Jharkhand High Court
Union Of India Through Secretary vs The State Of Jharkhand on 3 November, 2025
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Civil Review No.74 of 2023
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1. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry of Defence, South
Block, New Delhi.
2. Commanding Officer, Sonari Military Camp, Bistupur, Town
Jamshedpur, District East Singhbhum.
.......... Petitioners.
-Versus-
1. The State of Jharkhand, through the Principal Secretary,
Department of Revenue and Land Reforms, Government of
Jharkhand, Nepal House, Doranda, Ranchi.
2. The Deputy Secretary, Department of Revenue and Land
Reforms, Government of Jharkhand, Nepal House, Doranda,
Ranchi.
3. The Deputy Commissioner, East Singhbhum.
4. Circle Officer (Anchal Adhikari), Sakchi, Jamshedpur.
5. The Assistant Settlement Officer, Sakchi, Jamshedpur.
6. Alomoni Kamarin, wife of Late Bacha Kumar, resident of
Sonari, Khagalnagar, P.O. & P.S. Sonari, District East
Singhbhum.
7. Baisali Kamarin, D/o Late Bacha Kumar, resident of Sonari,
Khagalnagar, P.O. & P.S. Sonari, District East Singhbhum.
8. Utility Transport Company, a partnership firm, having its
registered office at New Kalimati Road, Sakchi, Jamshedpur,
through its one of the partners Daljeet Singh, S/o Late Sardar
Harjeet Singh, House no.7, Road No.5, C.H. Area North,
Bistupur, Jamshedpur.
9. M/s. Tata Steel Ltd., 24 Homy Modi Street, Fort, Mumbai,
having its Steel Plant at Jamshedpur, Town Jamshedpur,
District East Singhbhum, through R. Balasubrmaniam, Head
Jamshedpur Litigation, Tata Steel Ltd., P.S. Bistupur, District
East Singhbhum.
.......... Respondents.
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CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Anil Kumar, ASGI
Mr. Shiv Kumar Sharma,
Sr. Panel Counsel
For the State : Mr. Jai Prakash, AAG-IA
Mr. Yogesh Modi, AC to AAG-IA
For Res. Nos.6 to 8 : Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, Advocate
Mr. Prakhar Harit, Advocate
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Reserved on 17.10.2025 Pronounced on 03.11.2025
Per: Rajesh Shankar, J.
1. The present Civil Review application has been preferred against
the judgment dated 14.03.2023 passed in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012
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with L.P.A No. 236 of 2012 whereby the appeals filed by M/s Tata
Steel Limited (formerly known as M/s. Tata Iron and Steel
Company Limited) (hereinafter referred as the respondent no. 9)
against the common judgment dated 23.04.2012 passed in
W.P.(C) No. 1981 of 2003 with W.P.(C) No. 6816 of 2005 have
been dismissed.
Factual Matrix of the case:
2. The fact of the case as emerges from the record is that the
respondent no. 9 was incorporated as a Public Limited Company
on 26.08.1907. At different points of time, 15,725.05 acres land
in total was conveyed to it by the Government of Bihar in order to
establish industry for production of iron and steel. Since some
portions of the acquired land were not immediately needed by the
respondent no.9 for the purpose of establishing industry and other
civil amenities, the same were allowed to be under cultivators'
possession.
3. The land under Khata No. 40, Plot Nos. 1566, 1567, 1568, 1569,
1570 and 1572 situated at village Khuntadih, P.S Bistupur
(hereinafter referred as the said land) was in possession of one
Bengal Kumar. During the revisional survey and settlement
operation undertaken between the year 1934-37, Bengal Kumar
was shown as a tenant of the said land and the respondent no. 9
was shown as the owner of the same.
4. The respondent no.9 filed T.A. Misc. Case No. 01 of 1943-44
under Section 50 of the Chotanagpur Tenancy Act, 1908 for
restoration of the occupied lands under cultivators' possession
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including the said land and accordingly vide order dated
04.06.1944 passed by the Deputy Commissioner, Singhbhum
(respondent no.3), the possession of the same was delivered to it
on 24.06.1944 after deposit of a sum of Rs.11,117.14 in the
treasury as revenue deposit.
5. The Bihar Land Reforms Act, 1950 having come into force, the
interest of all intermediaries got vested in the State which became
the sole landlord and thus the entire acquired land including the
said land vested in the State. The respondent no.9 challenged few
provisions of the Act, 1950, in particular Section 2B of the said Act
before Hon'ble Supreme Court, however subsequently it withdrew
the petition in the year 1982.
6. In the meantime, Section 2B was deleted and Sections 7D and 7E
were incorporated in the Act, 1950 vide Amendment Act, 5 of
1972 by virtue of which the respondent no.9 became 'Settllee' of
the entire land earlier conveyed to it by the State of Bihar.
Subsequently, on the basis of a compromise between the
Government of Bihar and the respondent no.9, the provisions of
Sections 7D and 7E of the Act, 1950 were further amended vide
Amendment Act, 17 of 1983 and thereafter a lease deed was
executed between the Governor of the State of Bihar and the
respondent no.9 for a period of 40 years with effect from
01.01.1956 whereby the respondent no.9 became the deemed
'Lessee' of the entire acquired land including the said land.
7. In the year 1965, the State of Bihar through Land Reforms Deputy
Collector, Jamshedpur had initiated a proceeding under Sections
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5, 6 and 7 of the Act, 1950 against the respondent no.9 and
Bengal Kumar for fixation of fair rent which was registered as Case
No. 223/1965-66 and vide order dated 30.8.1966, the respondent
no.9 was directed to pay fair and equitable rent of the said land.
Against the said order, respondent no.9 preferred an appeal
before the respondent no.3 vide Revenue Misc. Appeal 106 of
1966-67 which was allowed on 18.09.1969 holding that the
respondent no. 9 was not liable to pay rent in view of section 2B
of the Act, 1950.
8. Thereafter, one Bachu Kumar, son of Bengal Kumar filed an
application being Revenue Misc. Case 4 of 1970-71 under Sections
5, 6 and 7 of the Act, 1950 for fixation of rent of the said land
which was allowed by the Land Reform Deputy Collector, East
Singhbhum vide order dated 31.7.1971 holding, inter alia, that the
rent for the subject property could be realized from him. The
respondent no.9 preferred an appeal against the order dated
31.7.1971 vide Revenue Misc. Appeal No. 10 of 1971-72, however
the said appeal was dismissed on 15.9.1980.
9. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent no. 9 filed writ petition being
C.W.J.C No. 202 of 1981 (R) before Ranchi Bench of Patna High
Court which was allowed vide order dated 23.09.1986 holding that
once the rights of the tenant had extinguished on 24.06.1944, no
revenue authority had any jurisdiction to entertain such
application and the said order was confirmed upto the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in S.L.P No. 6566 of 1987.
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10. The State of Bihar conducted a land survey wherein the name of
TISCO was not recorded as a lessee which led to filing of objection
by it under Section 83 of the Act, 1950 and the said case was
registered as Case No.467 of 1986-87. Though the Assistant
Settlement Officer passed an order dated 26.06.1992 for
recording the name of the respondent no.9 with respect to other
leasehold land, however it omitted to record the name of the
respondent no. 9 for the said land. Consequently, the respondent
no.9 filed Revision Case No. 138 of 1992-93 which was allowed
by the Court of Charge Officer, Jamshedpur vide order dated
15.6.1996.
11. Aggrieved thereby, Alomoni Kamarin, successor of Bengal Kumar
(the respondent no.6 herein) preferred an application being Case
No. 264 of 2001-02 under Section 90 of the Act, 1908 which was
allowed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, East Singhbhum,
Jamshedpur vide order dated 5.8.2002. Thereafter, the Principal
Secretary, Department of Revenue, Government of Jharkhand
vide letter dated 5.9.2005 directed the respondent no. 3 to release
the subject property in favour of Alomoni Kamarin and her
daughter Baisali Kamarin (respondent no.7 herein).
12. The Deputy Secretary, East Singhbhum vide letter dated
27.10.2005 again informed the respondent no.3 that the State of
Jharkhand had decided to release the subject property in favour
of respondent nos.6 and 7. Subsequently, upon issuance of a
general notice dated 19.11.2005, objections were invited
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regarding release of the said land in favour of the respondent
nos.6 and 7.
13. The respondent no. 9 then filed a writ petition being W.P. (C) No.
1981 of 2003 seeking quashing of the order dated 5.8.2002
passed by the Assistant Settlement Officer, East Singhbhum,
Jamshedpur in Case No.264 of 2001-2002. Another writ petition
being W.P.(C) No. 6816 of 2005 was also filed by the respondent
no.9 seeking quashing of various letters whereby the State
authorities were taking consequential steps to release the said
land in favour of the respondent nos.6 and 7. The said writ
petitions were however dismissed by the learned Single Judge
vide judgment dated 23.04.2012.
14. Aggrieved thereby, the respondent no. 9 filed appeals being L.P.A
No. 227 of 2012 and L.P.A No.236 of 2012 which have also been
dismissed vide common judgment dated 14.03.2023.
Argument made on behalf of the Review Petitioners
Learned A.S.G.I. appearing for the review petitioners submits that
pursuant to the judgment rendered in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 with
L.P.A No. 236 of 2012, the review petitioners examined the entire
records and in course of the same, it was detected that few
important facts could not be brought to the notice of the Court
due to inadvertence and negligence on the part of the authorities.
15. It is further submitted that the respondent no. 3 had requisitioned
the said land as well as other lands in exercise of the power
conferred under rule 75A of the Defence of India Rules, 1939 read
with the Bihar Government Notification No. 1705 dated
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08.05.1942 for military purpose and since then the said land was
in occupation of the review petitioners.
16. It is also submitted that in a proceeding initiated vide T.A Misc.
Case No. 1 of 1943-44 under Section 50 of the Act, 1908, the
delivery of possession of the said land was given to the
respondent no. 9 after deposit of compensation amount of
Rs.11,117.14 in the treasury.
17. It is further submitted that in the year 1954, the military
authorities had requested the respondent no.9 for settlement of
the entire area occupied by them and after negotiation, 94.535
acres of land in total including the said land was given to them on
lease for a period of 30 years on a nominal rent of Rs. 1 per acre
per annum and the said lease was subsequently renewed from
time to time.
18. It is argued that review petitioners will suffer irreparable damage
as well as security concern, if the said land is not delivered to
Ministry of Defence, Government of India since the said land is
the part of Jamshedpur Military Station.
19. It is also contended that the claim of the review petitioners can
be substantiated by the documents and letters which have been
exchanged in the said matter as well as attached plan showing
that the said land is located within the Military Station at
Jamshedpur.
20. It is further submitted that the proceeding under Section 90 of
the Act, 1908 initiated on the application of the respondent no. 6
was barred by the principle of res judicata in view of the judgment
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dated 23.09.1986 passed in C.W.J.C 202 of 1981 (R) whereby the
Patna High Court had clearly held that the right claimed by the
tenant had extinguished on 24.06.1944. The said order attained
finality up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated
07.08.1995 passed in SLP No. 6566 of 1987.
Argument on behalf of the respondent nos. 6, 7 and 8:
21. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent nos. 6, 7
and 8 submits that in the instant review petitioner, the Ministry of
Defence has now taken a complete new as well as contradictory
stands. At the first instance, the review petitioners had claimed
that the said land was sub-leased to it by the respondent no.9 for
which it had been paying rent, however now they are claiming
that the said land was requisitioned to them under rule 75A of the
Defence of India Rules, 1939 by the respondent no.3.
22. It is also submitted that the review petitioners have neither any
lawful right over the said land nor are in possession of the same.
It is an admitted stand of the review petitioners that they are the
sub-lessee of the respondent no. 9.
23. It is contended that the review petitioners have miserably failed
to make out any ground for review of the judgment dated
14.03.2023 passed in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 with L.P.A No. 236 of
2012 and as such the present review petition is liable to be
dismissed.
Finding of the Court:
24. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the
materials available on record.
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25. The review petition filed by the petitioners was earlier dismissed
by a co-ordinate Bench of this Court vide order dated 23.11.2023
on the ground that the same was filed after expiry of the period
of limitation and no application for condonation of delay was filed.
26. Aggrieved by the said order, the review petitioners filed appeals
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court and vide order dated
15.07.2024 passed in Civil Appeal Nos. 7864-7866 of 2024, the
present Civil Review has been remanded for deciding it on merit
by observing as under: -
"Leave granted.
We are inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment
passed in the review application as it has been dismissed
on two grounds, namely, that the appellant has filed it
belatedly and the defects pointed out by the Registry have
not been cured.
Taking into consideration the facts of the case, we are of
the view that the review will have to be heard on merits.
In such view of the matter, we are inclined to condone the
delay that has occasioned in filing the review application.
Consequently, we grant six weeks' time to the appellant to
rectify the defects pointed out by the Registry.
Thereafter, we request the High Court to decide the review
application on merits and in accordance with law.
Liberty is also granted to the appellant to challenge the
main order passed in the Letters Patent Appeal in the event
of review being dismissed.
We make it clear that we have not expressed anything on
the merits of the case and both parties are at liberty to
raise all contentions before the High Court.
Taking note of the submission of learned senior counsel
appearing for the contesting respondent that the matter is
pending from year 2006 onwards, we request the High
Court to expedite the hearing of the review application.
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The impugned Judgment passed in review stands set aside
with the above directions.
The appeals stand disposed of accordingly.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of."
27. Before delving into the merit of the review petition, it would be
appropriate to refer few judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
wherein the law relating to the scope of entertaining a review
petition has been discussed.
28. In the case of Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aibam Pishak
Sharma & Ors. reported in (1979) 4 SCC 389, the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held as under:
"3. ......... It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo
Singh v. State of Punjab there is nothing in Article 226 of
the Constitution to preclude a High Court from exercising
the power of review which inheres in every court of plenary
jurisdiction to prevent miscarriage of justice or to correct
grave and palpable errors committed by it. But, there are
definitive limits to the exercise of the power of review. The
power of review may be exercised on the discovery of new
and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise
of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the
person seeking the review or could not be produced by him
at the time when the order was made; it may be exercised
where some mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record is found; it may also be exercised on any analogous
ground. But, it may not be exercised on the ground that
the decision was erroneous on merits. That would be the
province of a court of appeal. A power of review is not to
be confused with appellate powers which may enable an
appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed
by the subordinate court."
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29. In the case of Parsion Devi and others Vs. Sumitri Devi and
others reported in (1997) 8 SCC 715, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has held as under:
"9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to
review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent
on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident
and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can
hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the court to exercise its power of review
under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction
under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an
erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review
petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and
cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
30. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in a judgment rendered in the case
of Haryana State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. Vs.
Mawasi and others, reported in (2012) 7 SCC 200 has held
thus:
"27. The aforesaid provisions have been interpreted in
several cases. We shall notice some of them. In S. Nagaraj
v. State of Karnataka, this Court referred to the judgments
in Raja Prithwi Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai and
Rajunder Narain Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing and observed:
"19. Review literally and even judicially means re-
examination or reconsideration. Basic philosophy
inherent in it is the universal acceptance of human
fallibility. Yet in the realm of law the courts and even
the statutes lean strongly in favour of finality of
decision legally and properly made. Exceptions both
statutorily and judicially have been carved out to
correct accidental mistakes or miscarriage of justice.
Even when there was no statutory provision and no
rules were framed by the highest court indicating the
circumstances in which it could rectify its order the
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courts culled out such power to avoid abuse of
process or miscarriage of justice. In Raja Prithwi
Chand Lal Choudhury v. Sukhraj Rai the Court
observed that even though no rules had been
framed permitting the highest court to review its
order yet it was available on the limited and narrow
ground developed by the Privy Council and the
House of Lords. The Court approved the principle
laid down by the Privy Council in Rajunder Narain
Rae v. Bijai Govind Sing that an order made by the
Court was final and could not be altered: (Rajunder
Narain Rae case, MIA p. 216)
'... nevertheless, if by misprision in embodying the
judgments, errors have been introduced, these
courts possess, by common law, the same power
which the courts of record and statute have of
rectifying the mistakes which have crept in. ... The
House of Lords exercises a similar power of
rectifying mistakes made in drawing up its own
judgments, and this Court must possess the same
authority. The Lords have, however, gone a step
further, and have corrected mistakes introduced
through inadvertence in the details of judgments; or
have supplied manifest defects, in order to enable
the decrees to be enforced, or have added
explanatory matter, or have reconciled
inconsistencies.' Basis for exercise of the power was
stated in the same decision as under:
'It is impossible to doubt that the indulgence
extended in such cases is mainly owing to the
natural desire prevailing to prevent irremediable
injustice being done by a court of last resort, where
by some accident, without any blame, the party has
not been heard and an order has been inadvertently
made as if the party had been heard.'
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Rectification of an order thus stems from the
fundamental principle that justice is above all. It is
exercised to remove the error and not for disturbing
finality. When the Constitution was framed the
substantive power to rectify or recall the order
passed by this Court was specifically provided by
Article 137 of the Constitution. Our Constitution-
makers who had the practical wisdom to visualise
the efficacy of such provision expressly conferred
the substantive power to review any judgment or
order by Article 137 of the Constitution. And clause
(c) of Article 145 permitted this Court to frame rules
as to the conditions subject to which any judgment
or order may be reviewed. In exercise of this power
Order 40 had been framed empowering this Court
to review an order in civil proceedings on grounds
analogous to Order 47 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure
Code. The expression, 'for any other sufficient
reason' in the clause has been given an expanded
meaning and a decree or order passed under
misapprehension of true state of circumstances has
been held to be sufficient ground to exercise the
power. Apart from Order 40 Rule 1 of the Supreme
Court Rules this Court has the inherent power to
make such orders as may be necessary in the
interest of justice or to prevent the abuse of process
of court. The court is thus not precluded from
recalling or reviewing its own order if it is satisfied
that it is necessary to do so for sake of justice."
28. In Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Most Rev. Mar
Poulose Athanasius, the three-Judge Bench referred to the
provisions of the Travancore Code of Civil Procedure, which
was similar to Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and observed:
"32. ... It is needless to emphasise that the scope of
an application for review is much more restricted
than that of an appeal. Under the provisions in the
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Travancore Code of Civil Procedure which is similar
in terms to Order 47 Rule 1 of our Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, the court of review has only a
limited jurisdiction circumscribed by the definitive
limits fixed by the language used therein.
It may allow a review on three specified grounds,
namely, (i) discovery of new and important matter
or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence, was not within the applicant's knowledge
or could not be produced by him at the time when
the decree was passed, (ii) mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record, and (iii) for any
other sufficient reason. It has been held by the
Judicial Committee that the words 'any other
sufficient reason' must mean 'a reason sufficient on
grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the
rule'. (See Chhajju Ram v. Neki.) This conclusion
was reiterated by the Judicial Committee in
Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi v. Parath Nath and was
adopted by our Federal Court in Hari Sankar Pal v.
Anath Nath Mitter, FC at pp. 110-11. The learned
counsel appearing in support of this appeal
recognises the aforesaid limitations and submits that
his case comes within the ground of 'mistake or error
apparent on the face of the record' or some ground
analogous thereto."
29. In Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.,
another three-Judge Bench reiterated that the power of
review is not analogous to the appellate power and
observed:
"11. ... A review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and
corrected, but lies only for patent error. We do not
consider that this furnishes a suitable occasion for
dealing with this difference exhaustively or in any
great detail, but it would suffice for us to say that
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where without any elaborate argument one could
point to the error and say here is a substantial point
of law which stares one in the face, and there could
reasonably be no two opinions, entertained about it,
a clear case of error apparent on the face of the
record would be made out."
30. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma,
this Court answered in affirmative the question whether the
High Court can review an order passed under Article 226 of
the Constitution and proceeded to observe:
"3. ... But, there are definitive limits to the exercise
of the power of review. The power of review may be
exercised on the discovery of new and important
matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due
diligence was not within the knowledge of the
person seeking the review or could not be produced
by him at the time when the order was made; it may
be exercised where some mistake or error apparent
on the face of the record is found; it may also be
exercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not
be exercised on the ground that the decision was
erroneous on merits. That would be the province of
a court of appeal. A power of review is not to be
confused with appellate powers which may enable
an appellate court to correct all manner of errors
committed by the subordinate court."
32. In Parsion Devi v. Sumitri Devi, the Court observed:
"9. ... An error which is not self-evident and has to
be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly
be said to be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the court to exercise its power of
review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC ... A review
petition, it must be remembered has a limited
purpose and cannot be allowed to be 'an appeal in
disguise'."
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33. In Lily Thomas v. Union of India, R.P. Sethi, J., who
concurred with S. Saghir Ahmad, J., summarised the scope
of the power of review in the following words:
"56. ... Such powers can be exercised within the
limits of the statute dealing with the exercise of
power. The review cannot be treated like an appeal
in disguise. The mere possibility of two views on the
subject is not a ground for review. Once a review
petition is dismissed no further petition of review can
be entertained. The rule of law of following the
practice of the binding nature of the larger Benches
and not taking different views by the Benches of
coordinated jurisdiction of equal strength has to be
followed and practised."
34. In Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik, the Court observed:
"13. ... The parameters are prescribed in Order 47
CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the
defendant to press for a rehearing 'on account of
some mistake or error apparent on the face of the
records or for any other sufficient reason'. The
former part of the rule deals with a situation
attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural
action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two
conclusions are not possible. Neither of them
postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party
had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or
could perhaps have argued them more forcefully
and/or cited binding precedents to the court and
thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict."
35. In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, the Court
considered the question whether a Tribunal established
under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 can review its
decision, referred to Section 22(3) of that Act, some of the
judicial precedents and observed:
"21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where
a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new
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matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must
be relevant and must be of such a character that if
the same had been produced, it might have altered
the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of
new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient
ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this,
the party seeking review has also to show that such
additional matter or evidence was not within its
knowledge and even after the exercise of due
diligence, the same could not be produced before
the court earlier.
22. The term 'mistake or error apparent' by its very
connotation signifies an error which is evident per se
from the record of the case and does not require
detailed examination, scrutiny and elucidation either
of the facts or the legal position. If an error is not
self-evident and detection thereof requires long
debate and process of reasoning, it cannot be
treated as an error apparent on the face of the
record for the purpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or
Section 22(3)(f) of the Act. To put it differently an
order or decision or judgment cannot be corrected
merely because it is erroneous in law or on the
ground that a different view could have been taken
by the court/tribunal on a point of fact or law. In any
case, while exercising the power of review, the
court/tribunal concerned cannot sit in appeal over
its judgment/decision."
31. In the case of Yashwant Sinha & Others Vs. Central Bureau
of Investigation through its Director and Another reported
in (2020) 2 SCC 338, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
under:-
58. In State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC
612], this Court, inter alia, held as follows: (SCC p. 633,
para 21)
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"21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where
a review is sought on the ground of discovery of new
matter or evidence, such matter or evidence must
be relevant and must be of such a character that if
the same had been produced, it might have altered
the judgment. In other words, mere discovery of
new or important matter or evidence is not sufficient
ground for review ex debito justitiae. Not only this,
the party seeking review has also to show that such
additional matter or evidence was not within its
knowledge and even after the exercise of due
diligence, the same could not be produced before
the court earlier."
(emphasis supplied)
65. Northern India Caterers (India) Ltd. v. Governor of
Delhi, (1980) 2 SCC 167] was a case which fell to be
considered under Article 137 of the Constitution of India.
The relevant discussion is found in paras 8 and 9. They
read as follows: (SCC pp. 171-72)
"8. It is well settled that a party is not entitled to
seek a review of a judgment delivered by this Court
merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh
decision of the case. The normal principle is that a
judgment pronounced by the court is final, and
departure from that principle is justified only when
circumstances of a substantial and compelling
character make it necessary to do so [Sajjan
Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1965 SC 845]. For
instance, if the attention of the court is not drawn to
a material statutory provision during the original
hearing, the court will review its judgment (Girdhari
Lal Gupta v. D.H. Mehta, (1971) 3 SCC 189] SCR at
p. 750). The Court may also reopen its judgment if
a manifest wrong has been done and it is necessary
to pass an order to do full and effective
justice: [O.N. Mohindroo v. District Judge, Delhi,
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(1971) 3 SCC 5] SCR at p. 27. Power to review its
judgments has been conferred on the Supreme
Court by Article 137 of the Constitution, and that
power is subject to the provisions of any law made
by Parliament or the rules made under Article 145.
In a civil proceeding, an application for review is
entertained only on a ground mentioned in Order 47
Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and in a
criminal proceeding on the ground of an error
apparent on the face of the record (Order 40 Rule 1,
Supreme Court Rules, 1966). But whatever the
nature of the proceeding, it is beyond dispute that a
review proceeding cannot be equated with the
original hearing of the case, and the finality of the
judgment delivered by the court will not be
reconsidered except "where a glaring omission or
patent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlier
by judicial fallibility" (Sow Chandra Kante v. Sk.
Habib, (1975) 1 SCC 674).
9. Now, besides the fact that most of the legal
material so assiduously collected and placed before
us by the learned Additional Solicitor General, who
has now been entrusted to appear for the
respondent, was never brought to our attention
when the appeals were heard, we may also examine
whether the judgment suffers from an error
apparent on the face of the record. Such an error
exists if of two or more views canvassed on the point
it is possible to hold that the controversy can be said
to admit of only one of them. If the view adopted by
the court in the original judgment is a possible view
having regard to what the record states, it is difficult
to hold that there is an error apparent on the face
of the record."
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69. In [Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati, (2013) 8 SCC 320] ,
this Court in para 20, laid down its conclusions, which reads
as follows: (SCC pp. 333-34)
"Summary of the principles
20. Thus, in view of the above, the following
grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by
the statute:
20.1. When the review will be maintainable:
(i) Discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence,
was not within knowledge of the petitioner or could
not be produced by him;
(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record;
(iii) Any other sufficient reason.
The words "any other sufficient reason" have been
interpreted in [Chhajju Ram v. Neki, 1922 SCC
OnLine PC 11] and approved by this Court in [Moran
Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius,
AIR 1954 SC 526] to mean "a reason sufficient on
grounds at least analogous to those specified in the
rule". The same principles have been reiterated
in [Union of India v. Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores
Ltd., (2013) 8 SCC 337]
20.2. When the review will not be maintainable:
(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not
enough to reopen concluded adjudications.
(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.
(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the
original hearing of the case.
(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material
error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines
its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice.
(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise
whereby an erroneous decision is reheard and
corrected but lies only for patent error.
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(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject
cannot be a ground for review.
(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record
should not be an error which has to be fished out
and searched.
(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully
within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot
be permitted to be advanced in the review petition.
(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief
sought at the time of arguing the main matter had
been negatived."
32. In the case of State (NCT of Delhi) through its Secretary,
Land and Building Department & Another vs. K.L. Rathi
Steels Ltd. & Others reported in (2024) 7 SCC 315, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:-
56. After considering a host of decisions with a fine-tooth
comb, the Court went on to cull out the principles of review
in para 35 of the decision which is extracted hereunder:
(State of W.B. v. Kamal Sengupta, (2008) 8 SCC 612)
"35. The principles which can be culled out from the
above noted judgments are:
(i) The power of the Tribunal to review its
order/decision under Section 22(3)(f) of the Act is
akin/analogous to the power of a civil court under
Section 114 read with Order 47 Rule 1CPC.
(ii) The Tribunal can review its decision on either of
the grounds enumerated in Order 47 Rule 1 and not
otherwise.
(iii) The expression "any other sufficient reason"
appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 has to be interpreted
in the light of other specified grounds.
(iv) An error which is not self-evident and which can
be discovered by a long process of reasoning,
cannot be treated as an error apparent on the face
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of record justifying exercise of power under Section
22(3)(f).
(v) An erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected
in the guise of exercise of power of review.
(vi) A decision/order cannot be reviewed under
Section 22(3)(f) on the basis of subsequent
decision/judgment of a coordinate or larger Bench
of the tribunal or of a superior court.
(vii) While considering an application for review, the
tribunal must confine its adjudication with reference
to material which was available at the time of initial
decision. The happening of some subsequent event
or development cannot be taken note of for
declaring the initial order/decision as vitiated by an
error apparent.
(viii) Mere discovery of new or important matter or
evidence is not sufficient ground for review. The
party seeking review has also to show that such
matter or evidence was not within its knowledge and
even after the exercise of due diligence, the same
could not be produced before the court/tribunal
earlier."
(emphasis supplied)
57. This Court in Subramanian Swamy v. State of T.N.,
(2014) 5 SCC 75, has read the Explanation as follows: (SCC
pp. 96-97, para 52)
"52. ... The Explanation to Order 47 Rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides ... that if the
decision on a question of law on which the judgment
of the court is based, is reversed or modified by the
subsequent decision of a superior court in any other
case, it shall not be a ground for the review of such
judgment. Thus, even an erroneous decision cannot
be a ground for the court to undertake review, as
the first and foremost requirement of entertaining a
review petition is that the order, review of which is
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sought, suffers from any error apparent on the face
of the order and in absence of any such
error, finality attached to the judgment/order
cannot be disturbed."
(emphasis in original)
33. The law enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid
judgments may thus be summarized as under: -
(i) A review petition cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in
disguise".
(ii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the
domain of the appellate court which it cannot be
permitted to be advanced in review petition.
(iii) The power of review may be exercised on discovery of
new and important matter or evidence or where some
mistake or error apparent on the face of the record is
found or on any analogous ground.
(iv) Mere discovery of new or important matter or evidence
is not sufficient ground for review. The party seeking
review has also to show that such matter or evidence was
not within its knowledge and even after the exercise of
due diligence, the same could not be produced before
the court/tribunal earlier.
(v) An error which is not self-evident and which can be
discovered by a long process of reasoning, cannot be
treated as an error apparent on the face of record.
(vi) The happening of some subsequent event or
development cannot be taken note of for declaring the
initial order/decision as vitiated.
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(vii) A review petition cannot be filed on the ground that the
decision was erroneous on merit.
34. Now, the primary issue before this court is as to whether any of
the above grounds is available in the present case so as to review
the judgment dated 14.03.2023 passed by a Co-ordinate Bench
of this Court in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 with L.P.A No. 236 of 2012.
35. It is evident from the record that the review petitioners were
arrayed as respondents in W.P.(C) No. 6816 of 2005 and in course
of adjudication of the said case, they were also provided
opportunity of hearing, however they did not bring any document
on record in support of its claims, rather they supported the case
of the respondent no. 6 and 7.
36. The relevant part of the judgment dated 23.04.2012 passed in
W.P.(C) No.1981 of 2003 with W.P.(C) No.6816 of 2005 is quoted
hereinbelow:
"Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent no.8 has supported the arguments on
behalf of the respondent nos.6 and 7."
37. That apart, the said judgment was not even challenged by the
review petitioners by filing an appeal and thus they literally
accepted the said judgment.
38. It is also important to note that the respondent no.9 filed appeals
being L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 and L.P.A No. 236 of 2012. The
review petitioners were arrayed as respondents in L.P.A. No.236
of 2012. The respondent no. 9 as well as the review petitioners
took specific stand that 94.535 acres of lands including the said
land were given to the review petitioners on sublease by the
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respondent no.9, however the said claim was not accepted by the
learned Division Bench observing as under: -
37. The first and foremost of all the inconsistencies in the
stand of the Tata Steel is that a copy of the lease/sub-lease
executed in favor of the Ministry of Defence has not been
brought on record. On the contrary, it can be easily inferred
from the aforementioned communications that the
proposal to acquire 94.535 acres land by the Ministry of
Defence did not fructify in execution of any lease deed/sub-
lease and all that can be projected by the Tata Steel is that
there were discussions with the Ministry of Defence over a
proposal for hiring of 94.535 acres land for which sanction
of the President was taken but, not even the sanction order
of the President has been produced on record. The Tata
Steel did not produce the records of handing over to and
taking over possession by the Ministry of Defence and there
is no evidence of the Ministry of Defence or its
agent/representative coming into possession over the said
lands. From the letter dated 13th February 1990 of the
Ministry of Defence, it transpires that the proposal for hiring
of 94.535 acres land was mooted sometime in 1960 or even
before that. In its letter dated 6th August 1988, the Tata
Steel has made a reference of a lease for a period of 30
years from 1st January 1956 which was neither executed
nor registered. There is also a reference of the lease deed
dated 1st August 1985 executed by the Government of
Bihar in favor of the Tata Steel and, in view thereof, the
Tata Steel seems to have suggested the Estate Officer for
execution of a lease for a period of 10 years ending on 31"
December 1995. The letter by the Tata Steel also does not
provide any clue as to when the sub-lease was executed, if
at all that was done. Therefore, what emerges is that there
is absolutely no description of the land admeasuring about
94.535 acres for which the President has accorded sanction
for hiring of the said land from the Tata Steel. Secondly, no
other document leave alone any lease deed has been
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produced by the Tata Steel or the Union of India. Thirdly,
the sanction of the President was for 30 years which period
has lapsed long back. In summation, the plea set-up by the
Tata Steel is not substantiated and it was a misconceived
defence.
54. The power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
is plenary and without any fetters. The High Court while
sitting in the writ jurisdiction is required to consider all
relevant facts to satisfy itself whether any relief can be
granted and shall not be swayed away by any issue
howsoever contested that may be. A host of claims have
been made by the Union of India and the private
respondent but none of them has been able to establish
any right, title or interest and more particularly possession
over the subject-property. The claim made by the Ministry
of Defence is not based on any clinching evidence. Its claim
is without any substance and in part self- contradictory
inasmuch as not even description of any construction over
the subject-property made by the Ministry of Defence has
been pleaded. What followed after the sanction of the
President was intimated through letter dated 22nd July
1960 to the Tata Steel has remained a mystery and the
plea of possession by raising construction over the subject-
property is not supported by any material whatsoever.
There is also absolutely no material on record to show that
the subject-property falls within 94.535 acres land which
allegedly has been taken over by the Ministry of Defence
under the sanction granted by the President. The story of
the Ministry of Defence having possession over 94.535
acres land including the subject-property has not been
accepted by the writ Court and, on the contrary, the writ
Court has approved the findings by the Assistant
Settlement Officer that the Garrison Engineers, MES
Tatanagar Division was tenant under Bengal Kumhar for
more than a decade between 10th April 1942 to 7th August
1953. This finding by the Assistant Settlement Officer is
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based on the rent receipts produced by Alomoni Kamarin
to show that the Bihar Regiment of Garrison Engineers paid
Rs. 317 and 4 Annas on 9th September 1944 and further
rents for different periods till 7th August 1953 on different
dates to the recorded tenant. The Tenancy Act provides a
statutory regime and is a complete code in itself. While so,
the findings of fact recorded by the statutory authority
under the Tenancy Act are binding on the parties except
where such findings of fact are not based on legal evidence
or are contrary to the records. The writ Court in exercise of
its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
shall not embark upon an exercise to test legality of the
order passed by a statutory Authority under the Tenancy
Act, except where the order is challenged on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. Even so, a plea based on jurisdictional
error committed by a statutory Authority under the
Tenancy Act may not invite exercise of the powers under
Article 226 of the Constitution. -----------"
39. Thus, the claim of the review petitioners' right, title, interest and
possession over the said land was rejected by the learned Division
Bench for want of any document in support of the said claim. The
learned Division Bench further observed that the Writ Court
approved the findings given by the Assistant Settlement Officer
that the Garrision Engineers, MES, Tata Nagar Division was tenant
under Bengal Kumar for more than a decade and had also paid
rent for the said land to the recorded tenant
40. The review petitioners have failed to show before this Court any
error apparent on the face of the record of the judgment passed
in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 with L.P.A No. 236 of 2012, rather they
have sought to review the said judgment by placing certain
documents contending that the said land was initially
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requisitioned to them under Rule 75A of the Defence of India
Rules, 1939. The review petitioners have also claimed that the
said land was sub-leased to them by the respondent no.9,
however they have again failed to bring on record any such lease
deed in support of their claims.
41. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases cited hereinabove has
specifically held that the party seeking to review an order on the
ground of discovery of new matter or evidence has to show that
the same was not within its knowledge and could not be earlier
produced before the court/tribunal even after exercise of due
diligence.
42. It is the own case of the review petitioners before this Court that
the said evidences/facts were not brought on record by them due
to inadvertence or negligence. They have failed to show before
this court that they had shown due diligence to discover and
produce the said documents before the writ court or at the time
of hearing the appeals by the learned Division Bench. Curiously
enough, the writ petitions were filed in the year 2003/2005 and
the order under review was passed in the year 2023. Thus, the
matter remained pending before this Court for about two decades,
but the documents relating to requisition of the said land under
the Defence of India Rules, 1939 was never brought on record. It
is also not the contention of the review petitioners that the said
documents were not in their possession.
43. Had the said documents been filed before the writ court, there
would have been determination on the said point. We are,
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therefore, of the view that such an issue cannot be raised in this
proceeding being barred by the doctrine of constructive res
judicata.
44. Res judicata is not confined to the issues which the court is
actually asked to decide, but it also covers the issues or facts
which are part of the subject-matter of the litigation and the same
could have been raised. It is well settled that an adjudication is
conclusive and final not only as to the actual matter determined,
but as to every other matter which the parties might and ought
to have litigated and have had decided as incidental to or
essentially connected with subject-matter of the litigation and
every matter coming into the legitimate purview of the original
action both in respect of the matters of claim and defence. It is
an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and
public policy for a party to relitigate the same issue which has
already been tried and decided earlier against him.
45. It is a settled law that if a review is sought on the ground of
discovery of new matter or evidence, such matter or evidence
must be relevant and must be of such character that if same had
been produced, it might have altered the judgment. In the present
case, the claim of the review petitioners is that the said land was
initially requisitioned and thereafter sub-leased to them by the
respondent no. 9. Thus, otherwise also these documents are not
of such a nature which might have altered the judgment, if the
same had been brought on record before the learned Division
Bench at the time of adjudication of the appeals.
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46. Thus, the review petitioners have failed to show any ground much
less a sufficient one for review of the judgment dated 14.03.2023
passed in L.P.A No.227 of 2012 with L.P.A No. 236 of 2012.
47. Before parting with the case, we would also like to deprecate the
conduct of the review petitioners who had, in fact, supported the
case of the respondent nos.6 and 7 before the Writ Court and
despite being non-appealing parties in L.P.A No. 227 of 2012 with
L.P.A No. 236 of 2012, have sought review of the judgment dated
14.03.2023 on the basis of certain documents claiming that the
same could not be filed before the writ court or during hearing of
the appeals due to their own negligence and inadvertence.
48. The review petition being devoid of merit is, accordingly,
dismissed.
(Tarlok Singh Chauhan, C.J.)
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
3rd November, 2025
AFR
Sanjay/
