Himachal Pradesh High Court
Ram Dass vs State Of H.P. And Another on 20 September, 2024
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8883 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No. 635 of 2024
.
Reserved on: 23.8.2024
Date of Decision: 20.9.2024.
Ram Dass ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. and another
Coram
r to ...Respondents
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No.
For the Petitioner : Ms. Vandana Thakur, Advocate,
vice Mr. Surinder Saklani,
Advocate.
For the Respondents : Ms. Ayushi Negi, Deputy Advocate
General, for respondent No.1.
Mr. Rakesh Thakur, Advocate, for
respondent No.2.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for
quashing of FIR No. 38 of 2022, dated 17.3.2022, registered at
Police Station Sadar, District Shimla, H.P. for the commission of
offences punishable under Sections 457 and 380 of IPC and
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8883 )
consequential proceedings pending before learned Judicial
Magistrate First Class, Court No.5, titled State of H.P. Vs. Ram
.
Dass. It has been asserted that the matter has been
compromised between the parties and both the parties have no
objection in case the FIR is ordered to be quashed as per
compromise.
2. The statement of the informant Pintu Kumar was
recorded on 23.4.2024, in which he stated that he had entered
into a compromise with the accused voluntarily.
3. The statements of the owners of the shops Ram
Prakash son of Hapsu Yadav and Pawan Kumar son of Sh. Diwan
Chand were recorded on 6.8.2024 in which they stated that the
theft was committed by the accused in their shop and they had
compromised the matter with the accused voluntarily without
any influence from any person.
4. Ms. Vandana Thakur, learned counsel for the
petitioner submitted that the parties have settled the dispute
amongst themselves. It was a private dispute between the
parties and FIR be quashed as per the settlement effected
between the parties.
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8883 )
5. Ms. Ayushi Negi, learned Deputy Advocate General
for respondent No.1/State submitted that the offence is not
.
private but affects the public at large and the FIR should not be
quashed based on the compromise between the parties.
Therefore, she prayed that the present petition be dismissed.
6. Mr. Rakesh Thakur, learned counsel for respondent
No. 2 adopted the submissions of Ms. Vandana Thakur, learned
counsel for the petitioner and submitted that FIR be quashed
based on the compromise effected between the parties.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303: 2012 SCC OnLine
SC 769 that the power to quash the proceedings under Section
482 based on the compromise is different from the power of
compounding under section 320 of Cr.PC. It was observed:
"57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the
ground of settlement between an offender and victim is
not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are
different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the
power of compounding offences given to a court under
Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of
criminal proceedings by the High Court in the exercise of
its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, the
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8883 )
power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the
provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is
guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other
hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for
.
quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or
criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as
to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise
of power although the ultimate consequence may be
acquittal or dismissal of indictment.
58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding
having regard to the fact that the dispute between the
offender and the victim has been settled although the
offences are not compoundable, it does so as in its
opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings will be an
exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that
the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace
is restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate
guiding factor. No doubt, crimes are acts that have
harmful effects on the public and consist of wrongdoing
that seriously endangers and threatens the well-being of
society and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer only
because he and the victim have settled the dispute
amicably or the victim has been paid compensation, yet
certain crimes have been made compoundable in law,
with or without the permission of the court. In respect of
serious offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other
offences of mental depravity under IPC or offences of
moral turpitude under special statutes, like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed
by public servants while working in that capacity, the
settlement between the offender and the victim can have
no legal sanction at all. However, certain offences which
overwhelmingly and predominantly bear civil flavour
having arisen out of a civil, mercantile, commercial,
financial, partnership or such like transactions or the
offences arising out of matrimony, particularly relating
to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where the wrong is
basically to the victim and the offender and the victim
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have settled all disputes between them amicably,
irrespective of the fact that such offences have not been
made compoundable, the High Court may within the
framework of its inherent power, quash the criminal
.
proceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfied
that on the face of such settlement, there is hardly any
likelihood of the offender being convicted and by not
quashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be
casualty and ends of justice shall be defeated. The above
list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will
depend on its facts and no hard-and-fast category can be
prescribed.
59. B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil
Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC (Cri)
145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 101]
do illustrate the principle that the High Court may quash
criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its
inherent power under Section 482 of the Code and Section
320 does not limit or affect the powers of the High Court
under Section 482. Can it be said that by quashing
criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003
SCC (Cri) 848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3
SCC (Cri) 858], Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4
SCC (Cri) 145] and Shiji [(2011) 10 SCC 705 : (2012) 1 SCC
(Cri) 101] this Court has compounded the non-
compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so.
There does exist the distinction between compounding an
offence under Section 320 and quashing a criminal case
by the High Court in the exercise of inherent power under
Section 482. The two powers are distinct and different
although the ultimate consequence may be the same viz.
acquittal of the accused or dismissal of indictment.
60. We find no incongruity in the above principle of law
and the decisions of this Court in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC
437: 1990 SCC (Cri) 327], Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC 435: 1993
SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049], Arun Shankar
Shukla [(1999) 6 SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8883 )
2554], Ishwar Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri)
1153], Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri)
1074] and Ashok Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321]. The
principle propounded in Simrikhia [(1990) 2 SCC 437: 1990
.
SCC (Cri) 327] that the inherent jurisdiction of the High
Court cannot be invoked to override express bar provided
in law is by now well settled. In Dharampal [(1993) 1 SCC
435: 1993 SCC (Cri) 333: 1993 Cri LJ 1049] the Court
observed the same thing that the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code cannot be utilised for exercising
powers which are expressly barred by the Code. A similar
statement of law is made in Arun Shankar Shukla [(1999) 6
SCC 146: 1999 SCC (Cri) 1076: AIR 1999 SC 2554]. In Ishwar
Singh [(2008) 15 SCC 667: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1153] the
accused was alleged to have committed an offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC and with reference to
Section 320 of the Code, it was held that the offence
punishable under Section 307 IPC was not compoundable
and there was an express bar in Section 320 that no
offence shall be compounded if it is not compoundable
under the Code. In Rumi Dhar [(2009) 6 SCC 364 : (2009) 2
SCC (Cri) 1074] although the accused had paid the entire
due amount as per the settlement with the bank in the
matter of recovery before the Debts Recovery Tribunal,
the accused was being proceeded with for the commission
of the offences under Sections 120-B/420/467/468/471
IPC along with the bank officers who were being
prosecuted under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the
Prevention of Corruption Act. The Court refused to quash
the charge against the accused by holding that the Court
would not quash a case involving a crime against the
society when a prima facie case has been made out
against the accused for framing the charge. Ashok
Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was again a case where
the accused persons were charged of having committed
the offences under Sections 120-B, 465, 467, 468 and 471
IPC and the allegations were that the accused secured the
credit facilities by submitting forged property documents
as collaterals and utilised such facilities in a dishonest
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and fraudulent manner by opening letters of credit in
respect of foreign supplies of goods, without actually
bringing any goods but inducing the bank to negotiate the
letters of credit in favour of foreign suppliers and also by
.
misusing the cash-credit facility. The Court was alive to
the reference made in one of the present matters and also
the decisions in B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675: 2003 SCC (Cri)
848], Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC 677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri)
858] and Manoj Sharma [(2008) 16 SCC 1 : (2010) 4 SCC
(Cri) 145] and it was held that B.S. Joshi [(2003) 4 SCC 675:
2003 SCC (Cri) 848] and Nikhil Merchant [(2008) 9 SCC
677 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 858] dealt with different factual
situation as the dispute involved had overtures of a civil
dispute but the case under consideration in Ashok
Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] was more on the criminal
intent than on a civil aspect. The decision in Ashok
Sadarangani [(2012) 11 SCC 321] supports the view that
criminal matters involving overtures of a civil dispute
stand on a different footing.
61. The position that emerges from the above discussion
can be summarised thus: the power of the High Court in
quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in the
exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and
different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.
Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the
guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the
ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of
any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal
proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where
the offender and the victim have settled their dispute
would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case
and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due
regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8883 )
even though the victim or victim's family and the
offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the
.
offender in relation to the offences under special statutes
like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing
criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the
criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominately
civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes
of quashing, particularly the offences arising from a
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or
such like transactions or the offences arising out of
matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes
where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature
and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal
proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and the victim, the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the
criminal case would put the accused to great oppression
and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to
him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and
complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In
other words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to
continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of
the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of
process of law despite settlement and compromise
between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to
secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the
above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court
shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal
proceeding."
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8883 )
9. The Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the power of
the Court to quash the FIR based on the compromise in Narender
.
Singh versus State of Punjab, 2014 (6) SCC 466 and laid down the
following principles:-
"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and
lay down the following principles by which the High Court
would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the
settlement between the parties and exercising its power
under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the
settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to
accept the settlement with direction to continue with the
criminal proceedings:
29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the
Code is to be distinguished from the power which
lies in the Court to compound the offences under
Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, under Section
482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power
to quash the criminal proceedings even in those
cases which are not compoundable, where the
parties have settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised sparingly
and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement
and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal
proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such
cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to
form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two
objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involve heinous and serious
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8883 )
offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on
society. Similarly, the offences alleged to have been
.
committed under special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis
of compromise between the victim and the
offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases
having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil
character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationships or family disputes
should be quashed when the parties have resolved
their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is
to examine as to whether the possibility of
conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of
criminal cases would put the accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
would be caused to him by not quashing the
criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and therefore
are to be generally treated as crimes against the society
and not against the individual alone. However, the
High Court would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed under this provision. It would be open
to the High Court to examine whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the
prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to proving the charge under Section
307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the
High Court to go by the nature of the injury
sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the
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vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of
weapons used, etc. Medical reports in respect of
injuries suffered by the victim can generally be the
guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie
.
analysis, the High Court can examine whether there
is a strong possibility of conviction or the chances
of conviction are remote and bleak. In the former
case, it can refuse to accept the settlement and
quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the
latter case, it would be permissible for the High
Court to accept the plea compounding the offence
based on a complete settlement between the
parties. At this stage, the Court can also be swayed
by the fact that the settlement between the parties
is going to result in harmony between them which
may improve their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power
under Section 482 of the Code or not, the timings of
settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where
the settlement is arrived at immediately after the
alleged commission of offence and the matter is
still under investigation, the High Court may be
liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the
criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of
this reason that at this stage the investigation is
still on and even the chargesheet has not been filed.
Likewise, in those cases where the charge is framed
but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is
still at the infancy stage, the High Court can show
benevolence in exercising its powers favourably,
but after a prima facie assessment of the
circumstances/material mentioned above. On the
other hand, where the prosecution evidence is
almost complete or after the conclusion of the
evidence the matter is at the stage of argument,
normally the High Court should refrain from
exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code,
as in such cases the trial court would be in a
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position to decide the case finally on merits and to
come to a conclusion as to whether the offence
under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.
Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is
.
already recorded by the trial court and the matter is
at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere
compromise between the parties would not be a
ground to accept the same resulting in the acquittal
of the offender who has already been convicted by
the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section
307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of a
heinous crime, therefore, there is no question of
sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime."
(Emphasis supplied)
10. This question was again considered in Parbatbhai
Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641: (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 1: 2017
SCC OnLine SC 1189 and the following principles were
summarized:
"16. The broad principles which emerge from the
precedents on the subject may be summarised in the
following propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of
the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of
any court or to secure the ends of justice. The
provision does not confer new powers. It only
recognises and preserves powers which inhere in
the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High
Court to quash a first information report or a
criminal proceeding on the ground that a
settlement has been arrived at between the
offender and the victim is not the same as the
invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of
compounding an offence. While compounding an
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offence, the power of the court is governed by the
provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section
482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
.
compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal
proceeding or complaint should be quashed in the
exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the
High Court must evaluate whether the ends of
justice would justify the exercise of the inherent
power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court
has a wide ambit and plenitude it has to be
exercised (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first
information report should be quashed on the
ground that the offender and victim have settled
the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive
elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482
and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has
been settled, the High Court must have due regard
to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous
and serious offences involving mental depravity or
offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the
family of the victim have settled the dispute. Such
offences are, truly speaking, not private in nature
but have a serious impact upon society. The
decision to continue with the trial in such cases is
founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. As distinguished from serious offences, there
may be criminal cases which have an overwhelming
or predominant element of a civil dispute. They
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stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of
the inherent power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise
.
from commercial, financial, mercantile,
partnership or similar transactions with an
essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
situations fall for quashing where parties have
settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceeding if in view of the compromise
between the disputants, the possibility of a
conviction is remote and the continuation of a
criminal proceeding would cause oppression and
prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set
out in proposition 16.8. and 16.9. above. Economic
offences involving the financial and economic well-
being of the State have implications which lie
beyond the domain of a mere dispute between
private disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the offender is
involved in an activity akin to financial or economic
fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the
act complained of upon the financial or economic
system will weigh in the balance."
11. Similar principles were laid down in State of M.P. v.
Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688: (2019) 2 SCC (Cri) 706: 2019 SCC
OnLine SC 320:
"15. Considering the law on the point and the other
decisions of this Court on the point, referred to
hereinabove, it is observed and held as under:
15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of
the Code to quash the criminal proceedings for the
non-compoundable offences under Section 320 of
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the Code can be exercised having overwhelmingly
and predominantly the civil character, particularly
those arising out of commercial transactions or
arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
.
disputes and when the parties have resolved the
entire dispute amongst themselves;
15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those
prosecutions which involved heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on
society;
15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for
the offences under special statutes like the
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by public servants while working in that
capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis
of compromise between the victim and the
offender;
15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act,
etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious
offences and therefore are to be treated as crimes
against the society and not against the individual
alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the
offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc.
which have a serious impact on the society cannot be
quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the
Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved
their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the
High Court would not rest its decision merely because
there is a mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the
charge is framed under this provision. It would be open
to the High Court to examine whether incorporation of
Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or if the
prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if
proved, would lead to framing the charge under
Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to
the High Court to go by the nature of the injury
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sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the
vital/delicate parts of the body, the nature of
weapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by
the High Court would be permissible only after the
.
evidence is collected after investigation the
chargesheet is filed/the charge is framed and/or
during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible
when the matter is still under investigation.
Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6
and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder
Singh [Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6
SCC 466 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 54] should be read
harmoniously and to be read as a whole and in the
circumstances stated hereinabove;
15.5. While exercising the power under Section
482 of the Code to quash the criminal
proceedings in respect of non-compoundable
offences, which are private and do not have a
serious impact on society, on the ground that
there is a settlement/compromise between the
victim and the offender, the High Court is
required to consider the antecedents of the
accused; the conduct of the accused, namely,
whether the accused was absconding and why
he was absconding, how he had managed with
the complainant to enter into a compromise,
etc." (Emphasis supplied)
12. It is apparent from the judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court that the power under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to
quash the FIR and the consequent proceedings should not be
exercised in case of heinous offences committed under the
special statute. This power can be exercised in case of private
dispute which does not affect the public at large. This Court had
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already quashed the FIR for the commission of an offence
punishable under Section 380 of IPC in Musharaf versus. State of
.
H.P 2022 (1) Shim. LC 319, Harsh Anand versus State of H.P. 2020
STPL 5681 and for the commission of an offence punishable
under Section 452 (which is a similar offence as compared to
Section 457 of IPC) in Chaman Lal versus State of H.P. Latest HLJ
2023 (HP) (1) 213, Avinash Singh Rana versus State of H.P. 2023
STPL 3181, Ameen versus State of H.P and others 2023 (1) Him. L.R.
375 and Prashant Dharmani and others versus State of H.P and
others 2023 (1) Him. L.R. 241 based on the compromise. These
judgments are binding upon this Court.
13. The fact that the Court had quashed the FIR for the
commission of an offence punishable under Section 452 of IPC
shows that the house trespass is considered to be a private
offence and not a public offence as contended by Ms Ayushi,
learned Deputy Advocate General for the respondent No.1/State.
14. Consequently, the present petition is allowed and FIR
No. 38 of 2022, dated 17.3.2022, registered at Police Station
Sadar, District Shimla, H.P. for the commission of offences
punishable under Sections 457 and 380 of IPC and the
Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:8883 )
consequential proceedings arising out of the same will also
stand quashed.
.
15. Petition stands disposed of in the above terms, so
also pending miscellaneous applications, if any.
16. Parties are permitted to produce a copy of this
judgment, downloaded from the webpage of the High Court of
Himachal Pradesh before the authorities concerned, and the said
authorities shall not insist on the production of a certified copy
but if required, may verify passing of the order from Website of
the High Court.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
20th September, 2024
(Chander)
