Jharkhand High Court
Mainu Singh vs The State Of Jharkhand on 19 October, 2022
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
(Criminal Revisional Jurisdiction)
Cr. Revision No. 721 of 2015
1.Mainu Singh, son of late Bandhu Singh
2.Bishun Singh, son of Khudi Singh
Both resident of village Dhodra, PO, PS&District Gumla (Jharkhand)
... Petitioners
Versus
1.The State of Jharkhand
2.Raj Kumar Narsia, s/o late Dwarika Prasad, r/o village Panso, PO, PS &
District Gumla ... Opposite Parties
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CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SHREE CHANDRASHEKHAR
For the Petitioners : Mr. Kripa Shankar Nanda, Advocate
For the State : Ms. Nehala Sharmin, Spl.PP
For OP No. 2 : Mr. Niranjan Kumar Sinha, Advocate
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Order No. 07/Dated: 19th October 2022
This criminal revision petition has been filed against the
judgment in Criminal Appeal No. 63 of 2011 by which the judgment of
conviction and sentence of RI for one year under section 138 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 passed in GR No.488 of 1999/TR
No. 1455 of 2011 has been affirmed.
2. Mr. Niranjan Kumar Sinha, the learned counsel appears for OP
No. 2.
3. Ms. Nehala Sharmin, the learned Spl.PP appears for the State.
4. Alongwith I.A.(cr.) No. 4457 of 2015, supplementary affidavit
dated 10th August 2015 has been filed by which a joint compromise
agreement signed by the petitioners and the complainant in the presence of
two witnesses has been brought on record. A photocopy of the Electoral
Photo Identity Card of Raj Kumar Narsia authenticated by him has also been
attached alongwith the supplementary affidavit dated 10th August 2015.
5. Mr. Kripa Shankar Nanda, the learned counsel for the
petitioners submits that the petitioners have already paid Rs. 40,000/- for
which Gumla PS Case No. 152 of 1999 was instituted by the complainant,
vide demand draft no. 628312 drawn on Union Bank Gumla which was
received by the complainant under a receipt.
6. The learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the judgment
in "Gian Singh v. State of Punjab" (2012) 10 SCC 303 to submit that in
view of compromise between the parties the judgment of conviction and
sentence awarded to the petitioners in GR No. 488 of 1999/TR No. 1455 of
2011 are liable to be set aside.
7. In "Gian Singh" the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under:
"58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having
regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the
victim has been settled although the offences are not
compoundable, it does so as in its opinion, continuation of
criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in
the case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an
end and peace is restored; securing the ends of justice being the
ultimate guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts which have
harmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing that
seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of the society and
it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only because he and the victim
have settled the dispute amicably or that the victim has been paid
compensation, yet certain crimes have been made compoundable
in law, with or without the permission of the court. In respect of
serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences
of mental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitude
under special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the
offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity, the settlement between the offender and the victim can
have no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which
overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour having
arisen out of civil, mercantile, commercial, financial, partnership
or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony,
particularly relating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the
wrong is basically to the victim and the offender and the victim
have settled all disputes between them amicably, irrespective of the
fact that such offences have not been made compoundable, the
High Court may within the framework of its inherent power, quash
the criminal proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is
satisfied that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any
likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not quashing the
criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualty and ends of justice
shall be defeated. The above list is illustrative and not exhaustive.
Each case will depend on its own facts and no hard-and-fast
category can be prescribed."
8. Section 147 of the Negotiable Instrument Act provides that
every offence punishable under the Act shall be compoundable
notwithstanding any provision under the Code of Criminal Procedure. This
obviously would have reference to section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure which provides that certain offences enumerated thereunder are
compoundable at the instance of the person who has suffered the harm.
9. In "Vinay Devanna Nayak v. Ryot Sewa Sahakari Bank Ltd."
(2008) 2 SCC 305 the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the
parliamentary intention under section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments Act
appears to be that normally compounding of offences under the Act should
not be denied.
10. In "K. M. Ibrahim v. K.P. Mohammed" (2010) 1 SCC 798 the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that section 147 of the Negotiable
Instruments Act shall have overriding effect over any other provision under
the general laws.
11. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:
"10. The object of Section 320 CrPC, which would not in the
strict sense of the term apply to a proceeding under the Negotiable
Instruments Act, 1881, gives the parties to the proceedings an
opportunity to compound offences mentioned in the table
contained in the said section, with or without the leave of the
court, and also vests the court with jurisdiction to allow such
compromise. By virtue of sub-section (8), the legislature has taken
one step further in vesting jurisdiction in the court to also acquit
the accused/convict of the offence on the same being allowed to be
compounded.
11. Inasmuch as, it is with a similar object in mind that Section
147 has been inserted into the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by
amendment, an analogy may be drawn as to the intention of the
legislature as expressed in Section 320(8) CrPC, although, the
same has not been expressly mentioned in the amended section to a
proceeding under Section 147 of the aforesaid Act.
12. Apart from the above, this Court is further empowered
under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass appropriate orders in
line with sub-section (8) of Section 320 CrPC in an application
under Section 147 of the aforesaid Act, in order to do justice to the
parties.
13. As far as the non obstante clause included in Section 147 of
the 1881 Act is concerned, the 1881 Act being a special statute, the
provisions of Section 147 will have an overriding effect over the
provisions of the Code relating to compounding of offences. The
various decisions cited by Mr Rohatgi on this issue do not add to
the above position.
14. It is true that the application under Section 147 of the
Negotiable Instruments Act was made by the parties after the
proceedings had been concluded before the appellate forum.
However, Section 147 of the aforesaid Act does not bar the parties
from compounding an offence under Section 138 even at the
appellate stage of the proceedings. Accordingly, we find no reason
to reject the application under Section 147 of the aforesaid Act
even in a proceeding under Article 136 of the Constitution."
12. In view of the settlement between the parties, the prayer for
compounding the offence under section 147 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act is granted.
13. Insofar as the punishment of RI for one year awarded to the
petitioners in GR No.488 of 1999/TR No. 1455 of 2011 is concerned, the
same in view of the judgment in "Gian Singh" is also required to be set
aside.
14. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and sentence of RI for
one year awarded to the petitioners in GR No.488 of 1999/TR No. 1455 of
2011 are set aside.
15. Criminal Revision No. 721 of 2015 is allowed.
(Shree Chandrashekhar, J.)
Tanuj/-
