Jharkhand High Court
M/S Shivay Enterprises Having Its ... vs The State Of Jharkhand Through Its ... on 13 October, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No.3475 of 2025
M/s Shivay Enterprises having its office at Baliapur, P.O. and P.S. Baliapur,
District-Dhanbad, Jharkhand through its partner namely Rajesh Jhalani,
aged about 50 years, son of Late Mohan Lal Jhalani, resident of House No.
781, Matkuriya, near Libra Hyundai showroom, P.O. Dhanbad, and P.S.
Bankmore, District- Dhanbad, Jharkhand. ......... ....... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through its Principal Secretary, Department of
Mines and Geology, at Nepal House, Doranda, P.O. Doranda, P.S.
Doranda, District Ranchi, Jharkhand.
2. The Mines Commissioner, Department of Mines and Geology, having
its office at Nepal House, Doranda, Ρ.Ο. Doranda, P.S. Doranda, District
Ranchi, Jharkhand.
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad, P.O. and P.S. Dhanbad, District
Dhanbad, Jharkhand.
4. The District Mining Officer, Dhanbad, P.O. and P.S. Dhanbad, District
Dhanbad, Jharkhand. ............ Respondents
With
W.P.(C) No.3525 of 2025
M/s Sitaram Mineral having its office at Chas, P.O. and P.S Chas, District-
Bokaro through its Proprietor namely Bina Sharma, aged about 76 years,
s/o Sri Prabhu Ram Barahi, resident of village Pratap Nagar, P.O. Chas,
P.S. Chas, District Bokaro, Jharkhand at present resident of C/O Sri
Sheochandra Prasad, resident of village Chainpur, P.O. Chainpur, P.S.
Chainpur, District Bokaro, Jharkhand. ....... Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through Principal Secretary, Department of
Mines and Geology, Government of Jharkhand, having Its office at
Nepal House, Doranda, P.O. and P.S. Doranda, District- Ranchi,
Jharkhand.
2. The Mines Commissioner, Ranchi Department of Mines and Geology,
Government of Jharkhand having its office at Nepal House, Doranda,
P.O. and P.S. Doranda, District- Ranchi, Jharkhand.
3. The Deputy Commissioner, Palamau having its Office at Medininagar,
P.O. Medininagar, P.S. Medininagar, District Palamu, Jharkhand.
4. The District Mining Officer, Palamau having its Office at Medininagar,
P.O. Medininagar, P.S. Medininagar, District Palamu, Jharkhand.
............ Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Petitioner(s) : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate
Mr. Ankit Vishal, Advocate
For the Resp-State of Jharkhand : Mr. Ashutosh Anand, AAG-III
Mr. Shray Mishra, AC to AG
Mr. Sahbaj Akhtar, AC to AAG-III
------
C.A.V on 09.09.2025 Pronounced on 13/10/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
1. Both the writ petitions have been tagged together vide order dated
25.07.2025 passed by a co-ordinate Division Bench of this Court.
2. In W.P.(C) No.3475 of 2025 the issue involved is pertaining to grant of
lease and execution of mining lease deed whereas in W.P(C)No.3525 of
2025 the issue involved is pertaining to quashing of the order by which the
mining lease granted in favour of the petitioner has been cancelled by the
competent authority.
3. Since the factual aspects and the grounds taken on behalf of the writ
petitioners are different and, as such, both the writ petitions are being dealt
with separately, however, the same is being reflected in the common order.
4. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for the following reliefs:
"For issuance of an appropriate writ (s)/ order (s)/direction(s)
particularly writ of mandamus commanding upon the
respondents to forthwith grant mining lease in favour of the
petitioner and execute mining lease deed for the period of 10
years of stone minerals in relation to an area admeasuring 2.36
Acres situated at Baliapur Circle, Mouza Salpatra, Khata No. 78,
Plot No. 77, District- Dhanbad."
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Factual Matrix
5. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ petition
needs to refer herein which reads as under:
(i) The grievance of the writ petitioner as per the
pleadings made in the writ petition is that the
petitioner is a partnership firm and the instant matter
relates to the inordinate delay on part of the
respondents in grant of mining lease in favour of the
petitioner and execution of lease deed in relation to
an area of 2.36 Acres situated at Baliapur Circle,
Mouza- Salpatra, Khata No. 78, Plot No. 77, District-
Dhanbad (hereinafter referred as "land in question").
(ii) The petitioner submitted an application dated
07.12.2015 for grant of mining lease in respect of the
land in question for mining of stone
boulder, which was duly received by the Office of
District Mining Officer, Dhanbad.
(iii) Thereafter, the Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad
vide letter no.2237 dated 07.12.2015 directed the
Circle Officer, Baliapur to submit an enquiry report
with respect to the land in question.
(iv) The Circle Officer Baliapur vide letter no.1164 dated
11.12.2015 informed the Assistant Mining Officer,
Dhanbad that the land in question is gairmajurwa and
it is not a forest land as per khatiyan and further the
land is not situated within the 500 meters radius of
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river, human settlement, educational institution,
hospital etc.
(v) The Divisional Forest Officer, Dhanbad vide letter
no. 2145 dated 19.12.2015 informed the Assistant
Mining Officer, Dhanbad that land in question is not
a forest land and there is no National Park/ Sanctuary/
biodiversity within the radius of 10 км.
(vi) The Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad vide letter
no. 46 dated 13.01.2016 informed the petitioner that
the Deputy Commissioner vide order dated
02.01.2016 has given approval for grant of mining
lease deed in favour of the petitioner and further
directed the petitioner to submit mining plan for
approval and obtain environmental clearance from
concerned authority.
(vii) Thereafter, the Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad
vide memo no. 1582/M dated 14.07.2016 approved
the Mining Plan along with Progressive Mine closure
Plan submitted by the petitioner in relation to the
land in question.
(viii) Accordingly, the petitioner submitted an application
before the District Environmental Impact Assessment
Authority (DEIAA), Dhanbad for grant of
Environmental clearance. The DEIAA in its meeting
dated 17.04.2017 decided not to grant environmental
clearance to the petitioner.
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(ix) The Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad vide letter
по. 1126 dated 24.06.2017 informed the petitioner the
DEIAA, Dhanbad has decided not to grant
environmental clearance to the petitioner.
(x) The petitioner vide letter dated 24.08.2017 requested
the Member Secretary, State Level Environment
Impact Assessment Authority, Jharkhand to consider
the case of petitioner for grant of environmental
clearance.
(xi) The State Level Environment Impact Assessment
Authority Jharkhand (SEIAA) in its meeting held on
11.11.2017 directed the District Environmental
Impact Assessment Authority, Dhanbad to reconsider
the argument of petitioner and pass speaking order..
(xii) Meanwhile, the Assistant Mining Officer, Dhanbad
vide letter no. 610 dated 19.03.2018 informed the
petitioner that the LOI for grant of mining lease in
favour of petitioner has been rejected in terms of the
Rules 9(1)(e) of the Jharkhand Minor Minerals
Concession Amendment Rules, 2017.
(xiii) Later on, the District Level Environment Impact
Assessment Authority, Dhanbad vide letter No. 1412
dated 08.12.2018 granted Environmental Clearance
in favour of the petitioner.
(xiv) Further, the petitioner filed an application dated
28.01.2019 before the Deputy Commissioner,
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Dhanbad for grant of stone mining lease over the land
in question in favour of the petitioner.
(xv) The District Mining Officer, Dhanbad vide memo no.
349 dated 25.02.2019 informed the petitioner that the
Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad vide order dated
11.02.2019 has rejected the application filed by the
petitioner.
(xvi) Thereafter, the petitioner preferred Revision Case
No. 22/2019 before the Mines Commissioner, Ranchi
challenging the decision of the Deputy
Commissioner, Dhanbad.
(xvii) The Mines Commissioner, Ranchi vide order dated
08.02.2022 set aside the order dated 11.02.2019 by
condoning the delay in submission of environmental
clearance and remanded the matter back to the
Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad to examine afresh
and dispose the matter subject to submission of
statutory clearances and fulfilment of legal
compliances as per provision
contained in JMMC Rules, 2004.
(xviii) Consequently, the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad
vide letter no. 913 dated 23.03.2022 the requested
Mines Secretary, Department of Mines and Geology,
Jharkhand requested to give appropriate direction
regarding the applicability of Rule 9(1)(a) of JMMC
Rules, 2004 as contained at the time of issuance of
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Letter of Intent (LOI) or Rule 9(1)(a) of the JMMC
(Amendment) Rules, 2019 would be applicable in the
case of petitioner.
(xix) The petitioner vide letter dated 09.01.2025 requested
the Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad to
execute mining lease in favour of the petitioner for
mining of stones over the land in question.
(xx) It is the case of the petitioner that the grant of Letter
of Intent vide order dated 02.01.2016 passed by the
Deputy Commissioner, Dhanbad creates enforceable
right in favour of the petitioner and the respondents
cannot decline the execution of mining lease on the
ground which was non-existent on the date of grant
of mining lease by the Deputy Commissioner vide
order dated 02.01.2016.
6. The petitioner has approached this Court by filing the instant writ
petition on the ground that after issuance of Letter of Intent (L.O.I) the
mining lease has not been granted even though the Deputy Commissioner,
Dhanbad has made communication to the Commissioner, Mines and
Geological Department, Government of Jharkhand to give proper
guideline with respect to sanction of the lease deed, but having no decision
taken the writ petition has been filed in the year 2025.
Submission on behalf of the writ petitioner:
7. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, the learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner has taken the following grounds in assailing the impugned order:
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(i) The contention has been raised after issuance of L.O.I, a right
has been accrued in favour of the writ petitioner and the right
once created the same cannot be taken away even after statutory
restriction as has been inflicted by virtue of insertion of provision
of JMMC Rules, 2004 amended in 2017.
(ii) The ground has been taken that the question of accrual of
right is required consideration on the basis of the issuance of
L.O.I moreover, the fact about the accrual of right has been taken
into consideration by this Court in the judgment passed in
W.P(C) No.454 of 2016 titled "Kohinoor Steel Private Limited
vs. Union of India and others".
8. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has
submitted that the impugned order therefore, needs interference by this
Court.
Submission on behalf of the Respondents:
9. Per contra, Mr. Ashutosh Anand, the learned AAG-III appearing for
the respondent-State to defend the impugned order has raised the following
grounds:
(i) It has been contended that after the statutory restriction imposed by
virtue of the amendment there cannot be any lease deed to be
executed in favour of the writ petitioner.
(ii) So far as the issuance of L.O.I, based upon that the ground of accrual
of right has been taken, is concerned the same is not available in
view of the specific provision as mandated under the Jharkhand
Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 particularly 9(1) (ङ).
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(iii) The reliance has been placed by referring the judgment rendered in
the case of "Kohinoor Steel Private Limited" (supra), on fact
applicability of the statutory provision, the said judgment will not
be applicable in the fact and circumstances of the present case.
(iv) The reason for the same has been argued that the judgment in the
case of "Kohinoor Steel Private Limited" (supra) pertaining to the
major mineral and the consideration of issuance of L.O.I said to be
accrual right has been considered on the basis of the statutory
provision of eligibility as provided under the provision of Section
10A(2)(b) of the Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015.
(v) It has been contended that in the present case, there is no such
provision as under the JMMC Rules, 2004.
10. The learned AAG-III appearing for the State of Jharkhand, based
upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is case where the
petitioner is not entitled for any relief in view of the statutory restrictions
as provided under the provision of JMMC Rules, 2004 as amended time to
time.
Response of the learned counsel for the petitioner:
11. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, in response, has
submitted that the question of the statutory restriction having been
imposed as has been taken on behalf of the State is concerned, the same is
not fit to be accepted in view of the conflict in the provision of Rule 9 of
JMMC Rules, 2004 amended in 2017 taking into consideration the
specific provision providing of accrued right in case of issuance of L.O.I
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as provided under Section 10A(2)(c) Mines and Minerals (Development
and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015.
12. It has been contended that JMMC Rules, 2004, being a sub-
ordinate legislation, cannot be allowed to prevail upon the parents Act, i.e.,
the Act of 1957.
Analysis:
13. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
appreciated the arguments advanced on their behalf as also go through the
material available on record.
14. This Court requires to consider the following issues:
(i) Whether on the issuance of L.O.I. can it be said to be an accrued
right in favour of the petitioner so as to prevail even upon the
statutory restrictions as has been stipulated in JMMC Rule 2004
amended time to time.
(ii) Whether the provision as contained under Rules, 2004 enacted
in exercise of power conferred under section 15 of the Act of 1957
can be said to be in conflict to the provision of MMDR Act, 1957.
15. Both the issues are being taken up separately.
16. The issue no.(ii) is being first taken into consideration.
17. It needs to refer herein the core object of the Mines and Minerals
(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) is to provide for
the development and regulation of mines and minerals in India under the
control of the Union Government. Overall purpose and objective of
the MMDR Act as well as the Rules framed thereunder is to ensure that
mining operations are carried out in a scientific manner with a high degree
of responsibility including responsibility in protecting and preserving the
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environment and the flora of the area, reference in this regard be made to
the Judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of Common Cause Vs. Union of India & Ors [(2017) 9 SCC 499], for
ready reference the relevant paragraph of the aforesaid judgment is being
quoted as under:
"84. Briefly therefore, the overall purpose and objective of
the MMDR Act as well as the Rules framed thereunder is to ensure
that mining operations are carried out in a scientific manner with a
high degree of responsibility including responsibility in protecting
and preserving the environment and the flora of the area. Through
this process, the holder of a mining lease is obliged to adhere to the
standards laid down under the Environment (Protection) Act,
1986 or the EPA as well as the laws pertaining to air and water
pollution and also by necessary implication, the provisions of
the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 (for short "the FC Act").
Exploitation of the natural resources is ruled out. If the holder of a
mining lease does not adhere to the provisions of the statutes or the
rules or the terms and conditions of the mining lease, that person is
liable to incur penalties under Section 21 of the MMDR Act. In
addition thereto, Section 4-A of the MMDR Act which provides for
the termination of a mining lease is applicable. This provides that
where the Central Government, after consultation with the State
Government is of the opinion that it is expedient in the interest of
regulation of mines and mineral development, preservation of
natural environment, prevention of pollution, etc. then the Central
Government may request the State Government to prematurely
terminate a mining lease."
18. The Act of 1957 contains provisions conferring power to the
State to make out rule, i.e. Rule 15 herein which is relevant under which
the JMMC Rules, 2004 has been formulated, for ready reference Rule 15
is being quoted hereunder as:
"15. Power of State Governments to make rules in respect of minor
minerals.―(1) The State Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, make rules for, regulating the grant of [quarry
leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions] in respect of
minor minerals and for purposes connected therewith.
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[(1A) In particular and without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the
following matters, namely:―
(a) the person by whom and the manner in which, applications for
quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral concessions may be
made and the fees to be paid therefor;
(b) the time within which, and the form in which, acknowledgement
of the receipt of any such applications may be sent;
(c) the matters which may be considered where applications in
respect of the same land are received within the same day;
(d) the terms on which, and the conditions subject to which and the
authority by which quarry leases, mining leases or other mineral
concessions may be granted or renewed;
(e) the procedure for obtaining quarry leases, mining leases or other
mineral concessions;
(f) the facilities to be afforded by holders of quarry leases, mining
leases or other mineral concessions to persons deputed by the
Government for the purpose of undertaking research or training in
matters relating to mining operations;
(g) the fixing and collection of rent, royalty, fees, dead rent, fines or
other charges and the time within which and the manner in which
these shall be payable;
(h) the manner in which rights of third parties may be protected
(whether by way of payment of compensation or otherwise) in cases
where any such party is prejudicially affected by reason of any
prospecting or mining operations;
(i) the manner in which rehabilitation of flora and other vegetation
such as trees, shrubs and the like destroyed by reason of any
quarrying or mining operations shall be made in the same area or in
any other area selected by the State Government (whether by way of
reimbursement of the cost of rehabilitation or otherwise) by the
person holding the quarrying or mining lease;
(j) the manner in which and the conditions subject to which, a quarry
lease, mining lease or other mineral concession may be transferred;
(k) the construction, maintenance and use of roads power
transmission lines, tramways, railways, serial rope ways, pipelines
and the making of passage for water for mining purposes on any land
comprised in a quarry or mining lease or other mineral concession;
(l) the form of registers to be maintained under this Act;
(m) the reports and statements to be submitted by holders of quarry
or mining leases or other mineral concessions and the authority to
which such reports and statements shall be submitted;
(n) the period within which and the manner in which and the
authority to which applications for revision of any order passed by
any authority under these rules may be made, the fees to be paid
therefore, and the powers of the revisional authority; and
(o) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed.]
(2) Until rules are made under sub-section (1), any rules made by a
state Government regulating the grant of [quarry leases, mining
leases or other mineral concessions] in respect of minor minerals
which are in force immediately before the commencement of these
Act shall continue in force.
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(3) The holder of a mining lease or any other mineral concession
granted under any rule made under sub-section (1) shall pay
[royalty or dead rent, whichever is more] in respect of minor
minerals removed or consumed by him or by his agent, manager,
employee, contractor or sub-lessee at the rate prescribed for the time
being in the rules framed by the State Government in respect of minor
minerals:
Provided that the State Government shall not enhance the rate of
[royalty or dead rent] in respect of any minor mineral for more than
once during any period of [three] years.]
[(4) Without prejudice to sub-sections (1), (2) and sub-section (3),
the State Government may, by notification, make rules for regulating
the provisions of this Act for the following, namely:―
(a) the manner in which the District Mineral Foundation shall work
for the interest and benefit of persons and areas affected by mining
under sub-section (2) of section 9B;
(b) the composition and functions of the District Mineral Foundation
under sub-section (3) of section 9B; and
(c) the amount of payment to be made to the District Mineral
Foundation by concession holders of minor minerals under section
15A.]"
19. The JMMC Rules, 2004 has been enacted by the State under the
conferment of power as provided under section 15 of the Act of 1957.
20. The question of having overriding of effect of the Act of 1957 is
the issue raised herein. The issue is not res integra that in our Constitution,
in Seven Schedule, is having three lists, i.e., List-I, List-II and List-III.
21. List-I has the subject matter wherein the power to formulate
laws has been conferred to the Central Government.
22. List-II has the subject matter wherein the laws making power has
been conferred to the State Government being the State subject.
23. List-III concurrent list has the subject matter upon which the
Central Government as well as State Government can formulate the law.
24. Under List-I the entry 54 pertain to the minerals. The Central
Government in order to take care of its development and regulation, has
enacted the Act of 1957.
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25. Entry 23 in the list-II speaks about Regulation of mines and
mineral development subject to the provisions of List I with respect to
regulation and development under the control of the Union. Further, Entry
50 in the List-II also speaks about the Taxes on minerals and, as such,
being the State subject, the State is to formulate its own legislation to
regulate the issue of minor minerals.
26. The issue of overlapping of the Entry-54 of the List-I and Entry-
50 of the List-II has been taken into consideration by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench in the case of
Mineral Area Development Authority & Anr. reported in M/S Steel
Authority of India & Anr Etc. 2024 INSC 554 wherein it has been held
that the Entry-54 in the List I and the Entry 50 of the List-II are not
overlapping to each other, however, subject to limitation for which the
Parliament has been conferred with the power, the relevant paragraph is
being quoted hereunder as:
28.Although the above entries are substantially similar to the
scheme under the GOI Act 1935, one of the differences lies in the
removal of "oil fields" from Entry 54 of List I and Entry 23 of
List II. The regulation and development of oil fields is now
enumerated under Entry 53 of List I.18 The other difference is
that while the GOI Act 1935 required a declaration by Federal
law, the Constitution now requires a declaration by Parliament.
The entry pertaining to taxes on mineral rights is largely similar
to Entry 44 of the Provincial Legislative List, except for the fact
that Entry 44 provided for imposition of "any limitations" by
"any Act" enacted by the Federal Legislature relating to mineral
development, while Entry 50 of List II does not include the
expression "any Act" enacted by Parliament. Before we delve
into the intricacies of the interpretation of the legislative entries,
we need to bear in mind the constitutional philosophy underlying
the Indian federal setup.
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32. Article 245 (read with Article 246) is the source of the
legislative powers of Parliament and the State legislatures. The
entries in the Seventh Schedule delineate the subject matter over
which the appropriate legislature can enact laws. The entries are
legislative heads and not the source of legislative powers.24 A
legislation could be composite in nature, drawing upon several
entries in a particular list.25 Such a legislation is referred to as
a "ragbag" legislation.
33. Article 254 clarifies that if the law made by a State legislature
is repugnant to any provisions of a law made by Parliament with
respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III, the law made
by Parliament would prevail and the law made by the State
legislature would be void to the extent of the repugnancy. The
issue of repugnancy arises only when both the legislatures are
competent to legislate on the subject with respect to List III.26
The issue of repugnancy does not arise if the legislations enacted
by Parliament and the State legislatures deal with separate and
distinct legislative subject matters. By virtue of Article 248,
Parliament has exclusive legislative powers to make laws with
respect to any of the matters not enumerated in List II or List
III.27 However, how should courts deal with a situation where
two legislations, enacted by Parliament and State legislature in
pursuance of their respective legislative powers, appear to
conflict with each other? The answer lies in Article 246 itself.
35. Hoechst Pharmaceuticals (supra) laid down the following
principles to resolve any direct conflict between the entries in List
I and List II: (i) in case of seeming conflict, the two entries should
be read together without giving a narrow and restricted reading
to either of them; (ii) an attempt should be made to see whether
the two entries can be reconciled so as to avoid a conflict of
jurisdiction; and (iii) no question of conflict arises between two
Lists if the impugned legislation in pith and substance appears to
fall exclusively under one list and the encroachment upon the
other list is incidental.
36. Articles 245 and 246 embody the essence of Indian federalism.
The division of legislative powers between Union and States is an
emanation of the federal project.31 This division also serves as a
constitutional limitation on legislative powers. Parliament cannot
entrench upon the plenary power of the State legislatures in the
ordinary course, except where the Constitution itself specifically
allows it.32 The appropriate legislature must possess legislative
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competence to enact a law on the subject matter it seeks to
legislate.
39. The above position of law has been expressly affirmed by the
nine-Judge Bench of this Court in Jindal Stainless Ltd v. State of
Haryana.36 Thus, it is an accepted principle that the subject
matter of taxation is dealt with under distinct entries and,
therefore, cannot be traced to a non-taxing entry. The taxing
powers of Parliament and the State legislatures are mutually
exclusive and clearly demarcated. There can be no overlap
between the taxing powers of the Union and the States. Entries
relating to taxing powers must be construed with clarity and
precision to maintain exclusivity and a construction of a taxation
entry which may lead to overlapping must be eschewed.37 If a
taxing power is enumerated within a particular legislative list, it
is automatically excluded from the purview of subject-matters in
other legislative lists. The residuary power of Parliament also
includes the power of making any law imposing a tax not
mentioned in either List II or List III.
41. Many entries in the Seventh Schedule may appear to overlap
because of the language used in the entries. The necessary
corollary to the scheme of legislative distribution is that that any
invasion by Parliament in the field assigned to the States and vice
versa is a breach of the Constitution.41 Even though the
Constitution distributes legislative powers between the Union and
the States, there have been situations where a legislation
purporting to deal with a subject in one list, touches on a subject
in another list. To remedy such situation, the doctrine of pith and
substance is used to examine whether the legislature has the
competence to enact a law with regard to either of the three lists
under the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution.42 There may
arise situations where a legislature may frame a law that in
substance and reality transgresses its legislative competence.
Such a piece of legislation is called "colourable legislation"
because the legislature veils its transgression by making it seem
as if the legislation is within its legislative competence.43 To
examine whether the legislature has transgressed its legislative
competence, the substance of the legislation is material. If the
subject-matter is in substance beyond the legislative powers of
the legislature, the form in which the law is clothed would not
save it from the vice of unconstitutionality.
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42. The Constitution has used specific expressions to resolve
potential overlaps or conflicts between and among the entries in
the three Lists. The entries in the Seventh Schedule have used
different phraseologies to either subject or restrict their scope
and ambit. Some of the legislative entries in the State List have
been made subject to broad or specific limitations or restrictions
with respect to the entries in the Union List or Concurrent List.--
--
43. The above table is an indication of the extent to which the
legislative powers of the States have been restricted, limited, or
altogether precluded. The use of the expression "other than" or
"not including" serves the purpose of redacting from the ambit
of the legislative power of the States to the extent suggested.
Where the Constitution intends to limit or preclude the legislative
powers of the State to a particular extent, it has used specific
terminologies such as "other than" and "not including".
44. Where the entries have used the phrase "subject to", the
legislative power of the State is made subordinate to Parliament
with respect to either the Union List or the Concurrent List. The
expression "subject to" conveys the idea of a provision yielding
place to another provision or other provisions to which it is made
subject.45 Therefore, where the Constitution intends to displace
or override46 the legislative powers of the States, it has used
specific terminology - "subject to". However, the Constitution
has also indicated the extent to which a particular legislative
entry under List II is subordinated. For instance, the subjection
is either with respect to provisions of List I or List III, or it can
also be to the extent of "any limitations" imposed by Parliament
by law. Thus, it is imperative that the entries in List II must be
read and interpreted in their proper context to understand the
extent of their subordination to Union powers.
47. The Constitution deploys three expressions to signify the
manner in which the legislative power could be exercised by
Parliament - "declared by or under law", and "declared by
Parliament by law", and "imposed by Parliament by law" The
difference in the character of these provisions can be gathered
from the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 which
substituted the expression "declared by Parliament by law" with
"declared by or under law made by Parliament" in Entry 6748
of the Union List. The object of the amendment was to enable the
delegate under the statute to make the required declaration.49
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The expression "by law" means that the legislative power should
be effectuated through the provisions of a statute. In comparison,
"by or under law" means that the legislative intent could be
effectuated either through the provisions of the statute or by any
subordinate authority vested with powers in that behalf by the
statute.50 It is important to note that Entry 50 of List II use the
expression "by law relating to mineral development". We will
have to bear the meaning of the expression "by law" in mind to
give an appropriate interpretation to the entry.
57. The principle which emanates from the above discussion is
that the State holds all natural resources, including minerals, as
a trustee of the public and must deal with them in a manner
consistent with the nature of such a trust.79 58. The Central
Government or the State Government may not always be the
"owner" of the underlying minerals. But the Constitution
empowers both Parliament (under Entry 54 of List I) and the State
legislatures (under Entry 23 of List II) to regulate mines and
mineral development, the entrustment to the State being subject
to the power of Parliament to regulate the domain. The
Constitution has entrusted the Union and the States with the
responsibility to regulate mines and mineral development in
consonance with the principles of the public trust doctrine and
sustainable development of mineral resources. Under the MMDR
Act, the Central Government, acting as a public trustee of
minerals, regulates prospecting and mining operations in public
interest.80 In the process, the legislation seeks to increase
awareness of the compelling need to restore the serious
ecological imbalance and protect against damage being caused
to the nature.81 In Pradeep S Wodeyar v. State of Karnataka,82
one of us (Justice D Y Chandrachud) observed that the essence of
the MMDR Act is to "protect humankind and every species whose
existence depends on natural resources from the destruction
which is caused by rapacious and unregulated mining." The
Court noted that the restrictions under Section 4 of the MMDR
Act are intrinsically meant to protect the environment and
communities who depend on the environment.
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27. Herein the parameter since has been fixed for applicability of
both the Act, i.e, the Act of 1957 and the JMMC Rules, 2004 formulated
under section 15 of the Act of 1957, therefore, is having no overlapping
effect rather both provisions are to be enacted by the Central Government
and the State Government so far as the Act of 1957 and JMMC Rules,
2004 respectively are concerned.
28. The law is well settled that once the power has been conferred
to the State under the parent legislation, herein section 15 of the Act of
1957, and if the State has come out with a rule in exercise of conferment
of the said power it is not available to say that if the rule has been
formulated by the State under the conferment of the aforesaid power the
issue of inconsistency in between the State legislation and the Central
legislation is available to be raised.
29. If the contention of the writ petitioner will be accepted, then the
entire object, basing upon which the Section 15 of the MMDR Act, 1957
has been formulated, will become redundant and ultimately the MMDR
Act, 1957 will prevail upon the State legislation. The same is not the
scheme of bifurcation of power to treat the federal system as per the
mandate carved out in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India.
30. This Court, therefore, is of the view that once the power has been
conferred of formulating the rule in view of the provision of section 15 of
the MMDR Act, 1957, and if the said Act will be applicable which is not
available for the writ petitioner to take aid of the MMDR Act, 1957 which
is operative in entirely different phase having its own self-contained
provision therein.
31. The issue no.(ii), therefore, is answered accordingly.
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32. This Court is now adverting into the issue no.(i) i.e. whether on
the issuance of L.O.I. can it be said to be an accrued right in favour of the
petitioner so as to prevail even upon the statutory restrictions as has been
stipulated in JMMC Rule 2004.
33. Before answering the said issue, it would to apt to discuss herein
the definition of vested/accrued right along with settled legal proposition.
34. Rights are 'vested' when right to enjoyment, present or
prospective, has become property of some particular person or persons as
present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or contingent interest
in property founded on anticipated continuance of existing laws, does not
constitute vested rights.
35. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition)
at page1397, the word 'vested' is defined as a tenure subject to no
contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right, vested
interest.
36. The word 'vested' is normally used where an immediate fixed
right in present or future enjoyment in respect of a property is created.
With the long usage the said word 'vest' has also acquired a meaning as
"an absolute or indefeasible right". It had a 'legitimate' or "settled
expectation" to obtain right to enjoy the property etc. Such "settled
expectation" can be rendered impossible of fulfilment due to change in law
by the legislature. Besides this, such a "settled expectation" or the so called
"vested right" cannot be countenanced against public interest and
convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the law.
37. Thus, "vested right" is a right independent of any contingency.
Such a right can arise from a contract, statute or by operation of law. A
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vested right can be taken away only if the law specifically or by necessary
implication provide for such a course.
38. In the light of the definition of the "vested right", it is evident
that right accrues to person or persons attached to an institution or building
or anything whatsoever, meaning thereby, if an incumbent is claiming a
vested right, he is to substantiate before the court of law that the right has
been created in his favour by an order passed by the competent authority
in accordance with law.
39. It is evident from the definition of the vested right that right
would be said to be vested right, permanent and continuous in nature and
if that be so, the question of prejudice or following of principles of natural
justice will arise.
40. The settled position of law is that once the right has been accrued,
the subsequent rule framed carving out the eligibility criteria will not be
considered to be a reason to recall the benefit already granted due to the
reason that a vested right has been created. Here, it is relevant to refer the
definition of vested right as has been held by Hon'ble Apex Court in MGB
Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh, [(2014) 13 SCC 583] at paragraphs
11, 12 and 13, which read hereunder as:--
"11. The word "vested" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (6th
Edn.) at p. 1563, as: "Vested.--fixed; accrued; settled; absolute;
complete. Having the character or given in the rights of absolute
ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condition
precedent. Rights are 'vested' when right to enjoyment, present or
prospective, has become property of some particular person or
persons as present interest; mere expectancy of future benefits, or
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contingent interest inproperty founded on anticipated continuance
of existing laws, does not constitute 'vested rights'."
12. In Webster's Comprehensive Dictionary (International Edition)
at p. 1397, "vested" is defined as law held by a tenure subject to no
contingency; complete; established by law as a permanent right;
vested interest.
13. Thus, vested right is a right independent of any contingency and
it cannot be taken away without consent of the person concerned.
Vested right can arise from contract, statute or by operation of law.
Unless an accrued or vested right has been derived by a party, the
policy decision/scheme could be changed."
41. Further, so far as the question of taking away the vested right is
concerned, the Hon'ble Apex Court has laid down the proposition in the
case of Chairman, Railway Board v. C.R. Rangadhamaiah, (1997) 6
SCC 623 at paragraph 24 which reads hereunder as:--
"24. In many of these decisions the expressions "vested rights" or
"accrued rights" have been used while striking down the impugned
provisions which had been given retrospective operation so as to
have an adverse effect in the matter of promotion, seniority,
substantive appointment, etc., of the employees. The said expressions
have been used in the context of a right flowing under the relevant
rule which was sought to be altered with effect from an anterior date
and thereby taking away the benefits available under the rule in
force at that time. It has been held that such an amendment having
retrospective operation which has the effect of taking away a benefit
already available to the employee under the existing rule is
arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of the rights guaranteed
under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. We are unable to hold
that these decisions are not in consonance with the decisions in
Roshan Lal Tandon [AIR 1967 SC 1889], B.S. Vedera [AIR 1969 SC
118] and Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni [(1983) 2 SCC 33]."
42. Thus, from the definition of the vested right it is evident that right
would be said to be vested right, permanent and continuous in nature and
if that be so, the question of prejudice or following of principles of natural
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justice will arise.
43. At this juncture it would be apt to refer herein the relevant
provision of Rule 9(1) (क), 9(घ) , 9(ङ), Rule 9(च), Rule 9(छ) and Rule
9(12) of the JMMC Rules 2004 for the purpose of consideration of the lis.
"9(1) (क)-रै यती भूमि के 03.00 हे० क्षेत्र एवं उससे कि क्षेत्र पर
पत्थर, िोरि एवं मिट्टी लघु खमिज के खिि पट्टा उपायुक्त द्वारा स्वीकृत
मकया जाएगा।
परन्तु मक सभी सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं झारखण्ड लघु खमिज सििुदाि (संशोधि)
मियिावली, 2019 के मियि-6(ख) के परन्तु िें उल्लेखखत क्षेत्र एवं खमिज
को छोड़कर सभी रै यती क्षेत्र पर बालू छोड़कर अन्य सभी लघु खमिज के
खिि पट्टा की स्वीकृमत झारखण्ड लघु खमिज िीलािी मियिावली, 2017
िें मिरूमपत प्रावधािों के अन्तगगत इलैक्टामिक िीलािी के िाध्यि से
मिदे शक, खाि के द्वारा मकया जाएगा। परन्तु राज्य सरकार
आवश्यकतािुसार िीलािी हेतु उपायुक्त को भी प्रामधकृत कर सकती है.
9(घ) इस अमधसूचिा के धिगगत होिेकी धतमध सेपूगगिेंसरकारी क्षेत्र
एरं 05.00 हेक्षेत्र सेअमधक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर खिि पट्टे हेतु प्राप्त आरेे दि
पत्र स्वतः अयोग्य हो जाएं गे।
9(ङ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे 0 क्षेत्र से अमधक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर प्राप्त
वैसे आवेदि पत्र मजसिें इस अमधसूचिा मिगगत होिे की मतमि से पूवग
झारखण्ड लघु खमिज सििुदाि मियिावली, 2004 के मियि 11 अंतगगत
Letter of Intent (आशय का पत्र) मिगगत हो चुका है , उसे इस अमधसूचिा
के मिगगत होिे की मतमि से 180 मदिों के अंदर पयागवरण स्वीकृमत एवं खिि
योजि अमिवायग रूप से सिमपगत करिा होगा, अन्यिा उिका आवेदि स्वतः
अस्वीकृत हो जाएगा।
9(च) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे क्षेत्र से अमधक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर प्राप्त वैसे
खिि पट्टे , जो िवीकरण अन्तगगत िे एवं पयागवरणीय स्वीकृमत खिि योजिा
प्राप्त िहीं रहिे के कारण कालमतरोमहत हो गये हो, उिके पट्टे की अवमध पट्टा
स्वीकृमत/िवीकरण की मतमि से 31 िाचग, 2022 तक के मलए अवमध मवस्ताररत
िािी जाएगी, बशते मक अमधसूचिा की मतमि के पूवग खिि पट्टा के अस्वीकृमत
/रद्द/व्ययगत होिे का आदे श िहीं पाररत मकया गया है , परन्तु वैसे खिि पट्टे
पर कोई खिि तब तक िहीं मकया जा सकेगा, जबतक मक खिि हेतु
आवश्यक पयागवरणीय स्वीकृमत/वि एवं पयागवरण मवभाग की स्वीकृमत खिि
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योजिा स्वीकृमत प्राप्त िहीं हो जाता है। आवेदक को सभी वांमछत अिापत्ती
180 मदिों के अन्दर सिमपगत करिा होगा ।
9(छ) सरकारी क्षेत्र एवं 05.00 हे0 क्षेत्र से अमधक के रै यती क्षेत्र पर
स्वीकृत/िवीकृत खिि पट्टे की अवमध यमद उिकी स्वीकृमत/िवीकरण की
अवमध [31 िाचग, 2022 के बाद की मतमि हो, तो उिकी अवमध उिकी
स्वीकृमत/िवीकरण की अवमध तक मवमधिान्य रहेगी।
9(12) मियि-9 (1) (घ), 9(1)(ङ), 9(1)(च), 9 (1) (छ) तिा 9 (10) पूवग से
स्वीकृत/आवमदत लघु खमिज के 5.00 हेक्टेयर क्षेत्र से कि क्षेत्र पर भी लागू
होंगें।"
44. It is evident from the provision of Rule 9(च) that in any case, ever
after renewal of the lease, initially, the same is not to be extended beyond
the period of 31.03.2020 by virtue of amendment incorporated w.e.f.
2018, the period has been extended upto the period of 31.03.2022. The
specific stipulation has been made that even if the license has been
renewed beyond the period of 31.03.2020, the force of the lease will be
upto 31.03.2022.
45. It is evident from the provision as contained under Rule 9(छ) as
referred above that the license if renewed or extended the validity of which
is after 31.03.2022, then, the validity of license will remain there upto the
period of lease but there cannot be any extension, thereafter, since as per
the mandate of the provision of Rule 9, the lease is to be granted by way
of auction.
46. It is evident from perusal of Rule 9(ङ), of Jharkhand Minor
Mineral Concession Rules, wherein, it has been stipulated that within 180
days from the issuance of notification, the Environmental Clearance has
to be mandatorily produced and if the same is not produced, the letter of
intent/application would be deemed to have been rejected.
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47. Further, there is a provision of Rule 9(ङ) which was added by
way of amendment dated 28.09.2020 and as per the said provision, in case
where due to delay in granting Environmental Clearance beyond 180 days,
which is not attributable to a lessee, and the lease agreement was not
approved, in those cases the Revisional Authority was given power to
decide the matter on merits.
48. It is further evident from the provision of Rule 9 (12) as quoted
and referred hereinabove that the mandate of Rule 9(1)(ङ), will be
applicable even if the area of land is less than 5 hectares.
49. In the backdrop of the aforesaid factual aspect and settled
proposition of law this Court is now adverting to the appreciation of the
issue no.(i).
50. The learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically
contended that since LOI has been issued by the authority concerned as
such the mining lease must be executed in the favour of the petitioner.
51. In the aforesaid context it needs to refer herein the definition of
Letter of Intent as provided in Rule 2 (29) of the Jharkhand Minor
Mineral Concession Rules, 2004 which reads as under: --
52. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan
Cooperative Dairy Federation Ltd. v. Maha Laxmi Mingrate Marketing
Service Pvt. Ltd., (1996) 10 SCC 405 at paragraph 7 thereof has held that
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Letter of Intent merely expressed an intention to enter into a contract. If
the conditions stipulated in the Letter of Intent were not fulfilled by
Respondent 1, and if the conduct of Respondent 1 was otherwise not such
as would generate confidence, the appellant was entitled to withdraw the
Letter of Intent, for ready reference, the relevant paragraph is being quoted
as under:
"7. ... The Letter of Intent merely expressed an intention to
enter into a contract. If the conditions stipulated in the Letter of
Intent were not fulfilled by Respondent 1, and if the conduct of
Respondent 1 was otherwise not such as would generate
confidence, the appellant was entitled to withdraw the Letter of
Intent. There was no binding legal relationship between the
appellant and Respondent 1 at this stage and the appellant was
entitled to look at the totality of circumstances in deciding
whether to enter into a binding contract with Respondent 1 or
not."
53. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of 'Dresser Rand S.A. v.
Bindal Agro Chem Ltd.' (2006) 1 SCC 751 has observed that a letter of
intent merely indicates a party's intention to enter into contract with other
party in future. A letter of intent is not intended to bind either party
ultimately to enter into a contract.
54. The view taken in Dresser Rand's case (supra) was reiterated by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of "Rishi Khan Logistics
Private Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of Kandla Port Trust", (2015) 13
SCC 233.
55. The nature of the right created under L.O.I issued and the
consequences of non-fulfillment of the conditions contained therein for
undue long time is considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter
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of "Bhushan Power and Steel Limited v. S.L. Seal", (2017) 2 SCC 125
wherein it has been held which reads as under:
"40. It is no doubt true that a letter of intent may be construed as
a letter of acceptance if such intention is evident from its terms.
It is not uncommon in contracts involving detailed procedure, in
order to save time, to issue a letter of intent communicating the
acceptance of the offer and asking the contractor to start the work
with a stipulation that the detailed contract would be drawn up
later. If such a letter is issued to the contractor, though it may be
termed as a letter of intent, it may amount to acceptance of the
offer resulting in a concluded contract between the parties. But
the question whether the letter of intent is merely an expression
of an intention to place an order in future or whether it is a final
acceptance of the offer thereby leading to a contract, is a matter
that has to be decided with reference to the terms of the letter.
When the LoI is itself hedged with the condition that the final
allotment would be made later after obtaining CRZ and other
clearances, it may depict an intention to enter into contract at a
later stage. Thus, we find that on the facts of this case it appears
that a letter with intention to enter into a contract which could
take place after all other formalities are completed. However,
when the completion of these formalities had taken undue long
time and the prices of land, in the interregnum, shot up sharply,
the Respondent had a right to cancel the process which had not
resulted in a concluded contract."
56. This Court based upon the aforesaid discussion as also after
going through the factual aspect involved in the case of "Bhushan Steel
Limited" (supra) is of the view that in both the judgments the issue as
provided under section 10A(2)(b) and 10A(2)(c) of the MMDR Act, 1957
was involved wherein the issue of eligibility wherein the exception has
been carved out to consider the issue of eligibility of one or other applicant
as provided under section 10A(2)(b) which provision is not available
under the JMMC Rules, 2004 amended in 2017. However, the different
provisions have been provided as under Rule 9(ङ)and Rule 9(च) which
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provides that even after issuance of L.O.I. certain conditions are to be
fulfilled, but herein after issuance of L.O.I the condition as stipulated
under Rule 9(ङ)and Rule 9(च) has not been fulfilled. The reason for
relying upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case
of "Bhushan Steel Ltd." (supra) is to consider the issue of L.O.I as a
vested right, but issuance of L.O.I which will create a vested right in favour
of one or the other party so far as it relates to the condition stipulated under
section 10A(2)(b) Of the MMDR Act, 1957 and since the different
parameters are therein the JMMC Rules, 2004, hence, no aid is to be given
to the petitioner based upon the consideration made by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of "Bhushan Steel Limited" (supra).
57. Thus, as per the settled position of law the issuance of Letter of
Intent (L.O.I) itself would not give a right to the petitioner of entering into
a lease agreement for mining of minor minerals on the site in question
without following all conditions as stipulated in the JMMC Rules, 2004
and particularly Rule 9(ङ) of the Rule, 2004.
58. It requires to refer herein that the learned counsel for the
petitioner in order to fortify his grievances has placed his reliance upon the
judgment rendered in the case of "Kohinoor Steels Pvt. Ltd" (Supra).
59. We have gone through the judgment passed in the aforesaid case
and found that was the case pertaining to the major minerals wherein the
provision of the MMDR Act, 1957 is applicable and, as such, the said
provision has been taken into consideration, particularly the eligibility
clause as provided under section 10A(2)(c) thereof, for ready reference the
same is being quoted hereunder as:
"10A(2)(c):
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"(c) where the Central Government has communicated previous
approval as required under sub-section (1) of section 5 for grant of
a mining lease, or if a letter of intent (by whatever name called) has
been issued by the State Government to grant a mining lease, before
the commencement of the Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Amendment Act, 2015, the mining lease shall be
granted subject to fulfilment of the conditions of the previous
approval or of the letter of intent within a period of two years from
the date of commencement of the said Act:
Provided that in respect of any mineral specified in the First
Schedule, no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be granted
under clause (b) of this subsection except with the previous approval
of the Central Government."
60. The ground has been taken based upon the aforesaid statutory
provision wherein one of the clauses being the issuance of L.O.I or
approval of the State Government and if that situation would be there, then
the application of such applicant is not be rejected holding such applicant
to be eligible.
61. This Court, while dealing with the issue wherein the provision of
section 10A(2)(c) has been taken as a ground, has dealt with the said issue
which is evident from the following paragraphs:
"69. Section 10A(2)(c) specifically prescribes that the mining lease
shall be granted subject to fulfilment of the conditions of the previous
approval or of the letter of intent within a period of two years from
the date of commencement of the said Act. In the proviso, it has been
mentioned that no prospecting licence or mining lease shall be
granted under clause (b) of this sub-section except with the previous
approval of the Central Government. Therefore, the time limit has
been prescribed for two years from the date of commencement of the
Amendment Act, 2015 and that too with prior approval of the Central
Government.
71. However, Section 10A(2)(b) & 10A(2)(c) of the Amendment Act,
2015 temporarily saved some pending applications from before the
2015 Amendment. These exceptions were applicable to the cases
where an applicant for mining lease had prospected the area, or in
respect of whom a recommendation was made by the State
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Government and grant of approval by the Central Government was
pending.
72. It is further clarified that for the applications saved under
Section 10-A(2)(b) & l0-A(2)(c) of the Act, Central Government's
approval was necessary before the grant of Mining Lease. For
pending applications under Section 10A(2)(b) of the Act, proviso to
Section 10A(2)(c) of the Act mandated the prior approval of the
Central Government before a Mining Lease was granted. Similarly,
for pending applications under Section 10A(2)(c) of the Act, the
Mining Lease shall be granted within two years of fulfillment of the
conditions mentioned in the Letter of Intent ("LOI" for short), only
where prior Central Government's approval has been
communicated. Therefore, in both the cases, i.e. Section 10A(2)(b)
and Section 10A(2)(c), previous approval of the Central Government
is necessary in view of the proviso to Section 10A(2)(c).
77. It is apt to mention that many of the applications covered under
Section 10A(2)(b) of the Act, which were pending for decision, in the
absence of a sun-set clause in the Pre-Amended Act, became an
anachronism in the auction-based regime. Therefore, in order to
bring these pending cases to a closure and to enable auction of these
mineral blocks in national interest, it was proposed to amend Section
10A(2)(b) of the Act.
78. This Court in view of the aforesaid provisions, as referred
hereinabove, is of the view that the MMDR Act, 1957, before
amendment of the year 2015 the lapsing period was not there, i.e, as
has been inserted by amendment carved out in the year 2015 by
insertion of section 10A (1) of the MMDR Act, 1957 as has been
referred hereinabove.
79. It is evident from section 10A(2)(c) that the effect of 10A(1) will
not be there subject to fulfillment of the condition as provided under
section 10A(2)(b) r/w section 10A(2)(c) wherein and whereunder it
has been provided that if the Central Government has granted
approval as required under sub-section 1 to section 5 of the MMDR
Act, 1957 or the letter of intent has been issued by the State
Government and if the condition so incorporated in the letter of
intent has been undertaken to be fulfilled within a period of two years
either from the date of approval by the Central Government or from
the date of issuance of letter of intent, then the mining lease can be
issued.
90. Section 10A(2)(b) is the condition of eligibility while section
10A(2)(c) is the criteria to be fulfilled by one or the other for the
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purpose of getting the mining lease which is first approval of the
central Government is required as referred under sub-section 1 of
section 5 of the MMDR Act, 1957 and second the letter of intent, if
issued by the State Government, and the concerned party has given
an undertaking to fulfil the conditions as stipulated in the letter of
intent.
91. The aforesaid conditions therefore specify that subject to
fulfillment of two conditions, i.e., the prior approval of the Central
Government or the letter of intent if issued by the State Government
or if the conditions stipulated in the letter of Intent is being
undertaken to be complied with within a period of two years then the
mining lease irrespective of the embargo as provided under section
10A(1) is to be issued.
92. It is evident that by issuance of the approval by the Central
Government or the letter of intent the issue has been taken in to
consideration that if the right has been accrued in favour of one of
the other by virtue of issuance of approval by the Central
Government or the letter of intent, if issued by the State Government,
then, there will be no adverse affect by the amendment incorporated
in the statutory provision of the Act of 1957.
62. However, in the aforesaid case the L.O.I was not issued and as
such this Court has come to a conclusion that the applicant, namely
Kohinoor Steel Private Limited (supra) was not eligible even in view of
the provision of 10 A (2) (c) for ready reference the operative part of the
said judgment is being referred hereunder as:
100. In the instant case the learned counsel for the petitioner-Firm
has tried to impress upon the Court that the recommendation letter
is to be construed as the letter of intent.
101. But this Court is not in agreement with such submission
because the recommendation cannot be said to be the accrual of
right and moreover, the letter of intent which is to be extended in
favour of the petitioner-Firm as required under the Act has not
been issued in favour of the party concerned.
102. Admittedly herein, the petitioner-Firm has harped upon to
accept the said recommendation to be the letter of intent so that a
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right is being said to be accrued in favour of the petitioner-Firm
and thereby the amendment incorporated in the statute be not
adversely affect the interest of the party concerned.
103. But the recommendation cannot be said to be an accrual of
right rather the interpretation of the word "recommendation"
cannot be said to be the binding upon the other, rather the same is
to be accepted and not to be accepted, as such, when the two
options are there, i.e., to be accepted or not to be accepted then
such decision cannot be said to bind the authority who has to take
decision
104. Further, the said recommendation as would be evident from
the content of the said letter dated 13.08.2010 is not showing any
willingness by the State rather the same is by making a request to
the Central Government to grant the approval as required to be
granted MMDR Act, 1957.
105. The letter of intent while on the other hand, if issued, then, it
will be said to the accrual of right and once the letter of intent has
been issued, then the substantial right is said to be created,
however, subject to fulfillment of the conditions as per the
requirement under section 10A(2)(c) within a period of two years,
then the mining lease will be issued.
106. The contention of the petitioner-Firm is also not fit to be
accepted to treat the recommendation letter to be binding in view
of the specific insertion under section 10A(2)(c) wherein in
addition to the two conditions, i.e., the prior approval of the
Central Government or the letter of intent to be issued by the State
Government, the condition stipulated in the letter of intent is to be
fulfilled within a period of two years.
107. Admittedly, and it cannot be that in the recommendation letter
dated.13.08.2010. there is no condition stipulated and as such the
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said recommendation letter in terms of the provision of section
10A(2)(c) cannot be construed to be letter of intent.
108. Further, the letter of intent is to be issued by the State, then
the question arises why the State has made a recommendation only
and letter of intent has not been issued even though the issuance of
letter of intent was within the domain of the State.
109. Apart from the above, it has to be observed that mere making
of the application for grant of mineral concessions by the
petitioner, does not create any right, much less a vested right, and
the petitioner cannot claim that it had pre-existing right to such
licence or lease. Its right is only to make an application, which was
given by the policy then existing, and if the policy is changed, may
be by way of an amendment to the Act, one cannot be stated to have
any right on the basis of the earlier policy, which now does not hold
good or find any place in the Statute.
110. Further, merely because the applications were kept pending
for long period by the concerned authorities would not create any
right or an applicant cannot be stated to have a vested right for
seeking mining lease on the basis of the provision which has been
substituted by the Amendment Act.
Conclusion
117. The recommendation of the State Government for grant of
previous approval of the Central Government for granting mining
lease is the statutory requirement for grant of mining lease by the
State Government, which is mandatory. The proviso to Section
10A(2)(c) expressly states that a prospecting license under Section
10A(2)(b) shall not be granted without prior approval of the
Central Government. Therefore, construed contextually, an
application is to be treated as 'pending' until Central Government
has considered the application and granted it's approval and the
petitioner's application is to be construed as a 'pending case' as
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the Central Government's approval was awaited. Therefore, the
first proviso cannot be read to vest any right before Central
Government's approval is granted.
120. As such on the basis of the aforesaid discussion, the argument
advanced by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner that
pendency of the application for grant of mining lease pursuant to
recommendation made by the State Government, a right has been
accrued in favour of the petitioner for consideration, is not fit to be
accepted.
122. This Court, in view of the above, is of the view that merely
because the recommendation has been made by the State the same
cannot be construed to be letter of intent creating any vested or
accrued right in favour of the petitioner-Firm, as such, in absence
of any accrued right the amended provision will automatically
adversely impact the interest of the petitioner-Firm and whatever
decision is to be taken on the basis of the amended provision which
has come into being said to be prospectively affected.
63. So far as the fact of the present case is concerned, there is no
provision as contained in JMMC Rules, 2004 holding the applicant to be
eligible due to fulfilment of certain conditions, rather, the conditions have
been provided, i.e., in Section 9 (ङ) which has been discussed and referred
hereinabove wherein the requirement has been made that even after
issuance of L.O.I, certain formalities is to be completed.
64. It needs to refer herein that after issuance of LOI, the application
of the petitioner was deemed rejected in terms of Rule 9(1) (ङ) of JMMC
Rules 2004 which was duly informed to the petitioner vide Memо No. 610
dated 19.03.2018. Consequently, the petitioner made application before
the Deputy Commissioner on 28.01.2019 along with E.C for grant of lease
but after consideration the application dated 28.01.2019 was rejected by
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Deputy Commissioner vide order dated 11.02.2019 which was duly
communicated by DMO Vide Memo No. 349 dated 25.02.2019.
65. Thereafter, petitioner moved in Revision Case No. 22/2019
before the Mines Commissioner and the Mines Commissioner vide order
dated 08.02.2022 condoned the delay and further remanded the matter for
fresh consideration as per the rules 2004. After receipt of the order passed
by Mines Commissioner, thereafter, the rules 2004 have been amended by
JMMC (Amended Rules) 2019 and it has been brought that no fresh lease
can be granted on government land and since the nature of land is
Government land in terms of Rule 9 (1) ka of Amended rules 2019 as such
the fresh lease to the petitioner has not been granted.
66. It requires to refer herein that since the Rule 9 (1) (क) of
Amended Rules, 2019 has not been challenged and as such the
respondents are bound by the said rules at the time of consideration of
application as no right has accrued in favour of petitioner prior to the date
of consideration of the application. Moreover, the issuance of L.O.I is
mere correspondence for obtaining the requisite clearances for grant of
lease and it does not create any right to the petitioner.
67. Thus, herein, there is no such provision that merely L.O.I has
been issued then the applicant will be considered to be eligible, rather,
even after issuance of L.O.I certain conditions are to be fulfilled as
provided under the provision of section 9 (घ) and (ङ) as referred
hereinabove.
68. Therefore, merely because the L.O.I has been issued no right will
be said to be created in favour of the petitioner said to be vested one.
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69. The fact of the present case since is different of the fact of the
case of "Kohinoor Steel Private Limited" (Supra) even the statutory
provision is not applicable herein, hence, the judgment rendered in the case
of "Kohinoor Steel Private Limited" (Supra) is not applicable in the facts
and circumstances of the present case.
70. So far as the argument advanced that the Deputy Commissioner
has made correspondence to the Mine Commissioner seeking guideline is
concerned, but no such guideline has been given, hence, the writ petitioner
is coming out with a plea that no such fault lies with him.
71. This Court has considered the aforesaid submission and found
that said guideline has been sought for on 23.03.2022 and, thereafter, the
petitioner sat idle and came to this Court only after more than three years,
i.e., on 08.07.2025.
72. This Court, in the entirety of the facts and circumstances and as
per the discussions made hereinabove, is of the view that no relief can be
granted to the writ petitioner and, accordingly, the present writ petition
fails and dismissed as such.
73. The present writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for the following reliefs:
(i) For issuance of an appropriate writ(s)/order (s) /direction(s),
particularly a writ of Certiorari for quashing/setting aside the order
dated 13.08.2024 as contained in memo no. 1724 dated 05.09.2024
(Annexure-19) passed in Revision Case No. 11/2024 by the Mines
Commissioner, Ranchi whereby and where under the revision
application filed by the petitioner against the order contained in
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memo no. 416/M dated 15.03.2024 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, Palamau has been dismissed.
And
(ii) For issuance of an appropriate Writ(s)/Order (s) /Direction(s),
particularly a writ of Certiorari for quashing and setting aside the
order contained in memo no. 416/M dated 15.03.2024 (Annexure-
18) passed by Deputy Commissioner, Palamau whereby and where
under the letter no. 2375/Μ. dated 29.12.2016 issued by District
Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar for grant of mining lease in
favour of petitioner has been cancelled under Rule 9(1)(Gha) of
Jharkhand Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2004 treating the
mining application dated 22.12.2016 as invalid.
And
(iii) Upon quashing of the aforesaid orders dated 15.03.2024 and
05.09.2024, for issuance of appropriate writ/s, order/s or direction/s
particularly writ of mandamus commanding upon the respondents
to forthwith grant mining lease of stone for the period of 10 years in
favour of the petitioner in terms of letter no. 2375/M. dated
29.12.2016 Issued by the District Mining Officer, Palamau,
Medininagar for stone mining in Mauza Chando, Thana No. 179,
Plot No. 2129 (P), Khata No. 347 admeasuring 9 acres of land.
Factual Matrix
74. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings made in the writ
petition needs to refer herein which reads as under:
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(i) The petitioner is a proprietorship firm and its proprietor is a
citizen of India and is thereby entitled by enforcement of
fundamental rights as guaranteed under the Constitution of India.
(ii) The petitioner had filed an application dated 22.05.2014 for grant
of Mining Lease of stone in District Palamu over an area of 9.00
acres in Mouza Chando, pertaining to Thana Chainpur, Thana
No. 179, Plot No.2129 (Part) of Khata No. 347 (hereinafter
referred as "land in question").
(iii) The Assistant Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar vide
letter no. 215 dated 22.05.2014 requested the Circle Officer,
Chainpur to Inform about the details/ status of the land in
question for grant of mining lease.
(iv) It is pleaded that the Circle Officer vide letter no. 287 dated
07.08.2014 submitted the enquiry of Circle Officer before the
Assistant Mining Officer, Palamau and informed that the land in
question is recorded as Tongra in Survey Khatian.
(v) Thereafter, the Assistant Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar
vide memo no. 597 dated 19.08.2014 issued certificate that the
petitioner has applied for grant of mining over land in question
under Rule 9 Jharkhand Minor Minerals Concession Rules, 2004
which is pending for grant of environmental clearance and there
is no mining lease adjoining to the leasehold area of petitioner.
(vi) The Deputy Director, Drilling-cum-Drawing and Disbursing
Officer, Office of Additional Director Laboratory, Hazaribag
vide letter no. 77 dated 07.10.2014 granted Approval of
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Mining Plan along with progressive Mine Closure Plan in
relation to land in question.
(vii) Consequently, the Divisional Forest Officer, Medininagar vide
letter no. 325 dated 04.02.2015 informed the Assistant Mining
Officer, Palamau that the mining lease may be granted in favour
of petitioner as the land in question is outside the forest boundary
and there is no- National Park/ Sanctuary within the radius of 3.5
KM. Further, it was informed that as per the application
submitted by Circle Officer, the land in question is "Gair
Majurua Tongra".
(viii) The State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority,
Jharkhand vide letter No. EC/SEIAA/2015-16/839/2015/1524
dated 25.08.2015 granted Environmental Clearance in favour of
the petitioner.
(ix) Further, the District Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar vide
letter no. 2375 dated 29.12.2016 informed the
petitioner that vide order dated 27.12.2016 passed by Deputy
Commissioner, Palamau Mining Lease for stone has been
granted in favour of the petitioner in Mouza-Chando, pertaining
to Plot No. 2129 (Part) of Khata No. 347, under Chainpur P.S. of
Palamau District for a period of 10 (ten) years from the date of
Execution of Mining Lease.
(x) In the aforesaid letter it was directed to the petitioner following
to deposit/submit the amount for execution of the Mining Lease
deed within 90 days under Rule 28 (1) of J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004:
A. Security Money Rs. 2,25,000/-.
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B. Preliminary Expenses- Rs. 1,000/-
C. Advance Deed Rent -Rs. 1,12,500/-.
D. Income Tax-Rs. 4,500/-.
E. Mining Lease Deed in Two copies/-.
F. Map of the granted area in two copies.
G. Financial assurance of Rs.1,00,000/-
(xi) It is stated that the petitioner was ready to deposit the above-said
amounts and documents for get it executed within the statutory
period, but in the meantime the petitioner fell ill seriously and
was bed-ridden from 10.01.2017 to 20.06.2017 due to Ascites
and tuberculosis and was under continuous medical treatment
and after recovering from the said illness, the petitioner managed
the above-said amount for deposit, but in the meantime the
period of 90 days lapsed as prescribed in Rule 28 (1) of
J.M.M.C. Rules, 2004.
(xii) Thereafter, in this regard that the petitioner had preferred
Revision Case No. 104/2017 before the Mines Commissioner,
Ranchi on 29.06.2017 wherein vide order dated 29.12.2017 as
contained in Memo No.04 dated 17.01.2018 the deemed
revocation was set-aside and the Deputy Commissioner was
directed to examine the matter afresh on merit and to pass a
speaking order as per Rules within 30 days from the date of
receipt of this order.
(xiii) It is pleaded that pursuant to the aforesaid order, the petitioner
requested the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau vide letter dated
20.01.2018 to decide afresh.
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(xiv) Consequent to aforesaid the petitioner received a letter No.
164/M dated 02.02.2018 issued by Deputy Commissioner,
Palamau wherein the petitioner was directed to submit all the
documents as required vide letter No. 2375/M dated 29.12.2017
of the District Mining Officer, Palamau within one week, so that
the execution of the granted Mining Lease Deed could be
executed within 30 days (i.e., up to 16.02.2018).
(xv) Thereafter, in terms of the directions issued by the Deputy
Commissioner, Palamu, the petitioner vide letter dated
08.02.2018 deposited security money, Preliminary Expenses,
Advance Dead Rent, Income Tax, in the Government Heads and
also pledged the financial assurance and submitted the Mining
Lease Deed typed on required Stamp Papers along with Plan of
the sanctioned area before the District Mining Officer, Palamau
which was duly acknowledged by the Office of the District
Mining Officer, Palamau.
(xvi) Thereafter the petitioner received an explanation vide letter
No.231/M dated 13.03.2018 of the Deputy Commissioner,
Palamau to explain within a week that why not the sanctioned
order of the Mining Lease may be revoked, as the required papers
and documents has been submitted belatedly by the petitioner
and as such the execution of Mining Lease could not be granted
by the undersigned within 30 days' time as allowed by Hon'ble
Court of Mines Commissioner.
(xvii) Subsequent thereof the petitioner submitted his reply vide letter
dated 18.03.2018 stating therein that as per order dated
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29.12.2017 of the Mines Commissioner, it was directed to the
Deputy Commissioner, Palamau "to examine the matter afresh
on merit and to pass speaking order as per Rule within 30 days
from the date of receipt of this order" and in the light of the above
order, the matter was examined afresh on merit by the Deputy
Commissioner, Palamau and was pleased to pass a Speaking
order within 30 days from the receipt (i.e. 18.01.2018) of the
order of Mines Commissioner, which was communicated to
petitioner vide his the Letter No. 164/M dated 02.02.2018
directing the petitioner to submit the relevant papers for
execution as such it is quite clear that the Deputy Commissioner,
Palamu had passed his Speaking Order within stipulated period
of 30 days. Thereafter in compliance of the letter No. 104/M
dated 02.02.2018 of D.C., Palamau the petitioner has already
been submitted the required papers within one week vide his
letter 08.02.2018 (which was under 30 days also).
(xviii) The petitioner further prayed to execute the Mining Lease Deed
as early as possible, so that the petitioner may be able to start the
mining works with payments of the Government Revenue as per
prescribed Rules and Regulations.
(xix) In spite of the submission of all the documents and payment of
requisite amount, no information was provided to the petitioner
regarding the execution of mining lease. Thereupon, the
petitioner sought information under RTI Act, 2005.
(xx) The District Mining Officer, Palamau vide letter No.1327 dated
08.09.2018 informed the petitioner that the mining lease in
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favour of petitioner could not be granted as the mining lease was
not executed within 30 days i.e. till 16.02.2018 from the date of
receipt of the order passed by the Mines Commissioner, Ranchi.
(xxi) Being aggrieved by the letter dated 08.09.2018 filed Revision
case being Revision Case No. 104 of 2017 before the Mines
Commissioner, Ranchi on 26.09.2018.
(xxii) The District Mining Officer, Palamau, vide letter no. 1437 dated
23.06.2023 submitted Statement of Facts prepared in Revision
Case No. 104/2017 before the Additional Secretary, Department
of Mines and Geology, Jharkhand.
(xxiii) Thereafter, Mines Commissioner, Ranchi vide order dated
19.01.2024 contained in memo no. 426 dated 23.02.2024 passed
in Revision Case No. 104/2017 allowed the application and
remanded the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau to
examine the matter afresh on merit and pass speaking order after
being satisfied with compliance of all other provision of JMMS
Rules, 2004 within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order.
(xxiv) Consequent to the aforesaid the Deputy Commissioner,
Palamau vide order contained in memo no. 416/M dated
15.03.2024 cancelled the letter no. 2375/M. dated 29.12.2016
issued by District Mining Officer, Palamau, Medininagar for
grant of mining lease in favour of petitioner treating the mining
application dated 22.12.2016 as invalid on the ground that the
provision contained in Rule 9(1) (घ) of JMMC Amendment
Rules, 2017 prohibits grant of mining lease of stone on
government land by Deputy Commissioner and further no LOI
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has been issued under Rule 11(ka) of JMMC Amendment Rules,
2017.
(xxv) Being aggrieved by the order dated 15.03.2024, the petitioner
preferred Revision Case No. 11/2024 before the Mines
Commissioner, Ranchi.
(xxvi) The Mines Commissioner, Ranchi vide order dated 13.08.2024
as contained in memo no. 1724 dated 05.09.2024 dismissed the
Revision Case No. 11/2024 filed by the petitioner on the ground
that the lease area of petitioner is government land which can be
given on lease only through electronic auction.
75. Being aggrieved, the petitioner-company has approached this
Court for redressal of its grievance by filing the present writ petition.
Submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner
76. The grant of Mining Lease vide order dated 27.12.2016 passed
by the Deputy Commissioner, Palamau creates enforceable right in favour
of the petitioner.
77. The right of petitioner for execution of mining lease deed which
accrued on the date of grant of mining lease in favour of the petitioner
cannot be abridged by the subsequent amendment of the Jharkhand Minor
Mineral Concession Rules, 2017.
78. The provision contained in Rule 9(1) (घ) of JMMC Amendment
Rules, 2017 cannot be given retrospective application against the
petitioner in defiance of the right created in favour of the petitioner by
grant of mining lease vide order dated 27.12.2016 passed by the Deputy
Commissioner, Palamau.
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79. Rule 9 (1) (घ) of the JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017 as
contained in notification dated 22.02.2017 invalidates the mining
application in relation government land received prior to date of
notification. It is submitted that the Rule 9 (1) (घ) of the JMMC
Amendment Rules, 2017 will not affect the validity of order passed by the
competent authority for grant of mining lease.
80. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has
submitted that the impugned orders therefore, needs interference by this
Court.
Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-State:
81. It has been contended on behalf of the respondent-State that from
perusal of the order dated 15.03.2024 by which lease granted vide order
dated 29.12.2016 has been cancelled, it would be evident that Deputy
Commissioner while passing the order dated 15.03.2024 has taken the
following grounds:
(i)The petitioner failed to produce any medical certificate
documentary proof of serious illness preventing submission
of documents within the stipulated 90 days;
(ii) The mining lease application dated 22.12.2016 had
become invalid under the JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017,
which bar grant of mining leases by the Deputy
Commissioner over Government land; and
(iii) No mandatory Letter of Intent under Rule 11 (क ) of the
JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017, had been issued in this case.
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82. Thus, from the aforesaid, it is evident that authority concerned
had passed the well-reasoned order based upon the factual aspect as well
as taken into consideration the statutory restriction which has been inserted
by the virtue of amendment of year 2017 as inserted in the rule 11(क) of
Rules 2004 and as such since the requirement has not been fulfilled by the
petitioner the lease has been cancelled, therefore there is no error in the
order impugned.
83. It has been contended that the petitioner, thereafter, preferred
Revision Application No. 11/2024 before the Mines Commissioner,
Jharkhand, Ranchi, challenging the aforesaid order dated 15.03.2024 and
the Mines Commissioner, Charkhand, Ranchi, vide final order dated
13.08.2024 contained in Memo No. 1724 dated 05.09.2024, has dismissed
the said revision on the ground of amendment in Rule 2004 by virtue of
JMMC Amendment Rules, 2017, which bars grant of mining leases by the
Deputy Commissioner over Government land. The learned counsel thereof
has submitted that in the light of the statutory restriction and since the
respondent is bound to follow the said statutory restriction it is not possible
to redress the grievances of the petitioner.
84. The petitioner has failed to justify the delay in submission of
documents within the prescribed 90 days and no mandatory Letter of Intent
was issued as required under the JMMC Amendment rules 2017 which
also prohibit grant of mining lease over the government land by the Deputy
Commissioner.
85. The learned AAG-III appearing for the State of Jharkhand, based
upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that it is case where the
petitioner is not entitled for any relief in view of the statutory restrictions
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as provided under the provision of JMMC Rules, 2004 as amended time to
time.
Analysis
86. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and
appreciated the arguments advanced on their behalf as also go through the
material available on record.
87. The issue of grant will be said to be vested/accrual of right is the
issue involved in the present case.
88. It requires to refer herein that this Court has already expressed its
view on the ambit of vested/accrued right in the preceding paragraph of as
such it is not required herein to reiterated the same.
89. It requires to refer herein that the amended provision as amended
in the JMMC Rules, 2004 does not speak with respect to eventuality in a
case of grant, rather a specific provision has been provided with respect to
issuance of L.O.I subject to fulfillment of conditions as provided under
section 9 (घ) and (ङ).
90. Further, the Grant being not referred in the Statute and, as such,
according to considered view of this Court no right will be said to be
accrued in favour of the writ petitioner merely on the basis of grant so as
to prevail upon the statutory provision as has been inserted after the
amendment in the JMMC Rules, 2004 amended in 2017.
91. Admittedly, the JMMC Rule 2004 has been amended in the year
2017 by insertion of the provision of Rule 9(ङ), Rule 9(च), and other allied
provisions of JMMC Rules, 2004 wherein the statutory restriction has been
imposed for grant of lease to carry out the mining lease. Further, there has
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been an amendment in the Rules and by virtue of said amendment, under
the provisions of Rule 9 (क) under the Jharkhand Minor Mineral
Concession Rules, 2004, lease for mining purpose is to be granted on
holding a proper auction.
92. Further as mentioned in the preceding paragraph as per Rule
9(ङ), of Jharkhand Minor Mineral Concession Rules wherein it has been
stipulated that within 180 days from the issuance of notification, the
Environmental Clearance has to be mandatorily produced and if the same
is not produced, the letter of intent/application would be deemed to have
been rejected. Further, there is a proviso under Rule 9(ङ) which was added
by the amendment dated 28.09.2020 and as per the said proviso, in case
where due to delay in granting Environmental Clearance beyond 180 days,
which is not attributable to a lessee, and the lease agreement was not
approved, in those cases the Revisional Authority was given power to
decide the matter on merits.
93. Now adverting to the factual aspects of the instant case, it is
evident that herein the mining lease application dated 22.12.2016 rendered
invalid in view of the JMMC Amendments Rule 2017 which categorically
prohibits the grant of mining lease by the Deputy Commissioner in respect
of Government land. Furthermore, no L.O.I as mandated under rule 11(क)
JMMC Amendments Rule 2017 has been issued in the present matter
which is the one of the requirements for grant of the mining lease.
94. This Court, in backdrop of the aforesaid, is of the view that in
view of the statutory restriction imposed by virtue of amendments in the
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provision of JMMC Rules, 2004, no relief can be granted to the writ
petitioner.
95. Accordingly, the instant writ petition stands dismissed.
96. In the result, W.P(C) No.3475 of 2025 and W.P(C) No. 3525 of
2025 stand dismissed and, as such, disposed of.
97. Pending I.As, if any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree.
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.) (Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Sudhir
Dated:13/10/2025
Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
AFR
Uploaded on 15/10/2025
