Unknown vs State Of Jharkhand
2024 Latest Caselaw 7606 Jhar

Jharkhand High Court

Unknown vs State Of Jharkhand on 2 August, 2024

Author: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

Bench: Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi

IN    THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
                W.P.(Cr.) No. 887 of 2023
1. BALCO Limited having its registered office at
Aluminum Sadan, Core-6, Scope Office Complex,
Lodi Road, P.O., P.S. and District-South Delhi, New
Delhi-110003 and its plant operations at P.O. BALCO
Nagar, Korba-495684, through Soumya Banerjee, son
of Late Indranath Banerjee, aged about 41 years,
residing at Flat No.309, Sector-I, BALCO Nagar,
Korba, P.O. & P.S. BALCO Nagar, District Korba
(Chhattishgarh) authorized signatory working as
Associate General Manager (Legal).
2. S.S. Rungta @ Sri S.S. Rungta @ Sushil Kumar
Roongta, aged about 73 years, son of Ramniwas
Rungta, residing at D-91, The Pinnacle, Opp. DLF
Golf Course, P.O., P.S.-Gold Course, District-
Gurgaon, State-Haryana-122009.
3. Abhijit Pati, aged about 61 years, son of Nirad
Baran Pati, residing at 1st Floor Module, C/2, Fortune
Towers, P.O. and P.S.-Chandrashekharpur, District-
Bhubaneshwar, State-Odisha-751623 was working as
CEO, BALCO Limited at Jharsuguda
4. Avinash Roy @ Avinash Chand Rai, aged about 53
years, son of Mankan Dey Rai, residing at B1 1603,
Adani Shantigram, P.O. & P.S.-Adalaj, District-Gandhi
Nagar-382421, State Gujarat, working as COO Power,
BALCO Limited.
5. Deepak Prasad, aged about 59 years, son of Ram
Pati Prasad, residing at Guest House, Vedanta
Aluminum Limited, Burkha Munda, P.O.-Kalimandir,
P.S.-Jharsuguda, District-Jharsuguda, State-Odisha-
768202, working as Plant Head, BALCO Limited.
6. Subhadeep Khan, aged about 41 years son of
Subrata Khan, residing at D-15, Sector-2, P.O. & P.S.
BALCO Nagar, District Korba, Chhattisgarh working

                               -1-        W.P.(Cr.) No. 887 of 2023
 as I/c FTP & ALH additional charge of Head-PR
Services, BALCO Limited.
                                                  .....    ...   Petitioners
                          Versus
1. State of Jharkhand
2. Ganesh Kumar Agiwal, M/s Vassu Enterprises, son of
Late Bala Prasad Agiwal, resident at Holding No. 206,
Road No.4, North Layout, Sonari, P.O. & P.S. Sonari Town,
Jamshedpur, Jharkhand. District-East Singhbhum.
                                                   .....   ...   Respondents
                     --------

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI

------

For the Petitioners : Mr. Indrajit Sinha, Advocate.

                     :        Mr. Kaushik Sarkhel, Advocate.
                     :        Mr. Rishav Kumar, Advocate.
For the State        :        Mr. Manoj Kumar, G.A.-III.
For the Resp. No. 2  :        Mr. Shresth Gautam, Advocate.
                     :        Mr. Yogendra Yadav, Advocate.
                     ------
C.A.V. on 25.07.2024                      Pronounced on 02.08.2024

Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Manoj Kumar, learned G.A.-III for the State and Mr. Shresth Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2.

2. Prayer in this petition is made for quashing of the order dated 14.06.2023, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur, in connection with Complaint Case No. 3105 of 2023, whereby, exercising the power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the learned court has been pleased to sent the complaint for registering the FIR and investigation. Further prayer is made for quashing of the entire criminal proceeding, arising out of Sonari P.S. Case no. 101 of 2023, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur.

3. The complaint case was filed, which was later on converted in to the FIR, alleging therein that the complainant is a reputed businessman and proprietor of M/s Vassu Enterprises, also a law-abiding citizen of Jamshedpur.

That no complaint has been filed by the complainant against the accused persons either in this court or in any court of law, prior to this application. The complainant does his business of Material Handling, House Keeping, loading- unloading and transporting to intended customers/Companies through his firm at locations in India on the basis of the contract. In the year 2010-11 M/s Balco Limited, Korba gave a contract to the complainant performed his job and completed the contract as assigned by the accused No.1 Company.

It is alleged that after being satisfied with the performance of the complainant for the execution of the assigned job, the accused no.1 Company through the accused no.2, 6 and 7 approached the complainant and assigned further work contracts for handling the materials in the premises of the accused no.1 company situated at different plants at Korba, Chhattisgarh, which has been properly executed by the complainant with fullest satisfaction, thereafter on 06.03.2013 one agreement was executed between the accused no.1 and the firm of the complainant to perform the handling work of material and scrap for purchase of heavy types of equipment and other essential items and thereafter he compelled to borrow money in the tune of above 2 crores of Rupees from the Corporation Bank (Currently Union Bank). And started to execute the assigned work awarded to him.

Suddenly on 24.02.2015 the accused no.1 through accused no. 5, 6 and 7 terminated the said agreements and detained the entire fleet of machines and equipment of the complainant of almost worth Rs. 2-3 Crore out of which few machines were returned to the complainant in adverse conditions and total machinery of housekeeping had been forcefully held by the accused persons and this intimation was

given by the accused persons through several E-mail. Thereafter the complainant started correspondence with the accused persons and demanded an updated balance amount payable by them to the complainant against the work executed by him, service tax, security deposit, labour retention, etc. along with entire machinery and equipment then under the chairmanship of COO of the company Avinash Roy (accused No.5) conducted a meeting in presence of the complainant and the plant head Deepak Prasad (accused no.6) and Subhadeep Khan (accused No.7) on 28.06.2015 and it was decided among them that within one month from the date of the meeting, the entire claim of the complainant will be settled, and all the equipment kept on the premises of the company will be retained.

It is further alleged that the accused persons did not honour the decision taken in the said meeting but some damaged equipment which was severely in damaged condition was returned to the complainant, but the remaining fleet of valuable machines and bill amount were held by them, in spite of repeated requests made by the complainant through emails but they turned it into a deaf ear.

It is averred that thereafter the complainant on 07.06.2017 wrote a letter addressed to the Honourable Prime Minister of India, Anil Agrawal Chairman BALCO Limited, Korba (accused no.2), S.S. Rungta Managing Director (accused no.3), CEO Abhijit Pati (accused no.4), Avinash Roy COO (accused no.5) and Deepak Prasad Plant head (accused no.6), DGM BALCO and other responsible persons for demanding of outstanding amount and security deposit etc. Thereafter in the Month of May 2018 a meeting was held among the complainant and the accused persons which continued for almost 8 Hrs. at the site of BALCO Limited, Korba and it was

decided the entire claim of the complainant i.e., in the tune of Rs. 15,40,68,631.46 and the security deposit will be paid with 18% interest to the complainant. It was also decided that Service Tax and GST will be paid at the rate of a 30% interest penalty thereon, and the value of machinery and types of equipment will be paid to the complainant. And all these claims will be paid within 7 days from the date of that settlement.

It is further averred that on 09.07.2019 an order was passed by the GST department against the firm of the complainant for the payment of GST amount in the tune of Rs. 2,37,48,427/- and penalty thereon of the equal amount l.e., 2,37,48,427/- plus 10,000/- vide order dated 09.07.2019 and accordingly demand notice dated 22.07.2019 was issued against the complainant, and when the complainant failed to deposit the said amount (almost 5 crores of Rupees) then GST department directed the accused no.1 BALCO Limited, Korba to make payment of the said demand with 30% interest as being principle contractor but they did not pay the same to the GST department and the said amount is still under the liability of the complainant and the department once again demanded the said amount from the complainant.

It is alleged that here it is pertinent to mention that the minutes of the meeting were also prepared in the said meeting i.e., meeting of May 2018 on which the complainant, Deepak Prasad and other officials of accused no.1, who were present in the meeting put their respective signature on it but the copy of the same was not given to the complainant on the said date. Thereafter the complainant on several occasions demanded the said copy of the minutes of the meeting through mail but they neither replied to those emails nor gave the copy of the minutes of the meeting to the complainant. Lastly the

complainant sent a legal notice of demand by his lawyer Sri Abhishek Choubey learned advocate vide demand notice dated 30.12.2021 through the Registered post and demanding therein the total payable amount in the tune of Rupees 15,40,68631.46 with full description but in spite of the receipt of the notice they have neither made payment of demanded money and did not return the equipment and machinery of their complainant. The said notice was replied to by BALCO Limited, Korba vide reply dated 05.02.2022 with a request that very soon they will sit together, and the matter will be settled, but to date, they neither paid a single penny against the legitimate claim nor returned the machinery to the complainant.

Thereafter the complainant submitted a written complaint dated 22.05.2023 to the Officer-in-charge, Sonari Police Station and SSP Jamshedpur duly received by them, but the O/C did not register the FIR given by the complainant, therefore the complainant filed this complaint before this learned Court.

Thus, all the accused persons with the connivance of each other and with common intention, with their malafide intention from the very inception cheated the complainant and misappropriated a sum of Rupees 15,40,68,631.46 and illegally withhold his equipment and machinery, and thus committed the offence punishable under sections 420, 406,409,120B and 34 of the 1.P.C. The complainant seeing no other options filed this complaint for the ends of justice.

4. Mr. Indrajit Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the complaint case was registered on 13.06.2023, being complaint Case No. 3105 of 2023 and by order dated 14.06.2023, passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the learned court has been pleased to send the said complaint to the police for

registration of the FIR and investigation and pursuant to that Sonari P.S. Case No. 101 of 2023 was registered. He submitted that petitioner No. 2 was the Non-Executive Chairman at Bharat Aluminium Company Limited [hereinafter referred to as BALCO Limited] and has no direct involvement in termination of the agreement between the BALCO Limited Company and the Respondent No.2. The petitioner No. 3 was working as CEO in BALCO Limited, Jharsuguda and was not even a part of BALCO Limited at the time of termination of agreement between the BALCO Limited Company and the Respondent No.2. Petitioner No.4 was working as COO Power in BALCO Limited and petitioner No.5 was working as Plant Head, BALCO Limited and the petitioner No.6 was working as I/c FTP & ALH additional charge of Head- PR services. He further submitted that all these petitioners have been falsely implicated in this case. He submitted that there was an arbitration clause in the said agreement and without resorting to the said clause, the respondent no. 2 had lodged a criminal complaint.

According to him, the Chairman of Vedanta Group Anil Agarwal is one of the greatest industrialist of the country and in the mid of 1970's, he began trading in scrap metal, collecting it from cable companies in other States and selling it in Mumbai. He submitted that said Anil Agarwal and his team incorporated Vedanta Resources Plc in 2003 in London and the said Vedanta Resources Plc, was the first Indian Firm to be listed on London Stock Exchange on 10.12.2003 and even the Chairman of the said Vedanta Group, who had also been made an accused in the present case, which clearly suggests that only to take a fame, the respondent No. 2 has included the name of the Chairman Anil Agarwal, who has got no concerned with the dispute.

He further submitted that Bharat Aluminium Company

Ltd. ("BALCO"") was incorporated in the year 1965 as a Government of India undertaking under the Companies Act. He also submitted that in the year 2010 VASSU Enterprises (hereinafter "Respondent No.2") approached BALCO to seek engagement for mechanized housekeeping, loading/unloading and transportation and the business relationship was established and in the 2010 and 2013, various contracts were executed between the BALCO Limted and Respondent No.2 for material handing in the Plant of BALCO, rake handling, housekeeping services and other services at Korba, Chhattisgarh as well as BALCO's unit at Jamshedpur, East Singhbhum, Jharkhand.

5. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the service agreement was entered in the year 2010 and lastly the agreement was finalised on 06.03.2013 at Korba, Chhattisgarh, contained in Annexure-3 to the petition and respondent No. 2 failed to undertake the contractual obligations as per the terms and conditions of the contract and he drew the attention of the court to para-14 of the writ petition and submitted that the nature of breach is disclosed therein. He submitted that when the respondent No. 2 was not able to comply with the terms and condition of the agreement and was lackadaisical in executing the said contract, thereafter several correspondences were made between the petitioner company and respondent No. 2 and lastly having no option, the petitioner company has terminated the contract entered into between the parties on 23.02.2015. He submitted that the entire allegations made in the complaint petition are false and concocted.

He further submitted that it has been alleged in para-11 of the complaint petition that on 09.07.2019 an order was passed by the GST Department against the firm of the respondent no. 2 for payment of GST amounting to Rs.

2,37,48,427/- and penalty of equal amount plus Rs. 10,000/- and a demand notice was also made. He submitted that a notice under Section 87 of the Finance Act was issued to the petitioner from the GST Department, Jamshedpur on 25.09.2017, wherein a demand of Rs. 1,64,04,996/- was made by the GST Department along with the interest. He further submitted that the petitioners company never undertook to clear the outstanding service tax/GST amount of the respondent no. 2, which has been imposed vide order dated 09.07.2019 and thus the petitioner company cannot be held liable for any notice received from the GST Department. He submitted that second notice was also received by the petitioner company on 16.02.2018 reiterating the demand under Section 87 of the Finance Act, 1994 and consolidated reply for the 1st and 2nd notice to the GST Department was made on 17.03.2018 specifically stating that the petitioner company has a pending dues amount to Rs. 3.57 lakhs from the respondent No. 2. He further submitted that respondent No. 2 has not done his part of the agreement and has issued a legal notice against the company that too after termination of the contract. He submitted that after nine years from the date of contractual dispute, the present complaint case has been filed, however, the same was converted into the FIR itself, which is not in accordance with law.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the learned court has not followed the guidelines prescribed under Section 156(3) of the Cr.P.C. and in absence of judicial mind, the said order has been passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and to buttress his arguments, he relied in the case of Priyanka Srivastava & Anr. Versus State of U.P. & Ors., reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287 and he particularly referred to Paras-22, 27 and 29, which is quoted hereinbelow:-

"22. In Anil Kumar v. M.K. Aiyappa, the two-Judge Bench had to say this:

"The scope of Section 156(3) CrPC came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. This Court in Maksud Saiyed [(2008) 5 SCC 668] examined the requirement of the application of mind by the Magistrate before exercising jurisdiction under Section 156(3) and held that where jurisdiction is exercised on a complaint filed in terms of Section 156(3) or Section 200 CrPC, the Magistrate is required to apply his mind, in such a case, the Special Judge/Magistrate cannot refer the matter under Section 156(3) against a public servant without a valid sanction order. The application of mind by the Magistrate should be reflected in the order. The mere statement that he has gone through the complaint, documents and heard the complainant, as such, as reflected in the order, will not be sufficient. After going through the complaint, documents and hearing the complainant, what weighed with the Magistrate to order investigation under Section 156(3) CrPC, should be reflected in the order, though a detailed expression of his views is neither required nor warranted. We have already extracted the order passed by the learned Special Judge which, in our view, has stated no reasons for ordering investigation."

27. Regard being had to the aforesaid enunciation of law, it needs to be reiterated that the learned Magistrate has to remain vigilant with regard to the allegations made and the nature of allegations and not to issue directions without proper application of mind. He has also to bear in mind that sending the matter would be conducive to justice and then he may pass the requisite order. The present is a case where the accused persons are serving in high positions in the bank. We are absolutely conscious that the position does not matter,

for nobody is above law. But, the learned Magistrate should take note of the allegations in entirety, the date of incident and whether any cognizable case is remotely made out. It is also to be noted that when a borrower of the financial institution covered under the SARFAESI Act, invokes the jurisdiction under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and also there is a separate procedure under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, an attitude of more care, caution and circumspection has to be adhered to.

29. At this stage it is seemly to state that power under Section 156(3) warrants application of judicial mind. A court of law is involved. It is not the police taking steps at the stage of Section 154 of the code. A litigant at his own whim cannot invoke the authority of the Magistrate. A principled and really grieved citizen with clean hands must have free access to invoke the said power. It protects the citizens but when pervert litigations takes this route to harass their fellows citizens, efforts are to be made to scuttle and curb the same."

7. On the same line, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further relied in the case of Usha Chakraborty & Anr. Versus State of West Bengal & Anr., reported in (2023) SCC OnLine SC 90. He also relied in the case of Anil Kumar & Ors. Versus M.K. Aiyappa & Ors., reported in (2013) 10 SCC 705 and in the case of Anjuri Kumari Versus State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Ors., reported in SCC OnLine Del 7570.

8. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that so far recovery of the amount is concerned, the respondent No. 2 has already moved under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 [MSME Act] that is still pending, being JHMSEFC Case No. 15 of 2024.

9. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners further

submitted that when an issue is financial in nature, arising out of an agreement, which clearly comes within the realm of civil and commercial law, as such, the criminal case is unwarranted. He relied in the case of Dinesh Gupta Versus State of U.P., reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 34.

10. Further learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that every breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating and only in those cases breach of contract would amount to cheating where there was any deception played at the very inception and for that he relied in the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika Versus State of Bihar & Anr., reported in (2005) 10 SCC 336.

11. Relying on the above judgments, Mr. Sinha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the high officials of the company have unnecessarily been implicated in a case, arising out of a commercial transaction and belatedly the case has been lodged, as such, the entire criminal proceeding is vitiated. He submitted that the learned court by order dated 14.06.2023, without applying its judicial mind, has passed the order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. is also bad in law. On these grounds, he submitted that the criminal proceedings may kindly be quashed.

12. Per Contra, Mr. Shresth Gautam, learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 submitted that the contention of the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners with regard to delay is misconceived one, as the negotiations were going on and thereafter in the month of May, 2018 a meeting took place in Korba in the State of Chhatishgarh, wherein the company agreed to pay the outstanding dues, as such, there is no delay. He submitted that company also agreed to pay the value of the equipment and machines withheld by it to the complainant. He further submitted that the agreement was terminated on 24.02.2015 admittedly the machines and equipments have been withheld by the petitioners company and the due has not been paid, as such, case of cheating

is made out. By way of referring the complaint petition, he submitted that the allegations are there of cheating, as such, the case is made out and this court at this stage may not interfere in the matter. He further submitted that the learned court is having all the powers to send the case to the police under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. On the point of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., he relied in the case of HDFC Securities Limited and Ors. Versus State of Maharashtra & Anr., reported in (2017) 1 SCC 640, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paras-9, 24 and 26 held as follows:-

"9. On the contrary, before the High Court it was submitted on behalf of respondent No.2 that an order under Section 156(3) of Criminal Procedure Code requiring investigation by the police does not cause any injury of irreparable nature which requires quashing of the investigation. It is further stated that the stage of cognizance would arise after the investigation report is filed. Therefore, the application filed by the appellants before the High Court is nothing but prematured and thus there is no need for exercising the powers of the High Court either under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of the Code. Further contention of the respondent before the High Court was that the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code should be sparingly used.

24. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent No.2 submitted that the complaint has disclosed the commission of an offence which is cognizable in nature and in the light of Lalitha Kumari's Case, (supra), registration of FIR becomes mandatory. We observe that it is clear from the use of the words "may take cognizance"

in the context in which they occur, that the same cannot be equated with "must take cognizance". The word "may" gives

discretion to the Magistrate in the matter. If on a reading of the complaint he finds that the allegations therein disclose a cognizable offence and that the forwarding of the complaint to the police for investigation under Section 156(3) will be conducive to justice and save the valuable time of the Magistrate from being wasted in enquiring into a matter, which was primarily the duty of the police to investigate, he will be justified in adopting that course as an alternative to taking cognizance of the offence, himself. It is settled that when a Magistrate receives a complaint, he is not bound to take cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint, do not disclose the commission of an offence.

27. It appears to us that the appellants approached the High Court even before the stage of issuance of process. In particular, the appellants challenged the order dated 04.01.2011 passed by the learned Magistrate under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants after summarizing their arguments in the matter have emphasized also in the context of the fundamental rights of the appellants under the Constitution, that the order impugned has caused grave inequities to the appellants. In the circumstances, it was submitted that the order is illegal and is an abuse of the process of law. However, it appears to us that this order under Section 156(3) of Cr.P.C. requiring investigation by the police, cannot be said to have caused an injury of irreparable nature which, at this stage, requires quashing of the investigation. We must keep in our mind that the stage of cognizance would arise only after the investigation report is filed before the Magistrate. Therefore, in our opinion, at this stage the High Court has correctly assessed the facts and the law in

this situation and held that filing of the petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., at this stage are nothing but premature. Further, in our opinion, the High Court correctly came to the conclusion that the inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. should be sparingly used."

13. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 has further relied a judgment of this court in the case of Jayant Gas Agency & Ors. Versus The State of Jharkhand & Anr. in Cr.M.P. No. 594 of 2021. He further relied in the case of Ramesh Sahu @ Rameshwar Sahu & Ors. Versus The State of Jharkhand, reported in (2022) 0 Supreme (jhk) 471 and also in the case of Amrit Agarwal Versus The State of Jharkhand & Anr. in Cr.M.P. No. 427 of 2022. He further relied in the case of Tarun Kumar Basak & Anr. Versus The State of Jharkhand & Anr., in Cr.M.P. No. 1455 of 2021. Relying on these judgments, he submitted that the learned court is having all powers, as such, there is no illegality in exercising the power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. On these grounds, he submitted that this petition may kindly be dismissed.

14. Mr. Manoj Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State submitted that there is no illegality in the order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., as such, this petition may kindly be dismissed.

15. In view of the above submissions of learned counsel appearing for the respective parties, the court has gone through the materials available on record including the order passed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. as well as the contents of the complaint, which was later on converted into the FIR under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C.

16. Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. primarily deals with the powers of the Police officer to investigate the cognizable cases. While passing

an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the learned Magistrate, does not take cognizance, which is in the nature of reminder to the police to exercise their primary duty and power of investigation. The power of learned court so far as Section 202 Cr.P.C. is not attracted under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. The learned magistrate is having all powers to treat any complaint and decide the same under Section 200 onwards falling under Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C. and further to proceed under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the learned court is required to find out as to whether on a bare reading of the complaint, disclosure of cognizable offence is made out or not and thereafter he is required to pass an order directing the police for investigation.

17. In the case in hand, admittedly the dispute is arising out of an agreement and the dispute starts after termination of the said agreement in the year 2015 and if the learned court coming to the conclusion that prima facie allegations are cognizable, then only he is required to pass an order under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. otherwise, the learned court is competent to proceed in light of Chapter-XV of the Cr.P.C. i.e. from Section 200 Cr.P.C. onwards and this fact has been considered in all the judgments, relied by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. and that aspect was further considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of HDFC Securities Limited (Supra), on which, heavy reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 in para-27 of the said judgment.

18. Thus, on the point of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the law is well settled that the learned court has to apply its mind and thereafter has to pass an order if the cognizable offence is made out.

19. So far as the nature of litigation in the present case is concerned, that is purely civil in nature, as the same is arising out of an agreement, which was later on turned down and thereafter the respondent No. 2 has also instituted a case under the Micro, Small

and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 and that is still pending, being JHMSEFC Case No. 15 of 2024 for recovery of the amount, which further strengthen the case of the petitioners. The High officials of the company, who were at the relevant time, were posted at different places, all have been implicated as an accused, which further suggests that maliciously the present case has been lodged against the high officials of the company. It is not a case, where action has been sought to taken against any one person, who has terminated the agreement. It is further well settled that every breach of contract cannot be a subject matter of criminal case unless there is deception played at the very inception. Admittedly, in the case in hand, the parties have worked together for some time and thereafter dispute arose, as such, the deception from the very beginning is not made out and rightly on the issue in question, the reliance has been placed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in the case of Uma Shankar Gopalika (Supra).

20. To pursue criminal charges in a case to abuse of criminal justice system with a motive to seek personal vengeance, rather are seeking to justice was further deprecated time and again by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and the High Courts and for a civil nature of case, no criminal proceeding can be allowed to be continued.

21. The concern with regard to growing tendency in business rivalry to convert the civil dispute into the criminal cases was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of A.M. Mohan Versus The State represented by SHO & Anr., arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 9598 of 2022, where in para-10, it has been held as under:-

"10. The Court has also noted the concern with regard to a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil disputes into criminal cases. The Court observed that this is obviously on account of a prevalent impression that civil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the interests of lenders/creditors. The Court also recorded

that there is an impression that if a person could somehow be entangled in a criminal prosecution, there is a likelihood of imminent settlement. The Court, relying on the law laid down by it in the case of G. Sagar Suri and Another v. State of U.P. and Others2 held that any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. The Court also observed that though no one with a legitimate cause or grievance should be prevented from seeking remedies available in criminal law, a complainant who initiates or persists with a prosecution, being fully aware that the criminal proceedings are unwarranted and his remedy lies only in civil law, should himself be made accountable, at the end of such misconceived criminal proceedings, in accordance with law."

22. In view of the above judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the learned court is further required to consider that whether the ingredients of Section 415 of I.P.C. is made out for a case registered under Section 420 of the IPC or not and for making a case, there should must be have the dishonest intention to cheat from the very beginning and on this ground, there are line of judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and to make a reference of some of them will suffice. Such as, Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi); reported in (2019) 11 SCC 706, Vir Prakash Sharma Versus Anil Kumar Agarwal & Anr., reported in (2007) 7 SCC 373.

23. The allegations reveal a purely civil dispute for a money claim alleging that full payments were not made. There is no assertion of any dishonest intention or misappropriation to cheat from the very beginning. The allegations are made after nine years and the limitation for filing the civil suit is already over and the case for recovery of the amount has already been filed under the Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006 that is still pending being

JHMSEFC Case No. 15 of 2024, as such, the present prosecution is complete abuse of the process of law.

24. In view of the above facts, reasons and analysis, to allow the proceeding to continue, will amount to an abuse of the process of law. As such, the entire criminal proceeding, in connection with Sonari P.S. Case no. 101 of 2023, pending in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur including the order dated 14.06.2023, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Jamshedpur, in connection with Complaint Case No. 3105 of 2023, whereby, exercising the power under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., the learned court has been pleased to sent the complaint for registering the FIR and investigation, are, hereby, quashed.

25. It is made clear that JHMSEFC Case No. 15 of 2024, pending before the competent authority shall be decided on its own merits, without prejudice to this order.

26. This petition is allowed and disposed of in the above terms. Pending I.A., if any, stands disposed of.

(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.) Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi.

Dated the 2nd August, 2024.

AFR/ Amitesh/-