Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 803 Jhar
Judgement Date : 19 February, 2021
1
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
L.P.A. No.36 of 2019
With
I.A.No.618 of 2019
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1. The State of Jharkhand, through Deputy Commissioner-cum- Chairman District Education Establishment Committee, Khunti, P.O. & P.S. Khunti, District: Khunti
2. The Regional Deputy Director of Education, South Chhotanagpur Region at Ranchi, P.O., P.S. & District: Ranchi
3. The District Superintendent of Education, Khunti, P.O. & P.S.:
Khunti, District: Ranchi .... .... Appellants
Versus
1. Anup Kumar Mishra, Son of Shri Rampado Mishra, Resident of Village: Ithe, P.O.: Ithe, P.S. Khunti, District: Khunti, presently working posted as Assistant Teacher, Govt. Middle School, Ghaghra, P.O. P.S. & District: Khunti
2. Swarup Kumar Mishra, Son of Shri Rampado Mishra, Resident of Village: Ithe, P.O. Ithe, P.S: Khunti, District: Khunti, presently working & posted as Assistant Teacher, Govt. Middle School, Haruhappu, P.O. Jaltanda, P.S. Karra, District: Khunti .... .... Respondents With L.P.A. No.197 of 2019 With I.A.No.2290 of 2019
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1. The State of Jharkhand, through Deputy Commissioner-cum- Chairman District Education Establishment Committee, Khunti Having Office At P.O. & P.S. Khunti, District: Khunti
2. The Regional Deputy Director of Education, South Chhotanagpur Region at Ranchi, P.O., P.S. & District: Ranchi
3. The District Superintendent of Education, Khunti, Having its Office At P.O. & P.S.: Khunti, District: Ranchi .... .... Appellants Versus
Shiv Kumar Mishra, Son of Shri Rampado Mishra, Resident of Village: Ithe, P.O.: Ithe, P.S. Murhu, District: Khunti, presently working posted as Assistant Teacher, Govt. Middle School, Siladon, P.O. Siladon P.S. & District: Khunti .... .... Respondent
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CORAM : HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD
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For the Appellants : Mr. PAS Pati, SC-IV (In LPA No.36/2019) : Mr. Manish Mishra, GP-V (In LPA No.197 of 2019) For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kr. Tiwari, Advocate (In both the cases)
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ORAL JUDGMENT 11/Dated: 19.02.2021
The matter has been heard through video conferencing with the
consent of learned counsel for the parties. There is no complaint about
any audio and visual quality.
I.A.No.618 of 2019 in L.P.A.No.36 of 2019 & I.A. No.2290 in
L.P.A.No.197 of 2019
These Interlocutory Applications have been filed for condoning the
delay of 147 and 189 days respectively, which have occurred in preferring
these appeals.
Notices were issued to the respondents on the point of limitation in
both the appeals and pursuant to that, the respondents have appeared
through their counsel and have filed their respective counter affidavits
wherein at paragraph no.6, they have pointed out that when the direction
issued by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order was not
complied with, the answering respondents filed Contempt Case (C) No.
721 of 2018 and only after receiving the notice in the contempt petition,
the appellants have preferred the present appeals just to save themselves
from the contempt proceedings.
It also appears from the certified copy of the impugned orders in both
the respective appeals that the requisition for supply of the certified copy
was made on 26.10.2018 so far L.P.A. No. 36 of 2019 is concerned,
whereas in L.P.A. No. 197 of 2019 it was made on 28.01.2019.
It has been contended on behalf of the answering respondents in
both the appeals that this shows that no decision for preferring the
appeals could be taken at that point of time.
Be that as it may, it is clear from the counter affidavit that a contempt
case was filed in connection with the impugned order and when the
notices were issued in the contempt case then only the appeals have
been filed because there is no denial to the aforesaid statements made in
the counter affidavit.
Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the
considered view that these appeals require to be heard on merit.
However, we are condoning the delay of 147 days and 189 days
respectively in preferring both the appeals, subject to payment of cost of
Rs.5000/- each in both the appeals which would be paid in favour of the
respondents through their counsel within a period of two weeks.
I.A. No. 618/2019 and I.A. No. 2290/2019 stand allowed.
L.P.A. No.36 of 2019 and L.P.A.No.197 of 2019
We have proceeded for hearing of the appeals on merit with the
consent of the parties.
2. In both these appeals, common order is under question under
Clause-10 of Letters Patent Appeal directed against the order/judgment
dated 24.07.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in
W.P.(S) No.5917 of 2017 with W.P.(S) No.5920 of 2017, whereby and
whereunder, relief sought for by the writ petitioners in W.P.(S) No.5917 of
2017 pertaining to payment of consequential monetary benefits of
salary/arrears to them upon grant of promotion in Grade-IV w.e.f.
12.09.2002 and monetary benefits were given after joining to the said post
with a further direction upon the respondents to grant promotion in Grade-
VII(Headmaster) w.e.f. 2007-2008, as per the provisions stipulated in the
Elementary School Teachers Promotion Rules, 1993 (hereinafter referred
as the Rules, 1993), whereas, the prayer made by the writ petitioner in
W.P.(S) No.5920 of 2017 for a direction upon the respondents to pay
consequential benefits of salary/arrears to the writ petitioner upon grant of
promotion in Grade-IV w.e.f. 01.08.2014, as the promotion has been given
to the petitioner w.e.f. 01.08.2014 but it has been stipulated that the said
pay scale of the promotional post shall be given upon the joining to the
said post with a further prayer for quashing the office order dated
08.04.2017, whereby, the promotion in Grade-IV which has been granted
to the writ petitioner vide memo no.1428 dated 02.11.2016 with
retrospective effect i.e. w.e.f. 12.09.2002 has been rectified by the
decision of the Establishment Committee, Khunti was directed to be
granted in favour of the writ petitioner by allowing the writ petition.
3. The brief facts of the cases are required to be referred herein which
reads as hereunder:-
The writ petitioners were appointed as Assistant Teacher in the
Elementary Schools of the State of Jharkhand. The petitioners in W.P.(S)
No.5917 of 2017 were granted promotion to Grade-IV w.e.f. 12.09.2002
and similarly, petitioner in W.P.(S) No.5920 of 2017 was granted promotion
to Grade-IV w.e.f. 01.08.2014.
It is the case of the writ petitioners that despite their requests, the
writ petitioners along with others were not granted promotion in Grade-I
Scale w.e.f. the date of their respective appointment, while similarly
situated persons were moved before this Court for grant of Grade-I Scale
from the date of their appointment and this Court in the case of Arun
Sinha Vs. The State of Jharkhand & Ors. [W.P.(S) No.638 of 2006]
passed an order on 04.04.2008, against the said order, the State had filed
L.P.A.No.214 of 2008 which was dismissed by the Division Bench of this
Court and subsequently, the State had preferred SLP (Civil) Nos.5520-
5522 of 2013 before the Hon'ble Apex Court and in terms thereof, the
benefits have been granted in favour of the writ petitioners of W.P.(S)
No.638 of 2006 but the similar relief has not been granted to the writ
petitioners of the instant case.
It is the further case of the writ petitioners that the respondents,
however, had granted Grade-IV promotion w.e.f. 12.09.2002 so far as it
relates to the writ petitioners of W.P.(S) No.5917 of 2017 and w.e.f.
01.08.2014 so far as it relates to the writ petitioner of W.P.(S) No.5920 of
2017 but the monetary benefits of the said promotion have not been
granted and it is indicated in the said order that the monetary benefits
shall be given from the date of joining to the said promotional post and
joining in the school.
It is the specific case of the writ petitioners that due to the laches on
the part of the respondents, promotions were granted in the year 2016
though it was fallen due w.e.f. 12.09.2002 [W.P.(S) No.5917 of 2017] and
w.e.f. 01.08.2014 [W.P.(S) No.5920 of 2017].
The writ petitioners have made series of representations but
however to that no effect, therefore, they have invoked the jurisdiction
conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
seeking therein the relief for release of monetary benefit from the date of
promotion on the ground that juniors to the petitioners have already
granted such benefits but the same has been denied.
The respondent State of Jharkhand has contested the case by filing
detailed counter affidavit inter-alia therein it has been stated that the writ
petitioners have been granted promotion w.e.f 12.09.2002 but they are not
entitled to be given any actual monetary benefits in lieu of the promotion
granted with retrospective effect.
The learned Single Judge after taking into consideration the rival
submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and taking into
consideration the various pronouncements of the Court, has allowed the
writ petition by quashing the order dated 08.04.2017 issued by the Deputy
Development Commissioner, Khunti so far as it relates to the petitioners
and further by holding the writ petitioners entitled for the benefits as
prayed for by them in the writ petition to be granted within the period of six
weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order with a
further direction upon the respondents to consider the cases of the
petitioners of W.P.(S) No.5917 of 2017 for their promotion to Grade-
VII(Headmaster) with effect from the date it fallen due to them, as per the
provisions stipulated in the Elementary School Teachers Promotion Rules,
1993 as the petitioners are having the requisite qualifications for the same
and after promoting them to the said post, to pay all the consequential
benefits to the petitioners, which is the subject matter of the present intra-
court appeals.
4. Mr. P.A.S. Pati, learned SC-IV appearing for the appellant-State of
Jharkhand in L.P.A.No.36 of 2019 while Mr. Manish Mishra, learned GP-V
appearing for the appellant-State of Jharkhand in L.P.A.No.197 of 2019
have vehemently submitted that the order passed by the learned Single
Judge is not proper on the ground that the writ petitioners are not entitled
to be given actual monetary benefit on account of retrospective promotion
and therefore, the respondent State of Jharkhand after taking into
consideration the fact that in case of retrospective promotion, there cannot
be any actual monetary benefit, has passed the impugned decision by
denying the claim which suffers from no infirmity and the learned Single
Judge without taking into consideration these aspects of the matter has
allowed the writ petitions which suffers from infirmity, hence, the same
may be quashed and set aside.
5. Per Contra, Mr. Amit Kr. Tiwari, learned counsel appearing for the
respondents-writ petitioners has submitted that it is the case of
discrimination since the writ petitioners have brought to the notice before
the learned Single Judge by filing the supplementary affidavit referring
therein the name of similarly situated junior employees who have been
granted monetary benefit with retrospective effect but the said claim has
been denied.
Further, submission has been made that the said supplementary
affidavit has not been rebutted by the respondent State of Jharkhand
before the Writ Court and therefore, as per the position of Law that there
cannot be any discrimination in the matter of promotion and once the
junior to the writ petitioners have been granted promotion with
retrospective effect as also the actual monetary benefit from the date of
promotion, the writ petitioners are also entitled to get the said benefits.
He, therefore, submits that the learned Single Judge after taking
into consideration the factual aspect about the laches committed on the
part of the State respondent as also going across the various judicial
pronouncements of the Court, has passed an order which cannot be said
to suffer from infirmity and therefore, the same may not be interfered with.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the State-appellants has submitted
by referring to Memo No.756 dated 20.06.2012, whereby and whereunder,
three co-junior employees, namely, Sri Mahabir Sah, Sri Panchanan
Mahto and Sri Satyaketu Nath Monishi have been granted promotion
w.e.f. 07.06.1996, 25.10.2007 and 11.12.2007 respectively with the
monetary benefit on the basis of pay scale of the promoted posts from the
date of joining in the transferred school but the fixation of pay will be from
the date of promotion and in that view of the matter, even accepting the
plea of the writ petitioners, they cannot be held entitled for the actual
monetary benefit from the date of promotion.
7. This Court, after having heard the learned counsel for the parties,
on perusal of the material available on record as also the finding recorded
by the learned Single Judge and on taking into consideration the rival
submissions made on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties, deem
it fit and proper first to look into the issue of discrimination as has been
agitated by the learned counsel appearing for the writ petitioners by
putting reliance upon the order dated 20.06.2012 as contained in Memo
No.756.
It is evident from the aforesaid order as has been annexed as
annexure-14 to the supplementary affidavit dated 08.06.2018 filed before
the Writ Court that three employees, namely, Sri Mahabir Sah, Sri
Panchanan Mahto and Sri Satyaketu Nath Monishi have been granted
promotion w.e.f. 07.06.1996, 25.10.2007 and 11.12.2007 respectively with
a clear cut stipulation made therein that the monetary benefit of the pay
scale of the promoted post will be payable from the date of giving joining
in the transferred school but the pay fixation on the basis of promotion
would be from the date of promotion.
8. It has not been disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the
State appellant that these three persons, namely, Sri Mahabir Sah, Sri
Panchanan Mahto and Sri Satyaketu Nath Monishi are not junior to the
writ petitioners and taking into consideration the settled position of Law
that while considering the case of promotion of one or the other
employees, the issue of seniority is required to be considered by the
appointing authority. In case of non-consideration of seniority, if any junior
co-employee is being granted promotion, the senior employee is having a
right to claim such promotion from the date from which the juniors have
been granted promotion.
9. The fact in hand is of discrimination and we after considering the
position of Law that there cannot be any unreasonable classification
permitted under Article 14 of the Constitution of India which envisages
about reasonable classification as has been held by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the judgment rendered in the case of State of Jammu &
Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Khosa and Ors., (1974) 1 SCC 19 wherein the
Court [Chandrachud, J. (as he then was)] in para 20 succinctly held as
under:
"The challenge, at best, reflects the respondent's opinion on promotional opportunities in public services and one may assume that if the roles were reversed, respondents would be interested in implementing their point of view. But we cannot sit in appeal over the legislative judgment with a view to finding out whether on a comparative evaluation of rival theories touching the question of promotion, the theory advocated by the respondents is not to be preferred. Classification is primarily for the legislature or for the statutory authority charged with the duty of framing the terms and conditions of service; and if, looked at from the standpoint of the authority making it, the classification is found to rest on a reasonable basis, it has to be upheld."
It was also observed that discrimination is the essence of classification and does violence to the constitutional guarantee of equality only if it rests on an unreasonable basis and it was for the respondents to establish that classification was unreasonable and bears no rational nexus with its purported object. Further, dealing with the right to equality, the Court (in paras 29 & 30) held thus :
"But the concept of equality has an inherent limitation arising from the very nature of the constitutional guarantee.
Equality is for equals. That is to say that those who are
similarly circumstanced are entitled to an equal treatment. Since the constitutional code of equality and equal opportunity is a charter for equals, equality of opportunity in matters of promotion means an equal promotional opportunity for persons who fall, substantially, within the same class."
Now, we would next refer to the decision in Air India v. Nergesh Meerza and others [(1981) 4 SCC 335], which propounds the right of equality under Article 14 after considering various decisions. In that case, constitutional validity of Regulation 46(i)(c) of Air India Employees' Service Regulations was challenged, which provides for retiring age of an Air-Hostess. The Court (in paragraph39) summarized thus :
"39. Thus, from a detailed analysis and close examination of the eases of this Court starting from 1952 till today, the following propositions emerge :-
(1) In considering the fundamental right of equality of opportunity a technical, pedantic or doctrinaire approach should not be made and the doctrine should not be invoked even if different scales of pay, service terms, leave, etc., are introduced in different or dissimilar posts. Thus, where the class or categories of service are essentially different in purport and spirit, Art. 14 can-not be attracted.
(2) Article 14 forbids hostile discrimination but not reasonable classification. Thus, where persons belonging to a particular class in view of their special attributes, qualities, mode of recruitment and the like, are differently treated in public interest to advance and boost members belonging to backward classes, such a classification would not amount to discrimination having a close nexus with the objects sought to be achieved so that in such cases Art. 14 will be completely out of the way.
(3) Article 14 certainly applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis.
(4) Where equals and unequals are treated differently, Article 14 would have no application.
(5) Even if there be one class of service having several categories with different attributes and incidents, such a category becomes a separate class by itself and no difference or discrimination between such category and the general members of the other class would amount to any discrimination or to denial of equality of opportunity.
(6) In order to judge whether a separate category has been carved out of a class of service, the following circumstances have generally to be examined:-
(a) the nature, the mode and the manner of
recruitment of a particular category from the very start,
(b) the classifications of the particular category.
(c) the terms and conditions of service of the members of the category,
(d) the nature and character of the posts and promotional avenues,
(e) the special attributes that the particular category possess which are not to be found in other classes, and the like."
Further, in D.S. Nakara & Ors. Vrs. Union of India, 1983 AIR 130,
their Lordships of the Hon'ble Apex Court has been pleased to hold that
Article 14 forbids class legislation but permits reasonable classification for
the purpose of legislation but the classification must satisfy the twin tests
of classification being found on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together from those that
are left out of the group and that differentia must have a rational nexus to
the object sought to be achieved by the statute in question. The thrust of
Article is that the citizen is entitled to equality before law and equal
protection of the law.
In the case of Ramana Dayaram Shetty Vrs. International Airport
Authority of India & Ors., AIR 1979 SC 1628, wherein the Hon'ble Apex
Court has been pleased to observe that a discriminatory action of the
Government is liable to be struck down, unless it can be shown by the
Government that the departure was not arbitrary, but was based on some
valid principle which in itself was not irrational, unreasonable or
discriminatory.
10. This Court has examined the issue on the basis of the aforesaid
settled position and found therefrom that the contention of the writ
petitioners regarding the discriminatory attitude of the respondent State of
Jharkhand by granting promotion to three employees, namely, Sri Mahabir
Sah, Sri Panchanan Mahto and Sri Satyaketu Nath Monishi have been
granted promotion w.e.f. 07.06.1996, 25.10.2007 and 11.12.2007
respectively but such benefit has not been granted to the writ petitioners.
However, the writ petitioners have approached to this Court claiming
therein the actual monetary benefit from the date of promotion i.e., w.e.f.
12.09.2002 but such benefit cannot be directed to be granted in favour of
the writ petitioners as because they have been granted promotion w.e.f.
12.09.2002 so far as the writ petitioners of W.P.(S) No.5917 of 2017 is
concerned and so far as the writ petitioner of W.P.(S) No.5920 of 2017,
who has been granted promotion w.e.f. 01.08.2014 by making reference
of the name of any employee that the other promoted employees, have
also been granted the monetary benefit from the date of promotion and
therefore, the claim which has been raised by the writ petitioners holding
them entitled for the actual monetary benefit from the date of promotion
i.e. w.e.f. 12.09.2002 and 01.08.2014 ought not to have been allowed by
the learned Single Judge on the principle that promotion is not a right but
consideration for promotion is only there and therefore, the writ petitioners
admittedly, have been granted promotion w.e.f. 12.09.2002 and
01.08.2014, they cannot be held entitled for actual monetary benefit with
effect from the date of promotion, however, since the respondent State of
Jharkhand has granted promotion in favour of three employees, namely,
Sri Mahabir Sah, Sri Panchanan Mahto and Sri Satyaketu Nath Monishi
have been granted promotion w.e.f. 07.06.1996, 25.10.2007 and
11.12.2007 respectively with a condition that pay scale of the promoted
post will be granted from the date of joining in the transferred school but
the benefit of pay fixation admissible with effect from the date of promotion
is also required to be extended in favour of the writ petitioners on the
principle of parity.
Accordingly, in our considered view, the order passed by the learned
Single Judge requires modification so far as this issue is concerned.
11. In view thereof, the order passed by the learned Single Judge is
modified to the extent that instead of holding the writ petitioners entitled
for actual monetary benefit with effect from the date of promotion, the writ
petitioners are being held entitled for the monetary benefit at least from
the date when the said benefit has been extended in favour of the
employees, namely, Sri Mahabir Sah, Sri Panchanan Mahto and Sri
Satyaketu Nath Monishi i.e. w.e.f. 20.06.2012.
12. So far as the other direction passed by the learned Single Judge for
consideration of the case of the writ petitioners in W.P.(S) No.5917 of 2017
for promotion to the post of Grade-VII(Headmaster) is concerned, the said
part of the order passed by the learned Single Judge is also required to be
modified, in view of the fact that nothing has been brought on record by
the learned counsel appearing for the respondents writ petitioners before
the learned Single Judge as to whether any junior to them has been
granted promotion to Grade-VII(Headmaster).
13. In view thereof and considering the aforesaid proposition of Law, the
instant appeals stand disposed of with the modification/direction as
indicated hereinabove.
14. In consequent to disposal of these appeals, I.A.No.617 of 2019 and
I.A.No.2291 of 2019 also stand disposed of.
(Dr. Ravi Ranjan, C.J.)
(Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.) Rohit/-.A.F.R.
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