Hit Narayan Singh vs The Branch Manager
2025 Latest Caselaw 4484 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Hit Narayan Singh vs The Branch Manager on 2 April, 2025

Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

                                                               (2025:JHHC:10183 )




                 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND, RANCHI
                            M.A. No. 370 of 2023
                                      ----

Hit Narayan Singh, aged about 62 years, son of Niwas Singh, Resident of Ram Nagar Colony, Bermo Karo, PO and PS - Bermo, District - Bokaro (Owner of Hyva Dumper vide Reg. No. JH 02X 3617 vide Engine No.B591803221E-63263275, Chassis No. MAT448085C3E14692) .... Appellant

-- Versus --

1. The Branch Manager, National Insurance Company Limited, having its office at Branch Office, New Road Phusro, PO - Phusro, PS - Bermo, District - Bokaro, Jharkhand

2. Seema Devi, aged about 46 years, wife of Ram Naresh Singh

3. Sunny Kumar Singh, aged about 27 years, son of Late Ram Naresh Singh

4. Payal Singh, aged about 20 years, daughter of Late Ram Naresh Singh All resident of 463, Phosro Bazar, Near Awadh Cinema Hall, Bermo, PO and PS - Bermo, District - Bokaro, Jharkhand

5. Dhanushdhari Choudhari, s/o Arjun Choudhari @ Rasiya Choudhari, R/o Kargali Bazar, PO and PS - Bermo, District - Bokaro (Driver of Hyva Dumper vide Reg. No. JH 02X 3617 .... Respondents

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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

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         For the Appellant         :-    Mr. Abhay Kr. Mishra, Advocate
                                   :-    Ms. Adya Mishra, Advocate
         For Respondent No.1       :-    Mr. Sumit Prakash, Advocate
                                   ----
07/02.04.2025      Heard learned counsel appearing for the appellant and

learned counsel appearing for the respondent No.1.

2. I.A. No.11561 of 2023 has been filed for condoning of delay

of 524 days in filing of the present appeal and formal ground has

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been taken in the said I.A. of preparation of appeal and in filing of

the appeal the said delay has occurred.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company

submits that proper explanation is not made.

4. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment dated

11.02.2022 passed in M.A.C. Case No.04 of 2017 by learned District

Judge-III-cum-Presiding Officer, Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,

Bokaro whereby the award was passed in favour of the claimants

and insurance company was directed to pay the awarded amount

and recover the same from the appellant, who is the owner of the

vehicle in question.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that

the driving license and permit was not produced before the learned

Court and in view of that the finding has been against the owner of

the insurance company and in view of that the direction has been

made to pay and recover from the appellant. He submits that the

permit and driving license was available, however, the same was not

filed before the learned Court and in view of that I.A. No.3175 of

2025 has been filed under Order 41 Rule 27 annexing the said

documents to allow the same at the appellate stage. On this

ground, he submits that this appeal may kindly be allowed after

condoning the delay and the additional evidence may kindly be

considered in deciding the said appeal.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the insurance company

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submits that the driving license and the permit was not produced

before the learned Court and in view of that the finding is against

the appellant herein and in view of that the direction of recovery

has been made. He submits that the insurance company has

already satisfied the award and claims have been paid and they

have filed the application for recovery of the said amount from the

appellant and thereafter the present appeal has been presented. He

submits that even due diligence is not disclosed in filing of the I.A.

under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC, as such the same cannot be

accepted by this Court at this stage.

7. It is an admitted position that appellant herein contested

the case before the learned Court and he has not produced the

driving license and permit before the learned Court and the learned

Court has given that finding against the appellant, who is the owner

of the vehicle in question. This aspect of the matter has been taken

by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Amrit Paul Singh and

Another versus TATA AIG General Insurance Company

Limited and Others reported in (2018) 7 SCC 558, wherein at

paragraph Nos.7 to 9 and 23, it has been held as under :-

7. The conclusions recorded by the Tribunal and further confirmed by the High Court clearly show that the accident occurred on 19-2-2013 and the competent authority issued the permit on 27-2-2013. In this regard, Sections 2(28) and 2(31) of the Act that define "motor vehicle" or "vehicle" and "permit" are reproduced below:

"2. (28) "motor vehicle" or "vehicle" means any mechanically propelled vehicle adapted for use upon roads

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whether the power of propulsion is transmitted thereto from an external or internal source and includes a chassis to which a body has not been attached and a trailer; but does not include a vehicle running upon fixed rails or a vehicle of a special type adapted for use only in a factory or in any other enclosed premises or a vehicle having less than four wheels fitted with engine capacity of not exceeding twenty- five cubic centimetres;

(31) "permit" means a permit issued by a State or Regional Transport Authority or an authority prescribed in this behalf under this Act authorising the use of a motor vehicle as a transport vehicle;"

On a perusal of both the definitions, it is quite clear that a permit has to be issued by the competent authority under the Act for use of a motor vehicle as a transport vehicle. The emphasis is on the words "use" as well as "transport vehicle".

8. Section 2(47) states that "transport vehicle" means a public service vehicle, a goods carriage, an educational institution bus or a private service vehicle. Section 66 stipulates necessity for permits. Sub-section (1) thereof provides that no owner of a motor vehicle shall use or permit the use of the vehicle as a transport vehicle in any public place, whether or not such vehicle is actually carrying any passengers or goods save in accordance with the conditions of a permit granted or countersigned by a Regional or State Transport Authority or any prescribed authority. Various provisos have been appended to the main provision stipulating conditions for use of the vehicle and purpose of carriage of goods vehicle. Sub-section (2) of Section 66 states that the holder of a goods carriage permit may use the vehicle for the drawing of any trailer or semi- trailer not owned by him, subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. It is necessary to mention here that a proviso has been added by Act 54 of 1994 with effect from 14-11- 1994 allowing the holder of a permit of any articulated vehicle to use the prime-mover of that articulated vehicle for any other semi-trailer. Section 2(2) defines "articulated

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vehicle" to mean a motor vehicle to which a semi-trailer is attached.

9. It is apt to note here that sub-section (3) of Section 66 carves out certain exceptions to sub-section (1). The relevant part of sub-section (3) is extracted below:

"66. (3) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply--

(a) to any transport vehicle owned by the Central Government or a State Government and used for Government purposes unconnected with any commercial enterprise;

(b) to any transport vehicle owned by a local authority or by a person acting under contract with a local authority and used solely for road cleansing, road watering or conservancy purposes;

(c) to any transport vehicle used solely for police, fire brigade or ambulance purposes;

(d) to any transport vehicle used solely for the conveyance of corpses and the mourners accompanying the corpses;

(e) to any transport vehicle used for towing a disabled vehicle or for removing goods from a disabled vehicle to a place of safety;

(f) to any transport vehicle used for any other public purpose as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf;

(g) to any transport vehicle used by a person who manufactures or deals in motor vehicles or builds bodies for attachment to chassis, solely for such purposes and in accordance with such conditions as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify in this behalf;

(h)* * *

(i) to any goods vehicle, the gross vehicle weight of which does not exceed 3000 kilograms;

(j) subject to such conditions as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify, to any transport vehicle purchased in

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one State and proceeding to a place, situated in that State or in any other State, without carrying any passenger or goods;

(k) to any transport vehicle which has been temporarily registered under Section 43 while proceeding empty to any place for the purpose of registration of the vehicle;

(l)* * *

(m) to any transport vehicle which, owing to flood, earthquake or any other natural calamity, obstruction on road, or unforeseen circumstances is required to be diverted through any other route, whether within or outside the State, with a view to enabling it to reach its destination;

(n) to any transport vehicle used for such purposes as the Central or State Government may, by order, specify;

(o) to any transport vehicle which is subject to a hire-

purchase, lease or hypothecation agreement and which owing to the default of the owner has been taken possession of by or on behalf of, the person with whom the owner has entered into such agreement, to enable such motor vehicle to reach its destination; or

(p) to any transport vehicle while proceeding empty to any place for purpose of repair."

23. The Court held that when the intention of the legislature is quite clear to the effect that a registered owner of the vehicle should not be held liable if the vehicle is not in his possession and control and there was evidence on record that Respondent 2 plied the vehicle without the insurance in violation of the statutory provision contained in Section 146 of the Act, the High Court could not have mulcted the liability on the financier and finally, the financier was absolved of the liability.

8. It is an admitted position that the said documents, the

driving license and the permit was not brought on record before the

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learned court. The Court has looked into the I.A. filed under Order

41 Rule 27 and finds that even the permit has not been annexed

with the said I.A. wherein the argument has been advanced on

behalf of learned counsel appearing for the appellant that permit

was there.

9. In light of Order 41 Rule 27 it is well settled that the said

can be considered by the appellate court also of taking additional

evidence but there are parameters of allowing the said application.

It may also be true that the appellate court may permit additional

evidence if the conditions laid down in this Rule are found to exist

and the parties are not entitled, as of right, to the admission of such

evidence. However, at the same time, where the additional evidence

sought to be adduced removes the cloud of doubt over the case and

the evidence has a direct and important bearing on the main issue

in the suit and interest of justice clearly renders it imperative that it

may be allowed to be permitted on record, such application may be

allowed. Even, one of the circumstances in which the production of

additional evidence under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC by the appellate

court is to be considered is, whether or not the appellate court

requires the additional evidence so as to enable it to pronounce

judgment or for any other substantial cause of like nature. The

admissibility of additional evidence does not depend upon the

relevancy to the issue on hand, or on the fact, whether the

applicant had an opportunity for adducing such evidence at an

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earlier stage or not, but it depends upon whether or not the

appellate court requires the evidence sought to be adduced to

enable it to pronounce judgment or for any other substantial cause.

It is further observed that the true test, therefore is, whether the

appellate court is able to pronounce judgment on the materials

before it without taking into consideration the additional evidence

sought to be adduced. In view of that for consideration of such

application for additional evidence all the relevant factors are

required to be taken into consideration. Further the due diligence in

allowing such application at such a belated stage is another

parameter which is not shown in the said I.A. and in view of that

the Court finds that in absence of the permit on the record, the said

application is also not in accordance with law.

10. In view of the above on merit, the appellant has not been

able to satisfy the Court and due diligence has not been shown to

allow the petition under Order 41 Rule 27 of the CPC.

11. So far limitation is concerned that is also not explained

properly in the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive

Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, reported in (2008) 14

SCC 448 it was observed that the laws of limitation are founded on

public policy. Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as

"statutes of peace". An unlimited and perpetual threat of limitation

creates insecurity and uncertainty some kind of limitation is

essential for public order. The principle is based on the maxim

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"interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium", that is, the interest of the

state requires that there should be end to litigation but at the same

time laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice

suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and preventing

oppression. The object for fixing time limit for litigation is based on

public policy fixing a lifespan for legal remedy for the purpose of

general welfare. They are meant to see that the parties do not

resort to dilatory tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly.

Salmond in his jurisprudence states that the laws come to the

assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy. The Court finds that

there is no substantial explanation of condoning the delay of 524

days, as such on the delay also the case of the appellant fails.

12. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis this appeal

along with the I.A. No.11561 of 2023 are hereby dismissed.

13. Pending petition, if any, is also disposed of.

14. It has been pointed out by learned counsel appearing for

the insurance company that the award is already satisfied and in

view of that the statutory amount, if any, deposited by the appellant

shall be returned back to the appellant.

(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Sangam/ A.F.R.