Jharkhand High Court
Pawan Kumhar vs M/S Bharat Coking Coal Ltd Through Its ... on 12 February, 2024
Author: S.N. Pathak
Bench: S.N. Pathak
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No. 207 of 2021
with
I.A. No. 7606 of 2023
Pawan Kumhar .... .... Petitioner
Versus
1. M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd through its Chairman-cum-Managing
Director, Dhanbad.
2. The Director Personnel of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd, Dhanbad.
3. The General Manager (Personnel), M/s Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.,
Dhanbad.
4. The General Manager, Barora Area No.1, Bharat Coking Coal Ltd.,
Dhanbad.
5. The General Manager, BCCL, Mines Rescue Station, Dhanbad.
.... ... Respondents
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CORAM : HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE S.N. PATHAK
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For the Petitioner : Mr. Suraj Singh, Advocate
For the Respondents : Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, Advocate
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10/ 12.02.2024 Heard the parties.
2. The petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for a
direction upon the respondents to correct the date of birth in the entire service
records based on matriculation certificate as 9.10.1972 instead of 25.8.1967
which was wrongly entered by the respondents.
3. The petitioner was appointed as Minor Loader on compassionate
ground on 30.10.1990 at Madhuban Colliery, Barora Area No.1 under the
respondent-BCCL. It is stated in the writ petition that before joining in the
present service, the petitioner appeared in the Matriculation Examination and
the petitioner has duly submitted his admit card to the Management and
therefore, the Area Personnel Manager vide Ref. No. 1228 dated 15.2.2000
has issued a letter to the Bihar School Examination Board for verification of
the certificate. It is further case of the petitioner that during course of his
service, he was promoted to the post of Mining Sardar, wherein the date of
birth as mentioned in the matriculation certification has been mentioned in
the relevant document as 09.10.1972. The petitioner represented before the
respondents on 7.2.2006 when he came to know about the date of birth
mentioned in the service excerpts as 25.8.1967, but the same was not
considered and the petitioner's date of birth has been entered in the service
excerpts as 23 years as on 25.8.1967, which is incorrect. Therefore, he has
been constrained to knock the door of this Court.
4. Mr. Suraj Singh, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner
submits that the respondents are not justified in entering the date of birth as
23 years as on 25.8.1967 when the matriculation certificate was already
available. Learned counsel further submits that even the respondents have
considered the date of birth as 09.10.1972 while granting promotion to the
post of Mining Sardar. Therefore, it was open for the respondents to enter the
same date of birth as per matriculation certificate in the entire service
excerpts including Form-B. Learned counsel further submits that the
petitioner passed the matriculation examination before entering into the
service and therefore, it cannot be said that it is a belated claim. It is the
respondents who have made a wrong entry in the service excerpts. The
petitioner is still in service and therefore, his date of birth should be corrected
as per matriculation certificate. Hence, a direction be given to the
respondents to act accordingly.
5. On the other hand, Mr. Anoop Kumar Mehta, learned counsel
appearing for the respondents submits that the petitioner has raised the
dispute for the first time in the year 2005 while he was appointed in service
in the year 1990 itself. Learned counsel submits that since the petitioner did
not submit the matriculation certificate at the time of joining and therefore,
he was sent for medical examination. Thereafter, based on the medical
assessment, the date of birth of the petitioner was entered in Form-B register
as 23 years as on 25.8.1990 and the petitioner duly acknowledged the same
by putting his signature. He further submits that all along the service period,
the petitioner had accepted the date of birth mentioned in the Form-B
register, which is a statutory form and binding upon the parties. Learned
counsel further submits that it is one thing to say that the petitioner has raised
the dispute for correction in the date of birth while in service, but the law is
well settled that maximum period for correction in the date of birth in the
service experts is ten years. Learned counsel submits that the petitioner had
never submitted his matriculation certificate at the time of initial appointment
and if at all he had submitted the matriculation certificate, there was no
occasion for the respondents not to consider the date of birth in view of the
matriculation certificate and send the petitioner for medical examination.
Hence, no interference is warranted in the writ petition and the same is fit to
be dismissed in limine.
6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having
gone through the materials on record, this Court is of the considered view
that no interference is warranted in the writ petition for the following facts
and reasons:-
(i) The petitioner was appointed in the year 1990. The petitioner has not
submitted the matriculation certificate at the time of initial
appointment. Therefore, he was sent for medical assessment and based
on the report of the medical expert, the date of birth of the petitioner
has been entered in Form-B, which the petitioner duly acknowledged
by putting his signature.
(ii) The petitioner has accepted the date of birth mentioned in the service
excerpts particularly Form-B which is statutory Form for long 16
years, which was never disputed.
(iii) It is well settled that dispute in relation to date of birth can be raised
within a maximum period of ten years. In the instant case, the
petitioner has raised the dispute after 16 years.
(iv) The similar issue fell for consideration before this Court way back in
the year 2004 in the Civil Paswan Vs. State of Jharkhand & Ors.,
reported in (2005) 4 JLJR 344 (HC), wherein the Court has declined
to interfere in correction of date of birth after long 33 years. The
relevant para-8 reads thus:-
"Keeping in view the above facts and circumstances, this
Court is not inclined to direct the respondents to correct the
date of birth of petitioner after 33 (thirty three) years of his
appointment he having knowledge of his date of birth ten
years back; as such the decisions relied upon by the
petitioner is of no help to him."
(v) Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of delay and laches
held that writ petition in service matters is not maintainable after a
long delay. Admittedly, after a gross delay of about 16 years, the
petitioner woke-up from deep slumber and filed the present writ
petition, which is hopelessly barred by limitation in view of the
celebrated judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Naib
Subedar Lachhman Dass Vs. Union of India, reported in AIR 1977
SC 1979, wherein, Their Lordship while dismissing the writ petition
observed that "for the first time in September, 1970 the appellant
invoked the extra-ordinary powers of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution for challenging the legality of an order dated
21.12.1966. The writ petition was filed after a gross delay for which
there is no satisfactory explanation and, therefore, the High Court was
justified in dismissing it summarily"
(vi) Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Chennai Metropolitan
Water Supply and Sewerage Board & others Vs. T.T. Murali Babu,
reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108, has held as under:
"Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly
brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the
explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The
court should bear in mind that it is exercising an
extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional
court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but
simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary
principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate
reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure,
the Court would be under legal obligation to scrutinize
whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or
not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain
circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most
circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster
for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the Court. Delay
reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a
litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely,
"procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second,
law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix.
Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. In
the case at hand, though there has been four years' delay in
approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to
address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinize
whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any
justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated
approach gains more significance as the respondent-
employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing
a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained
unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill
health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining
innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause
of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is
likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on
others' ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others
into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may
have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not
expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons - who
compete with 'Kumbhakarna' or for that matter 'Rip Van
Winkle'. In our considered opinion, such delay does not
deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the
writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the
very threshold."
7. As a sequitur to the aforesaid rules, regulations, guidelines and
judicial pronouncements, I do not find any merit in the writ petition which
warrants any interference.
8. The writ petition and the aforesaid interlocutory application
stands dismissed.
(Dr. S.N. Pathak, J.)
R.Kr.
