Jharkhand High Court
Rajesh Dubey vs The State Of Jharkhand Through The ... on 19 August, 2025
Author: Deepak Roshan
Bench: Deepak Roshan
2025:JHHC:24661
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P. (S) No. 1871 of 2025
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Rajesh Dubey, aged about 41 years, son of Gopal Dubey, Permanent
resident of Village- Bishunpur, P.O.- Nawada, P.S. & District-
Garhwa (Jharkhand) at present residing at Tatisilve Milan Chowk,
P.O.-Tatisilve, P.S.-Tatisilve, Dist.-Ranchi. ......Petitioner
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand through the Secretary, Home Prison
and Disaster Management Department, Government of
Jharkhand, Project Building, Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S. Dhurwa,
District- Ranchi (Jharkhand).
2. The Director General of Police, Police Headquarter, Dhurwa,
P.O. & P.S.- Dhurwa, District- Ranchi (Jharkhand).
3. The Inspector General of Police, Forest Officer's Colony,
Doranda, P.O. & P.S.- Doranda, District- Ranchi (Jharkhand).
4. The Deputy Inspector General of Police, Raja-Rani Kothi,
Doranda, P.O. & P.S.- Doranda, District- Ranchi (Jharkhand).
5. The Commandant, JAP-09, Sahibganj, P.O.- Sahibganj, P.S.-
Sahibganj (Mufassil), District- Sahibgnaj (Jharkhand).
.....Respondents
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE DEEPAK ROSHAN
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, Sr.Advocate
Mr. Om Prakash, Advocate
For the Resp.-State : Mr. Mithilesh Singh, G.A.-IV
Mr. Bhanu Pratap, A.C. to G.A.-IV
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C.A.V. ON:-15/07/2025 PRONOUNCED ON:-19/08/2025
1. Heard learned counsels for the parties.
2. The instant writ application has been preferred by the
petitioner praying therein for the following reliefs:
(a) To quash the order contained in Memo No. 294 dated 25.04.2023
(Annexure-3) passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police,
Jharkhand Armed Police, Ranchi (respondent no.4) whereby the
petitioner's order of dismissal from service passed by the
Commandant, Jharkhand Armed Police-9, Sahibganj (respondent
no.5) by order No. 659 contained in memo no. 250 dated
10.12.2021 has been upheld which is wholly perverse, illegal and
arbitrary in view of the fact that the Commandant (respondent
no.5) after considering the delayed period of 229 days as
reasonable adjusted the said period as being on Extra Ordinary
Leave (E.O.L.), but without pay.
(b) To quash the order no. 226 of 2023 contained in memo no. 540
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dated 03.05.2023 passed by the Commandant, JAP-09, Sahibganj
(respondent no.5) whereby the petitioner's representation praying
for reinstating him in service was rejected.
3. The brief facts of the case as per the pleadings are that
pursuant to the advertisement, the petitioner applied for the post
of Constable in JAP-09, Sahibganj and after undergoing the
selection process successfully, he was appointed as constable and
since then he had been discharging his duty till his dismissal from
service by order No.659 contained in memo No.250 dated
10.12.2021 passed by the Commandant, JAP-09, Sahibganj.
4. The facts reveal that as per Annexure-1, the petitioner
was subjected to a departmental enquiry on the following charges:
(i) As against sanctioned C.L. of 5 days + 01 (closed day) total
06 days from 07.08.2020 to 13.08.2020 the petitioner did
not report on duty on 14.08.2020 and due to delay in
joining his duty, the petitioner's salary was withheld by
order contained in memo no. 918 dated 25.08.2020.
(ii) In spite of several notices sent to the home address of the
petitioner vide notices dated 25.12.2020, 27.01.2021 and
20.03.2021; the petitioner did not inform about his being in
jail custody.
(iii) After a long period of 229 days, the petitioner reported on
duty on 31.03.2021 and submitted an application stating
that he was continuously in jail from 04.09.2020 to
22.02.2021 in connection with a case filed by his second
wife alleging torture relating to dowry and it was also stated
that he had some fracture in the left hand having met with
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an accident in support of which he filed the copies of bail
order granted by the this High Court, Jharkhand and also
filed Medical treatment papers but did not file the purchase
receipts of medicine.
5. A show cause vide memo no. 390 dated 20.04.2021 for
explaining the delay in joining his duty was asked for and the
show cause was found unsatisfactory. However, the petitioner's
withholding the salary was released leaving decision as regards
the delayed period of joining to be taken during departmental
enquiry.
6. Further fact reveals that during the service tenure the
petitioner absconded four times and delayed five times in joining
his duty after leave.
It has been alleged that the petitioner did not inform
about the long period of delay of 229 days in joining his duty.
Even earlier, he absconded from duty time and again and there
was always delay in joining as against the leave period reflect
serious indiscipline, arrogance (uddandta) and swekshacharita
which is against the conduct of a good constable belonging to a
disciplined force.
7. Thereafter, departmental enquiry was conducted and
two witnesses Shri Ramdev Ram, Rakshit Padhidhakari-I and Shri
Arun Kumar Singh, Rakshit Padhadhikari-II were examined.
Thereafter, vide, order No.659 contained in memo No.250 dated
10.12.2021(Annexure-2), the commandant, JAP-09, Shibganj after
considering the fact that the petitioner was in jail from 04.09.2020
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to 22.02.2021 in connection with Garhwa Mahila P.S. Case No.
22/2019 lodged by his second wife under Section 498A I.P.C. and
3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and considering that he met with an
accident and was under medical treatment treated his delayed
joining by 229 days and adjusted the same as being on Extra
Ordinary Leave (EOL) without pay and dismissed the petitioner
from service considering his previous punishments relating to his
delayed joining, absconding and taking alcohol which amounted to
habitual indiscipline and which is a major punishment under Rule
843 of the Police Manual.
8. Thereafter, the petitioner filed appeal against the said
order of the Commandant, JAP-09, Sahibganj dated 10.12.2021
(Annexure-2) before the Deputy Inspector General of Police,
Jharkhand Armed Police, Ranchi which was dismissed by order
contained in memo No.294 dated 25.04.2023 (Annexure-3),
passed by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Jharkhand
Armed Police, Ranchi. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a
representation before the Commandant, JAP-09, Sahibganj
praying for reconsideration and for his reinstatement in service
which was rejected by order No.226 of 2023 contained in memo
No.540 dated 03.05.2023 (Annexure-4).
9. Mr. Rajeeva Sharma, Ld. Sr. Counsel for the petitioner
only argued on the quantum of punishment in the background
that for the charge of habitual absenteeism, punishment has been
imposed earlier and for current/present charge, admittedly, the
petitioner was in jail custody.
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10. Ld. Sr. Counsel tries to impress this Court by
submitting that though on previous several occasions, he has
been awarded punishment, but in the instant departmental
proceeding, the petitioner was in jail custody on the charge of
498A of I.P.C. and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and since he was
in custody, he was unable to defend his case properly.
11. Admittedly, there is no averment or allegation of the
petitioner that principle of natural justice has not been followed in
the instant case. As a matter of fact, in para-11 of the writ
application the petitioner has challenged the dismissal order as
not tenable for following reasons:
(I) The order of dismissal from service is not reasonable, fair
and just as the delayed joining of 229 days by the
petitioner was duly adjusted treating the petitioner as
being on Extra Ordinary Leave without pay for the
delayed joining period of 229 days.
(II) The order of dismissal from service considering the
previous punishment is wholly arbitrary in view of the
fact that the petitioner cannot be punished twice for the
same charges.
12. So far as the first contention as referred to hereinabove
is concerned; the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Maan Singh
Vs. Union of India and Others1 has held as under:
"5. In Harihar Gopal case this Court noticed that the delinquent officer in
failing to report for duty and remaining absent without obtaining leave had
acted in a manner irresponsibly and unjustifiedly; that, on the finding of the
(2003) 3 SCC 464
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enquiry officer, the charge was proved that he remained absent without
obtaining leave in advance; that the order granting leave was made after the
order terminating the employment and it was made only for the purpose of
maintaining a correct record of the duration of service and adjustment of
leave due to the delinquent officer and for regularising his absence from
duty. This Court's attention was not invited to any rule governing the
respondent's service conditions under which an order regularising absence
from duty subsequent to termination of employment had the effect of
invalidating termination. Thus, this Court concluded that it could not be held
that the authority after terminating the employment of the delinquent officer
intended to pass an order invalidating that earlier order by sanctioning
leave so that he was to be deemed not to have remained absent from duty
without leave duly granted.
6. Bakshish Singh case arose out of a suit filed by Bakshish Singh who was
a police constable in Punjab but was dismissed from service on 1-6-1988
after a regular departmental enquiry on the charge of unauthorised absence
from duty. This order was challenged on several grounds and the trial court
decreed the suit on the basis that the order of dismissal could not have been
passed by the defendants inasmuch as they themselves had regularised
and treated the period of the plaintiff's absence from duty as the period of
leave without pay and they could not legally say that he was guilty of
misconduct for unauthorised absence from duty. Having found that it was
not a case of misconduct of the gravest kind, the lower appellate court, while
upholding the findings of the trial court, remanded the case back to the
disciplinary authority for passing a fresh order of punishment. Second
appeal preferred before the High Court was dismissed in limine. In those
circumstances, this Court noticed that: (SCC p. 225, para 4)
"Once it was found as a fact that the charge of unauthorised absence
from duty did not survive, we fail to understand how the lower appellate
court could remand the matter back to the punishing authority for passing
a fresh order of punishment"
(emphasis supplied)
It was further noticed that the finding of the trial court was that proper opportunity
of hearing was not given and the signatures of Bakshish Singh were obtained
under duress during departmental proceedings and when that finding remained
intact, there was no occasion to remand the case to the punishing authority merely
for passing a fresh order of punishment. It is in these circumstances this Court
ultimately passed an order as set out in para 11 of the judgment, which is as
under: (SCC pp. 226-27)
"[I]t will be noticed that the trial court recorded a categorical finding of
fact that a proper opportunity of hearing was not afforded to the respondent in
the departmental proceedings and that his allegation that his signatures on
certain papers during those proceedings were obtained under duress, was not
controverted as the State of Punjab had led no evidence in defence. The trial
court also recorded a finding that unauthorised absence from duty having been
regularised by treating the period of absence as leave without pay, the charge
of misconduct did not survive. It was with this finding that the suit was
decreed. The lower appellate court confirmed the finding that since the period of
unauthorised absence from duty was regularised, the charge did not survive
but it did not say a word about the finding relating to the opportunity of hearing
in the departmental proceedings. Since those findings were not specifically set
aside and the lower appellate court was silent about them, the same shall be
treated to have been affirmed. In the face of these findings, it was not open to
the lower appellate court to remand the case to the punishing authority for
passing a fresh order of punishment. The High Court before which the second
appeal was filed by the State of Punjab, did not advert itself to this
inconsistency as it dismissed the appeal summarily, which indirectly reflects
that it allowed an inconsistent judgment to pass through its scrutiny"
Therefore, the appeal in Bakshish Singh case was allowed. It is only in the
headnote of the Report that the question whether an employee could be held guilty
of misconduct on the basis of unauthorised absence is set out as decided in the
trial court and affirmed by the first appellate court and not from the judgment of
this Court such a conclusion can be drawn since there is no consideration or
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discussion at all, much less any declaration of law is made by this Court on this
aspect of the matter. This Court in that case really considered the scope of powers
of remand, made the order as set out above and did not, in fact, consider the
question whether the view expressed by the first appellate court in affirming the
order of the trial court was justified or not, but proceeded on the basis that on the
conclusion reached by the first appellate court whether remand to disciplinary
authority is permissible in law and recorded its findings. Therefore, the decision of
this Court in Bakshish Singh case is not an authority for the proposition that the
order terminating the employment cannot be sustained inasmuch as in the later
part of the same order the disciplinary authority also regularised unauthorised
absence from duty by granting an employee leave without pay. In our view, thus,
there is no conflict in this regard with the decision in Harihar Gopal case."
13. Thus, we see that the Hon'ble Apex court has
categorically held that additional statement in the later part of the
order that the period of absence be treated as leave without pay to
be not amounting to condonation of absence is not vitiative of the
dismissal order and dismissal order passed for unauthorized
absence and further directing the period of absence to be treated
as leave without pay, has been held to be valid.
14. So far as the second ground referred to hereinabove is
concerned; it is true that the petitioner was in jail custody for the
charge under Sections 498A of I.P.C. and 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition
Act, but there is no chit of paper in order to demonstrate that the
petitioner ever requested the department to hold the departmental
proceeding. Moreover, there is no allegation of non-compliance of
principles of natural justice. From the charge-sheet (Annexure-1),
it appears that there was a specific charge that during short span
of 14 years and 6 months of service, he has been punished several
times.
15. As a matter of fact, in the impugned order itself; a
chart has also been given by the disciplinary authority which
indicates that altogether 21 times the petitioner has been
punished within a period of 14 years and 6 months and he has
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also been punished for taking liquor while on service. From
record, it further appears that in the inquiry No.16 of 2013, he
was In-charge of magazine guard, however, he was found sleeping
after taking liquor. In other words, in none of the incidents when
he was punished, it can be said that there is any error and only
for that very reason there is a specific charge being charge No.5
that four times he has been held as absconder and five times he
has been charged for unauthorized absence.
16. The sympathetic argument of Ld. Sr. Counsel as
indicated hereinabove that this Court should think about the
quantum of punishment; this court after going through the
impugned order, is of the firm opinion, looking to the act and
nature of the petitioner, the order of punishment does not shocks
the conscience of the Court that any lesser punishment should be
given to this petitioner in the background that the petitioner was
in service of a force and the disciplinary authority has rightly held
in the impugned order that this act of the petitioner will also affect
the other police personnel; as such, this Court is not inclined to
interfere with the impugned orders.
17. Interestingly, the petitioner has been dismissed from
service vide order dated 10.12.2021 and his appeal was also
dismissed on 25.04.2023 and further, revision was also dismissed
on 03.05.2023, but for the reasons best known to the petitioner,
he did not challenge the same in the year 2023; rather he waited
for almost two years in challenging the impugned orders.
18. As stated hereinabove, neither there is any allegation
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for non-compliance of principles of natural justice; nor there is
any perversity in the impugned order and the finding given by the
disciplinary authority/appellate authority/revisional authority are
well reasoned and speaking order and at the cost of repetition, the
charges and the previous conduct of the petitioner reflected in the
impugned order clearly goes to show that the finding of the
respondent authority that he is not fit to be part of force, is
correct.
19. Having regard to the observations and discussions
made hereinabove, no relief can be granted to this petitioner.
Accordingly, the instant writ petition is dismissed. Pending I.A., if
any, also stands closed.
(Deepak Roshan, J.)
vikas/-
A.F.R.
