Court and the order passed by Mines
Commissioner, Ranchi was set aside and a direction
was given to hear the revision on its own merits.
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
(ix) Thereafter, petitioner filed another Revision
application being Revision Case No. 103 of 2023
but in the said Revision Application, an order
contained in Memo No. 1212/MC dated 10.07.2024
was passed by Respondent-Mines Commissioner,
Jharkhand, wherein petitioner has been directed to
deposit 50% of the disputed demand amount and,
thereafter, it has been directed that further date of
hearing shall be scheduled after compliance of the
order of deposit of 50% of the amount.
(x) Being aggrieved with the aforesaid order dated
10.7.2024 the present writ petition has been
preferred wherein prayer for quashing of the order
dated 10.07.2024 has been sought for and in
alternative to aforesaid prayer, the quashing of the
order dated 26.05.2018 has been sought for.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner
3. Learned counsel for the writ petitioner has submitted that the
revisional authority has committed gross error in passing the order
by directing the writ petitioner to deposit the 50 per cent of the
amount and it is only then, the revision will be heard on merit.
4. It has been submitted that under the provision of Rule 62 of the
JMMC Rules, 2004 amended in 2017, there is no condition to
entertain the revision, subject to deposit of 50 per cent of the
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
amount but without taking into consideration the aforesaid
requirement, the revisional authority has rejected the revision on
the aforesaid pretext.
5. It has been contended that depositing 50 per cent of the amount
which is also not proper on the part of the revisional authority to
come to such conclusion, reason being that, when this Court has
granted liberty to prefer the revision, then, it should have been
heard on merit.
6. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has
submitted that the issue so raised, therefore, needs interference
by also interfering with the order passed by the revisional
authority, as there in this writ petition.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also submitted by pressing
the alternative prayer made in the writ petition that the demand
may be interfered by exercising the power conferred under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, since, the said demand as per the
impugned demand notice is not based upon the proper
calculation.
Submissions of the learned counsel for the Respondent-State
8. Per contra, learned Advocate General appearing for the
respondent-State has submitted that the revisional authority has
not committed any error, since, the revisional authority on its suo
motu power as also the power conferred on the application made
by the party aggrieved, has exercised both the powers
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
simultaneously and while exercising the suo motu power, 50 per
cent, being the requisite amount for entertaining the appeal, in
view of the provision of Rule 65 of the JMMC Rules, 2004, was
not deposited and based upon the aforesaid ground, the appellate
authority has dismissed the appeal.
9. However, the said order has been quashed by this Court by again
giving liberty to the petitioner to approach before the revisional
authority but that does not mean that the requirement as provided
under the statutory provision as Rule 65(3) for depositing the 50
per cent amount, is waived out in any circumstances.
10. The writ petitioner does not want to deposit the pre-requisite
amount and straightaway wants adjudication and if the said prayer
of the writ petitioner, will be allowed, then the provision of Rule
65(3) of Rules, 2004 will become redundant.
11. Learned Advocate General has submitted that the petitioner
had also approached the Hon'ble High Court in W.P.(C) No. 977 of
2020, wherein the petitioner had challenged the demand notice
dated 26.05.2018 and the entire certificate proceeding but the
said writ petition was dismissed vide order dated 06.08.2025, as
such the scope of alternate prayer is now not available for the
petitioner.
12. Learned Advocate General, so far as it relates to the alternative
prayer for interfering with the demand, has submitted that once
the prayer for Writ of Certiorari has been made without issuance
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
of Writ of Certiorari, there cannot be any order said to be
consequential by showing interference with the demand, which is
the subject matter of the prayer made for issuance of Writ of
Certiorari by quashing and setting aside the order of demand.
13. Learned Advocate General, based upon the aforesaid grounds,
has submitted that the revisional authority has taken into
consideration all these issues and that led him to reject the
revision, hence, the same suffers from no error.
Analysis
14. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the pleadings made in the writ petition as also the counter
affidavit.
15. The issue which requires consideration in the present case,
i.e.,
(i) Whether the revisional authority while passing the
order requiring to deposit 50 per cent amount, in a
case where the 50 per cent amount has not been
deposited before the original authority exercising
the power of appeal, in view of the provision of
Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004, can it be
said to suffer from an error, if the matter has been
asked to be decided by this Court in view of the
liberty granted to decide it in accordance with law.
(ii) Whether the alternative prayer can be entertained
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
if the main prayer has been made for issuance of
Writ of Certiorari, since, the outcome of the main
prayer will govern the alternative prayer also
herein.
16. Both the issues since are interlinked and as such, the same
are being considered together.
17. But, before considering the aforesaid issues, the relevant
provisions of the JMMC Rules, 2004 pertaining to the adjudicatory
power conferred to the revisional and appellate authority, in view
of the provision of Rule 62 and Rule 65 of the JMMC Rules, 2004,
for ready reference, Rule 62 and Rule 65 of the JMMC Rules,
2004, are being quoted as under:-
"62. पुनरीक्षण के लिए आवेदन-(1) आयुक्त स्वप्रेरणा पर
किसी भी समय पर अभभलेख िे िारणों िो भलखखत रूप से
अंकित िरते हुए एवं किसी व्यक्क्त िे समाहताा अथवा
स्वीिृतत पदाधििारी द्वारा इन तनयमों िे अंतर्ात पाररत
आदे श से असंतुष्ट होने पर अथवा आवेदन दाखखल किये
जाने पर आदे श से संसूचन िे 60 ददनों िे भीतर या
समाहताा/स्वीिृतत पदाधििारी द्वारा स्वतः अस्वीिृत आदे श
िे 75 ददनों िे भीतर यदद ऐसी स्वयं अस्वीिृतत िी संसूचना
नहीं िी र्यी है, इस आदे श िे पुनरीक्षण हेतु िायावाही प्रारं भ
िरें र्े। परन्तु यह कि पुनरीक्षण हे तु आवेदन उपरोक्त वखणात
उपबंि िे बाद भी स्वीिार किया जा सिता है , यदद आवेदि
आयुक्त िो इस तथ्य से संतुष्ट िरें कि उसिे ससमय
आवेदन नहीं िरने िे यथेष्ट िारण थे।
(2) खनन पट्टा स्वीिृत िरने अथवा नवीिरण िरने से
इंिार िरने वाले समाहताा िे आदे श िे ववरूद्ि उपतनयम
(1) िे अंतर्ात चलने वाली प्रत्येि िायावाही में यदद उसी क्षेत्र
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
अथवा उस क्षेत्र िे किसी अंश में यदद किसी व्यक्क्त िो
खनन पट्टा स्वीिृत किया र्या है अथवा नवीिृत किया
र्या है तो उसे भी एि पक्षिार बनाया जायेर्ा।
(3) उपतनयम (1) िे अंतर्ात आवेदन िे साथ आवेदि
उपतनयम (2) िे पक्षिारों िी संख्या िे अनुरूप क्जतनी
प्रततयां वांतित हो, दे र्ा।
(4) उपतनयम (2) िे अंतर्ात आवेदन तथा उसिी प्रततयां
प्राप्त िरने िे पश्चात ् आयुक्त आवेदन िी एि प्रतत एवं
जहां स्वयं आयुक्त िी स्वप्रेरणा पर उपतनयम (1) िे अंतर्ात
िायावाही प्रारं भ िी र्यी है, सभी पक्षिारों िो िायावाही
प्रारं भ होने िी सूचना भेजेंर्े क्जसमें एि तारीख तय होर्ी
क्जससे अथवा उसिे पूवा उस पुनरीक्षण आवेदन िे ववरूद्ि
यदद वे चाहें तो प्रततनधित्व िर सिते हैं।
तनयम-62(5) ["उपायुक्त या अन्य किसी प्राधििार, क्जसिा
उल्लेख तनयम-2 में हो िे आदे श से संतुष्ट नहीं होने पर
1,000 (एि हजार) रूपये िा शुल्ि जमा िर
पुनरीक्षण/अपील खान आयुक्त िे समक्ष िर सिेर्ा।)]
65. अपीि-(1) इन तनयमों िे अिीन किसी भी सक्षम
पदाधििारी िो प्रदत्त शक्क्तयों िे अनुप्रयोर् में पाररत किसी
आदे श से अर्र िोई व्यक्क्त असंतुष्ट है तो वह उस आदे श िे
30 ददनों िे भीतर संबधं ित क्षेत्र िे उपतनदे शि खान िे पास
अपील िर सिता है।
(2) प्रत्येि अपील िे भलए 50 रूपये िा शुल्ि अदा िरना
होर्ा। अपील िे ज्ञापन िे साथ िोषार्ार रसीद संलग्न होना
चादहए क्जसमें यह प्रदभशात िरना होर्ा कि अपील िा शुल्ि
सरिारी िोषार्ार में अथवा भारतीय स्टे ट बैंि िी िोई भी
शाखा जो राज्य सरिार िे खाते में िोषार्ार िे माध्यम से
व्यवसाय िर रहा है , वे लेखा शीषा ["0853 अलौह िातु खनन
और िातुिमा उद्योर्; 102-खतनजों संबंिी ररयायती फीस,
किराये और रॉयल्टी" (1) खतनज ररयायत तथा नवीिरण
स्वीिृक्क्त िे भलए शुल्ि (2) खनन पट्टा एवं अनुज्ञक्प्त
िारिों से प्राप्त लर्ान तथा स्वाभमस्व िे रूप में जमा किया
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
र्या हो।
(3) तनयम 41(1) िे अंतर्ात सक्षम पदाधििारी द्वारा पाररत
आदे श िे ववरूद्ि तब ति िोई अपील स्वीिार नहीं िी
जाएर्ी जब ति कि आवेदि ने सक्षम पदाधििारी द्वारा
तनिााररत राभश िा 50 प्रततशत भुर्तान नहीं िर ददया हो।
(4) अपील सुनने वाले प्राधििारी अपील िे अंतर्ात आदे श
िो, आवेदि िो सुनवाई िा पूरा अवसर दे ने िे बाद यदद
आवश्यि हो तो संबधं ित पदाधििारी िे प्रततवेदन पर ववचार
िरने िे बाद उस आदे श िो अभभपुष्ट, संशोधित अथवा
तनरस्त िर सिते हैं।
(5) यदद अपील सुनने वाले प्राधििारी िे पाररत आदे श िो
संशोधित िरते हैं तथा उस संशोिन द्वारा लर्ान स्वाभमस्व
िे मामले में यदद राहत दी र्यी हो तो वह उस आदे श िी
अभभप्रमाखणत प्रतत तथा तीन सच्ची प्रततभलवप खान आयुक्त
िो भेजेंर्े।"
18. It is evident from the provision of Rule 65 that the appellate
authority is to exercise power of appeal in a case where the party
aggrieved approaches by the decision taken by the original
authority, subject to condition as would be evident from sub-rule 3
of Rule 65 that the pre-requisite amount of 50 per cent is to be
deposited mandatorily.
19. The provision of Rule 62 confers power upon the revisional
authority, the Mines Commissioner, wherein, powers have been
conferred, i.e., (i) the revisional authority can exercise power on
its own, i.e., suo motu power vested upon him and; (ii) he can
exercise the power of revisional jurisdiction or on an application
made by the party aggrieved.
20. Herein, the admitted fact is that the demand notice has been
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
issued to the writ petitioner, against which, the appellant has
preferred an appeal being Appeal No.08/2018 before the
appellate forum as per the provision provided under Rule 65 of
the JMMC Rules, 2004 but without complying with the pre-
requisite condition as provided under Rule 65(3), Hence, the
appellate authority has dismissed the appeal vide order dated
31.08.2018 due to non-compliance of the pre-requisite condition,
as provided under Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004.
21. The petitioner came to this Court by filing a writ petition being
W.P.(C) No.4986 of 2018 and thereafter, liberty was granted to
him to prefer a revision.
22. The writ petitioner has preferred revision being Revision Case
No.26 of 2019 before the revisional authority. The revisional
authority has dismissed the revision vide order dated 26.05.2023
on the ground that the present revision case has been filed
against the liberty granted by the High Court wherein liberty had
been granted to move before the revisional authority within two
weeks but the revision petition has been filed after delay of 197
days.
23. Being aggrieved, vide order dated 26.05.2023 passed in
Revision Case No.26 of 2019, the writ petitioner filed W.P.(C)
No.4143 of 2023. In the said writ petition, order dated 26.05.2023
was set aside and the matter was remitted back to the Court of
learned Commissioner, Mines for consideration of the issue on
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
merit.
24. Thereafter, the petitioner filed another revision application
being Revision Case No.103 of 2023. The Revisional Authority,
vide order dated 28.06.2024, directed the writ petitioner to deposit
50 per cent of the demand in terms of Rule 65(3) of the JMMC
Rules, 2004.
25. The question has been raised on behalf of the writ petitioner
that the revisional authority has got no jurisdiction to ask the writ
petitioner to deposit 50 per cent of the amount for the purpose of
entertaining the revision.
26. This Court, in order to consider the aforesaid argument, needs
to refer herein the power which has been vested upon the
revisional authority, i.e., the revisional authority can exercise suo
motu power against the order passed by the original authority or
the appellate authority and on an application filed by the party
aggrieved.
27. This Court is of the view that the moment, the suo motu power
has been conferred to the revisional authority, the revisional
authority can take cognizance on its own with respect to any error
committed by the inferior authority in the hierarchy, meaning
thereby, the inherent power has been vested upon the revisional
authority to rectify the error on its own motion also in addition to
the application filed by the party aggrieved.
28. Herein, the writ petitioner has preferred revision on the basis of
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
liberty granted by this Court but very surprisingly under the order
passed by the Writ Court, we have found on its perusal which has
been appended in the paper-book that reference of prayer made
of challenging the demand notice and the order passed by the
appellant authority is there in the very first paragraph, but, no
reference is there in the said order that the appellate authority has
dismissed the appeal due to non-depositing of the pre-requisite
amount, for ready reference, relevant part of the order passed by
the learned Coordinate Bench of this Court dated 09.11.2023
passed in W.P.(C) No.4143 of 2023, is being referred as under:-
"1.By filing this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed
for the following reliefs:-
"For the issuance of an appropriate Writ/Writs,
Order/Orders, direction/directions or a writ in the nature
of Certiorari for quashing of the memo No. 1561 dated
19.07.2023 (Annexure-7) passed by the Respondent
No. 2 wherein the order dated 31.08.2018 (Annexure-4)
passed by the Deputy Director, Mines, Santhal Pargana
in Appeal No. 08/2018 has been upheld ignoring the
fact that the Demand Notice dated 26.05.2018 suffers
from material irregularities and bogus demand and both
the appellate and revisional authorities has rejected the
claim of petitioner on technical ground without going
into the merit of case as the demand notice is an
arbitrary order passed by the respondent No. 4 with
ulterior motive and the same is against the principal of
Natural Justice and against the mandate of articles 16
and 21 of the Constitution of India."
2) It is apparent from the order impugned, i.e.,
Annexure-7 to the writ application passed by the
learned Mines Commissioner, Ranchi in Revision
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
Case No. 26 of 2019 on 26.05.2023, that the
revision petition of the petitioner was dismissed on
the ground of limitation. The learned Mines
Commissioner held that the Revision Petition along
with limitation petition had to be filed in the light of
the order dated 19.11.2018 passed by this Court in
W.P.(C) No. 4986 of 2018, but the petitioner has
filed the revision application after a delay of about
197 days and as per the order passed by this Court
on 19.11.2018, the petitioner had to file revision
petition before him within two weeks. It was
submitted before the learned Mines Commissioner
that the reason for delay in filing revision was that
the petitioner was under treatment of doctor and the
doctor advised him for 3-4 months complete rest
during 15.01.2019 to 15.05.2019. The reasons
assigned by the learned counsel for the petitioner
was held by the learned Mines Commissioner to be
not acceptable by him and then the revision
application has been held not maintainable.
3) A supplementary affidavit has been filed in this
writ application along with the medical certificate
issued by Neelam Nursing Home, signed by Dr.
Bindu Bhushan, M.S., that the petitioner was
suffering from Hepatitis and its related complications
since 15.01.2019 onwards and was under his
treatment for a period 3 to 4 months and he was fit
to resume duties on 16.05.2019.
4) Keeping in view the aforesaid document, we are
of the considered opinion that the petitioner was
prevented from sufficient cause in approaching the
revisional court in pursuance to the order passed by
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
this Court as above. We also take note of the ratio
decided by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case
of Collector Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr.
Vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors, (1987) 2 SCC 107 wherein
the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as
follows:-
1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to
benefit by lodging an appeal late.
2. Refusing to condone delay can result in
a meritorious matter being thrown out at
the very threshold and cause of justice
being defeated. As against this when delay
is con- doned the highest that can happen
is that a cause would be decided on merits
after hearing the parties.
3. "Every day's delay must be explained"
does not mean that a pedantic approach
should be made. Why not every hour's
delay, every second's delay? The doctrine
must be applied in a rational common
sense pragmatic manner.
4. When substantial justice and technical
considerations are pitted against each
other, cause of substantial justice deserves
to be preferred for the other side cannot
claim to have vested right in injustice being
done because of a non-deliberate delay.
5. There is no presumption that delay is
occasioned deliberately, or on account of
culpable negligence, or on account of mala
fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by
resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious
risk.
6. It must be grasped that judiciary is
respected not on account of its power to
legalize injustice on technical grounds but
because it is capable of removing injustice
and is expected to do so.
5) In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion
that the learned Mines Commissioner took an
erroneous view and dismissed the revision
application on merit. In that view of the matter, the
impugned order dated 26.05.2023 is hereby set
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
aside. The matter is remitted back to the Court of
learned Commissioner Mines for reconsideration on
merit.
6) The respondents are at liberty to file their
objections to the main application on merit.
7) With such observations the writ application is
disposed of."
29. The petitioner, in terms of the aforesaid order, has approached
to the revisional authority by filing the Revision Case No.103 of
2023.
30. The revisional authority has entertained the same but while
exercising the suo motu power on consideration of the fact vide
order dated 28.06.2024 had directed the petitioner to deposit the
pre-requisite amount of 50 per cent of the demand as per
provision of Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004.
31. The emphasis of argument of the writ petitioner herein is that
the revisional authority cannot be allowed to assume the power of
the appellate authority to look into the issue, i.e.,
"as to whether 50 per cent required amount as per
the provision of Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rule, 2004
has been deposited or not."
32. But, we are not in agreement with such ground/submission,
reason being that, when the revisional authority has been given
suo motu power under the hierarchy of the adjudicatory forum
under the JMMC Rules, 2004, then, the revisional authority is
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
competent enough to exercise the power of superintendence also
upon the issue of adjudication either of the original authority or the
appellate authority so that there may not be any miscarriage of
justice.
33. This Court is further of the view that in an admitted case where
the 50 per cent amount as required to be deposited at the time of
filing of an appeal under Rule 65(3), has not been deposited and
on that ground, the appeal has also been dismissed, whether, will
it be proper for this Court to give go-by to the requisite
requirement as per the statutory mandate as per the provision of
Rule 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004.
34. The answer of this Court is in negative, since, if the statutory
mandate has been enacted, then, as per the position of law, the
statutory body is to act strictly in pursuant to the provision as
provided under the statute and if the statutory authority is not
acting upon on the basis of the statutory mandate, then, in such
circumstances, the High Court is to issue mandamus in exercise
of power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,
even, it is the admitted case where the statutory mandate has not
been complied by not depositing the pre-requisite amount as
required before filing of the appeal under Rule 65(3) of the JMMC
Rules, 2004.
35. This Court cannot be a silent spectator and if the view has
been taken by the revisional authority under the power of
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
superintendence, then on its own motion, the requirement of
depositing 50 per cent amount and if the amount has not been
deposited, then, in such reason assigned by the revisional
authority as one of the reasons for rejecting the revision, this
Court is of the view that no Writ of Certiorari can be issued by
showing interference with the decision so taken by the revisional
authority.
36. It would be apt to refer herein that this Court in the Letters
Patent Appeal being L.P.A. No.480 of 2024 (Shiv Shankar vs.
The State of Jharkhand) in almost similar circumstances, has
adjudicated the issue regarding the exercise of power by the
revisional authority in a case of conferment of power to exercise
suo motu as also on the basis of the application to be made by
the party aggrieved pertaining to the matter arising out of a case
of Jharkhand Building (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011
(in short 'J.B.C. Act', 2011) which contains a provision under
Section 37 of the Act, 2011 conferring power to the revisional
authority to exercise suo motu power against the order passed by
the Controller or the appellate authority and on the application if
filed by the party aggrieved.
37. The issue agitated in the said case was that whether the
revisional authority has jurisdiction to straightway look into the
propriety of the order passed by the Rent Controller, original
authority.
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
38. Such issue was raised in a situation that the Rent Controller-
cum-Sub- Divisional Officer, Sadar Ranchi has given a finding
while answering the issue in a case of eviction of the tenant by
coming to conclusion of breach of agreement, as provided under
Section 19(1)(a) of the J.B.C. Act, 2011 and default in making
payment of rent, as per the condition stipulated under Section
19(1)(d) of the Act, 2011.
39. The order of Controller was challenged before the appellate
authority, the Deputy Commissioner, wherein, the appellate
authority has only gone into the issue of default in making
payment of rent. The arrear of rent has been paid and as such,
the appellate authority has allowed the tenant to remain in the
possession.
40. The tenant being aggrieved with the same, has approached to
the revisional authority under the power conferred under Section
37 of the J.B.C. Act, 2011.
41. The revisional authority, in stead of considering the issue of
default in making payment of rent, has considered the propriety of
the order passed by the rent controller so far as it relates to
breach of terms and conditions of the lease.
42. It has been contended in the said case that the revisional
authority in excess of jurisdiction has straightaway entered into
the finding of the order passed by the Rent Controller skipping the
order passed by the appellate authority.
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
43. This Court has given finding by negating the said ground on
the basis of conferment of power to the revisional authority as
under Section 37 of the Act, 2011 along with suo motu power and
also on the basis of the application filed by the party aggrieved.
44. The suo motu power has been dealt with by this Court by way
of exercise of power to superintend and in that view of the matter,
if the revisional authority has gone into the issue of condition of
breach of lease, in the aforesaid pretext, the power which has
been exercised by the revisional authority cannot be said to be
unjust and improper.
45. However, the provision as provided under Section 37 of the
Act, 2011 speaks that the order passed by the Controller or the
appellate authority is to be looked into in exercise of suo motu
power or the application filed by the party aggrieved. The relevant
paragraphs of the said judgment are being referred as under:-
"42. This Court before considering the aforesaid issue needs to
refer herein, the provision of Section 37 of the Act, 2011, which
is being referred as under:-
"37. Revision-(1) The Commissioner may, either of his
own motion or on application made to him in this behalf,
revise any order passed by the Controller or by the
Appellate Authority on appeal under this Act.
(2) The exercise of the powers by the Commissioner
under this section shall be subject to such rules as may
be prescribed and for reasons to be recorded in writing.
(3) Such revision application shall be disposed of within
six months from the date of filing of such application."
43. It is evident from the aforesaid provision that the revisional
authority, Commissioner has been conferred with the power to
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
exercise the revisional power of his own motion or on
application made to him in this behalf, revise any order passed
by the Controller or by the Appellate Authority on appeal under
this Act. The exercise of the powers by the Commissioner under
this section shall be subject to such rules as may be prescribed
and for reasons to be recorded in writing.
44. It is evident that the revisional authority has been conferred
with the power to exercise the same on his own motion or even
on application made in this behalf and while doing so, the
revisional authority can revise any order passed by the Rent
Controller or by the appellate authority on appeal under this
Act, meaning thereby, the revisional authority can also suo motu
consider the order passed by the Controller independent to that
of the order passed by the appellate authority that is very
specific in the aforesaid provision that the moment the
stipulation has been made under Section 37 of the Act, 2011
that the revisional authority may revise any order passed by the
Controller or by the Appellate Authority on appeal.
45. The power conferred to the revisional authority by
conferring suo motu power itself clarifies the power of the
revisional authority, i.e., only in order to rectify if the error
committed either by the Rent Controller or by the appellate
authority.
46. The moment, the power has been conferred to the
revisional authority to exercise the power of revision of an order
passed by the Controller and as such, it is not incumbent upon
the revisional authority to throw out the revision if it has been
filed directly against the order passed by the Controller."
46. It needs to refer herein that the aforesaid judgment was
challenged before the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing Special Leave
to Appeal (Civil) No. 14096 of 2025 and the same has been
dismissed, vide order dated 16.05.2025.
47. Now coming to the instant case, it requires to refer herein that
so far as the jurisdiction of District Mining Officer under Rule 54(6)
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
of JMMC Rules 2004 is concerned, this Court in the writ petition
being W.P. (C) No. 2859 of 2022, vide order dated 18.09.2025 has
categorically held that by virtue of Section 21(5) of the MMDR Act,
1957, the State Government has been conferred with the power to
recover the mineral itself or its price if already sold, along with any
rent, royalty, or tax owned for the unauthorized occupation of the
land. It has further been observed that if the ratio of the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Common
Cause Vs. Union of India & Ors., [(2017) 9 SCC 499] will be
taken into consideration along with the provision of Rule 54(6) as
also the purport of Section 21(5) of the Act, 1957, it is evident that
the power has been conferred to the State Government to recover
the amount. Since the provision has been stipulated for recovery
of the amount by the State Government which itself suggest that
the authority, if conferred with the power, is having jurisdiction to
raise the demand in exercise of Power conferred under Rule 54(6)
of Rule 2004, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph of the
aforesaid judgment is being quoted as under:
"81. It also requires to refer herein that by virtue of Section
21(5) of the MMDR Act, 1957, the State Government has
been conferred with the power to recover the mineral itself or
its price if already sold, along with any rent, royalty, or tax
owned for the unauthorized occupation of the land. Herein,
the State Government means the functionaries of the State,
i.e., the executive authority. Accordingly, power has been
conferred upon the DMO by virtue of the notification dated
6th May, 2025, although there was no notification prior to the
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
issuance of notification dated 6th May, 2025 that is the
reason notification has been issued conferring power upon
the representative(s) of the State Government and therefore,
the State Government i.e., representative(s) of the State
Government has power to raise demand under Section 54(6)
of the Rules, 2004.
82. So far as the power which has been exercised by the
District Mining Officer under the provision of Rule 54(8) now
it is 54(6) is concerned wherein the ground has been taken
that under Rule 54(6) the District Mining Officer has no
jurisdiction, but if the ratio of the judgment rendered by the
Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Common Cause (Supra)
will be taken into consideration along with the provision of
Rule 54(6) as also the purport of Section 21(5) of the Act,
1957, it is evident that the power has been conferred to the
State Government to recover the amount. Since the provision
has been stipulated for recovery of the amount by the State
Government which itself suggest that the authority, if
conferred with the power, is having jurisdiction to raise the
demand in exercise of Power conferred under Rule 54(6) of
Rule 2004.
48. It needs to refer herein that the petitioner had also approached
this Court in W.P.(C) No. 977 of 2020, wherein, the petitioner had
challenged the demand notice dated 26.05.2018 and the entire
certificate proceeding but the said writ petition was dismissed vide
order dated 06.08.2025, for ready reference, the relevant
paragraphs of the order dated 06.08.2025 is being quoted as
under:
1. The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226
of the Constitution of India, against the demand notice
dated 26.05.2018 whereby the petitioner has been
directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 1,51,50,440/- including
fine of Rs. 3,98,000/- and for quashing certificate
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
proceeding as well as order of issuance of distress
warrant dated 22.01.2020 issued by respondent no. 2.
31. Admittedly, the petitioner was granted lease in mauza
Fataipur for certain area. The petitioner received a
demand notice dated 26.05.2018 issued by respondent
no. 3-District Mining Officer, Pakur, against which the
petitioner preferred an appeal before the respondent no.
2, which was dismissed vide order dated 31.08.2018 on
the ground that the petitioner did not prefer the appeal
within the limitation period, and further, the petitioner did
not deposit 50% of the amount of demand as per Rule
65(3) of the JMMC Rules.
35. The petitioner being aggrieved thereof has again
approached this Court against the demand notice dated
26.05.2018 whereby the petitioner has been directed to
deposit a sum of Rs. 1,51,50,440/- including fine of Rs.
3,98,000/- and for quashing certificate proceeding as well
as order of issuance of distress warrant dated 22.01.2020
issued by respondent no. 2.
38. Learned counsel for the respondent-State has taken
the ground that even the prayer which was made in
earlier round of litigation i.e., in W.P.(C) No. 4986 of 2018
has again been agitated in this case besides other prayer
and the petitioner instead of pursuing the revision has
again approached this Court for the self-same relief.
39. In view thereof, this Court has gone through order
dated 19.11.2018 passed in W.P.(C) No. 4986 of 2018
and the prayer made in the present writ petition has found
that in both the writ petition i.e., in earlier round of
litigation and in the present one prayer for quashing the
demand notice dated 26.05.2018 has been made but in
the instant writ petition besides that prayer has also been
made for quashing the certificate proceeding as well as
order of issuance of distress warrant dated 22.01.2020
issued by respondent no. 2.
40. However, the fact remains that in view of liberty
granted in W.P. (C) No. 4986 of 2018, the petitioner
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
preferred revision application being Revision Case No. 26
of 2019, which is still pending and during pendency of the
said revision application the respondent-District Mining
Officer filed a certificate proceeding being Certificate
Case No. 2/18-19 for realization of certificate amount, in
which distress warrant has been issued, which has been
held to be issued in accordance with law.
41. Therefore, this Court does not find any merit in the
case so as to make any interference with the order
passed by the authorities concerned.
42. Accordingly, the instant writ petition sans merit is
dismissed."
49. It needs to refer herein that it is the settled connotation of law
that the things are to be done as provided in the statute and there
cannot be any deviation, reference may be made to the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Babu
Verghese vs. Bar Council of Kerala, reported in (1999) 3 SCC
422, wherein, it has been held at paragraphs-31 & 32 as under:
"31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the
manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute,
the act must be done in that manner or not at all. The origin of
this rule is traceable to the decision in Taylor v. Taylor which
was followed by Lord Roche in Nazir Ahmad v. King
Emperor who stated as under:
"[W]here a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way,
the thing must be done in that way or not at all."
32. This rule has since been approved by this Court in Rao Shiv
Bahadur Singh v. State of V.P. and again in Deep Chand v.
State of Rajasthan. These cases were considered by a three-
judge bench of this Court in State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and
the rule laid down in Nazir Ahmad case was again upheld. This
rule has since been applied to the exercise of jurisdiction by
courts and has also been recognized as a statutory principle of
administrative law."
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
50. Reference may also be made to the judgment rendered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Zuari Cement Ltd. v. Regional
Director ESIC Hyderabad (in Civil Appeal No. 5138-40/2007),
reported in (2015) 7 SCC 690, wherein, it has been held at
paragraph-14 as under:
"14. As per the scheme of the Act, the appropriate
Government alone could grant or refuse exemption. When the
statute prescribed the procedure for grant or refusal of
exemption from the operation of the Act, it is to be done in that
manner and not in any other manner. In State of Jharkhand v.
Ambay Cements, it was held that :
26.... it is the cardinal rule of interpretation that where
a statute provides that a particular thing should be
done, it should be done in the manner prescribed
and not in any other way."
51. In the instant case, herein the revisional authority has gone into
the issue of pre-requisite amount to be deposited in terms of the
provision of Section 65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004 and if he has
gone into the issue in order to maintain the mandate of the
statutory command, it cannot be said that the revisional authority
has exceeded its jurisdiction.
52. Accordingly, the issue no.(i) is answered herein against the
petitioner.
53. Since the first issue itself has been answered against the writ
petitioner, then there is no question to go into the alternative
prayer as the same depends upon the issue no.(i) and
accordingly, the same is hereby, rejected.
54. Further, the principle of issuance of Writ of Certiorari is well
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
settled, as per the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court
in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. Radhakrishnan, reported in A.I.R.
1964 Supreme Court 477, wherein, at paragraph-7 it has been held
as under:
"7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of
High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art. 226
has been frequently considered by this Court and the
true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A
writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals:
these are cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of
it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ
can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction
conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal Acts illegally or
improperly, as for instance, it decides a question without
giving an opportunity to be heard to the party affected by
the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with
the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice.
There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue
a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the
Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate
Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of
fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of
the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or
questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is
apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a
writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may
appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by
the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is
shown that in recording the said finding, the tribunal had
erroneously refused to admit admissible and material
evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible
evidence which has influenced the impugned finding.
Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
would be regarded as an error of law which can be
corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this
category of cases, however, we must always bear in
mind that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal
cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of
certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material
evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or
inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and
the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the
said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is
within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the
High Courts under Art. 226 to issue a writ of certiorari
can be legitimately exercised."
55. Similarly, in the case of Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Ahmad
Ishaque and Ors., reported in AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held at paragraph-21 as hereunder: -
"21. With regard to the character and scope of the writ
of certiorari and the conditions under which it can be
issued, the following propositions may be taken as
established: (1) Certiorari will be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or
Tribunal acts without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or
fails to exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be
issued when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the
exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it
decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to
be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice. (3)
The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in exercise of
a supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. One
consequence of this is that the Court will not review
findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal
even if they be erroneous. This is on the principle that a
Court which has jurisdiction over a subject-matter has
jurisdiction to decide wrong as well as right, and when
the Legislature does not choose to confer a right of
appeal against that decision, it would be defeating its
purpose and policy, if a superior Court were to rehear
the case on the evidence and substitute its own findings
in certiorari."
56. In the case of Sawarn Singh and Anr. vs. State of Punjab and
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
Ors., reported in (1976) 2 SCC 868, their Lordships, while
discussing the power of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India for issuance of writ of certiorari, has been pleased to hold at
paragraph nos.12 and 13, as hereunder:
"12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it will
be useful to notice the general principles indicating the
limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari jurisdiction can be
exercised only for correcting errors of jurisdiction
committed by inferior courts or tribunals. A writ of certiorari
can be issued only in the exercise of supervisory
jurisdiction which is different from appellate jurisdiction.
The Court exercising special jurisdiction under Article 226
is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. As was pointed
out by this Court in Syed Yakoob's case (supra).
13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an inferior
tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only if in
recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on
evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused to
admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not
supported by any evidence at all, because in such cases
the error amounts to an error of law. The writ jurisdiction
extends only to cases where orders are passed by inferior
courts or tribunals in excess of their jurisdiction or as a
result of their refusal to exercise jurisdiction vested in them
or they act illegally or improperly in the exercise of their
jurisdiction causing grave miscarriage of justice."
57. This Court, applying the principle as laid down in these cases,
is of the view that the order passed by the original authority
exercising the power of appeal, in view of the provision of Rule
65(3) of the JMMC Rules, 2004, cannot be said to suffer from an
error.
58. So far as the issue of alternative prayer is concerned, once the
Court has already taken the view that this case is not fit for
issuance of Writ of Certiorari, then, no consequential direction can
be passed in a case where the alternative prayer has been made
as in the present case. Otherwise, if any direction will be passed
2025:JHHC:29774-DB
in the alternative prayer, then, dismissing the writ petition by
declining to issue Writ of Certiorari, will become redundant.
59. This Court, considering the aforesaid fact and based upon the
aforesaid reason, is of the view that the instant writ petition lacks
merit.
60. In the result, the instant writ petition fails and is, dismissed.
61. In consequence thereof, pending interlocutory application(s), if
any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
23/09/2025
Rohit/-A.F.R.
