Jharkhand High Court
Dipankar Jha Aged About 43 Years Son Of ... vs Abbott Healthcare Private Limited on 28 February, 2025
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No. 225 of 2024
----
Dipankar Jha aged about 43 years son of Late Sankar Jha,
resident of C/o Plot No. 234A, Near Durga Mandir, Ritudih, P.O.
Siwandih, P.S. Maraferi, District Bokaro Steel City, Jharkhand
...Appellant
Versus
Abbott Healthcare Private Limited, a Company registered under the
Lawsof India and having its office at 4, Corporate park, Sion
Trombay Road, P.O. and P.S. Sion, District Mumbai (Maharashtra)
PIN-400071, through Shailendra Singh Pawar, aged about 50 years
Son of Shri O.S. Pawar, working as Senior Manager (HR), Abbott
Healthcare Private Limited and resident of 24C, Sapphire-1,
Cosmos Jewels, Kavesar, P.O. and P.S. Kasarvadavali, District-
Thane, (Maharashtra), PIN 400615. ....Respondent
----
CORAM: HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
----
For the Appellant : Mr. Uday Choudhary, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Nipun Bakshi, Advocate
----
Reserved on 12.02.2025 Pronounced on 28/02/2025
Per Deepak Roshan, J.
This Intra Court Appeal is directed against the
judgment passed by learned Single Judge in W.P(L) No. 1299 of
2023, whereby the writ application filed by the respondent was
allowed and Industrial Award dated 10.09.2022 passed by
learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro in I.D Case No.
01 of 2017, was set aside treating it to be beyond jurisdiction.
2. The brief fact of the case is that the Respondent-
Company dismissed the appellant from services of the Company
with effect from 25.02.2013 vide letter dated 20.02.2013.
Thereafter, the appellant filed an application invoking the
jurisdiction of learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bokaro
under Section 2A(2) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 as amended
by the Industrial Dispute (Amendment) Act, 2010 on 12.04.2017
i.e., after a gap of more than 4 years.
3. Before the Labour Court, the Respondent-Company
took a specific plea in its written statement that the application
filed by the applicant-appellant is not maintainable as the same
has been filed beyond the period of 3 years from the date of
dismissal of the appellant; however the learned Presiding Officer,
Labour Court failed to frame any issue with regard to
maintainability of the application filed by the appellant nor dealt
with the said pleading under Section 2A(2) of the Act and finally
allowed the application of this appellant by directing the
Respondent-Company to reinstate the appellant-workman with
continuity in service and 30% of the total back wages from the
date of his dismissal till his reinstatement.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that
learned Single Judge has not taken note of the fact that in
several rulings, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that when a
reference was made under Section 10(1)(C) of the I.D. Act, the
reference should not be questioned by the Labour Court on the
ground of delay alone.
In support of his argument, learned counsel referred
to the case of Raghubir Singh vs. General Manager, Haryana
Roadways, Hissar reported in (2014) 10 SCC 301. He further
relied upon the judgment passed in the case of M/s. Glenmark
Pharmaceuticals Limited vs. The Judge, Labour Court and
Industrial Tribunal, Bhilwara & another passed in D.B. Civil
Special Appeal (W) No. 801 of 2014 dated 27.08.2015. He also
referred to the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Kuldeep Singh v. G.M., Instrument Design Development &
facilities Centre & Anr. reported in 2011 LAB I.C 645, wherein the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held that reference has to be made if the
dispute exists at the time of making reference.
He contended that the learned writ court has failed to
consider the fact that there is a Limitation Act which is
applicable in each and every law and learned Presiding Officer,
Labour Court has taken into consideration the entire judgments
and also the law of limitation and allowed the application of the
appellant filed under Section 2A(2) of I.D. Act.
5. In crux, learned counsel for the appellant tried to
impress this Court by his submission that when the Labour
Court has already entertained the application filed by the
appellant and directed the Management to reinstate him in
service with 30% of total back wages taking into consideration
that the Union has approached the Deputy Labour
Commissioner, Bokaro regarding illegal dismissal of the
appellant and in pursuant to that Deputy Labour Commissioner,
Bokaro has issued a notice to the Respondent-Company and the
said conciliation proceeding was pending before the Deputy
Labour Commissioner, Bokaro. However, a letter was issued to
him to approach the Labour Court as the conciliation has failed.
Therefore, learned Writ Court should have considered
the entire facts and the judgments cited at bar by the appellant
that in the case of reference no limitation has been prescribed
and reference has to be made if the dispute exists at the time of
making reference.
6. Per Contra, learned counsel for the Respondent-
Company submits that no error has been committed by learned
Writ Court; inasmuch as, sub-section (3) of Section 2A provides
that an application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be made to
learned Labour Court or the Tribunal before expiry of three years
from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or otherwise
termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).
Learned counsel further submits that no error has
been committed by learned writ court because when the statute
specifically prohibits entertainment of any application; then the
limitation act will not apply.
7. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and after
going through the documents available on record, it appears that
admittedly, the appellant was dismissed from service of the
Respondent-Company with effect from 25.02.2013 and he has
filed an application under Section 2A(2) of the Act as amended by
the Act of 2010 on 12.04.2017 i.e., much beyond the period of
three years.
Under Section 2A(2) of the Act, it is categorically
stipulated that the application referred to sub-section(2) shall be
made to the Labour Court or the Tribunal before expiry of three
years from the date of discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or
otherwise termination of service as specified in sub-section (1).
For brevity, Section 2A of I. D. Act is quoted
hereinbelow:
"2-A. Dismissal, etc., of an individual workman to be
deemed to be an industrial dispute.- [(1)] Where any
employer discharges, dismisses, retrenches, or otherwise
terminates the services of an individual workman, any
dispute or difference between that workman and his
employer connected with, or arising out of, such
discharge, dismissal, retrenchment or termination shall be
deemed to be an industrial dispute notwithstanding that
no other workman nor any union of workmen is a party to
the dispute.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 10, any
such workman as is specified in sub-section (1) may, make
an application direct to the labour Court or Tribunal for
adjudication of the dispute referred to therein after the
expiry of forty-five days from the date he has made the
application to the Conciliation Officer of the appropriate
Government for conciliation of the dispute, and in receipt
of such application the Labour Court or Tribunal shall
have powers and jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
dispute, as if it were a dispute referred to it by the
appropriate Government in accordance with the provisions
of this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply in
relation to such adjudication as they apply in relation to
an industrial dispute referred to it by the appropriate
Government.
(3) The application referred to in sub-section (2) shall be
made to the Labour Court or Tribunal before the expiry of
three years from the date of discharge, dismissal,
retrenchment or otherwise termination of service as
specified in sub-section (1)."
Thus, we see that the outer limit for filing an
application before the Labour Court or Tribunal within a period
of 3 years has been fixed by the statute.
8. The contention of learned counsel for the appellant
that in the case of reference, no limitation is prescribed and a
reference is made if the dispute exists at the time of making
reference and since the illegality was continuing from the date of
termination and the conciliation had failed; as such the Award
passed by the learned Presiding Officer was justified; is
misconceived for the obvious reason that the instant case does
not arise out of a Reference made by the Government under
Section 10 of I.D. Act, 1947; rather an application has been filed
by the appellant under section 2A(1) of the Act where the period
is prescribed.
The law is now well settled that when in any Statute
the outer limit has been prescribed; then the Court cannot
entertain any application filed beyond the period of limitation. In
this regard, reference may be made to the case of Singh
Enterprises vs. Commissioner of Central Excise,
Jamshedpur and others reported in (2008) 3 SCC 70. The
relevant para is extracted hereinbelow.
"8. The Commissioner of Central Excise (Appeals) as also the
Tribunal being creatures of statute are not vested with
jurisdiction to condone the delay beyond the permissible
period provided under the statute. The period up to which the
prayer for condonation can be accepted is statutorily
provided. It was submitted that the logic of Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963 (in short "the Limitation Act") can be
availed for condonation of delay. The first proviso to Section
35 makes the position clear that the appeal has to be
preferred within three months from the date of
communication to him of the decision or order. However, if the
Commissioner is satisfied that the appellant was prevented
by sufficient cause from presenting the appeal within the
aforesaid period of 60 days, he can allow it to be presented
within a further period of 30 days. In other words, this
clearly shows that the appeal has to be filed within 60 days
but in terms of the proviso further 30 days' time can be
granted by the appellate authority to entertain the appeal.
The proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 35 makes the
position crystal clear that the appellate authority has no
power to allow the appeal to be presented beyond the period
of 30 days. The language used makes the position clear that
the legislature intended the appellate authority to entertain
the appeal by condoning delay only up to 30 days after the
expiry of 60 days which is the normal period for preferring
appeal. Therefore, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of
the Limitation Act. The Commissioner and the High Court
were therefore justified in holding that there was no power to
condone the delay after the expiry of 30 days' period."
Emphasis Suppled
9. In the aforesaid case also since there was an outer
limit prescribed for filing an appeal before the Appellate
Authority and also period for condonation of delay was
prescribed; the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that authorities
being creatures of statute are not vested with jurisdiction to
condone the delay beyond the permissible period. The learned
Writ Court has taken into consideration each and every aspect of
the matter and also the judgments referred by the appellant and
has finally allowed the application of the respondent on the
ground that the application itself was filed beyond the period of
limitation as prescribed under Section 2A(3).
10. After perusing the impugned order, we do not find any
error, so as to interfere with the same. The judgment cited by
learned counsel for the appellant has no bearing in the facts and
circumstances of this case as this was not a case of reference
and the judgments cited were in the case of reference under
Section 10 of I.D. Act, 1947 made by the Government to the
Courts/Tribunals; however in the instant case, the appellant has
filed an application under Section 2A(2) before the learned
Presiding Officer for which there is a prescribed outer limit and
admittedly the application was filed beyond that period; as such
we sustain the order passed by the learned writ court and the
instant appeal is hereby dismissed. No cost.
(M. S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
Jk
A. F .R
