Himachal Pradesh High Court
Sneh Lata vs State Of H.P. And Anr on 4 October, 2024
( 2024:HHC:9545 )
IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr. MMO No 868 of 2024.
Reserved on: 11.09.2024.
Date of Decision: 04.10.2024.
Sneh Lata ...Petitioner
Versus
State of H.P. and Anr. ...Respondents
Coram
Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 No
For the Petitioner : Mr. I.S. Chandel, Advocate.
For the Respondents : Mr. Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate
General.
Rakesh Kainthla, Judge
The petitioner has filed the present petition for quashing
of FIR No. 49 of 2023, dated 16.11.2023 registered for the
commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A and 506
read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter referred
to as IPC) at Police Station Moorang, District Kinnaur and the
consequential proceedings pending before learned Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Kinnaur at Reckong Peo, District Kinnaur, H.P.
Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes.
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2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present petition
are that the informant made a complaint to the police asserting that
she was married to Lakshman Kumar in the year 2021 as per local
customs. Her husband, parents-in-law and sister-in-law started
harassing her after her marriage. They started demanding money
from her. Her husband mentally harassed her for 2 years while
making demands for money. He also taunted her. Her parents-in-
law and sister-in-law also mentally harassed her. Her Sister-in-law
Sneh Lata used to harass her mentally and demand money. She used
to say, "Provide us the money or else go to your own home and you
cannot take care of the child". Her parents-in-law, husband and
sister-in-law used to taunt her daily that vehicle and money were
provided in the neighbourhood but the informant had not brought
anything from her parents. The informant's family members had
also not provided "Lambu" in the marriage due to which she was
being harassed daily. Her ornaments were taken by her parents-in-
law and she was not allowed to wear them. Her husband told her to
call her family members on 03.05.2023 because he did not want to
reside with her nor he wanted to talk to her. The informant's parents
and other relatives discussed the matter with the informant's
husband, parents-in-law and sister-in-law and asked them not to
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harass the informant. They also promised to provide ₹1,00,000/-.
However, the informant's husband, parents-in-law and sister-in-
law did not agree. When the informant tried to take her child with
her, her husband and father-in-law warned her that in case the
child was touched they would kill her. Her sister-in-law, Sneh Lata,
used to message and taunt the victim. The police registered the FIR
and conducted the investigation. After the completion of the
investigation, the police filed the charge sheet before the Court for
the commission of offences punishable under Section 498A and 506
read with Section 34 of IPC.
3. Being aggrieved from the registration of the FIR and
filing of the charge sheet, the petitioner filed the present petition
asserting that she is a practicing Advocate and a member of the
Shimla Bar Association. Her brother solemnized the marriage with
the informant in November 2021 according to local rituals and
customs. He suffered from acute back pain after the marriage and he
was treated at IGMC Shimla. He remained dependent upon his
family members. The behaviour of the informant changed abruptly
after the receipt of the report of the MRI of her husband. She started
misbehaving and torturing her husband and other family members.
She abused her husband in January 2023 and threatened to beat him.
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He called Sant Ram and Nargu Chand who advised the informant to
behave properly. The informant again abused her husband on
03.05.2023 and refused to reside with him. He reported the matter to
the Panchayat through a written complaint. She called her parents
who abused the petitioner's family members. The informant's
husband also reported the incident to SHO Police Station Moorang.
The informant left her matrimonial home on 03.05.2023. She filed
complaints before Pradhan of Gram Panchayat, Ribba on 04.05.2023
just to counter the allegations made against her. She also filed a
complaint at Police Station Tapri. Gram Panchayat Ribba and Police
Station Tapri did not find any substance in the allegations made in
the informant's complaints. The informant again filed a complaint
against the petitioner and her family members in November 2023.
She made false allegations regarding the demand for dowry. She
complained about not giving "lambu" which is large Brass utensil
given by the bride's family to the family of the bridegroom during
the marriage ceremony as a custom. The police filed the chargesheet
and the matter is listed on 01.10.2024. The allegations have been
made against the petitioner to spoil her career. The petitioner is
preparing for various competitive examinations. The informant was
also aware of the fact that the petitioner would defend her brother
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and family member, therefore all the family members were falsely
implicated. The complaints were made to Nargu Chand and Sheela
Devi who have also not stated anything about the demand for the
dowry. Rather they have accepted the informant's husband's version
and patched up the matter between the parties. The informant had
made a false complaint as a counterblast to the complaint made by
her husband against her. She has not mentioned the date, time,
month and year when the dowry demand was made. She left her
matrimonial home on 03.05.2023 after six months. There are
material contradictions and improvements in the informant's
version. The contents of the FIR do not attract the ingredients of the
commission of offences punishable under Section 498A and 506
read with Section 34 IPC. Therefore, it was prayed that the present
petition be allowed and the complaint and the charge sheet be
quashed.
4. I have heard Mr. I.S. Chandel, learned counsel for the
petitioner and Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General
for the respondent/State.
5. Mr. I.S. Chandel, learned counsel for the petitioner
submitted that the allegations made in the FIR are false and were
made to harass the petitioner and spoil her career. The allegations
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are silent regarding the date, time and place and do not disclose the
commission of any cognizable offence. Therefore, he prayed that the
present petition be allowed and the FIR and the charge sheet be
quashed.
6. Mr. Prashant Sen learned Deputy Advocate General for
the respondent/State submitted that this Court cannot look into the
documents filed with the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The
allegations in the FIR and the charge sheet clearly show that the
petitioner along with her family members had harassed her by
demanding dowry. They repeatedly taunted the informant and
compelled her to leave her matrimonial home. The truthfulness or
otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR is not to be seen at this
stage but is to be adjudicated during the trial. Therefore, he prayed
that the present petition be dismissed.
7. I have given considerable thought to the submissions
made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully.
8. The parameters for exercising jurisdiction under Section
482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.M.
Mohan v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339, wherein it was observed: -
9. The law with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction under
Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash complaints and criminal
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proceedings has been succinctly summarized by this Court in
the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited (2006)
6 SCC 736: 2006 INSC 452 after considering the earlier
precedents. It will be apposite to refer to the following
observations of this Court in the said case, which read thus:
"12. The principles relating to the exercise of jurisdiction
under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to
quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been
stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To
mention a few--Madhavrao Jiwajirao
Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC
692: 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan
Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol
Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194: 1995 SCC
(Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro
Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State
of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164: 1996 SCC
(Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC
259: 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P)
Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269: 2000 SCC (Cri)
615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000)
4 SCC 168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay
Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645: 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu
Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque [(2005)
1 SCC 122: 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to
our purpose are:
(i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations
made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their
face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima
facie constitute any offence or make out the case
alleged against the accused.
For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as
a whole, but without examining the merits of the
allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a
meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment
of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in
the complaint is warranted while examining prayer for
quashing a complaint.
( 2024:HHC:9545 )
(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear
abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal
proceeding is found to have been initiated with mala
fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm,
or where the allegations are absurd and inherently
improbable.
(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to
stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power
should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.
(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim
reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged.
If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the
complaint, merely on the ground that a few
ingredients have not been stated in detail, the
proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the
complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so
bereft of even the basic facts which are necessary for
making out the offence.
(v.) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil
wrong; (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil
wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial
transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from
furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil
law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature
and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a
criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint
relates to a commercial transaction or breach of
contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has
been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the
criminal proceedings. The test is whether the
allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal
offence or not.
9. Similar is the judgment in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,
2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held: -
( 2024:HHC:9545 )
12. We may gainfully refer to the following observations of
this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal1992
Supp (1) SCC 335: 1990 INSC 363:
"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various
relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of
the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of
decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary
power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under
Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and
reproduced above, we give the following categories of
cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be
exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any
court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it
may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible
guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list
of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be
exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first
information report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their
entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or
make out a case against the accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information
report and other materials, if any, accompanying the
FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying
an investigation by police officers under Section
156(1) of the Code except under an order of a
Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of
the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in
the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in
support of the same do not disclose the commission
of any offence and make out a case against the
accused.
(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute
a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-
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cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by
a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or
complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever
reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground
for proceeding against the accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in
any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned
Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted)
to the institution and continuance of the proceedings
and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code
or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress
for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly
attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding
is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for
wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view
to spite him due to private and personal grudge.
103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that
the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should
be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection
and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court
will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as
to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the
allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that
the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer
an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according
to its whim or caprice."
10. The petitioner has relied upon various documents to
show that the contents of the FIR are false. It was laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1:
1983 SCC (Cri) 115, that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face
( 2024:HHC:9545 )
of the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence
is constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It
was observed:
"10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against
an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the
face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same,
no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that
taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without
adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then
the High Court will be justified in quashing the proceedings in
exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code."
11. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram, 1990
SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the fresh
evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding under
Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:
"Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to
be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a
photostate copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in
Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present
petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither
permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this document
is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is not the
object of Section 482, Cr.P.C."
12. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in
Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K.
Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:
"9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the
documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of the
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witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the
proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not
filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars the
Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles
laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M.
Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme 192. The relevant
portion of the said judgment reads as follows:
"The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears
that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of
the statement made on oath of the complainant that the
ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and
there is no material to show that the complaint is mala
fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be
no justification for interference by the High Court.
When information is lodged at the Police Station and an
offence is registered, then the mala fides of the
informant would be of secondary importance. It is the
material collected during the investigation and evidence
led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused
person. The allegations of mala fides against the
informant are of no consequence and cannot by itself be
the basis for quashing the proceedings".
13. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of
Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was
observed at page 142:
"16. ... the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the
complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from
the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the
offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the
veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in
the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, based on the
evidence collected during the course of the trial."
( 2024:HHC:9545 )
14. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of
Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was
held:
13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on,
if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the
same are not material at the stage of deciding whether
quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was
warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any
reliance on these three documents.
15. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus
Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, (2024) 2 SCC 86:
(2024) 1 SCC (Cri) 512: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1258, wherein it was
observed:
"63. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by
the High Courts under Section 482CrPC, in a case where the
offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have not
been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer
for quashing is made, the law seems to be well settled that the
High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if
the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not there before
the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what
the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may
not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers
saved by Section 482CrPC; such powers are always available to
be exercised ex debito justitiae i.e. to do real and substantial
justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts
exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an FIR or
criminal proceedings arising from a police report by the High
Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC
not being substantially different from the tests laid down for
quashing a process issued under Section 204 read with Section
200, the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are
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empowered to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the
substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the
witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no
offence is made out and that proceedings, if allowed to
continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This
too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does
not overwhelmingly so demand." (Emphasis supplied)
16. Therefore, it is not permissible to look into the material
filed by the petitioner with the petition and the Court has to rely
upon the material brought upon the record of learned Trial Court.
17. The FIR clearly mentions that the petitioner and her
family members had harassed the informant for not bringing
sufficient dowry. The petitioner used to ask for money from the
informant or in the alternative to leave her matrimonial home. She
used to send the message to harass the informant. She and other
family members demanded "Lambu" which as per the petitioner is a
large Brass utensil given by the family of the bride to the family of
the bridegroom during the marriage ceremony as a custom. Thus,
the allegations in the FIR constitute the commission of the
cognizable offence.
18. It was submitted that the FIR is vague and does not show
any specific detail against the petitioner. This is not correct. The
victim specifically mentioned the role of the petitioner and the
words uttered by her. She stated that she was being taunted almost
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daily. She mentioned that she was asked to bring her family
members on 03.05.2023 who promised to pay ₹ 1,00,000 as
demanded by the petitioner's family members. These allegations
clearly show that the allegations in the FIR are not vague but are
detailed.
19. The police have also recorded the statement of the
informant under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. which is running into four
pages. It mentions the incidents in detail with the exact words used
by the petitioner. She has also mentioned the details of the articles
given to her and retained by the petitioner and her family members.
She also provided the bills for the article supplied to her. Thus, the
submission that the contents of the FIR and the charged sheet are
vague and do not disclose the commission of any cognizable offence
is not acceptable.
20. It was submitted that the allegations in the FIR are false.
This Court cannot determine the truthfulness or falsity of the
allegations because it is a matter of trial to be adjudicated by the
learned Trial Court where the matter is pending. This position was
laid down in Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643
wherein it was held: -
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"13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court
would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the
reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made
in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the
proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the
allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face
value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make
out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the
present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if
taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an
offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the
considered view that the present case would fall under
Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the
case of Bhajan Lal (supra).
14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in
the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi),
Department of Home(2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:
"14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of
the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once
the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR
is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission,
keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph
Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of
Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph
Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7
SCC 59: (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding
the question of whether the High Court could entertain
the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the
charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency
of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para
16)
"16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various
sections under which the appellant is being
charged and is to be prosecuted would show
that the same are not made out even prima facie
from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge
sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge
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[Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC
OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined
whether the offences alleged to have been
committed by the appellant were prima facie
made out from the complainant's FIR, charge-
sheet, documents, etc. or not."
21. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the
truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR.
22. A charge sheet has been filed before the Court. The
learned Trial Court is seized of the matter. It was laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Iqbal v. State of U.P., (2023) 8 SCC 734:
2023 SCC OnLine SC 949 that when the charge sheet has been filed,
learned Trial Court should be left to appreciate the same. It was
observed:
"At the same time, we also take notice of the fact that the
investigation has been completed and charge-sheet is ready
to be filed. Although the allegations levelled in the FIR do not
inspire any confidence particularly in the absence of any
specific date, time, etc. of the alleged offences, we are of the
view that the appellants should prefer a discharge
application before the trial court under Section 227 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). We say so because even
according to the State, the investigation is over and the
charge sheet is ready to be filed before the competent court.
In such circumstances, the trial court should be allowed to
look into the materials which the investigating officer might
have collected forming part of the charge sheet. If any such
discharge application is filed, the trial court shall look into
the materials and take a call whether any discharge case is
made out or not."
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23. Therefore, the present petition discloses the commission
of offences and the same cannot be quashed while exercising
jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C.
24. Hence, the present petition fails and the same is
dismissed.
25. The observation made here-in-above shall remain
confined to the disposal of the petition and will have no bearing,
whatsoever, on the merits of the case.
(Rakesh Kainthla)
Judge
4th October, 2024
(Nikita)
