Jharkhand High Court
Rajesh Kaime vs Coal India Limited on 9 May, 2025
Author: Ananda Sen
Bench: Ananda Sen
2025:JHHC:14142
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No.2656 of 2020
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Rajesh Kaime, son of late Lal Singh, resident of C-1, Central Saunda,
P.O. Saunda, P.S. Bhurkunda, District Ramgarh.
... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. Coal India Limited, through the Board of Directors, Coal Bhawan,
Premises No.4 MAR, Plot No.AF-III, Action Area-1A, New Town,
Rajarhat, Kolkata- 700156 (WB).
2. The Chairman-cum-Managing Director, Coal Bhawan, Premises
No.4 MAR, Plot No.AF-III, Action Area-1A, New Town, Rajarhat,
Kolkata- 700156 (WB).
3. Central Coalfield Limited, through its Chairman-cum-Managing
Director, Darbhanga House, P.O. Kanke, P.S. Gonda, District
Ranchi, Jharkhand.
4. The Company Secretary, Premises No.4 MAR, Plot No.AF-III,
Action Area-1A, New Town, Rajarhat, Kolkata- 700156 (WB).
... ... Respondents
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CORAM : SRI ANANDA SEN, J
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For the Petitioner(s) : Ms. Chandana Kumari, Advocate
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Arpan Mishra, Advocate
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JUDGMENT
CAV On : 18.03.2025 Pronounced on : 09/05/2025
By way of filing this writ petition, the petitioner has
sought for the following reliefs:-
"(a) For quashing the order as contained in letter No.
3851-60 dated 24.2.2020 passed by respondent
No.2, whereby and whereunder, the petitioner
has been dismissed from his services of the com-
pany with immediate effect under provisions of
Coal India Executives (Conduct, Discipline and
Appeal) Rules, 1978, which in illegal AND in the
alternative, the petitioner prays for direction upon
the respondent authorities to dispose of the ap-
peal under Rule 36 of the Coal India Executives
(Conduct, Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1978,
which is pending since March, 2020;
(b) For quashing of order as contained in Ref. No.
CIL/C5A (iv)/635/ΑΑ/546 dated 27.11.2020,
whereby and whereunder, the appeal filed by the
petitioner against the order of dismissal, has been
rejected."
2025:JHHC:14142
2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was working
in the post of Assistant Manager (Personnel). On the basis of com-
plaint made by Vijay Kumar Paswan on 22.08.2017 to the office of
S.P.(CBI), Ranchi with regard to demand of illegal gratification by
the petitioner, R.C. Case No. 06A/2017-R was registered in the
year 2017. However, the petitioner was acquitted from the charges
for offence u/s 7 and 13(2) read with section 13(1)(d) of the Pre-
vention of Corruption Act 1988 by judgment dated 01.04.2019.
That the Chairman-cum-Managing Director, CCL initiated the de-
partmental proceeding after the institution of FIR and issued the
memorandum containing the imputation of misconduct along with
Article of Charges on 28.12.2017. The Enquiry Officer on comple-
tion of enquiry in the departmental proceeding, submitted the re-
port dated 01.03.2019 holding the petitioner guilty of the charges.
Thereafter, the petitioner was given 15 days to submit his repre-
sentation against the enquiry report by Chairman-cum-Managing
Director, CCL vide letter no. 132 dated 15.04.2019. The petitioner
made his representation after acquittal from the charges by the
Spl. Judge CBI, Ranchi, however, Respondent no 3 again vide let-
ter no 644 dated 01.06.2019 directed to submit a representation.
It is submitted that vide letter no 3851-60 dated 24.02.2020, the
respondent no. 1 passed its final order of dismissal of the peti-
tioner from his service. The petitioner had preferred an appeal
against the order of dismissal, before the Board of Directors, Coal
India Limited, however, even after a lapse of 5 months, the peti-
tioner did not receive any notice for date of hearing nor any com-
munication was made to him.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
enquiry officer had not examined S.C. Jha and Vijay Kumar Paswan
even when they were named as chargesheet witnesses. There
were no oral and documentary evidences produced. The only doc-
ument evidence relied upon by the management is the complaint
dated 22.08.2017 made by Vijay Kumar Paswan. There were no
witness produced by the management to show in any manner that
at any point of time, there were any dues lying towards LCS and
gratuity to be paid nor any evidence had been proved that any file
2025:JHHC:14142
in this regard towards the payment of dues to the family of the
deceased employee Ajay Kumar was pending before the petitioner.
Even the principle of preponderance of probability in departmental
proceeding cannot be applied as there was no evidence against
the petitioner nor there any documentary evidence to show the
liability of the petitioner for making payment of LCS and gratuity
amount to the family of the deceased. Furthermore, the four wit-
nesses cannot be relied upon as they were not the eye witnesses
and also the evidences produced by them does not prove the
charges against the petitioner.
4. In reply, learned counsel for the respondent has
placed reliance on judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to
show that that judicial review of departmental inquiry is based on
different principles altogether and acquittal of the petitioner from
Criminal Court would not result into exoneration of the petitioner.
Counsel submitted that the petitioner filed series of representa-
tions but without justified reasons on one pretext or the other for
change of Inquiring Authority. The departmental proceedings is
conducted as per provisions of CDA Rules 1978 of Coal India Lim-
ited and the charges are proved based on preponderance of prob-
ability. It is further stated that the petitioner failed to settle the
legal dues of the deceased in favour of his legal heirs within rea-
sonable time for his personal gains. Furthermore, bribe of Rs
6000/- had been recovered from the petitioner's possession in
presence of independent witnesses. The petitioner was caught red
handed during accepting bribe. The evidence of demand and ac-
ceptance of bribe in the enquiry are enough to prove the charges.
Thus, the respondent has rightly dismissed the petitioner from his
services.
5. Heard learned counsels for the both the parties.
6. In this case, the petitioner has challenged the
punishment in the departmental proceeding. The charge against
the petitioner is that when the petitioner was posted in Sayal "D"
Colliery, he committed gross irregularity in the matter of payment
of gratuity and life cover scheme amount of a deceased employee
inasmuch as he demanded an illegal gratification of Rs.50,000/-
2025:JHHC:14142
for having facilitated the payments of dues towards Life cover
scheme and gratuity.
7. The departmental proceeding was initiated and
thereafter the petitioner was punished. The punishment was
dismissal from service. Be it noted that for the self same charge,
a criminal proceeding was instituted under the Prevention of
Corruption Act being R.C. Case No.06(A)/2017-R. In the said
criminal case, the petitioner was acquitted holding that the
prosecution has not been able to prove its case against the
petitioner beyond all reasonable doubt. The acquittal of the
petitioner in the criminal case is dated 01.04.2019.
8. Though the Article of Charge in the departmental
proceeding is dated 28.12.2017 but the order of dismissal of the
petitioner from service is dated 24.02.2020 i.e. after the
petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case.
9. In a departmental proceeding, the Court sitting in a
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is not
an Appellate Court.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Director
General of Police, Railway Protection Force and Others
versus Rajendra Kumar Dubey reported in 2020 SCC OnLine
SC 954 at paragraph 21.1 thereof, has held that it is well settled
that High Court cannot act as an Appellate Authority and re-
appreciate the evidence, which was led before the enquiry officer.
By referring to judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh
Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao [1963 AIR SC 1723], the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has held that it is not the function of the High
Court to review the findings and arrive at a different finding. In a
departmental proceeding, scope is very limited and it is well
settled that the High Court can interfere where the departmental
authority has acted against the principles of natural justice or
where the findings are based on no evidence or in violation of the
statutory rules provided. Further, if the punishment imposed is
excessive, the Court can also interfere. It has also been held by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court that under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, the High Court shall not:-
2025:JHHC:14142
(i) re-appreciate the evidence;
(ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in the case the
same has been conducted in accordance with law;
(iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence;
(iv) go into the reliability of the evidence;
(v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings
can be based;
(vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be;
(vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its
conscience.
10. The nature of proof is also different in the
departmental proceeding and criminal proceeding. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court in a recent decision in the case of AAI v. Pradip
Kumar Banerjee reported in (2025) 4 SCC 111, while dealing
with a case in respect of taking bribe from the contractors has
held that it is a settled principle of law that the burden laid upon
the prosecution in a criminal trial is to prove the case beyond
reasonable doubt. However, in a disciplinary enquiry, the burden
upon the department is limited and it is required to prove its case
on the principle of preponderance of probabilities.
11. It is the case of the petitioner that non-examination
of the complainant has prejudiced the case of the petitioner.
However, in a departmental proceeding non-examination of the
complainant is not fatal enough when there are other materials to
implicate the delinquent.
The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pradip
Kumar Banerjee (supra), has also taken note of the aforesaid
ground. Relevant paragraphs (para-31 & 32) indicating the same
are as hereunder:-
"31. Further, we are unable to sustain the finding of the
Division Bench that the non-examination of the
complainant is fatal to the case of the appellant
authority. It is well-settled principle of law that even in a
criminal case pertaining to demand and acceptance of
illegal gratification, the courts are empowered to record
conviction, where the decoy turns hostile, and the
prosecution case is based purely on the evidence of the
Trap Laying Officer and the trap witnesses. In this
regard, we are benefitted by the judgment of this Court
in Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v. State of
2025:JHHC:14142
Gujarat [Bhanuprasad Hariprasad Dave v. State of
Gujarat, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 81] , wherein it was held
thus : (SCC OnLine SC para 7)
"7. ... It is now well settled by a series of decisions
of this Court that while in the case of evidence of
an accomplice, no conviction can be based on his
evidence unless it is corroborated in material
particulars but as regards the evidence of a partisan
witness it is open to a court to convict an accused
person solely on the basis of that evidence, if it is
satisfied that that evidence is reliable."
32. In the case at hand, the subject-matter concerns a
domestic enquiry, where the strict rules of evidence
prohibiting admissibility of confessional statements
recorded by the police officials do not apply. Likewise,
non-examination of the decoy cannot be treated to be
fatal in the domestic enquiry where other evidence
indicts the delinquent officer. As has been held by this
Court in Narender Singh [Delhi Police v. Narender Singh,
(2006) 4 SCC 265 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 686] , even a
confession of the delinquent employee recorded by the
Trap Laying Officer during the criminal investigation can
be relied upon by the disciplinary authority."
12. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Syndicate Bank v. B.S.N. Prasad reported in (2025) 3 SCC
601, has held that it is well-settled that an acquittal in a criminal
case is no ground to exonerate a delinquent in disciplinary
proceedings as the standard of proof differs in these proceedings.
It is well-settled that the adequacy of the evidence adduced
during disciplinary inquiry cannot be gone into in writ jurisdiction.
13. In the instant case, I find that by way of an
independent witness and other materials, the guilt of the
delinquent employee has been established in the departmental
proceeding. As held earlier, it is well settled that here in a
departmental proceeding, the guilt can be established on the
principle of preponderance of probability. In this case, by applying
the aforesaid principle, I find that there is no illegality committed
2025:JHHC:14142
by the Management in finding the guilt of the delinquent
employee.
14. Further, it is not a case of "No Evidence".
Evidences were there, which were appreciated by the employer.
This Court not being an Appellate Court, cannot reappraise the
evidence and come to a different conclusion.
15. So far as the acquittal in the criminal case is
concerned, as held above, the principle of proof of guilt in a
criminal case is absolutely different than what is necessary to
prove the guilt in a departmental proceeding. Further, the
situations in the criminal case were also not similar. It is not a
case that the entire occurrence had not happened. Further, the
judgment in the criminal case is not of a clean acquittal.
16. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances
of this case and taking into consideration the judgments passed
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, I am of the view that the petitioner
has rightly been charged for his misconduct in as mentioned in
the Article of Charges. Thus, the impugned order does not warrant
any interference.
17. Accordingly, this writ petition stands dismissed.
(ANANDA SEN, J.)
09/05/2025
HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Prashant
NAFR
