Jharkhand High Court
Jahnvi Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand on 2 August, 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
W.P.(S) No.4298 of 2024
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1. Jahnvi Singh, aged about 27 years, daughter of Jeevendra Singh,
resident of Amaha House, Boda Bagh Road, Civil Lines, P.O.-
Head Post Office Sirmaur Chauraha, P.S.-Amahiya, Rewa,
District-Rewa, Madhya Pradesh, PIN-486001.
2. Tamana, aged about 29 years, daughter of Jai Pal Sehrawat,
resident of House No.65, Village-Bakkarwala, P.O.-Nangloi, P.S.-
Mundka, West Delhi, District-Delhi (NCT), PIN-110041.
.... .... Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand
2. The Law Secretary, Jharkhand, having its office at Project Building
at Dhurwa, P.O. & P.S.-Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
3. The Secretary, Department of Personnel, Administrative Reforms
and Rajbhasha, having its office at Project Building at Dhurwa,
P.O. and P.S. Dhurwa, District-Ranchi.
4. The Chairman, Jharkhand Public Service Commission, Ranchi,
having its office at Jail More, Kutchery, P.O. Kutchery, P.S.
Kotwali, District-Ranchi.
5. The Secretary, Jharkhand Public Service Commission, Ranchi,
having its office at Jail More, Kutchery, P.O. Kutchery, P.S.
Kotwali, District-Ranchi.
6. The Controller of Examination, Jharkhand Public Service
Commission, Ranchi, having its office at Jail More, Kutchery, P.O.
Kutchery, P.S. Kotwali, District-Ranchi.
7. Registrar General, Jharkhand High Court at Ranchi, P.O. and P.S.
Dhurwa, District-Ranchi, Jharkhand
.... .... Respondents
CORAM : HON'BLE THE ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN KUMAR RAI
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Pradyumna Poddar, Advocate
Mr. Rishav Raj, Advocate
For the State : Mr. Yogesh Modi, AAG-IA
For the JPSC : Mr. Sanjoy Piprawall, Advocate
Mr. Prince Kumar, Advocate
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02/Dated: 02.08.2024
1. This writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India for quashing and setting aside the
communication of rejection of the claim for acceptance of their
candidature in the preliminary exam test conducted for recruitment to
the post of Civil Judge, Junior Division, under the State Judicial
Services, notified in terms of advertisement no.22/2023.
2. The brief facts of the case, as per the pleading made in the writ
petition, required to be enumerated, as under:-
3. It is the case of the writ petitioners that the Jharkhand Public
Service Commission (in short 'JPSC') vide advertisement no.22 of
2023 dated 14.08.2023, advertised vacancies for the post of Civil
Judge, Junior Division in the Jharkhand Judicial Service. The JPSC
called for applications from desirous and eligible candidates for
recruitment to the said post. In pursuant to the advertisement, the
petitioners filled their application forms through online application
system provided on the website of the commission within the
applicable time frame. The petitioners' candidature was found to be
complete with the requirement advertised by the Commission. As
such, the petitioners were issued provisional admit cards for
appearing in the PT Exam. The Exam was scheduled on 10.03.2024.
4. Thereafter, the petitioners appeared at their respective
examination centers for exam. They were served with a copy of the
question booklet and the OMR answer sheet at the centre. The
question booklet contained certain instructions on its cover page.
The operative instructions for filling of information on the OMR
answer sheet was to be provided on the OMR answer sheet itself.
The petitioners proceeded to fill up the necessary information
including their roll numbers in the space provided in the OMR answer
sheet. The petitioner no.1 while darkening the circle for the third digit
of her roll number, her pen brushed against the circle for the fourth
digit of her roll number.
5. The petitioner no.1 thereafter was assured by the Invigilator
that the minor brushing of the pen on the said spot did not constitute
a mistake/wrong. The petitioner no.1 was instructed that she should
ignore the brushing and proceed to darken the circle on the correct
spot. Similarly, the petitioner no.2, while darkening the circle for the
first digit of her roll number, her pen brushed on the circle. She also
informed the invigilator for same and invigilator assured that the
same did not constitute a mistake.
6. On 13.05.2024, the Commission released the corrected and
revised answer key for the PT Exam. Thereafter, the Commission
published the result for the PT Exam on their website. On the same
day, the cut-off marks for different categories were also notified. The
petitioners did not find their roll numbers in the result declared by the
Commission. Being aggrieved with the aforesaid, the petitioners are
before this Court by filing this writ petition.
7. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in course of argument, has
admitted that the only reason for rejection of candidature is that there
is some brushing in the OMR Sheet at the time of furnishing the
details over there.
8. It has been contended that the said error is being considered to
be an error is minor and for that reason, the rejection of candidature
cannot be said to be just and proper. The authority, without taking
into consideration the same, has rejected the candidature of the
petitioners, hence, this writ petition.
9. Mr. Sanjoy Piprawall, learned counsel appearing for the
respondent-JPSC has submitted that OMR Sheet has been rejected
due to wrong bubbling in the relevant circle of the roll number.
10. It has been contended that since there is error in filling up of
the relevant circle in the roll number and if in that count, the system
based upon the particular software, has rejected the candidature, the
same cannot be said to suffer from an error in the process of
scrutinization/selection.
11. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties and
gone across the pleading made in the writ petition.
12. It needs to refer herein that in pursuant to the advertisement
no.22 of 2023, the writ petitioners had participated in the preliminary
exam test for consideration of their candidature to participate in the
written examination for the post of Civil Judge, Junior Division. The
admit card has been issued. The writ petitioners had participated but
the candidature has been rejected.
13. The admitted case of the writ petitioners as per the pleading
made that the writ petitioners had committed error in filling up the
circle of the roll number and while doing so, there is brushing aside.
14. However, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-JPSC
has submitted that the OMR Answer Sheet of the writ petitioners has
been rejected due to incomplete/incorrect filling of the relevant circle
of the roll number.
15. Therefore, the admitted case even as per the petitioners is that
some error has been committed while filling up the circle earmarked
for the roll number.
16. The further admitted case is that Answer Sheet/OMR sheet has
been decided to be evaluated by the OMR scanning machine which
is based upon the Software, as per condition no.3 of the admit card,
from where, it appears that answer sheet will be processed by
electronic device. Invalidation of answer sheet due to
incomplete/incorrect filling of relevant circle of Roll No. and Question
Booklet Series in the OMR Answer Sheet shall result in cancellation
of candidature. Any deficiency in filling up OMR Answer Sheet shall
be the sole responsibility of the candidate. For ready reference,
condition no.3 of the provisional Admit Card reads as under:-
"3. Answer Sheet will be processed by
electronic device. Invalidation of answer sheet
due to incomplete/incorrect filling of relevant circle
of Roll No. and Question Booklet Series in the
OMR Answer Sheet shall result in cancellation of
candidature. Any deficiency in filling up OMR
Answer Sheet shall be the sole responsibility of
the candidate. Please do not write or mark on this
Answer Sheet outside the demarcated areas. It
will invalidate your Answer Sheet. Candidates are
advised to read the instructions carefully, given in
the cover and back page of the Question Booklet
and back side of OMR answer sheet before
attempting the questions."
17. The condition has put in clause no.4 of the Admit Card which
stipulates that all other information i.e., Roll No., Registration No.,
and Question Booklet Series etc. (in word or number or both as
required) must be furnished on the respective columns at OMR
Answer Sheet as per instructions given in the OMR Answer Sheet.
18. It is evident from clause stipulated particularly condition no.3
that the condition to fill up the OMR sheet has been made to be
mandatory since in view of the condition stipulated in condition no.3
that in case of any deficiency in filling up of OMR Answer Sheet, the
candidature of the particular candidate will be cancelled, which
means that when consequence is there, then the condition so put in
the admit card, will be mandatory one, reference in this regard may
be made to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Dalchand Vrs., Municipal Corporation, Bhopal & Anr.,
reported in (1984) 2 SCC 486, wherein, it has been held as under:-
".... .... ....There are no ready tests or invariable
formulae to determine whether a provision is
mandatory or directory. The broad purpose of the
statute is important. The object of the particular
provision must be considered. The link between the
two is most important. The weighing of the
consequence of holding a provision to be mandatory
or directory is vital and, more often than not,
determinative of the very question whether the
provision is mandatory or directory. Where the design
of the statute is the avoidance or prevention of public
mischief, but the enforcement of a particular provision
literally to its letter will tend to defeat that design, the
provision must be held to be directory, so that proof of
prejudice in addition to non-compliance of the
provision is necessary to invalidate the act
complained of. It is well to remember that quite often
many rules, though couched in language which appears to
be imperative, are no more than mere instructions to those
entrusted with the task of discharging statutory duties for
public benefit. The negligence of those to whom public
duties are entrusted cannot by statutory interpretation be
allowed to promote public mischief and cause public
inconvenience and defeat the main object of the statute. It
is as well to realise that every prescription of a period
within which an act must be done, is not the prescription of
a period of limitation with painful consequences if the act is
not done within that period. Rule 9(j) of the Prevention of
Food Adulteration Act, as it then stood, merely instructed
the Food Inspector to send by registered post copy of the
Public Analyst's report to the person from whom the
sample was taken within 10 days of the receipt of the
report. Quite obviously the period of 10 days was not a
period of limitation within which an action was to be
initiated or on the expiry of which a vested right accrued.
The period of 10 days was prescribed with a view to
expedition and with the object of giving sufficient time to
the person from whom the sample was taken to make such
arrangements as he might like to challenge the report of
the Public Analyst, for example, by making a request to the
Magistrate to send the other sample to the Director of the
Central Food Laboratory for analysis. Where the effect of
non-compliance with the rule was such as to wholly
deprive the right of the person to challenge the Public
Analyst's report by obtaining the report of the Director of
the Central Food Laboratory, there might be just cause for
complaint, as prejudice would then be writ large. .Where
no prejudice was caused there could be no cause for
complaint. I am clearly of the view that Rule 9(j) of the
Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules was directory and
not mandatory. The decisions in Public
Prosecutor v. Murlidhar [1977 Cr LJ 1634 (AP) : 1977 Andh
LT 34 : 1977 MLJ (Cri) 205] and Bhola Nath v. State [1977
Cr LJ 154 (Cal) : (1977) 1 FAC 38] to the extent that they
hold that Rule 9(j) was mandatory are not good law. The
petition is dismissed.
19. Likewise, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Patil
Automation (P) Ltd. & Ors. Vrs. Rakheja Engineers (P) Ltd.,
reported in (2022) 10 SCC 1, wherein, it has been held at paragraph-
34, which reads as under:-
34. In Bhikraj Jaipuria v. Union of India [Bhikraj
Jaipuria v. Union of India, AIR 1962 SC 113] , a Bench
of five learned Judges dealt with the question arising out
of Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act, 1935.
The Court, inter alia, had to deal with the question,
whether enactment should be considered directory or
obligatory : (AIR p. 119, para 17)
"17. The question still remains whether the purchase
orders executed by the Divisional Superintendent but
which were not expressed to be made by the Governor-
General and were not executed on behalf of the
Governor-General, were binding on the Government of
India. Section 175(3) plainly requires that contracts on
behalf of the Government of India shall be executed in
the form prescribed thereby; the section however does
not set out the consequences of non-compliance. Where
a statute requires that a thing shall be done in the
prescribed manner or form but does not set out the
consequences of non-compliance, the question whether
the provision was mandatory or directory has to be
adjudged in the light of the intention of the legislature as
disclosed by the object, purpose and scope of the
statute. If the statute is mandatory, the thing done not in
the manner or form prescribed can have no effect or
validity : if it is directory, penalty may be incurred for
non-compliance, but the act or thing done is regarded as
good. As observed in Maxwell on Interpretation of
Statutes, 10th Edn., p. 376:
'It has been said that no rule can be laid down for
determining whether the command is to be considered
as a mere direction or instruction involving no
invalidating consequence in its disregard, or as
imperative, with an implied nullification for disobedience,
beyond the fundamental one that it depends on the
scope and object of the enactment. It may perhaps be
found generally correct to say that nullification is the
natural and usual consequence of disobedience, but the
question is in the main governed by considerations of
convenience and justice, and when that result would
involve general inconvenience or injustice to innocent
persons, or advantage to those guilty of the neglect,
without promoting the real aim and object of the
enactment, such an intention is not to be attributed to
the legislature. The whole scope and purpose of the
statute under consideration must be regarded.'
Lord Campbell in Liverpool Borough
Bank v. Turner [Liverpool Borough Bank v. Turner,
(1860) 30 LJ Ch 379 : 45 ER 715] observed : (ER p.
718)
'... No universal rule can be laid down ... as to
whether mandatory enactments shall be considered
directory only or obligatory with an implied nullification
for disobedience. It is the duty of courts of justice to try
to get at the real intention of the legislature by carefully
attending to the whole scope of the statute to be
construed.' "
20. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhavnagar
University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. and Others, reported in
(2003) 2 SCC 111, wherein, at paragraph-42 and 43, it has been held
as under:-
"42. We are not oblivious of the law that when a public
functionary is required to do a certain thing within a
specified time, the same is ordinarily directory but it is
equally well settled that when consequence for inaction on
the part of the statutory authorities within such specified
time is expressly provided, it must be held to be
imperative.
43. In Sutherland's Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn., Vol.
3, at p. 102 the law is stated as follows:
"... unless the nature of the act to be performed, or the
phraseology of the statute is such that the designation of
time must be considered a limitation of the power of the
officer".
At p. 107 it is pointed out that a statutory direction to
private individuals should generally be considered as
mandatory and that the rule is just the opposite to that
which obtains with respect to public officers. Again, at p.
109, it is pointed out that often the question as to whether
a mandatory or directory construction should be given to a
statutory provision may be determined by an expression in
the statute itself of the result that shall follow
noncompliance with the provision. At p. 111 it is stated as
follows:
"As a corollary of the rule outlined above, the fact that no
consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute,
has been considered as a factor tending towards a
directory construction. But this is only an element to be
considered, and is by no means conclusive."
21. It is evident from the aforesaid judgment that if there is no
consequence due to non-compliance of the condition stipulated, then
such condition will be considered to be obligatory/directory but when
the consequence is there, then, it will be considered to be mandatory
in nature.
22. Adverting to the factual aspect of the present case, when it is
the admitted case of the writ petitioners that some deficiency which
is of any nature whatsoever, as per the petitioners, has occurred due
to some brushing in the respective column having the column of roll
number, while as per the reason assigned in the impugned order
issued by the JPSC, the respective circle of the roll number has not
duly been filled up.
23. It needs to refer herein that whatever has been referred in the
condition of provisional Admit Card that has been carried from the
question booklet.
24. Therefore, the authority after taking into consideration the
condition stipulated in condition no.3 which confers power upon the
Commission to reject the candidature in case of deficiency in filling
up the OMR Answer Sheet, which has been considered to be
mandatory, as per the preceding paragraphs as referred
hereinabove.
25. Therefore, this Court is of the view that it is not a case where
the direction is to be issued for issuance of Writ of Certiorari, reason
being that, for issuance of Writ of Certiorari, the jurisdiction lies with
the High Court is very limited, i.e., if the order suffers from
jurisdictional error or there is any error apparent on the face of
record, reference in this regard may be made to the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Syed Yakoob
Vrs. K.S. Radhakrishnan and Ors., A.I.R. 1964 Supreme Court
477, wherein at paragraph no.7 Their Lordships have been pleased
to hold as follows:-
"7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of
High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Art.
226 has been frequently considered by this Court and
the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in
doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting
errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or
tribunals : these are cases where orders are passed
by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is
in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise
jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in
exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or
Tribunal Acts illegally or improperly, as for instance, it
decides a question without giving an opportunity to be
heard to the party affected by the order, or where the
procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is
opposed to principles of natural justice. There is,
however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court
exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate
Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings
of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as
result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be
reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error
of law which is apparent on the face of the record can
be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact,
however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of
certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording
the said finding, the tribunal had erroneously refused
to admit admissible and material evidence, or had
erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which
has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a
finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be
regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by
a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of
cases, however, we must always bear in mind that a
finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be
challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on
the ground that the relevant and material evidence
adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or
inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The
adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point
and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said
finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated
before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the
jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Art.
226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately
exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad
Ishaque, 1955-1 SCR 1104 : ((S) AIR 1955 SC 233);
Nagendra Nath v. Commr. Of Hills Division, 1958
SCR 1240 : (AIR 1958 SC 398) and Kaushalya Devi
v. Bachittar Singh, AIR 1960 SC 1168.
26. Reference in this regard also may be made to the judgment
rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs.
Ahmad Ishaque and Ors., AIR 1955 Supreme Court 233, it has
been held at Paragraph-21, as hereunder :-
".......as to the character and scope of the writ of
'certiorari' and the conditions under which it could be
issued. The question has been considered by this
Court in 'Parry and Co. v. Commercial Employees'
Association, Madras,' AIR 1952 SC 179 (L):-
'Veerappa Pillai v. Raman and Raman Ltd.' AIR 1952
SC 192 (M); 'Ebrahim Aboobaker v. Custodian
General of Evacuee Property New Delhi,' AIR 1952
SC 319 (N), and quite recently in AIR 1954 SC
440(C). On these authorities, the following
propositions may be taken as established: (1)
'Certiorari' will be issued for correcting errors of
jurisdiction, as when an inferior Court or Tribunal acts
without jurisdiction or in excess of it, or fails to
exercise it. (2) Writ of certiorari will also be issued
when the Court or Tribunal acts illegally in the
exercise of its undoubted jurisdiction, as when it
decides without giving an opportunity to the parties to
be heard, or violates the principles of natural justice.
(3) The Court issuing a writ of certiorari acts in
exercise of a supervisory and not appellate
jurisdiction. One consequence of this is that the Court
will not review findings of fact reached by the inferior
Court or Tribunal even if they be erroneous. This is on
the principle that a Court which has jurisdiction over a
subject-matter has jurisdiction to decide wrong as well
as right, and when the Legislature does not choose to
confer a right of appeal against that decision, it would
be defeating its purpose and policy, if a superior Court
were to rehear the case on the evidence and
substitute its own findings in "certiorari"......."
27. In another judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court in Sawarn Singh
and Anr. Vrs. State of Punjab and Ors., (1976) 2 SCC 868 their
Lordships while discussing the power of writ under Article 226 for
issuance of writ of certiorari has been pleased to hold at paragraph
nos.12 and 13 as under:
"12. Before dealing with the contentions canvassed, it
will be useful to notice the general principles
indicating the limits of the jurisdiction of the certiorari
jurisdiction can be exercised only for correcting errors
of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals.
A writ of certiorari can be issued only in the exercise
of supervisory jurisdiction which is different from
appellate jurisdiction. The Court exercising special
jurisdiction under Article 226 is not entitled to act as
an appellate Court. As was pointed out by this Court
in Syed Yakoob's case (supra).........
13. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by an
inferior tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued only
if in recording such a finding, the tribunal has acted on
evidence which is legally inadmissible, or has refused
to admit admissible evidence, or if the finding is not
supported by any evidence at all, because in such
cases the error amounts to an error of law. The writ
jurisdiction extends only to cases where orders are
passed by inferior courts or tribunals in excess of their
jurisdiction or as a result of their refusal to exercise
jurisdiction vested in them or they act illegally or
improperly in the exercise of their jurisdiction causing
grave miscarriage of justice."
28. This Court, by applying the aforesaid principle and as per the
discussion made hereinabove as also the condition/clause as
contained in condition no.3 of the provisional Admit Card, is of the
view that it is not a case where the Writ of Certiorari can be issued.
29. In the result, this writ petition fails and is, dismissed.
30. In consequence thereof, pending Interlocutory Application(s), if
any, stands disposed of.
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, A.C.J.)
(Arun Kumar Rai, J.)
Rohit/-A.F.R.
