[Cites 19, Cited by 0]
Himachal Pradesh High Court
Reserved On: 25.2.2026 vs Onkar Chand on 23 March, 2026
2026:HHC:8211
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. Appeal No. 330 of 2015
Reserved on: 25.2.2026
.
Date of Decision: 23.3.2026.
State of H.P. ...Appellant
Versus
Onkar Chand ...Respondent
of
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
rt
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Appellant : Mr Lokender Kutlehria, Additional
Advocate General.
For the Respondent : Mr. Ankur Dass Sood, Advocate.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The present appeal is directed against the judgment
dated 16.2.2015, passed by learned Special Judge, Bilaspur,
District Bilaspur, H.P. (learned Trial Court), vide which the
respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was
acquitted of the charged offences. (Parties shall hereinafter be
referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the
learned Trial Court for convenience.)
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present
appeal are that the police presented a challan against the
.
accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 341, 352 and 506 of the
Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 3(1)(x) of the Scheduled
Caste and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989
of
(SC&ST Act). It was asserted that the informant, Gulab Dass, was
present in the shop of Ravi Dutt to buy some articles on
rt
23.8.2010, at about 5.45 PM. The accused Omkar Soni came to
the shop and caught the informant by his neck. He told the
informant that he (the informant) had made a complaint
regarding the sale of water. The informant asked the accused to
leave his neck and told him that he had not made any complaint.
The accused threatened the informant and abused him in the
name of his caste. The incident was witnessed by Ravi Dutt and
Prakash Chand. The informant reported the matter to the police.
An FIR (Ex.PW1/A) was registered. Sanjay Sharma (PW7)
investigated the matter. He visited the spot and prepared the
spot map (Ex.PW7/A). He filed the applications (Ex.PW5/A and
Ex.PW4/A) and obtained the pedigree table of the accused
(Ex.PW7/D) and the informant (Ex.PW4/B) from Halqua Patwari.
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He recorded the statements of witnesses as per their version.
After the completion of the investigation, a challan was
.
prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court.
3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to
summon the accused. When the accused appeared, the learned
Trial Court charged the accused with the commission of offences
of
punishable under Sections 341, 352, 506 of IPC and Section 3(1)
(x) of SC&ST Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to
rt
be tried.
4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove
its case. Gulab Dass (PW1) is the informant/victim. Thakur Dass
(PW2), Rattan Lal (PW3) and Ravi Dutt (PW6) are the
eyewitnesses. Basu Dev (PW4) prepared the informant's
pedigree table. Subhash Chand (PW5) prepared the pedigree
table of the accused. Sanjay Sharma (PW7) investigated the
matter. SI Ram Dass (PW8) partly investigated the matter. SI
Ludar Chand (PW9) signed the FIR.
5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section
313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution's case in its entirety. He
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claimed that he was falsely implicated. He did not produce any
evidence in defence.
.
6. Learned Trial Court held that the incident occurred
on 23.8.2010 at 5.45 PM and the matter was reported to the
police on 24.8.2010 at 3.45 PM. The informant stated that he had
gone to the Police Station, but his report was not registered. This
of
explanation was not proved. The presence of Thakur Dass (PW2)
and Rattan Lal (PW3) on the spot was doubtful. Thakur Dass
rt
(PW2) was on good terms with the informant and was inimical
to the accused. Rattan Lal was not named in the FIR, and no
reason was assigned for the omission. The sequence of events
narrated by the witnesses did not tally. Ravi Dutt did not support
the prosecution's case. The notification to prove that the
informant belonged to the scheduled caste was not produced. All
these circumstances made the prosecution's case doubtful.
Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the
charged offences.
7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the
learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal,
asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the
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accused. The delay was properly explained. Learned Trial Court
wrongly rejected the statements of Thakur Dass and Rattan Lal.
.
Ravi Dutt was a shopkeeper, and he favoured the accused
because the accused was his customer. The notification was
produced on record to show that the informant belonged to the
scheduled caste. Learned Trial Court erred in rejecting this
of
notification. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be
allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be
rt
set-aside.
8. I have heard Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned
Additional Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr.
Ankur Dass Sood, learned counsel for the respondent/ accused.
9. Mr Lokender Kutlehria, learned Additional Advocate
General for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial
Court erred in acquitting the accused. The informant had
specifically stated that the accused had abused and threatened
him. This was corroborated by Thakur Dass and Prakash Chand.
The statements of witnesses were consistent. Learned Trial
Court erred in rejecting the statements of the prosecution's
witnesses. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be
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allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be
set-aside.
.
10. Mr. Ankur Dass Sood, learned counsel for the
respondent/accused, submitted that the prosecution had relied
upon the interested witnesses and the learned Trial Court was
justified in rejecting their testimonies. Learned Trial Court had
of
taken a reasonable view which could have been taken based on
the material placed before it, and this Court should not interfere
rt
with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if
another view is possible. Hence, he prayed that the present
appeal be dismissed.
11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment
of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176:
(2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of
acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/
omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a
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conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It
was observed at page 440:
.
"12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position
that the interference with the finding of acquittal
recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by
the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers
from patent perversity; that the same is based on a
misreading/omission to consider material evidence on
of
record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and
only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is
possible from the evidence available on record."
13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of
rt
A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed:-
"12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has
full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an
appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the
reinforced or 'double' presumption of innocence after
acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable
views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal
should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only
warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based
on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in
a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate
Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court
for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A
catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more
firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia,
Mallappav. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104, Ballu @
Balram @ Balmukund v. State of Madhya Pradesh 2024
INSC 258, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of
Karnataka 2024 INSC 320, and Constable 907 Surendra
Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114."
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14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the
parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
.
15. The incident occurred on 23.8.2010 at about 5.45 PM.
The FIR (Ex.PW1/A) was registered on 24.8.2010 at 3.45 PM. The
distance between the place of the incident and the Police Station
is shown to be 4 kilometres in Column No. 5(a) of the FIR. It was
of
mentioned that there was no delay in reporting the matter by the
informant, which is not correct because there was a delay of
rt
about one day.
16. The victim stated in his examination-in-chief that
he had made a complaint to the police on 23.8.2010. He went to
the Police Station on the date of the incident, but the SHO did
not write his complaint and told him that he would call him
later. He again went to the Police Station on 24.8.2010 at 9:30
AM, but the FIR was lodged till 3.45 PM.
17. This explanation was not proved on record. SI Ludar
Singh (PW9) registered the FIR. He has nowhere stated that the
victim had visited the Police Station on 23.8.2010 or in the
morning of 24.8.2010. Thus, the explanation provided by the
victim was not proved on record. It was laid down in Mehraj
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Singh v. State of U.P. (1994) 5 SCC 188 that the delay in lodging
FIR leads to embellishments, concoction and fabrication and the
.
court should see the prosecution case with utmost care and
caution in case of delay. It was observed:
"FIR in a criminal case and particularly in a murder case
is a vital and valuable piece of evidence to appreciate the
of
evidence led at the trial. The object of insisting upon
prompt lodging of the FIR is to obtain the earliest
information regarding the circumstances in which the
crime was committed, including the names of the actual
rt
culprits and the parts played by them, the weapons, if
any, used, as also the names of the eyewitnesses, if any.
Delay in lodging the FIR often results in embellishment,
which is a creature of an afterthought. On account of the
delay, the FIR not only gets bereft of the advantage of
spontaneity, but danger also creeps in with the
introduction of a coloured version or exaggerated story.
With a view to determining whether the FIR was lodged at
the time it is alleged to have been recorded, the courts
generally look for certain external checks. One of the
checks is the receipt of a copy of the FIR, called a special
report in a murder case, by the local Magistrate. If this
report is received by the Magistrate late, it can give rise to
an inference that the FIR was not lodged at the time it is
alleged to have been recorded, unless, of course, the
prosecution can offer a satisfactory explanation for the
delay in dispatching or receipt of the copy of the FIR by
the local Magistrate. The prosecution has presented no
evidence at all in this case. The second external check,
equally important, is the sending of a copy of the FIR
along with the dead body and its reference in the inquest
report. Even though the inquest, prepared under Section
174 CrPC, is aimed at serving a statutory function, to lend
credence to the prosecution's case, the details of the FIR
and the gist of statements recorded during inquest
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proceedings get reflected in the report. The absence of
those details is indicative of the fact that the
prosecution's story was still in an embryonic state and
had not been given any shape, and that the FIR came to be
.
recorded later on, after due deliberations and
consultations and was then ante-timed to give it the
colour of a promptly lodged FIR. In our opinion, on
account of the infirmities as noticed above, the FIR has
lost its value and authenticity, and it appears to us that
the same has been ante-dated and had not been recorded
of
till the inquest proceedings were over at the spot by PW
8."
18. This position was reiterated in P Rajagopal vs State of
rt
Tamil Nadu 2019 (5) SCC 40, wherein it was observed: -
"12. Normally, the Court may reject the case of the
prosecution in case of inordinate delay in lodging the first
information report because of the possibility of a
concoction of evidence by the prosecution. However, if
the delay is satisfactorily explained, the Court will decide
the matter on the merits without giving much importance
to such delay. The Court is duty-bound to determine
whether the explanation afforded is plausible enough
given the facts and circumstances of the case. The delay
may be condoned if the complainant appears to be
reliable and without any motive for implicating the
accused falsely. [See Apren Joseph v. State of Kerala, (1973)
3 SCC 114; Mukesh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2017) 6 SCC 1]."
19. A similar view was taken in Sekaran v. State of T.N.,
(2024) 2 SCC 176: (2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 548: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1653,
wherein it was observed on page 182:
"14. We start with the FIR, to which exception has been
taken by the appellant, urging that there has been no
satisfactory explanation for its belated registration. It is
2026:HHC:8211
trite that merely because there is some delay in lodging
an FIR, the same by itself and without anything more
ought not to weigh in the mind of the courts in all cases as
fatal for the prosecution. A realistic and pragmatic
.
approach has to be adopted, keeping in mind the
peculiarities of each particular case, to assess whether the
unexplained delay in lodging the FIR is an afterthought to
give a coloured version of the incident, which is sufficient
to corrode the credibility of the prosecution's version.
15. In cases where delay occurs, it has to be tested on the
of
anvil of other attending circumstances. If on an overall
consideration of all relevant circumstances it appears to
the court that the delay in lodging the FIR has been
explained, mere delay cannot be sufficient to disbelieve
rt
the prosecution case; however, if the delay is not
satisfactorily explained and it appears to the court that
cause for the delay had been necessitated to frame anyone
as an accused, there is no reason as to why the delay
should not be considered as fatal forming part of several
factors to vitiate the conviction."
20. Therefore, the learned Trial Court was justified in
doubting the prosecution's case because of the delay.
21. The victim, Gulab Singh, specifically stated in his
examination-in-chief that the accused was inimical to him
because he and his family had not supported the accused in the
Panchayat election. Thus, the relationship between the parties
was inimical, and the learned Trial Court was justified in
insisting upon the corroboration of the victim's testimony.
2026:HHC:8211
22. The victim stated that the accused caught hold of his
shirt and dragged him towards the road. He requested the
.
accused to leave the collar. The accused said that he (the
informant) had made a complaint regarding the sale of water.
The informant explained that he had not made any such
complaint. The accused abused the informant in the name of his
of
caste. Thus, as per the victim, the words were uttered after the
accused had told the informant about the complaint.
rt
23. Thakur Dass (PW2) stated that he had seen the
accused Omkar Chand holding the informant's collar and calling
him (the informant) by the name of his caste. The accused told
the informant that he was proud of something and that he would
set him right. The informant asked the accused to leave the
collar and talk to him peacefully. The accused left the informant
and threatened him.
24. The statement of this witness does not corroborate
the informant's version. He stated that the accused had abused
the informant before catching him by his collar. The informant
stated that the accused had abused him after catching hold of his
collar. Thakur Dass (PW2) stated that the accused told the
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informant that he was proud of something and he would set him
right, which fact was not narrated by the informant. The
.
informant stated that the accused was asking why the informant
had made a complaint about the sale of water, which fact was
not mentioned by him. His name was not mentioned in the FIR,
which makes his presence doubtful. Thakur Dass (PW2)
of
admitted in his cross-examination that he is posted in the same
school in which the informant's son-in-law is posted. He
rt
admitted that he had a dispute with the accused and the
villagers. Thus, he was inimical to the accused and working with
the informant's son-in-law. All these circumstances made his
testimony doubtful.
25. Rattan Lal (PW3) stated that the accused was holding
the informant from the collar of his shirt and abusing him in the
name of caste. The accused left the informant's collar after
seeing him and Thakur Dass.
26. The name of this witness was also not mentioned in
the FIR. He had not stated that the informant had asked the
accused to maintain peace, after which the accused had abused
the informant in the name of his caste. He did not say that the
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accused had asked the informant about the complaint made by
him. He admitted in his cross-examination that his wife and the
.
informant's wife were related to each other. Thus, he has not
assigned any reason for the quarrel. His narration of facts is
different from the prosecution's case. He is known to the
informant, and his name was not mentioned in the FIR. All these
of
circumstances made his testimony doubtful.
27. Ravi Dutt (PW6) stated that the accused and the
rt
informant had arguments, but he was not aware of the nature of
the arguments. He denied that the accused had dragged the
informant towards the road by catching his collar or had abused
him in the name of his caste. Thus, he has not supported the
prosecution's version regarding the incident.
28. Prakash Chand was named in the FIR, but he was not
examined by the prosecution. Therefore, adverse inference was
to be drawn against him and the learned Trial Court was justified
in doubting the prosecution's case.
29. The victim stated that the accused had dragged him
towards the road by holding his collar. He did not produce his
shirt to corroborate this version. The victim was not medically
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examined to prove that he had sustained any injury in the
scuffle.
.
30. Thus, the learned Trial Court was justified in
doubting the prosecution's case in these circumstances. Learned
Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been
taken based on evidence led before it and no interference is
of
required with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court,
even if another view is possible.
rt
31. No other point was urged.
32. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is
dismissed.
33. Keeping in view of the provisions of Section 437-A of
the Code of Criminal Procedure [Section 481 of Bharatiya
Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)], the respondent/
accused is directed to furnish personal bonds in the sum of
₹25,000/- with one surety in the like amount to the satisfaction
of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/learned Trial
Court, within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months
with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being
filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the
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respondent/accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear
before the Hon'ble Supreme Court.
.
34. A copy of this judgment, along with the records of the
learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith.
35. Pending miscellaneous application(s), if any, also
of
stand(s) disposed of.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
rt Judge
23rd March, 2026
(Chander)
