Jharkhand High Court
Sukhdeo Das vs The State Of Jharkhand on 3 August, 2021
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI
Cr.M.P. No. 4067 of 2019
with
I.A. No. 970 of 2020
1. Sukhdeo Das
2. Rajkumar Das
3. Mitthu Das @ Mithun Das
4. Sahodari Devi ..... ... Petitioners
Versus
1. The State of Jharkhand.
2. Chameli Devi ..... ... Opposite Parties
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CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR DWIVEDI
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For the Petitioners : Mr. Arwind Kumar, Advocate.
For the State : Mr. Satish Prasad, A.P.P.
For the O.P. No. 2 : Mr. Shree Niwas Roy, Advocate.
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05/ 03.08.2021 Heard Mr. Arwind Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the
petitioners, Mr. Satish Prasad, learned counsel for the State as also Mr. Shree
Niwas Roy, learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2.
2. This petition has been heard through Video Conferencing in view of
the guidelines of the High Court taking into account the situation arising due to
COVID-19 pandemic. None of the parties have complained about any technical
snag of audio-video and with their consent this matter has been heard.
3. This criminal miscellaneous petition has been filed for quashing of
the entire criminal proceeding and the order, taking cognizance dated 08.06.2008,
passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Giridih, in Complaint Case No.
641 of 2008 corresponding to T.R. No. 323 of 2019, whereby, cognizance under
Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code has been taken against the petitioners.
4. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that the case
was registered under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code against the
petitioners. It is also submitted that the compromise is entered into between both
the parties and the case, arising out of the matrimonial dispute, under Section
498-A has been compromised between the parties.
5. This fact has come by way of an interlocutory application, being
I.A. No. 970 of 2020, wherein both the parties have admitted about the
compromise, arrived at between the parties.
6. Learned counsel for the O.P. No. 2 also accepts the above position.
7. In the case of K. Srinivas Rao Versus D.A. Deepa, reported in
(2013) 5 SCC 226, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Paragraph-44 has held as
follows:-
44. We, therefore, feel that though offence punishable under
Section 498-A IPC is not compoundable, in appropriate
cases if the parties are willing and if it appears to the
criminal court that there exist elements of settlement, it
should direct the parties to explore the possibility of
settlement through mediation. This is, obviously, not to dilute
the rigour, efficacy and purport of Section 498-A IPC, but to
locate cases where the matrimonial dispute can be nipped in
bud in an equitable manner. The Judges, with their expertise,
must ensure that this exercise does not lead to the erring
spouse using mediation process to get out of clutches of the
law. During mediation, the parties can either decide to part
company on mutually agreed terms or they may decide to
patch up and stay together. In either case for the settlement
to come through, the complaint will have to be quashed. In
that event, they can approach the High Court and get the
complaint quashed. If, however, they choose not to settle,
they can proceed with the complaint. In this exercise, there is
no loss to anyone. If there is settlement, the parties will be
saved from the trials and tribulations of a criminal case and
that will reduce the burden on the courts which will be in the
larger public interest. Obviously, the High Court will quash
the complaint only if after considering all circumstances it
finds the settlement to be equitable and genuine. Such a
course, in our opinion, will be beneficial to those who
genuinely want to accord a quietus to their matrimonial
disputes.
8. Further in the case of B.S. Joshi and Ors. Versus State of Haryana
and Anr., reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Paragraphs-7 and 8 has held as follows:-
7. The High Court has relied upon Madhu Limaye case for
coming to the conclusion that since the offences under
Sections 498-A and 406 IPC are non-compoundable, it
would be impermissible in law to quash the FIR on the
ground that there has been a settlement between the parties.
The decision in Madhu Limaye case has been misread and
misapplied by the High Court. The question considered in
that case was when there was a bar on the power of revision
in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal,
enquiry, trial or other proceedings, what would be its effect
on exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code. Sub-
section (2) of Section 397 CrPC providing that the power of
revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised
in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal,
inquiry, trial or other proceedings was noticed and it was
held that on a plain reading of Section 482, it would follow
that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section
(2) of Section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect
the inherent powers of the High Court". The Court said that
if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the
exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at
naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of
the revisional powers but adopting a harmonious approach
held that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397
operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High
Court meaning thereby that the High Court will have no
power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. It
was further held that, then, in accordance with one of the
other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will
come into play, there being no other provision in the Code
for the redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In
Madhu Limaye case, it was, inter alia, said that if for the
purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the
High Court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained
in Section 397(2) can limit or affect the exercise of the
inherent power by the High Court. By way of an illustration,
an example was given that where without jurisdiction the
court takes cognizance or issues process and assumes it to
be an interlocutory order, would it stand to reason to say
that the inherent power of the High Court cannot be
exercised for stopping the criminal proceedings as early as
possible, since being an interlocutory order, it was not
revisable and resultantly the accused had to be harassed up
to the end, though the order taking cognizance or issuing
process was without jurisdiction. It was held that the bar will
not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the court
and/or to secure the ends of justice.
8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case does not lay
down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the
criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in
Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of
the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of
justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320
would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It
is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and
circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a
power.
9. In view of the aforesaid facts and considering the judgment of
Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of K. Srinivas Rao (Supra) and B.S. Joshi
(supra) and also there is no societal interest involved in this case and both the
parties have compromised their matrimonial dispute by way of filing I.A. No. 970
of 2020, the order, taking cognizance dated 08.06.2008, passed by the learned
Chief Judicial Magistrate, Giridih, including the entire criminal proceeding in
connection with Complaint Case No. 641 of 2008, are, hereby quashed.
10. Cr.M.P. No. 4067 of 2019 stands allowed and disposed of. I.A. No.
970 of 2020 also stands allowed and disposed of.
(Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J.)
Amitesh/-
