Jharkhand High Court
National Insurance Company Ltd vs Smt. Ulashi Singh on 17 February, 2025
Author: Rajesh Shankar
Bench: Rajesh Shankar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(C) No. 2785 of 2008
National Insurance Company Ltd., Divisional Office at Bistupur,
Jamshedpur, through its Administrative Officer, In-charge Legal Cell
and duly constituted attorney of National Insurance Company Ltd.,
Ranchi ... ... Petitioner
Versus
1. Smt. Ulashi Singh, W/o Late Kuna Singh Sardar
2. Minor Manomath Singh, S/o Late Kuna Singh Sardar
3. Minor Saraswati Singh, D/o Late Kuna Singh Sardar
Respondent nos. 2 & 3 are minors being represented through
their mother and natural guardian- respondent no. 1
All are R/o Village-Matkamdih, PO-Bansa, PS-Chandil, District-
Saraikella-Kharsawan
4. Kartar Singh, S/o Sadhu Singh, R/o H.No. 212, Gali No.4,
Durgapuri Chowk, Shandora, Delhi (Owner of the offending
truck bearing No. HR-38J-6871)
5. Raj Singh, S/o Raghubir Singh, R/o Bara Flat, Sidhgora, PO &
PS-Sidhgora, Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum (authorized
representative of the owner-cum-bailor of the offending truck
bearing No. HR-38J-6871) ... ... Respondents
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH SHANKAR
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For the Petitioner : Mr. G.C. Jha, Advocate
Mrs. Nirupama, Advocate
For the Respondent Nos.1 to 3 : Mr. J.N. Upadhyay, Advocate
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17/17.02.2025 The present writ petition has been filed for
quashing/setting aside the order dated 09.01.2008 (Annexure-1 to
the writ petition) passed by the Permanent Lok Adalat, Jamshedpur
(hereinafter referred to as "the PLA") in P.L.A. Case No. 90/2007 in
exercise of its power conferred under Section 22(C) of the Legal
Services Authorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the Act,
1987), whereby the petitioner was directed to pay the awarded
amount of compensation of Rs.2,63,000/- to the claimant i.e., the
respondent no. 1 within one month from the said order, failing
which she was made entitled to recover and realize the
compensation amount through the process of law with interest at
the rate of 12% per annum on account of death of her husband
namely, Kuna Singh Sardar in motor vehicle accident.
2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the
respondent no. 1 had filed an application under Section 166 of the
Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 for herself and on behalf of her two minor
children i.e., the respondent nos. 2 and 3 before the P.L.A,
Jamshedpur constituted under Section 22(B) of the Act 1987
claiming compensation of Rs.3,20,000/- along with interest on
account of death of her husband namely, Kuna Singh Sardar in
motor vehicle accident which was said to have been taken place on
05.08.2006 caused by a truck bearing registration No. HR-38J-6871
near Village Khunti, Chandil, District Seraikella-Kharsawan.
Thereafter, a case was registered as P.L.A Case No. 90 of 2007. The
petitioner filed the written statement challenging the maintainability
of the said case stating that the P.L.A. had no jurisdiction to
entertain the cases related to Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 as the Motor
Accident Claims Tribunals were separately constituted for the said
purpose.
3. It is further submitted that after receipt of the notice
from the P.L.A, the petitioner deputed Mr. Arun Kumar Tiwary,
Advocate as Investigator who reported the petitioner vide his report
dated 19.07.2007 that altogether four cases were filed by the
claimant(s) at different courts for grant of compensation on account
of death of Late Kuna Singh Sardar who had died in the motor
vehicle accident occurred on 05.08.2006 and thus it was clear that
the claimant(s) had not come to the court with clean hands.
4. It is also submitted that the claimants had suppressed
the material fact that they had already filed compensation cases
before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunals (M.A.C.T), Seraikella
and Jamshedpur vide Compensation Case Nos. 1/2007 and
155/2006 respectively which were dismissed on 01.06.2007 and
07.07.2007 respectively. Hence, on this score alone, the claim
application being P.L.A No. 90 of 2007 filed by the claimant(s) was
fit to be dismissed.
5. It is further submitted that the P.L.A in its order dated
09.01.2008 completely ignored and did not even discuss the points
raised by the petitioner in the written statement. It is also
submitted that the P.L.A constituted under the Act, 1987 had no
jurisdiction to decide the issue which was required to be
adjudicated on the basis of reasoning and evidence led by the
parties.
6. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondent
nos. 1, 2 and 3 submits that P.L.A Case Nos. 90 of 2007 and 92 of
2007 were filed by the claimants under Section 166 and Section
140 of the Act, 1988 respectively. P.L.A Case No. 92 of the 2007
was allowed by the P.L.A awarding compensation of Rs.50,000/- to
the claimant(s) which was also paid by the petitioner. Moreover,
Compensation Case No. 1 of 2007 filed by the claimants before the
District Judge-cum-M.A.C.T at Seraikella under Section 166 of the
Act, 1988 was dismissed as withdrawn and the said fact has been
mentioned in the award dated 09.01.2008 passed in P.L.A Case No.
90 of 2007. The Compensation Case No. 155 of 2006 was filed
under Section 140 of the Act, 1988 before the court of District
Judge-cum-M.A.C.T at Jamshedpur which was also dismissed as
withdrawn on 07.07.2007 and presently, no case is pending before
any court except the present one. It is also submitted that there is
no deliberate suppression of fact by the respondent no. 1.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
materials available on record.
8. The thrust of argument of learned counsel for the
petitioner is that the Permanent Lok Adalat has no jurisdiction to
entertain claim cases under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 since a
separate tribunal has been constituted for the said purpose. It is
further contended that four cases regarding payment of
compensation on account of death of Late Kuna Singh Sardar were
filed by the claimant(s) in different courts and as such, the P.L.A,
Jamshedpur committed serious error in awarding the compensation
to the claimant(s).
9. To appreciate the said contention of learned counsel
for the petitioner, I have perused judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court rendered in the case of "Inter Globe Aviation Ltd. Vs. N.
Satchidanand" reported in (2011) 7 SCC 463, the relevant
paragraph of which reads as under:
27. The nature of proceedings before the Permanent Lok
Adalat is initially a conciliation which is non-adjudicatory
in nature. Only if the parties fail to reach an agreement
by conciliation, the Permanent Lok Adalat mutates into
an adjudicatory body, by deciding the dispute. In short,
the procedure adopted by the Permanent Lok Adalats is
what is popularly known as "CON-ARB" (that is,
"conciliation-cum-arbitration") in the United States,
where the parties can approach a neutral third party or
authority for conciliation and if the conciliation fails,
authorise such neutral third party or authority to decide
the dispute itself, such decision being final and binding.
The concept of "CON-ARB" before a Permanent Lok
Adalat is completely different from the concept of judicial
adjudication by the courts governed by the Code of Civil
Procedure. The Permanent Lok Adalat not being a
"court", the provision in the contract relating to
exclusivity of jurisdiction of courts at Delhi will not apply.
10. In the case of "Bar Council of India Vs. Union of
India" reported in (2012) 8 SCC 243, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
has held as under:
24. Parliament can definitely set up effective alternative
institutional mechanisms or make arrangements which
may be more efficacious than the ordinary mechanism of
adjudication of disputes through the judicial courts. Such
institutional mechanisms or arrangements by no stretch
of imagination can be said to be contrary to
constitutional scheme or against the rule of law. The
establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats and conferring
them jurisdiction up to a specific pecuniary limit in
respect of one or more public utility services as defined in
Section 22-A(b) before the dispute is brought before any
court by any party to the dispute is not anathema to the
rule of law. Instead of ordinary civil courts, if other
institutional mechanisms are set up or arrangements are
made by Parliament with an adjudicatory power, in our
view, such institutional mechanisms or arrangements
cannot be faulted on the ground of arbitrariness or
irrationality.
25. The Permanent Lok Adalats under the 1987 Act (as
amended by the 2002 Amendment Act) are in addition to
and not in derogation of the fora provided under various
statutes. This position is accepted by the Central
Government in their counter-affidavit.
26. It is necessary to bear in mind that the disputes
relating to public utility services have been entrusted to
Permanent Lok Adalats only if the process of conciliation
and settlement fails. The emphasis is on settlement in
respect of disputes concerning public utility services
through the medium of Permanent Lok Adalat. It is for
this reason that sub-section (1) of Section 22-C states in
no unambiguous terms that any party to a dispute may
before the dispute is brought before any court make an
application to the Permanent Lok Adalat for settlement of
dispute. Thus, settlement of dispute between the parties
in matters of public utility services is the main theme.
However, where despite the endeavours and efforts of
the Permanent Lok Adalat the settlement between the
parties is not through and the parties are required to
have their dispute determined and adjudicated, to avoid
delay in adjudication of disputes relating to public utility
services, Parliament has intervened and conferred power
of adjudication upon the Permanent Lok Adalat.
27. Can the power conferred on Permanent Lok Adalats
to adjudicate the disputes between the parties
concerning public utility service up to a specific
pecuniary limit, if they do not relate to any offence, as
provided under Section 22-C(8), be said to be
unconstitutional and irrational? We think not. It is
settled law that an authority empowered to adjudicate
the disputes between the parties and act as a tribunal
may not necessarily have all the trappings of the court.
What is essential is that it must be a creature of statute
and should adjudicate the dispute between the parties
before it after giving reasonable opportunity to them
consistent with the principles of fair play and natural
justice. It is not a constitutional right of any person to
have the dispute adjudicated by means of a court only.
Chapter VI-A has been enacted to provide for an
institutional mechanism, through the establishment of
Permanent Lok Adalats for settlement of disputes
concerning public utility service before the matter is
brought to the court and in the event of failure to reach
any settlement, empowering the Permanent Lok Adalat
to adjudicate such dispute if it does not relate to any
offence.
11. Learned Division Bench of this Court in the case of
"M/s Oriental Insurance Company Limited Vs. Bodya Oraon
& Anr." [W.P.(C) No. 1975 of 2007] has answered the
reference by observing that the Permanent Lok Adalat has power to
adjudicate upon any dispute after following the procedure of
making all efforts of settlement as provided under Section 22(C) of
the Act, 1987. It has also been observed that upon failing the
parties to arrive at settlement, the Permanent Lok Adalat should
adjudicate the dispute between the parties under Section 22(C)(8)
of the Act, 1987.
12. The issue as to whether the P.L.A has jurisdiction to
decide motor accidental claim, is no more res-integra. Moreover, the
establishment of Permanent Lok Adalats and conferring them
jurisdiction to settle the dispute up to a specific pecuniary limit in
respect of one or more public utility services as defined in Section
22-A(b) before the dispute is brought before any court by any party
to the dispute, is not anathema to the rule of law. If any
institutional mechanism other than ordinary civil courts is set up or
arrangement is made by the parliament with an adjudicatory power,
then such institutional mechanism or arrangement cannot be
faulted on the ground of arbitrariness or irrationality. However, the
nature of proceeding before the Permanent Lok Adalat is initially of
conciliation which is non-adjudicatory in nature and only if the
parties fail to reach an agreement by conciliation, the Permanent
Lok Adalat mutates into an adjudicatory body, by deciding the
dispute. The P.L.A is thus competent to entertain the cases under
Sections 140 and 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, but the same have
to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure laid down under
Section 22(C) of the Act, 1987.
13. Thus, the main issue for consideration before this Court
is as to whether the P.L.A, Jamshedpur has followed the procedure
laid down under Section 22(C) of the Act, 1987 while deciding the
claim of the claimants.
14. Now, coming back to the case in hand. In the
impugned order itself it has been observed that during the
conciliation proceeding, the insurance company denied to conciliate
the case on the ground that the driving licence of the offending
vehicle was not provided for verification and as such, the case was
taken up for determination on merit under Section 22(C)(8) and
22(D) of the Act, 1987. The said fact has not been controverted by
the petitioner and as such, I do not find any substance in the
contention of the petitioner that the P.L.A had no jurisdiction to
award compensation to the claimants. Apart from that, the
petitioner has already complied the order of the Permanent Lok
Adalat passed in P.L.A Case No. 92 of 2007 filed under Section 140
of the Act, 1988, by paying interim compensation amounting to
Rs.50,000/- to the claimants and as such, the petitioner cannot be
permitted to raise the question regarding passing of the award of
compensation under Section 166 of the Act, 1988 by the Permanent
Lok Adalat in P.L.A Case No. 90 of 2007.
15. So far as the claim of the petitioner to the extent that
the claimants had filed four cases regarding compensation on
account of death of Kuna Singh Sardar, it transpires from the
counter affidavit filed on behalf of the claimants that two cases i.e.,
Compensation Case No. 155 of 2006 and Compensation Case No.
01 of 2007 filed before the Court of District Judge-cum-M.A.C.T,
Jamshedpur and District Judge-cum-M.A.C.T, Seraikella respectively
were dismissed as withdrawn. Moreover, P.L.A Case No. 92 of 2007
and P.L.A Compensation Case No. 90 of 2007 were filed before the
P.L.A Jamshedpur under Sections 140 and 166 of the Act, 1988
respectively and compensation of Rs.50,000/- was awarded to the
claimants in P.L.A Case No. 92 of 2007 under no fault liability
whereas the claimants have been awarded compensation of
Rs.2,63,000/- in P.L.A Case No. 90 of 2007 i.e., the present one.
Thus, I am of the view that since two compensation cases filed
before the Tribunal at Jamshedpur and Seraikella were already
withdrawn, the P.L.A, Jamshedpur has not committed any illegality
in awarding compensation to the claimants vide impugned order
dated 09.01.2008.
16. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I do not find any
infirmity in the order passed by the P.L.A, Jamshedpur in P.L.A Case
No. 90 of 2007 awarding compensation of Rs.2,63,000/- to the
claimants. So far as the distribution of compensation amount
amongst the claimants as well as mother of the deceased as
ordered by the P.L.A in the impugned order dated 09.01.2008 is
concerned, I am of the view that the same is required to be
modified in the interest of justice in view of the fact that almost 17
years have elapsed since passing of the award and two claimants
(the petitioner nos. 2 and 3 herein) who were minors at the time of
passing of the award have now become major. Moreover, learned
counsel for the parties are not in a position to inform this Court as
to whether the mother of the deceased is still alive. As such, the
impugned order dated 09.01.2008 is modified to the following
extent:
(1) The entire compensation amount of
Rs.2,63,000/- shall be paid to the wife of the
deceased i.e., respondent no. 1 namely, Smt.
Ulashi Singh through an account payee cheque.
(2) The respondent no. 1 will also be paid an
interest @ 6% per annum by the petitioner on
the compensation amount from the date of filing
of P.L.A Case No. 90 of 2007 till the
disbursement of the compensation amount to
the said respondent.
(3) The entire compensation amount with
interest shall be paid to the respondent no. 1
within one month from the date of passing of
this order.
17. The writ petition is disposed of with the aforesaid
direction.
(Rajesh Shankar, J.)
Manish/AFR
