Kanu Lal Sah vs Raj Kishore Sah
2023 Latest Caselaw 1169 Jhar

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
            Civil Review No. 15 of 2022

Kanu Lal Sah                                       ....    .... Petitioner
                               Versus

1. Raj Kishore Sah
2. Basant Sah
                                                   ....   ....   Respondents
                          ------

CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GAUTAM KUMAR CHOUDHARY

------

For the Petitioner : Mr. R.S. Mazumdar, Sr. Advocate Mrs. J.K. Mazumdar, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Lukesh Kumar, Advocate

C.A.V. ON 20.01.2023 PRONOUNCED ON 17 / 03 /2023

1. The instant civil review application has been filed for review of the judgment passed by this court on 31.1.2022 in S.A. No. 253 of 2007 to that part of the order by which direction has been given for an enquiry into the mesne profit for the period from the date of eviction order (2nd September, 2005) till the delivery of possession and for the assessment of market rent for every three years from the date of eviction order, to be determined by the competent authority as per law.

2. The plea for review is premised on the ground that Title Suit No.61 of 1994 for eviction of petitioner/defendant/appellant was decreed under Section 11 (1)(c) of the Bihar Building (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 on the ground of default, personal necessity and of altering and damaging the tenanted premise.

3. The case of the petitioners/defendants inter alia is that there had not been any default in payment of rent. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties and after considering the evidence on record, the learned trial Court decreed the suit under section 11(1)(c) of the rent act for personal necessity holding that plaintiff required the suit premises.

4. The appeal preferred by the petitioner/defendant being T.A. No.160 of 2005 was dismissed confirming the eviction order passed by the trial court.

5. The second appeal S.A No.253 of 2007 has been dismissed by this court by judgment dated 31.01.2022.

6. The review has been preferred mainly on the ground that the rent had been enhanced time to time and the petitioner had been paying

rent regularly till 5.01.2022 (date of eviction decree passed by the trial Court), and there was no arrear of rent on the part of the review petitioner, as he had paid the rent till February 2022. That being no arrear of rent, the order for enquiry into the mesne profit passed by this Court for the period from the date of eviction order till the delivery of possession was beyond the evidence and findings recorded by the learned courts below .

7. The principles and stages for review were succinctly stated in K.N. Mishra Vs. Union Of India (AIR 2003 Cal 307):

"ORDER 47 provides three stages for dealing with review. A review commences as is clear from Order 47 CPC with an ex parte application. The Court then may either reject the application at once or may issue a rule calling on the other side to show-cause why the review should not be granted. This is the first stage. The second stage begins with the admission of the review application. This is followed by hearing the cause shown by the other side and the application. This hearing necessitates to some extent an investigation into the merits. If the rule is discharged, the case ends. The Chapter for review is closed at the second stage. If the rule is made absolute, then the procedure reaches the third stage. This is done under Rule 4. Then the case is re-heard on merits under Rule 8. Upon such hearing on merit, it may result in a repetition of the former decree or order or in some variation of it. Though, the result may be same whether the rule is discharged or on rehearing, the original decree is repeated, but in law, there is a material difference. In the latter case, the matter having been re- opened, there is a fresh decree. In the former case, the parties are relegated to and still rest on the old decree. This distinction is of fundamental importance as was held in Vadilal v. Fulchand, 1905 ILR 30 Bom 56 and Nanhe v. Mangat Rai, (1913) 20 IC 647. The failure to recognize this distinction between the second and third stage led to the embarrassment of litigants in many instances, especially in the class of cases contemplated in Order 47 Rule 5. The distinction is apparent and simple. From the scheme of Order 47, it appears that after the first stage, if the review travels to the second stage, the review part is complete on the termination of the second stage. Inasmuch as either the review is rejected or granted.

Once it is granted, the earlier order stands recalled and the suit or the appeal revives and the matter is re-heard in the third stage. This re-hearing is of the suit or appeal so revived and is something distinct from review. Order granting review under Rule 4 is appealable under Order 43 Rule 1 (w) but rejection thereunder is not. The order passed upon re-hearing under Rule 8 is distinct and different from those under Rule 4. An order under Rule 8 is a decree or order passed in the original suit or appeal. It is subject to appeal under Section 96 or 100 or 104 CPC or under the Letters Patent or such other law as the case may be. It is not an order on the application for review. It assumes a complexion altogether different from an order of review. Once the order under review is recalled and the matter is directed to be re-heard, it is no more a review subject to Order 47 Rule 5. Inasmuch as at the re-hearing, the case is reopened either wholly or in part and it is re-heard afresh. Even if after the third stage, the old decree or order is repeated, even then it would be a fresh order or decree passed in the suit or appeal after re-hearing. When the application for review is granted, the original decree or order is law stands vacated and the suit or the appeal stands revived. Once the suit or appeal stands revived, it cannot come within the scope of Order 47 Rule 5. This is more so from the scheme of the procedure laid down in Order 47".

8. Without issuing notice to the respondents, this Court is of the view that the instant review petition is misconceived. The law of restitution and mesne profit is settled by a long line of judicial precedents.

9. The protection of the Rent Act available to a tenant is available only till the date of passing of the eviction order and once the order has been passed on any ground whether it is default or personal necessity, the tenant becomes liable to pay the market rent to the landlord till the date of eviction and delivery of possession. It is immaterial whether eviction was stayed during the pendency of appeal, as one cannot be permitted to unjust enrichment by protracted litigation. In order to reiterate the law on this point it will be desirable to refer to some of the authorities on the point of restitution and mesne profit.

The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed and held in South

Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P., (2003) 8 SCC 648 "26. ......... The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost; and it is the duty of the court to do so unless it feels that in the facts and on the circumstances of the case, the restitution far from meeting the ends of justice, would rather defeat the same. Undoing the effect of an interim order by resorting to principles of restitution is an obligation of the party, who has gained by the interim order of the court, so as to wipe out the effect of the interim order passed which, in view of the reasoning adopted by the court at the stage of final decision, the court earlier would not or ought not to have passed. There is nothing wrong in an effort being made to restore the parties to the same position in which they would have been if the interim order would not have existed.

27. Section 144 CPC is not the fountain source of restitution, it is rather a statutory recognition of a pre-existing rule of justice, equity and fair play. That is why it is often held that even away from Section 144 the court has inherent jurisdiction to order restitution so as to do complete justice between the parties. In Jai Berham v. Kedar Nath Marwari [(1922) 49 IA 351 : AIR 1922 PC 269] Their Lordships of the Privy Council said: (AIR p. 271) "It is the duty of the court under Section 144 of the Civil Procedure Code to 'place the parties in the position which they would have occupied, but for such decree or such part thereof as has been varied or reversed'. Nor indeed does this duty or jurisdiction arise merely under the said section. It is inherent in the general jurisdiction of the court to act rightly and fairly according to the circumstances towards all parties involved." Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC 249

52. The main question which arises for our consideration is whether the prevailing delay in civil litigation can be curbed? In our considered opinion the existing system can be drastically changed or improved if the following steps are taken by the trial courts while dealing with the civil trials:

............

..............

...............

D. The court must adopt realistic and pragmatic approach in granting mesne profits. The court must carefully keep in view the ground realities while granting mesne profits. ......................

G. The principle of restitution be fully applied in a pragmatic manner in order to do real and substantial justice.

Emphasis supplied Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (2011) 8 SCC 161

148. The appellants must pay the amount is one thing but should they pay only that amount or something more? If the period were a few days or months it would have been different but here it is almost 14 years that have lapsed and the amount has not been paid. The questions, therefore, are really three:

1. Can a party who does not comply with the court order be permitted to retain the benefits of his own wrong of non- compliance?

2. Whether the successful party be not compensated by way of restitution for deprivation of its legitimate dues for more than fourteen years? and

3. Whether the Court should not remove all incentives for not complying with the judgment of the Court?

Answering these questions will necessitate analysis of certain concepts.

149. It is settled principle of law that no one can take advantage of his own wrong. Unless courts disgorge all benefits that a party availed by obstruction or delays or non-compliance, there will always be incentive for non-compliance, and parties are ingenious enough to come up with all kinds of pleas and other tactics to achieve their end because they know that in the end the benefit will remain with them.

150. Whatever benefits a person has had or could have had by not complying with the judgment must be disgorged and paid to the

judgment-creditor and not allowed to be retained by the judgment- debtor. This is the bounden duty and obligation of the court. In fact, it has to be looked at from the position of the creditor. Unless the deprivation by reason of delay is fully restituted, the creditor as a beneficiary remains a loser to the extent of the unrestituted amount.

174. In Padmawati v. Harijan Sewak Sangh [(2008) 154 DLT 411 (Del)], the High Court held as under: (DLT p. 413, para 6) "6. The case at hand shows that frivolous defences and frivolous litigation is a calculated venture involving no risks situation. You have only to engage professionals to prolong the litigation so as to deprive the rights of a person and enjoy the fruits of illegalities. I consider that in such cases where court finds that using the courts as a tool, a litigant has perpetuated illegalities or has perpetuated an illegal possession, the court must impose costs on such litigants which should be equal to the benefits derived by the litigant and harm and deprivation suffered by the rightful person so as to check the frivolous litigation and prevent the people from reaping a rich harvest of illegal acts through the courts. One of the aim of every judicial system has to be to discourage unjust enrichment using courts as a tool. The costs imposed by the courts must in all cases should be the real costs equal to deprivation suffered by the rightful person."

We approve the findings of the High Court of Delhi in the aforementioned case.

175. The High Court also stated: (Padmawati case [(2008) 154 DLT 411 (Del)] , DLT pp. 414-15, para 9) "9. Before parting with this case, we consider it necessary to observe that one of the [main] reasons for overflowing of court dockets is the frivolous litigation in which the courts are engaged by the litigants and which is dragged as long as possible. Even if these litigants ultimately lose the lis, they become the real victors and have the last laugh. This class of people who perpetuate illegal acts by obtaining stays and injunctions from the courts must be made to pay the sufferer not only the entire illegal gains made by them as costs to the person deprived of his right and also must be

burdened with exemplary costs. Faith of people in judiciary can only be sustained if the persons on the right side of the law do not feel that even if they keep fighting for justice in the court and ultimately win, they would turn out to be a fool since winning a case after 20 or 30 years would make wrongdoer as real gainer, who had reaped the benefits for all those years. Thus, it becomes the duty of the courts to see that such wrongdoers are discouraged at every step and even if they succeed in prolonging the litigation due to their money power, ultimately they must suffer the costs of all these years' long litigation. Despite settled legal positions, the obvious wrongdoers, use one after another tier of judicial review mechanism as a gamble, knowing fully well that dice is always loaded in their favour, since even if they lose, the time gained is the real gain. This situation must be redeemed by the courts."

192. The court's constant endeavour must be to ensure that everyone gets just and fair treatment. The court while rendering justice must adopt a pragmatic approach and in appropriate cases realistic costs and compensation be ordered in order to discourage dishonest litigation. The object and true meaning of the concept of restitution cannot be achieved or accomplished unless the courts adopt a pragmatic approach in dealing with the cases.

197. The other aspect which has been dealt with in great detail is to neutralise any unjust enrichment and undeserved gain made by the litigants. While adjudicating, the courts must keep the following principles in view:

(1) It is the bounden duty and obligation of the court to neutralise any unjust enrichment and undeserved gain made by any party by invoking the jurisdiction of the court.

(2) When a party applies and gets a stay or injunction from the court, it is always at the risk and responsibility of the party applying. An order of stay cannot be presumed to be conferment of additional right upon the litigating party. (3) Unscrupulous litigants be prevented from taking undue advantage by invoking jurisdiction of the court. (4) A person in wrongful possession should not only be removed from that place as early as possible but be compelled to pay for

wrongful use of that premises fine, penalty and costs. Any leniency would seriously affect the credibility of the judicial system.

(5) No litigant can derive benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law.

(6) A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs.

(7) Litigation should not be permitted to turn into a fruitful industry so that the unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to invoke the jurisdiction of the court.

(8) The institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by delayed action of courts. Emphasis supplied to the under lined portion

10. The second plea raises the question that the suit was not decreed for default but on the ground of personal necessity then why should the petitioner pay the market rent from the date of eviction order? Is there a duty of a tenant to pay market rent from the date of eviction order or he has a right to continue in the tenanted premise on the meagre rent decades ago?

Law on these questions is emphatic that once the eviction order is passed there is no right to continuation in the tenanted premise on the old rent by taking the advantage of stay to the eviction order by the appellate Courts. In any case he has to recompense the landlord for the loss caused of realistic market rent in dragging the litigation and continuing in the leased premises. Reference to some of the authorities should clear the law on the point.

Emphasis supplied Chander Kali Bai v. Jagdish Singh Thakur, (1977) 4 SCC 402 at page 407

12. For the reasons stated above it is manifest that the defendants remained in occupation of the accommodation on and from January 1, 1973 as a tenant, conveniently to be called statutory tenant, under the Act. Their occupation was not unauthorised or wrongful until a decree for eviction was passed by the first appellate court on August 11, 1975. Their occupation became unauthorised or wrongful only from that date. They are not,

therefore, liable to pay any damages or mesne profits for the period commencing from January 1, 1973 and ending on August 10, 1975. Decree for damages either in respect of the two months prior to the institution of the suit or for the subsequent period must therefore be set aside. The defendant-appellants will be liable to pay damages or mesne profits at the rate of Rs 125 per month (the rate of damages could not be and was not challenged before us) from August 11, 1975 only, until the delivery of the vacant possession of the accommodation.

2003 SCC On Line Del 519 Amar Singh Trilochan Singh Vs Jasoti

24. There is one disturbing fact that I cannot ignore. The appeal was filed way back in 1982 and stay against recovery of possession has continued from 24th February, 1982 till date. Considering the fact that stay of eviction has operated for over 21 years and keeping in view the principle that no one can take benefit of a stay or an injunction that is ultimately vacated, I wish to make orders for compensation on the lines as the Supreme Court did in Marshal Sons & Co. (I) Ltd. v. Sahi Oretrans (P) Ltd. & Anr., 1999 (2) SCC 325: 1999 AIR (SO 882.

28. Since it will be difficult for this Court to assess the amount, I leave it open to the landlord to make an application to the Controller for an inquiry into and determination of the mesne profits for the period the stay of this Court remained in operation and further till possession is delivered. Credit of interim payments shall be allowed. Such application may be made within three months from today, and for that limited purpose the original proceedings shall continue. On filing of such application, Controller shall decide the same in accordance with law.

Emphasis supplied Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors (P) Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705

19. To sum up, our conclusions are:

(1) ................

(2) In case of premises governed by the provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, in view of the definition of tenant

contained in clause (l) of Section 2 of the Act, the tenancy does not stand terminated merely by its termination under the general law; it terminates with the passing of the decree for eviction. With effect from that date, the tenant is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises and earn rent if the tenant would have vacated the premises. The landlord is not bound by the contractual rate of rent effective for the period preceding the date of the decree. (3) The doctrine of merger does not have the effect of postponing the date of termination of tenancy merely because the decree of eviction stands merged in the decree passed by the superior forum at a later date.

Emphasis supplied Anderson Wright & Co. v. Amar Nath Roy, (2005) 6 SCC 489

6. The learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants cannot be held liable to pay anything more than the standard rent of the premises, in spite of the decree for eviction having been passed as the same is sub judice. This submission needs a summary dismissal in view of the judgment of this Court in Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. case [(2005) 1 SCC 705] . Both the parties have filed affidavit and counter-affidavit, placing on record material giving the Court an idea of the rate of rent generally prevalent in the locality where the suit property is situated. Canara Bank on the first floor of this building is paying rent @ Rs 25 per sq ft other than maintenance and municipal taxes. One Rumpa Ghosh entered as the tenant in the year 2002 is paying rent @ Rs 32 per sq ft. Taking an overall view of the material made available by the parties, we think that the appellants should, from the date of the decree of the eviction, pay mesne profits/compensation for use and occupation @ Rs 15 per sq ft subject to final determination of the same by a competent forum. Achal Mishra Vs Rama Shanker Singh JT (2005) 4 SC 236 We make it clear that the respondents shall be liable to pay rent equivalent to mesne profits with effect from the date they are ceased to entitled to retain possession of the premises as tenant

and for such period the landlords entitlement cannot be said to be held pegged to the standard rent.

Emphasis supplied Trilochan Singh v. Daya Shankar, 2010 SCC OnLine Del

40. To help redeem the situation, and also set an example for litigants and prevent them from abusing the process and taking advantage of laws, delays to benefit themselves and deprive another of the usufruct of his property, I propose to examine the matter further and pass orders.

43. Of course where there is rent control protection, no such obligation arises upon efflux of time or upon service of a notice for termination and the lessee is entitled to continue as a tenant, until an order for eviction is passed by the Rent Controller. In other words, it is only on an order for eviction being passed that the tenancy would stand terminated and with effect from the date of the order he shall become an unauthorized occupant [vide Atma Ram Properties (P) Ltd. v. Federal Motors Pvt. Ltd., (2005) 1 SCC 705].

45. When as per contract, or in law, the entitlement to occupy a premises comes to an end, it is for the tenant including those claiming under him, to himself vacate the premises and hand them over to the landlord. It is not that every lease which expires by efflux of time; or a month-to-month tenancy that is determined by a notice to quit; or where protection of rent control ceases to be available on some ground, the case has to become litigation before our Courts.

47. Since the litigation has been dragged after 1993, and after 1999 for 11 years before this Court, therefore, it is not only the period after the stay in this appeal, it is also the period after the death of Kailash Kaur when all rights extinguished and despite that, matter was still being contested and possession of the premises withheld, that has to be considered.

48. Till 1993, the law gave protection to the widow of Kailash Kaur. With the widow not living there, but the sons carrying on business in the premises as they claim, it can be argued that she

had lost the right to protection and payment of Rs. 22 per month. Because long time has elapsed, I would not go behind 1993. After 1993, it was the duty of the legal heirs to hand over possession to the landlord and when they did not, but continued to raise disputes and prolong the litigation and derive the benefits of using the shop, they became liable to pay mesne profits.

49. Every party is expected to comply with the law and the contract that he has entered into and his failure to do so and his causing unnecessary litigation should mean a penalty and not a benefit for him. Our Courts are overloaded because it is widely believed that to force the other party to start litigation will in the end be beneficial for the wrong-doer.

50. To tackle Court delays, the motivation for raising disputes and delaying litigation must be removed. A party who makes a claim or raises a dispute before a Court must know that whenever the case is decided, and if it is decided against him, not only all benefits that he may have received in the meantime will have to be paid back, but all losses of the other party will also have to be compensated. Unless all losses and deprivations of the successful party have been fully compensated for, the Court fails in its task of doing justice. If Courts pass orders directing payment of realistic costs and compensation that sufficiently make up for the losses of the other, the motivation behind raising of disputes will be removed and the Courts will be freed of a lot of frivolous litigation.

51. Keeping in view this state of affairs and the prevalent general impression, it will be a useful approach if the Court, when deciding a matter, considers what all orders ought to be passed so as to do complete justice and ensure that the party which has lost, does not get away without having to compensate the other for the deprivation it caused to it by raising the dispute.

52. Where a lessee whose lease has been determined, or a tenant who is no longer entitled to protection of rent control laws, fails in his obligation to deliver possession to the landlord, he and all those who are occupying the premises with him and if the tenant be dead or gone the legal heirs or others who are in possession

incur the liability of mesne profits towards the landlord. Such liability arises by reason of their failure of comply with the law and deliver possession to the owner.

53. A person, cannot say that I am occupying but I am not liable for mesne profits. Each person would be liable. If a person who is impleaded as a respondent to the eviction petition or an appeal and is not interested really in the subject matter of the appeal, and may not even be in possession, on receiving notice from the Court, does not file an affidavit in the Court stating that he is not concerned with the premises, he runs the risk of the Court, when finally deciding the matter, also making him liable for any mesne profits.

55. There is yet another ground for the liability. This appeal was admitted on 8.1.2000 when the stay order was granted and the benefit of the stay order has been enjoyed by the Appellant. In Amar Singh Trilochan Singh v. Jasoti, 105 (2003) DLT 499, this Court was considering a question regarding mesne profits and after noticing the delays of pendency and some decisions in paras 15, 16 and 17, held (para 19) as under:

"Since it will be difficult for this Court to assess the amount, I leave it open to the landlord to make an application to the Controller for an inquiry into and determination of the mesne profits for the period the stay of this Court remained in operation and further till possession is delivered. Credit of interim payments shall be allowed. Such application may be made within three months from today, and for that limited purpose the original proceedings shall continue. On filing of such application, Controller shall decide the same in accordance with law."

56. The observations of the Supreme Court in South Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. State of M.P., (2003) 8 SCC 648 : AIR 2003 SC 4482 (para 24) are reproduced below:

"24. ... In law, the term 'restitution' is used in three senses: (i) return or restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status; (ii) compensation for benefits derived from a wrong done to another; (iii) compensation or reparation for the loss caused to another.... The successful party can demand (a) the delivery of

benefit earned by the opposite party under the interim order of the Court, or (b) to make restitution for what it has lost; and it is the duty of the Court to do so unless it feels that in the facts and on the circumstances of the case, the restitution would far from meeting the ends of justice, would rather defeat the same. ..."

57. For the period during which the stay was in operation at the instance of the Appellant, and the Respondent No. 1 was being deprived of the fruits of the order passed by the Tribunal, there must be an order that fully compensates Respondent No. 1 for all deprivations and losses.

58. Therefore, while dismissing the appeal, I direct that inquiry be made to determine the mesne profits for the period 13.4.1993 (when Kailash Kaur died) till the delivery of possession along with interest from the date of accrual till payment @ 9% per annum against the appellant Trilochan Singh. For this purpose, the trial Court record shall be sent back to the Controller, who will conduct an inquiry and pass orders quantifying the amount in terms of this judgment after giving credit for the amounts already paid. The amount so determined will be executable as a decree for recovery of money. Except for that, the appeal is dismissed.

Emphasis supplied Bhom Raj Vs Shakuntla Mehta CMP No.7399 of 2018 in Civil Revision No. 168 of 2018 decided by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh 7.01.2019

5. At the outset, it needs to be observed that there can be no dispute that once decree for eviction has been passed in that even the execution of decree for eviction can be stayed only if the tenant is put to such reasonable returns as would in the appeal of the court, reasonably compensate the landlord for the loss occasioned by the delay in execution of decree by the grant of stay order, in the event of the appeal being dismissed. There can be further no quarrel that with effect from the date of decree of eviction, the tenant is liable to pay the mesne profit of compensation for use and occupation charges of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises on being vacated by the tenant.

6. It may also be observed that the courts after passing of an order of eviction can always put the occupant of the premises to terms including payment of mesne profit. The very purpose of awarding mesne profit or use and occupation charges is to put a check on the diabolical plans of the tenant who has been ordered to be evicted and ensure that he does not squat on the premises by paying meagre rent. At the same time even the landlord is also compensated to receive higher rent than the contractual rent. Martin & Harris (P) Ltd. v. Rajendra Mehta, (2022) 8 SCC 527

18. Thus, after passing the decree of eviction the tenancy terminates and from the said date the landlord is entitled for mesne profits or compensation depriving him from the use of the premises.

Emphasis supplied

Sumer Corporation Vs Vijay Anant Gangan & Ors Civil Appeal No. 7774 of 2022 decided by the Supreme Court on 9.11.2022 As observed and held by this court in the case of Atma Ram properties Pvt. Ltd. (supra), from the date of the decree of eviction the tenant is liable to pay mesne profits or compensation for use and occupation of the premises at the same rate at which the landlord would have been able to let out the premises and earn rent if the tenant would have vacated the premises. The landlord is not bound by the contractual rate of rent effective for the period preceding the date of the decree.

Emphasis supplied

11. What follows from the long line of judicial pronouncement is that the judicial process is a solemn proceeding which cannot be allowed to be converted into an instrument of oppression or unjust enrichment by dragging on the litigation on one pretext or the other. In such an eventuality the party on the wrong is liable to make good to the party denied the fruits of decree due to pending litigation.

12. The present case involves a matter where the suit was filed for eviction in 1994 and decree for eviction was passed eleven years later in 2005. The first appeal was dismissed in 2007 and the second appeal dismissed in 2022 by this Court. In order to compensate the successful

party who had been deprived of the fruits of the decree for eviction since 2005 and enquiry was directed to be held by the executing court into the mesne profit for the period from the date of eviction order (2nd September 2005). I do not find any reason to interfere with the earlier order passed by this Court in the second appeal. Civil litigation cannot be permitted to become an industry to profit by delaying its final outcome.

13. All the Courts of the State of Jharkhand will take note of the law on restitution and mesne profits laid down by Hon'ble the Supreme Court and other High Courts as discussed above, and will apply it in appropriate case. Let a copy of this Judgment be sent to the Judicial Academy Jharkhand for utilizing it in training courses for judicial officers.

The Civil Review Petition stands dismissed.

                                         (Gautam Kumar Choudhary, J.)

Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi
Dated the 17th March, 2023
AFR /     AKT