Jharkhand High Court
Simpi Kumari vs Vikash Kumar Singh on 23 April, 2025
Author: Sujit Narayan Prasad
Bench: Sujit Narayan Prasad, Rajesh Kumar
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
First Appeal No.111 of 2024
-----
Simpi Kumari ....... ... Appellant
Versus
Vikash Kumar Singh ... ... Respondent
-------
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH KUMAR
-------
For the Appellant : Mr. Sourabh Kumar Das, Advocate
Mr. Abhishek Kumar, Advocate
For the Respondent : Mr. Awnish Shankar, Advocate
------
rd
Order No.07/Dated: 23 April, 2025
I.A No.10029 of 2024
1. The present interlocutory application has been filed under section
5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 for condonation of delay of 23 days
in preferring First Appeal No.111 of 2024.
2. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent who has
appeared in pursuance to the notice dated 06.01.2025 has sought
for leave of this Court to accept the response of the delay
condonation application.
3. This Court in order to consider the issue of limitation has found it
proper to take the affidavit on record.
4. Let the affidavit be taken on record.
5. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has submitted
that the delay of 23 days has been caused in filing the appeal due
to having no knowledge about passing of judgment and decree for
dissolution of marriage which was granted in favour of the
respondent herein.
6. It is stated in the instant interlocutory application that when the
appellant came to know about divorce case, she filed a transfer
petition before this Court in which stay was granted, but before
that the decree for divorce has been granted in favour of the
respondent-husband.
7. The learned counsel based upon the aforesaid ground has
submitted that the delay of 23 days, therefore, may be condoned
so that the matter may be decided on merit considering the ground
as referred in paragraph nos.5 and 6 of the instant interlocutory
application to be sufficient cause.
8. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-husband has made
opposition to the delay condonation application on the ground that
whatever has been stated in paragraph nos.5 and 6 the same
cannot said to be sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the
delay.
9. It has been submitted that the appellant was having knowledge
about the pending divorce suit and even she has filed the transfer
petition before this Court.
10. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent-husband, based
upon the aforesaid ground, has submitted that since the appellant-
wife was having knowledge of the divorce suit and, as such, it is
incorrect on the part of the appellant-wife to say that she was
having no knowledge about disposal of the said divorce suit.
Therefore, the delay of 23 days in filing the appeal cannot be
condoned.
11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone
through the pleadings made in the instant interlocutory application
as also the pleadings made in the affidavit filed on behalf of the
respondent.
12. We are conscious with the fact that the delay is to be condoned in
exercise of power conferred under section 5 of the Limitation Act
depending upon the sufficient cause if shown by the party seeking
condonation of delay.
13. It also requires to refer herein that what is the meaning of
'sufficient cause'. The consideration of meaning of 'sufficient
cause' has been made in Basawaraj & Anr. Vrs. Spl. Land
Acquisition Officer, [(2013) 14 SCC 81], wherein, it has been
held by the Hon'ble Apex Court at paragraphs 9 to 15 hereunder:-
"9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which the defendant could not
be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is
"adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to
answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient"
embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which
when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in
the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from
the viewpoint of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this
context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have
acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its
part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot
be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained
inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must
afford sufficient ground to enable the court concerned to exercise
discretion for the reason that whenever the court exercises
discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must
satisfy the court that he was prevented by any "sufficient cause"
from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is
furnished, the court should not allow the application for
condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the
mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior
purpose. (See Manindra Land and Building Corpn. Ltd. v.
Bhutnath Banerjee [AIR 1964 SC 1336] , Mata Din v. A.
Narayanan [(1969) 2 SCC 770 : AIR 1970 SC 1953] , Parimal v.
Veena [(2011) 3 SCC 545 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 1 : AIR 2011 SC
1150] and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corpn. of Brihan
Mumbai [(2012) 5 SCC 157 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 24 : AIR 2012
SC 1629] .
10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar [AIR 1964 SC 993] this
Court explained the difference between a "good cause" and a
"sufficient cause" and observed that every "sufficient cause" is a
good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can
only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a
lesser degree of proof than that of "sufficient cause".
11. The expression "sufficient cause" should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so
long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has
been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case
and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide Madanlal v.
Shyamlal [(2002) 1 SCC 535 : AIR 2002 SC 100] and Ram Nath
Sao v. Gobardhan Sao [(2002) 3 SCC 195 : AIR 2002 SC 1201] .
12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may
harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its
rigour when the statute so prescribes. The court has no power to
extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. "A result
flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no
power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a
distress resulting from its operation." The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the court
has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The
legal maxim dura lex sed lex which means "the law is hard but it is
the law", stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently
been held that, "inconvenience is not" a decisive factor to be
considered while interpreting a statute.
13. The statute of limitation is founded on public policy, its aim
being to secure peace in the community, to suppress fraud and
perjury, to quicken diligence and to prevent oppression. It seeks to
bury all acts of the past which have not been agitated
unexplainably and have from lapse of time become stale.
According to Halsbury's Laws of England, Vol. 28, p. 266:
"605. Policy of the Limitation Acts.--The courts have expressed at
least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of
limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of
cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost
the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with
good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable
diligence."
An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and
uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or
deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice
by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own
inaction, negligence or laches. (See Popat and Kotecha Property v.
SBI Staff Assn. [(2005) 7 SCC 510] , Rajender Singh v. Santa
Singh [(1973) 2 SCC 705 : AIR 1973 SC 2537] and Pundlik Jalam
Patil v. Jalgaon Medium Project [(2008) 17 SCC 448 : (2009) 5
SCC (Civ) 907] .)
14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka [(2002) 4 SCC
578 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 830 : AIR 2002 SC 1856] this Court held
that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to
legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the
Constitution Bench in Abdul Rehman Antulay v. R.S. Nayak
[(1992) 1 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 93 : AIR 1992 SC 1701] .
15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the
applicant has to explain the court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a
party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part
in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not
acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in
condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the
parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation
of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant
to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any
justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing
an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts
to showing utter disregard to the legislature."
14. Thus, it is evident that the sufficient cause means that the party
should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of
bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a
case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted
deliberately" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and
circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable
the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that
whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised
judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was
prevented by any "sufficient cause" from prosecuting his case, and
unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not
allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to
examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device
to cover the ulterior purpose as has been held in Manindra Land
and Building Corporation Ltd. Vrs. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors.,
AIR 1964 SC 1336, Lala Matadin Vrs. A. Narayanan, (1969) 2
SCC 770, Parimal Vrs. Veena @ Bharti, (2011) 3 SCC 545 and
Maniben Devraj Shah Vrs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan
Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157.
15. It has further been held in the aforesaid judgments that the
expression 'sufficient cause' should be given a liberal
interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so
long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be
imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause
has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case
and no straitjacket formula is possible, reference in this regard
may be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. Vrs.
Gobardhan Sao & Ors., (2002) 3 SC 195, wherein, at paragraph-
12, it has been held as hereunder:-
"12. Thus it becomes plain that the expression "sufficient cause"
within the meaning of Section 5 of the Act or Order 22 Rule 9 of
the Code or any other similar provision should receive a liberal
construction so as to advance substantial justice when no
negligence or inaction or want of bona fides is imputable to a
party. In a particular case whether explanation furnished would
constitute "sufficient cause" or not will be dependent upon facts of
each case. There cannot be a straitjacket formula for accepting or
rejecting explanation furnished for the delay caused in taking
steps. But one thing is clear that the courts should not proceed
with the tendency of finding fault with the cause shown and reject
the petition by a slipshod order in over-jubilation of disposal drive.
Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the rule and
refusal, an exception, more so when no negligence or inaction or
want of bona fides can be imputed to the defaulting party. On the
other hand, while considering the matter the courts should not lose
sight of the fact that by not taking steps within the time prescribed
a valuable right has accrued to the other party which should not be
lightly defeated by condoning delay in a routine-like manner.
However, by taking a pedantic and hypertechnical view of the
matter the explanation furnished should not be rejected when
stakes are high and/or arguable points of facts and law are
involved in the case, causing enormous loss and irreparable injury
to the party against whom the lis terminates, either by default or
inaction and defeating valuable right of such a party to have the
decision on merit. While considering the matter, courts have to
strike a balance between resultant effect of the order it is going to
pass upon the parties either way."
16. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Ramlal, Motilal and
Chhotelal Vrs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762, has held
that merely because sufficient cause has been made out in the facts
of the given case, there is no right to the appellant to have delay
condoned. At paragraph-12, it has been held as hereunder:
"12. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that even after
sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the
condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of
a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the
discretionary jurisdiction vested in the court by Section 5. If
sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the
application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that
ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the court has to
enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This
aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all
relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its
bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry
while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is
shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the court
may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the
party was sitting idle during all the time available to it. In this
connection we may point out that considerations of bona fides or
due diligence are always material and relevant when the court is
dealing with applications made under Section 14 of the Limitation
Act. In dealing with such applications the court is called upon to
consider the effect of the combined provisions of Sections 5 and 14.
Therefore, in our opinion, considerations which have been
expressly made material and relevant by the provisions of Section
14 cannot to the same extent and in the same manner be invoked in
dealing with applications which fall to be decided only under
Section 5 without reference to Section 14. In the present case there
is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should be exercised in
favour of the appellant because apart from the general criticism
made against the appellant's lack of diligence during the period of
limitation no other fact had been adduced against it. Indeed, as we
have already pointed out, the learned Judicial Commissioner
rejected the appellant's application for condonation of delay only
on the ground that it was appellant's duty to file the appeal as soon
as possible within the period prescribed, and that, in our opinion,
is not a valid ground."
17. Thus, it is evident that while considering the delay condonation
application, the Court of Law is required to consider the sufficient
cause for condonation of delay as also the approach of the litigant
as to whether it is bona fide or not as because after expiry of the
period of limitation, a right is accrued in favour of the other side
and as such, it is necessary to look into the bona fide motive of the
litigant and at the same time, due to inaction and laches on its part.
18. This Court adverting to the ground taken in the instant
interlocutory application as also come to the consideration as to
whether the ground shown for condoning the delay of 23 days can
be said to be sufficient cause or not.
19. Expression 'sufficient cause' has been dealt with which means
that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there
was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and
circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has
"not acted deliberately" or "remained inactive".
20. It has been stated in paragraph nos.5 and 6 of the instant
interlocutory application that the appellant was having no
knowledge about the divorce suit. Further, the appellant having
knowledge of divorce suit, approached this Court by filing a
transfer suit for transfer of the divorce suit from Hazaribagh to
Ranchi. The stay was also granted by this Court but before that a
decree for divorce was granted by the learned Family Judge,
Hazaribagh.
21. We are considering the issue of matrimonial dispute and as per
the law laid down for condoning the delay that the issue of
limitation is to be taken liberally and not to be taken in hyper
technically manner. The reason what has been stated in paragraph
nos.5 and 6, therefore, cannot be said to be not having sufficient
reason being filing the appeal after delay of 23 days.
22. The objection, however, has been made by the learned counsel for
the respondent showing the issue of having knowledge of the
pending divorce suit and, as such, it cannot be expected that the
appellant has no knowledge about the decree of divorce said to be
passed by the learned Family Judge, Hazaribagh.
23. Since we have referred herein the fact that we are dealing with the
matrimonial dispute and the decree of divorce has been passed in
favour of the respondent-husband by the impugned judgment
which is under challenge in the instant appeal.
24. This Court, considering the reason assigned in paragraph nos. 5
and 6 of the instant interlocutory application, is of the view that
the same is sufficient cause for the purpose of condoning the delay
of 23 days in filing the appeal.
25. Accordingly, I.A. No. 10029 of 2024 is allowed.
26. Consequently, the delay of 23 days in filing the present appeal is
hereby condoned.
27. Heard the learned counsel for the parties.
28. Admit.
29. Call for the Trial Court Records.
30. List this case after receipt of the Trial Court Records.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Rajesh Kumar, J.)
Sudhir
