Jharkhand High Court
Arvind Kumar Agarwal vs Rakhi Rani Agarwal on 14 November, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
F.A. No. 10 of 2024
1. Arvind Kumar Agarwal, aged about 44 years, son of Satyendra
Agarwal, resident of Sarvodaya Nagar, PO & PS: Daltonganj, District-
Palamau
... ... Petitioner/Appellant
Versus
Rakhi Rani Agarwal, aged about 42 years, daughter of Ashok Agarwal,
resident of C/o Loriyal Professional Saloon, Arush Complex, Near
ICICI Bank, Pagoda Chowk, PO, PS & District-Hazaribagh
... ... Respondent/Respondent
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Anand Kumar Pandey, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Pankaj Kr. Choudhary, Advocate
Mr. Arya Suman, Advocate
----------------------------
C.A.V. on 7th November, 2025 Pronounced on 14/11/2025
Per Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.
Prayer
1. The instant appeal under Section 19(1) of the Family Courts Act, 1984 is
directed against the order/judgment dated 20th December, 2023 (decree
sealed and signed on 12th January, 2024) passed by the learned Principal
Judge, Family Court, Hazaribagh in Original Suit No. 119 of 2023,
whereby and whereunder, the petition filed under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b)
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 by the appellant/petitioner seeking a
decree of divorce against his wife, has been dismissed.
Factual Matrix
2. The brief facts of the case leading to filing of the divorce petition by the
appellant/petitioner needs to be referred herein as under:
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It is the case of the appellant/petitioner that the marriage of the
appellant/petitioner with the respondent-wife was solemnized on
27.04.2013 as per Hindu rites and custom at Agrasen Bhawan,
Daltonganj, District-Palamau (Jharkhand). After marriage, the respondent-
wife led conjugal life in her matrimonial house at Daltonganj, Palamau,
till November, 2016. Now, the parties are not living together.
It is the further case of the appellant/petitioner that the respondent-
wife had filed Maintenance Case No.217 of 2022 before the same Court,
which was dismissed on contest, however, she had filed maintenance case
only after acknowledgement of notice of divorce suit.
It is the further case of the appellant/petitioner that on the day of
Chauthari, i.e., on 29.04.2013, she started demanding fridge and in
default, she destroyed household articles and was asking for divorce. She
never cooked meal and not discharged her household duties. She was
blaming the appellant/petitioner as impotent. On several occasion, the
appellant/petitioner and his father approached the respondent-wife and her
family members for resumption of conjugal life but she refused.
He thereafter again approached her for resumption of conjugal life on
01.06.2022 at Hazaribag where she was running a Beauty Parlour under
the name and style of "Lorial Professional Saloon" but she refused to
resume conjugal life. She was insisting to live separately. Therefore, the
appellant/petitioner has prayed for divorce on the ground of cruelty and
desertion.
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After notice the respondent-wife appeared and had filed a written
statement wherein she raised defences and she denied the case of
petitioner-husband except filing of the said Maintenance case and
submitted further that in the marriage, sufficient dowry etc. were given but
in matrimonial house, she was treated with cruelty in demand of further
dowry. It has further been submitted that She was visiting her
matrimonial house but in December, 2021 she was refused to enter into
the house of the petitioner/appellant. She never refused resumption of
conjugal life and still willing to resume conjugal life. It has further been
stated that the appellant/petitioner runs business of tobacco and earns
Rs.70,000 to 80,000/- per month.
3. It is evident from the factual aspect that the appellant/petitioner had a
motion by filing a petition under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu
Marriage Act, 1955 for decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty and
desertion.
4. After taking into consideration the pleading of the both the parties the
learned Family Court has framed altogether five issues which are as
follows:-
(i) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form?
(ii) Whether the parties are legally married husband and wife?
(iii) Whether the petitioner-husband was treated with cruelty after
marriage by the respondent-wife?
(iv) Whether the respondent-wife voluntarily deserted the petitioner-
husband?
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(v) Whether the petitioner-husband is entitled for the relief of divorce
as prayed for on the grounds of cruelty and desertion as contained
u/s 13(1)(i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 or any
other relief/reliefs?
5. The evidences have been led on behalf of both the parties. Thereafter, vide
order dated 20.12.2023 the judgment has been passed dismissing the suit
by holding that none of the ground either of cruelty or desertion has been
established by the appellant/petitioner, which is the subject matter of the
present appeal.
Submission of the learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner:
6. It has been contended on behalf of the appellant/petitioner that the factual
aspect which was available before the learned Family Judge supported by
the evidences adduced on behalf of the appellant/petitioner has not
properly been considered and as such, the judgment impugned is perverse,
hence, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
7. It has also been contended that the learned Family Court has failed to take
into consideration the pleadings coupled with the ample evidence on
record, as it has been established that the respondent left her matrimonial
house as far as back on 13.11.2016. Further, the respondent-wife has left
her matrimonial home with all her belongings without any intimation to
the appellant and his family members.
8. It has been submitted that the respondent-wife is running a Beauty Parlour
and she is earning a lot.
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9. Therefore, it has been submitted that the issue of cruelty and desertion has
not been taken into consideration in right perspective by the learned
Family Court.
10. Learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner, based upon the aforesaid
ground, has submitted that the judgment impugned suffers from
perversity, as such, not sustainable in the eyes of law.
Submission of the learned counsel for the respondent-wife:
11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent-wife, while defending the
impugned judgment, has submitted that there is no error in the impugned
judgement. The learned Family Judge has considered the issue of cruelty
and desertion and having come to the conclusion that no cogent evidence
has been adduced to establish either cruelty or desertion, has dismissed the
petition.
12. It has been contended that respondent wife never refused resumption of
conjugal life and still willing to resume conjugal life with
petitioner/appellant.
13. It has been submitted that the appellant/petitioner has tried to mislead the
Court by filing application on the misleading ground of committing
cruelty by the wife upon the husband.
14. Learned counsel, based upon the aforesaid grounds, has submitted that if
on that pretext, the factum of cruelty and desertion has not been found to
be established, based upon which the decree of divorce has been refused
to be granted, the impugned judgment cannot be said to suffer from an
error.
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Analysis:
15. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through
the finding recorded by the learned Family Judge in the impugned
judgment.
16. The case has been heard at length. The admitted fact herein is that the suit
for divorce has been filed on the ground of cruelty and desertion, i.e., by
filing an application under Section 13(1)(i-a)(i-b) of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955 and accordingly, issues have been framed wherein primarily
issue nos.(iii) and (iv) pertain to cruelty and desertion.
17. The evidence has been led on behalf of both the parties, i.e., the
appellant/petitioner and the respondent-wife. For ready reference, the
evidences led on behalf of the parties are being referred as under:
All four P.Ws., i.e., P.W.1 to P.W.4 filed their respective
examination-in-chief in support of the case of the petitioner
husband and they all have deposed that due to physical, mental and
economical cruelty of the respondent-wife, the petitioner-husband
has suffered a lot.
(i) PW-1 Arvind Kumar Agarwal (appellant/petitioner himself) has
stated in his cross-examination that no legal notice for restitution of
conjugal life was issued nor social or personal effort was made. On
01.06.2022, he visited the respondent-wife at Hazaribag and since,
respondent-wife refused to resume conjugal life, he filed divorce
suit. He had further stated that respondent-wife never visited him.
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he had further stated that he cannot say about jewelery given in
marriage and no Panchayati took place.
(ii) PW-2 Satyendra Kumar Agarwal (father of the petitioner-husband)
has also deposed that there are sufficient household articles in his
house except fridge. He has three sons. All are married. On
13.11.2016, the respondent-wife went away to her parental house.
On 01.06.2022, petitioner-husband met with respondent-wife. She
refused resumption of conjugal life. Thereafter, present case was
lodged. On that day, no physical relationship was established
between the parties. Petitioner-husband narrated this matter to
mother. Panchayati took place at Daltonganj. He is not against of
resumption of conjugal life of parties. No dowry or cruelty case has
been lodged by the respondent-wife. 3 to 4 times, he has visited the
respondent-wife at Hazaribagh but every time he was insulted. He
cannot say the date when the petitioner-husband visited the
respondent-wife.
(iii) PW-3 Jai Prakash Agarwal (Jija of the appellant/petitioner-
husband) in his cross-examination has deposed that he never visited
the respondent-wife at Hazaribag. On 01.06.2022, the petitioner and
his father came to Hazaribagh. He has seen the photo of Beauty
Parlour of respondent-wife in facebook but not seen physically.
(iv) PW-4 Birendra Ram (Neighbour of petitioner-husband) has
deposed in his cross-examination that the respondent wife was
insisting the petitioner husband to live separately for which the
petitioner husband has filed the suit. He cannot remember the date
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and how many times respondent wife visited her parental house,
from marriage till 2023. He has also deposed that the petitioner
husband and his father visited the saloon of respondent wife at
Hazaribag in the year, 2022 but he was not accompanying them. He
cannot say the date of panchayati. The petitioner husband runs
tobacco shop with his father.
18. The respondent-wife has also been examined as R.W.-1. For ready
reference, her evidence along with other R.Ws. are being referred as
under:
(i) RW-1 Rakhi Rani Agarwal (respondent-wife) has stated in her
examination-in-chief filed on affidavit that she still wants to resume
her conjugal life.
In her cross-examination she has deposed that she has been
using vermilion over her forehead. She came back to parental house
from matrimonial house in December, 2021. She did not state no
depose in her maintenance case that she has no relation with
husband since 13.11.2016.
(ii) R.W.2 Ashok Kumar Agarwal (father of the respondent-wife) has
deposed in his cross-examination that no dowry-cruelty case was
lodged. Respondent-wife lived in matrimonial house till 2016.
Respondent-wife was living in her matrimonial house, the
petitioner-husband was visiting house of this witness but can't say
its number. Further, deposition has been made that on 01.06.2022,
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the petitioner-husband did visit his house. After one night stay, he
went back promising to come for Bidai.
(iii) R.W.3 Sunil Kumar Agarwal (brother of respondent-wife) has
deposed in his cross-examination that he works in BCCL, Dhanbad
and living there with his family. Since in government job, he cannot
undertake any business. He was also a witness in maintenance case
of respondent. He had deposed that respondent/wife lived in
matrimonial house till December, 2021 and no cruelty upon
respondent-wife took place in his presence. He had further stated
that respondent-wife runs beauty parlor at Hazaribagh.
19. The learned Family Judge has gone into the interpretation of the word
"cruelty" and "desertion" and assessing the same from the evidences led
on behalf of the parties as also the submission made in the pleading, i.e.,
plaint and written statement, has found that the element of cruelty and
desertion could not have been established.
20. The learned counsel for the appellant/petitioner has argued that the
evidence of cruelty and desertion has not properly been considered and as
such, the judgment suffers from perversity, hence, not sustainable in the
eyes of law.
21. While on the other hand, argument has been advanced on behalf of the
respondent has submitted that the judgment is well considered one and
merely by committing fraud, the suit for divorce has been filed.
22. This Court while appreciating the argument advanced on behalf of the
parties on the issue of perversity needs to refer herein the interpretation of
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the word "perverse" as has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court
which means that there is no evidence or erroneous consideration of the
evidence. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Arulvelu and Anr. vs. State
[Represented by the Public Prosecutor] and Anr., (2009) 10 SCC 206
while elaborately discussing the word perverse has held that it is, no
doubt, true that if a finding of fact is arrived at by ignoring or excluding
relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant material or if
the finding so outrageously defies logic as to suffer from the vice of
irrationality incurring the blame of being perverse, then, the finding is
rendered infirm in law. Relevant paragraphs, i.e., paras-24, 25, 26 and 27
of the said judgment reads as under:
"24. The expression "perverse" has been dealt with in a number of
cases. In Gaya Din v. Hanuman Prasad [(2001) 1 SCC 501] this
Court observed that the expression "perverse" means that the findings
of the subordinate authority are not supported by the evidence brought
on record or they are against the law or suffer from the vice of
procedural irregularity.
25. In Parry's (Calcutta) Employees' Union v. Parry & Co. Ltd. [AIR
1966 Cal 31] the Court observed that "perverse finding" means a
finding which is not only against the weight of evidence but is
altogether against the evidence itself. In Triveni Rubber &
Plastics v. CCE [1994 Supp (3) SCC 665 : AIR 1994 SC 1341] the
Court observed that this is not a case where it can be said that the
findings of the authorities are based on no evidence or that they are so
perverse that no reasonable person would have arrived at those
findings.
26. In M.S. Narayanagouda v. Girijamma [AIR 1977 Kant 58] the
Court observed that any order made in conscious violation of pleading
and law is a perverse order. In Moffett v. Gough [(1878) 1 LR 1r 331]
the Court observed that a "perverse verdict" may probably be defined
as one that is not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether
against the evidence. In Godfrey v. Godfrey [106 NW 814] the Court
defined "perverse" as turned the wrong way, not right; distorted from
the right; turned away or deviating from what is right, proper, correct,
etc.
27. The expression "perverse" has been defined by various
dictionaries in the following manner:
1. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary of Current English, 6th
Edn.
"Perverse.--Showing deliberate determination to behave in a way
that most people think is wrong, unacceptable or unreasonable."
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2. Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, International
Edn.
Perverse.--Deliberately departing from what is normal and
reasonable.
3. The New Oxford Dictionary of English, 1998 Edn.
Perverse.--Law (of a verdict) against the weight of evidence or the
direction of the judge on a point of law.
4. The New Lexicon Webster's Dictionary of the English
Language (Deluxe Encyclopedic Edn.)
Perverse.--Purposely deviating from accepted or expected
behavior or opinion; wicked or wayward; stubborn; cross or petulant.
5. Stroud's Judicial Dictionary of Words & Phrases, 4th Edn.
"Perverse.--A perverse verdict may probably be defined as one that is
not only against the weight of evidence but is altogether against the
evidence.""
23. The ground for divorce has been taken of cruelty and desertion. The
"cruelty" has been interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Dr. N.G. Dastane vs. Mrs. S. Dastana, (1975) 2 SCC 326 wherein it has
been laid down that the Court has to enquire, as to whether, the conduct
charge as cruelty, is of such a character, as to cause in the mind of the
petitioner, a reasonable apprehension that, it will be harmful or injurious
for him to live with the respondent.
24. This Court, deems it fit and proper to take into consideration the meaning
of 'cruelty' as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Shobha Rani
v. Madhukar Reddi, (1988)1 SCC 105 wherein the wife alleged that the
husband and his parents demanded dowry. The Hon'ble Apex Court
emphasized that "cruelty" can have no fixed definition.
25. According to the Hon'ble Apex Court, "cruelty" is the "conduct in
relation to or in respect of matrimonial conduct in respect of matrimonial
obligations". It is the conduct which adversely affects the spouse. Such
cruelty can be either "mental" or "physical", intentional or unintentional.
For example, unintentionally waking your spouse up in the middle of the
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night may be mental cruelty; intention is not an essential element of
cruelty but it may be present. Physical cruelty is less ambiguous and more
"a question of fact and degree."
26. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further observed therein that while dealing
with such complaints of cruelty it is important for the court to not search
for a standard in life, since cruelty in one case may not be cruelty in
another case. What must be considered include the kind of life the parties
are used to, "their economic and social conditions", and the "culture and
human values to which they attach importance."
27. The nature of allegations need not only be illegal conduct such as asking
for dowry. Making allegations against the spouse in the written statement
filed before the court in judicial proceedings may also be held to
constitute cruelty.
28. In V. Bhagat vs. D. Bhagat (Mrs.), (1994)1 SCC 337, the wife alleged in
her written statement that her husband was suffering from "mental
problems and paranoid disorder". The wife‟s lawyer also levelled
allegations of "lunacy" and "insanity" against the husband and his family
while he was conducting a cross-examination. The Hon‟ble Apex Court
held these allegations against the husband to constitute "cruelty".
29. In Vijaykumar Ramchandra Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar Bhate, (2003)6
SCC 334 the Hon‟ble Apex Court has observed by taking into
consideration the allegations levelled by the husband in his written
statement that his wife was "unchaste" and had indecent familiarity with a
person outside wedlock and that his wife was having an extramarital
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affair. These allegations, given the context of an educated Indian woman,
were held to constitute "cruelty" itself.
30. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Joydeep Majumdar v. Bharti Jaiswal
Majumdar, (2021) 3 SCC 742, has been pleased to observe that while
judging whether the conduct is cruel or not, what has to be seen is whether
that conduct, which is sustained over a period of time, renders the life of
the spouse so miserable as to make it unreasonable to make one live with
the other. The conduct may take the form of abusive or humiliating
treatment, causing mental pain and anguish, torturing the spouse, etc. The
conduct complained of must be "grave" and "weighty" and trivial
irritations and normal wear and tear of marriage would not constitute
mental cruelty as a ground for divorce.
31. Since, the appellant husband has also raised the issue of desertion
therefore the definition of "desertion" is required to be referred herein as
defined under explanation part of Section 13 of Hindu Marriage Act 1955
which means the desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the
marriage without reasonable cause and without the consent or against the
wish of such party, and includes the willful neglect of the petitioner by the
other party to the marriage.
32. Rayden on Divorce which is a standard work on the subject at p. 128 (6th
Edn.) has summarised the case-law on the subject in these terms:
"Desertion is the separation of one spouse from the other, with
an intention on the part of the deserting spouse of bringing
cohabitation permanently to an end without reasonable cause
and without the consent of the other spouse; but the physical act
of departure by one spouse does not necessarily make that
spouse the deserting party."
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The legal position has been admirably summarised in paras-453
and 454 at pp. 241 to 243 of Halsbury's Laws of England (3rd Edn.), Vol.
12, in the following words:
"In its essence desertion means the intentional permanent forsaking
and abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's consent,
and without reasonable cause. It is a total repudiation of the obligations of
marriage. In view of the large variety of circumstances and of modes of life
involved, the Court has discouraged attempts at defining desertion, there
being no general principle applicable to all cases.
Desertion is not the withdrawal from a place but from a state of
things, for what the law seeks to enforce is the recognition and discharge
of the common obligations of the married state; the state of things may
usually be termed, for short, 'the home'. There can be desertion without
previous cohabitation by the parties, or without the marriage having been
consummated. The person who actually withdraws from cohabitation is
not necessarily the deserting party. The fact that a husband makes an
allowance to a wife whom he has abandoned is no answer to a charge of
desertion.
33. The offence of desertion is a course of conduct which exists independently
of its duration, but as a ground for divorce it must exist for a period of at
least two years immediately preceding the presentation of the petition or,
where the offence appears as a cross-charge, of the answer. Desertion as a
ground of divorce differs from the statutory grounds of adultery and
cruelty in that the offence founding the cause of action of desertion is not
complete, but is inchoate, until the suit is constituted. Desertion is a
continuing offence.
34. It is, thus, evident from the aforesaid reference of meaning of desertion
that the quality of permanence is one of the essential elements which
differentiates desertion from wilful separation. If a spouse abandons the
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other spouse in a state of temporary passion, for example, anger or
disgust, without intending permanently to cease cohabitation, it will not
amount to desertion. For the offence of desertion, so far as the deserting
spouse is concerned, two essential conditions must be there, namely, (1)
the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation
permanently to an end.
35. Similarly, two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is
concerned: (1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving
reasonable cause to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the
necessary intention aforesaid. In such a situation, the party who is filing
for divorce will have the burden of proving those elements.
36. Recently also, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Debananda Tamuli vs.
Kakumoni Kataky, (2022) 5 SCC 459 has considered the definition of
'desertion' on the basis of the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena, AIR 1964 SC 40
which has been consistently followed in several decisions of this Court.
The law consistently laid down by this Court is that desertion means the
intentional abandonment of one spouse by the other without the consent of
the other and without a reasonable cause. The deserted spouse must prove
that there is a factum of separation and there is an intention on the part of
deserting spouse to bring the cohabitation to a permanent end. In other
words, there should be animus deserendi on the part of the deserting
spouse. There must be an absence of consent on the part of the deserted
spouse and the conduct of the deserted spouse should not give a
reasonable cause to the deserting spouse to leave the matrimonial home.
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The view taken by the Hon'ble Apex Court has been incorporated in the
Explanation added to sub-section (1) of Section 13 by Act 68 of 1976. The
said Explanation reads thus:
"13. Divorce.--(1) ...
Explanation.--In this sub-section, the expression "desertion" means the
desertion of the petitioner by the other party to the marriage without
reasonable cause and without the consent or against the wish of such
party, and includes the wilful neglect of the petitioner by the other party
to the marriage, and its grammatical variations and cognate
expressions shall be construed accordingly."
37. This Court, on the premise of the interpretation of the word "cruelty" and
"desertion" has considered the evidences of the witnesses as has been
incorporated by the learned Court in the impugned judgment.
38. It is evident therefrom that the ground of cruelty has been taken of
demanding fridge and in default, she destroyed household articles and was
asking for divorce. Further ground herein is that she never cooked meal
and did not discharge her household duties. Further, the respondent wife
was blaming the petitioner husband as impotent.
39. The suit has been filed in the year 2022. The said ground cannot be said to
be sufficient ground to prove the ground of cruelty, i.e., on the day of
Chauthari, on 29.04.2013, she started demanding fridge and in default, she
destroyed household articles and was asking for divorce, as such, said
ground has been disbelieved by the learned Family Judge.
40. Further, the petitioner-husband has not disclosed exactly when for the first
time and for the last time he was blamed as impotent.
41. The desertion has also been taken as a ground but the desertion has been
defined and interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the desertion will
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be said to be desertion if either of the party, on his/her own wish, has left
the matrimonial house. But no concrete evidence has been produced by
the appellant/petitioner to prove the element of desertion showing that the
respondent-wife has left her matrimonial house on her own wish and
without any valid reason.
42. From the perusal of impugned judgment, it is evident that the learned
Family Judge, on consideration of both the issues at depth, has not found
the ground for dissolution of marriage as alleged and accordingly,
dismissed the suit.
43. This Court, based upon the aforesaid discussions, is of the view that the
appellant/petitioner has failed to establish the element of perversity in the
impugned judgment as per the discussion made hereinabove, as such, the
instant appeal deserves to be dismissed.
44. Accordingly, the instant appeal fails and is dismissed.
45. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
I Agree
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
14/11/2025
/
Rohit A.F.R.
Uploaded on 14.11.2025
