Himachal Pradesh High Court

Date Of Decision: 3.10.2024 vs State Of H.P. & Others on 3 October, 2024

Author: Vivek Singh Thakur

Bench: Vivek Singh Thakur

                                                                   2024:HHC:9782




    IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
                                        CWPOA No. 6680 of 2020

                                        Date of decision: 3.10.2024

Amin Chand.                                              ...Petitioner.
                                  Versus
State of H.P. & others.                                 ...Respondents.
Corum
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting?1 Yes

For the Petitioner:           Mr.Abhay Kaushal, Advocate, vice Mr.Pawnish
                              Kumar Shukla, Advocate.

For the Respondents:          Mr.Varun      Chandel,      Additional      Advocate
                              General.


              Vivek Singh Thakur, Judge (Oral)

Petitioner has approached this Court seeking direction to the

respondents to regularize his service on completion of 8 years of service in the

year 2005 alongwith consequential benefits, after quashing and setting aside

rejection of his claim vide Office Order dated 23.7.2018 issued in sequel to

direction passed by the erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal in earlier

petition Original Application No. 2233 of 2018, titled as Amin Chand Vs. State

Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment? Yes

2 2024:HHC:9782

of H.P. and another preferred by the petitioner before the erstwhile H.P. State

Administrative Tribunal.

2. Claim of the petitioner is that he was engaged initially in the year

1997 and thus he had completed 8 years daily waged service in the year 2005

but benefit of regularization was extended to him in the year 2011, whereas he

was entitled for regularisation in June, 2005 in view of judgment passed by the

High Court in CWP No. 2735 of 2010, titled as Rakesh Kumar Vs. State of

H.P.

3. In alternative learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted

that in case petitioner is not found to be entitled for regularisation on

completion of 8 years service for want of availability of post, then also for the

Policy framed by the State and extension thereof to the daily waged workers in

terms of various pronouncements of this High Court as well as the Supreme

Court, petitioner is entitled, at least, for conferment of work charge status on

completion of 8 years service w.e.f. June, 2005.

4. In response, by filing detailed reply, respondents have submitted

that petitioner was initially engaged in the year 1997, but during 1997-1998 he

worked intermittently for 124 and 114 days respectively and in the year 1999

after working for 15 days, he left the job and thereafter he filed a Reference

before the Labour Court, which was allowed on 24.4.2010 and petitioner was

re-instated w.e.f. 2.8.2010 in compliance of the award passed by the Labour 3 2024:HHC:9782

Court by granting reinstatement in service w.e.f. date of termination i.e.

October, 1999, as the Labour Court in its award had directed to reinstate the

petitioner from the date of termination alongwith seniority and continuity of the

service. Copy of award dated 24.4.2010 passed by the Labour Court in

Reference Petition No. 27 of 2008, titled as Amin Chand Vs. Executive

Engineer has also been placed on record with the rejoinder, which indicates

that petitioner was directed to be reinstated from the date of his termination

alongwith 25% back wages and continuity of service from the said date.

5. It is further case of the respondents that petitioner stood retired

from the service on 31.8.2017 and benefits, for which he was found entitled,

stand released in his favour, therefore, for delay and laches in approaching the

Court petitioner is not entitled for any relief claimed in the petition.

7. It has been further contended on behalf of respondents that

petitioner was given seniority w.e.f. October, 1999 and, therefore, petitioner

would complete 8 years deemed service as on 31.12.2008 and would become

eligible for regularisation thereafter, however, regularisation is always subject

to availability of vacancy and prevailing regularisation Policy of the

Government and in terms of that petitioner was regularized as per available

vacancy and prevailing Policy w.e.f. 2011.

8. It has been also contended on behalf of respondents that

petitioner had preferred Original Application No. 2233 of 2018 before the 4 2024:HHC:9782

erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal and in furtherance to order dated

16.4.2018 passed by erstwhile H.P. State Administrative Tribunal in the said

petition, respondents have considered and decided the claim of the petitioner

with reference to the judgment passed in Rakesh Kumar's case, whereby

claim of petitioner has been rejected by issuing Office Order dated 16.4.2018

(Annexure A-2) and, therefore, it has been contended that the petitioner is not

entitled to file present petition on the same and similar plea, which already

stood adjudicated by the Court and his claim stood rejected by the

Department.

9. Referring judgments passed in CWP No. 499 of 2021, titled as

Kishori Lal Vs. State of H.P. & others, CWP No. 500 of 2021, titled as Sant

Ram Vs. State of H.P. & others, decided on 31.3.2021, CWPOA No. 316 of

2020, titled as Bihari Lal Vs. State of H.P. & others, decided on 24.9.2021

and CWP No. 1542 of 2020, titled as Naresh Kumar Vs. State of H.P. &

others, dated 21.8.2020, it has been contended that being a fence sitter,

petitioner is not entitled for any relief, as prayed by him, particularly when he

had accepted the offer of regularisation in the year 2011 itself without any

protest.

10. It is admitted case of the parties that petitioner was appointed as

daily waged Beldar in the year 1997. However, plea of the respondents that

he served in the years 1997 and 1998 for 124 and 114 days, respectively, has 5 2024:HHC:9782

not been disputed in the petition or rejoinder filed to the reply. Though it is

claim of the respondents that petitioner had left his job at his own in the year

1999, but the said assertion stands rebutted by the averments made in the

reply itself, admitting that Reference Petition No. 27 of 2008 was decided in

favour of the petitioner wherein it was held that his termination in October,

1999 was illegal and accordingly petitioner was directed to be reinstated with

continuity in service since October, 1999. The said Award of Labour Court has

been accepted by respondents-Department and petitioner was re-engaged

after October, 1999, however adding 15 days of his previous service,

petitioner cannot be said to have completed 240 days in the said calendar

year.

11. It is admitted case of parties that since 2000, for acceptance of

award passed in favour of petitioner by the Labour Court, petitioner is to be

considered to have completed 240 days in each calendar year since 1.1.2000

and accordingly petitioner would completed 8 years service with 240 days in

each calendar year on 1.1.2008. With these admitted facts petitioner would be

entitled for, at least, conferment of work charge status on completion of 8

years on 1.1.2008 alongwith all consequential benefits for the observations

made hereinafter.

12. Plea of respondents that for passing of Office Order dated

23.7.2018 (Annexure A-2), rejecting the claim of the petitioner, he is not 6 2024:HHC:9782

entitled for filing present petition, is misconceived and thus not sustainable, as

the said Office Order has been passed in furtherance to the Original

Application No. 2233 of 2018 preferred by the petitioner against the

Department, which was disposed of directing the respondents-Department to

decide and consider the case of the petitioner. In such a situation for rejection

of claim of the petitioner, petitioner has a constitutional and legal right to assail

the rejection of his claim by assailing impugned order dated 23.7.2018.

13. It is also claimed by respondents that for judgment dated

31.3.2016 passed in LPA No. 76 of 2016, titled as State of H.P. Vs. Shyam

Lal, regularisation cannot be claimed automatically, but it shall be subjected to

availability of sanctioned vacant post, that too on the basis of approved

Government Regularisation Policy. It is further submitted that case of the

petitioner is not covered by the judgment passed in Rakesh Kumar's case.

14. Division Bench of this High Court in CWPOA No. 6151 of 2020,

titled as Rashid Mohammad Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others,

decided on 13.6.2024 has observed as under:-

"23. The issue in this regard also stands settled in the judgment of Rakesh Kumar's case, wherein it has been observed as under:-

"6. The simple question is whether the delay defeats justice? In analyzing the above issue, it has to be borne in mind that the petitioners are only class-IV workers (Beldars). The schemes announced by the Government clearly provided that the department concerned should consider the 7 2024:HHC:9782

workmen concerned for bringing them on the work-charged category. So, there is an obligation cast on the department to consider the cases of the daily waged workmen for conferment of the workcharged status, being on a work- charged establishment, on completion of the required number of years in terms of the policy. At the best, the petitioners can only be denied the interest on the eligible benefits and not the benefits as such, which accrued on them as per the policy and under which policy, the department was found to confer the status, subject to the workmen satisfying the required conditions."

27. It was duty of the respondents-State to confer Work Charge status upon the petitioner and for lapse on the part of respondents, petitioner, who belongs to the lowest rank of hierarchy in the service cannot be made to suffer, and in numerous similar cases it has also been held that for dereliction of duty on the part of concerned officer, petitioner cannot be made to suffer and, thus, prayer of learned Additional Advocate General is rejected.

28. For delayed extension of benefits, arising out of the Policy of the State, the petitioner cannot be deprived from consequential benefits from the due date, as implementation of Policy is the duty of the State through its Officers, being custodian of rights of citizens.

29. In CWPOA No.5286 of 2020, titled as Mohinder Singh vs. State of H.P. & others, this High Court has observed as under:-

"2. The decision to grant benefit to individuals like the petitioner in terms of judgment passed by this Court, in CWP No. 2735 of 2010 titled Rakesh Kumar Vs. State of H.P. alongwith connected matters decided on 28.07.2010, was taken vide letter dated 08.06.2015 i.e. Annexure A5. Subsequently, the respondents implemented the decision in Rakesh Kumar's case and as a consequence thereof, the date of regularization of the petitioner was changed to 01.01.2005, as is evident from Annexure R3 dated 01.08.2015.

                            8                            2024:HHC:9782



...                              ...                          ...

7. From a perusal of records, it is clearly evident that sole ground for non grant of benefits to the petitioner is based on the reason that the petitioner had not filed a case seeking the benefits of Rakesh Kumar's case stated supra. At the outset, it is made clear that no other ground is available to the State to defend its action as it is a well settled principle of law that reasons are not like wine which mature over a period of time. As has been held in AIR 1978, Supreme Court, 851 titled Mohinder Singh Gill and another Vs. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi and others. Relevant extract is reproduced herein below:-

"8. The second equally relevant matter is that when a statutory functionary makes an order based on certain grounds, its validity must be judged by the reasons so mentioned and cannot be supplemented by fresh reasons in the shape of affidavit or otherwise . Otherwise, an order bad in the beginning may, by the time it comes to court on account of a challenge, get validated by addition grounds later brought out. We may here draw attention to the observations of Bose J. In Gordhandas Bhanji (AIR 1952 SC 16) ( at. p.18):

" Public orders publicly made, in exercise of a statutory authority can not be construed in the light of explanations subsequently given by the officer making the order of what he meant, or of what was in his mind, or what he intended to do. Public orders made by public authorities are meant to have public effect and are intended to affect the acting and conduct of those to whom they are addressed and must be construed objectively with reference to the language used in the order itself."

Orders are not like old wine becoming better as they grow older."

8. A perusal of Rakesh Kumar's case stated supra reflects that the same is a decision, which touches upon a policy matter, scheme of regularization. Rakesh Kumar's case is a judgment in rem with intention to give benefits to all similarly situated persons, whether 9 2024:HHC:9782

they approached the Court or not. The same casts an obligation upon the authorities to themselves extend the benefits thereof to all similarly situated persons. A perusal of Annexure A5, letter dated 08.06.2015, reflects the respondents authorities of their own had also decided to extend the benefits of Rakesh Kumar's case to all.

9. In Rakesh Kumar's case, there is no direction of the Court to restrict the consequential benefits, including monetary benefits, for three years prior to filing of the petition. It has been observed in Rakesh Kumar's case that for delay in approaching the Court, the petitioner, at the most, can be denied interest on delayed payment, but shall not be denied arrears of wages and other financial benefits for which he is entitled, like others, from the date of regularization/ conferment of Work Charge status. Therefore, restriction of payment of consequential benefits for only three years prior to filing of the Writ Petition is not sustainable.

10. Even otherwise, when a particular set of employees is given relief by the Court, other identical situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit, and not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.

11. Plea of the respondents with respect to delay and laches is also not legally sustainable. The distinction between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered in rem and in personam is lucidly captured in State of UP Vs. Arvind Kumar Shrivastva 2015 (1) SCC Page 347 followed in 2021 Vol. 13 SCC Page 225. Relevant extract wherein is being reproduced hereinbelow:-

"22.1. The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by this Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule would be that merely because other similarly situated 10 2024:HHC:9782

persons did not approach the Court earlier, they are not to be treated differently.

22.2. However, this principle is subject to well recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fencesitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim.

22.3. However, this exception may not apply in those cases where the judgment pronounced by the court was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons, whether they approached the court or not. With such a pronouncement the obligation is cast upon the authorities to itself extend the benefit thereof to all similarly situated persons. Such a situation can occur when the subject matter of the decision touches upon the policy matters, like scheme of regularisation and the like (see K.C. Sharma v. Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721). On the other hand, if the judgment of the court was in personam holding that benefit of the said judgment shall accrue to the parties before the court and such an intention is stated expressly in the judgment or it can be impliedly found out from the tenor and language of the judgment, those who want to get the benefit of the said judgment extended to them shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer from either laches and delays or acquiescence." (Emphasis supplied)

12. Present case is covered by Paras 22.1 and 22.3 of Arvind Kumar Shrivastva's case supra and, therefore, claim of the petitioner does not suffer either from delay and laches or acquiescence.

11 2024:HHC:9782

13. Where the Court has not restricted the benefits for specific period, any guidelines, instructions, circular etc issued by Department or executive decision of any other authority cannot restrict such benefit as it would amount to modification of order of Court by an authority having no jurisdiction to do so.

30. Similar view has been taken by this High Court in CWPOA

NO.5741 of 2020, titled as Dhanveer Singh vs. State of H.P. &

others, decided on 29.08.2023.

31. In CWPOA No.2343 of 2020, titled as Vikram Singh vs.

Himachal Road Transport Corporation, and other connected

matters, decided on 09.11.2023, this High Court has observed as

under:-

"23. In so far as the plea of limitation/delay and laches is concerned, the same is also liable to be rejected. As has already been stated supra, the plea of petitioners is based on discrimination which is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. In this regard, it would be appropriate to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K. Thimmappa and others vs. Chairman, Central Board of Directors, State Bank of India and another, 2001 (2) SCC 259, wherein, it has been categorically laid down that if there is an infraction of Article 14 of the Constitution of India then petition cannot be dismissed on the ground of delay and laches.

... ... ...

25. For delayed regularization, petitioners cannot be blamed as the same was to be done by the respondent-Corporation. In this regard, reliance is placed on the decision of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in CWP No.2735 of 2010, titled as Rakesh Kumar vs. State of HP and others alongwith connected matters decided on 28.07.2010."

32. It is also apt to record that Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.5806 of 2024, titled Himachal Road Transport Corporation & Others vs. 12 2024:HHC:9782

Vikram Singh & others, laying challenge to the decision in Vikram Singh's case (supra), was dismissed by the Supreme Court of India on 15.03.2024.

33. Affirming State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, Supreme Court of India in Chairman/Managing Director, Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited and others vs. Ram Gopal, (2021) 13 SCC 225, has observed as under:-

"13. We may hasten to add that these principles may not, however, apply to judgments which are delivered in rem. The State and its instrumentalities are expected In such category of cases to themselves extend the benefit of a judicial pronouncement to all similarly placed employees without forcing each person to individually knock the doors of courts. This distinction between operation of delay and laches to judgments delivered in rem and in personam, is lucidly captured in State of U.P. vs. Arvind Kumar Srivastava. ... ... ..."

34. Learned Additional Advocate General has also referred judgment dated 23.05.2024, passed by a Co-ordinate Division Bench of this High Court in CWPOA No.6143 of 2020, titled Chatro vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, wherein prayer for consequential benefits from due date was rejected. Similar issue has been considered and adjudicated by other Division Benches in cases decided prior to 23.05.2024. The judgment in Chatro's case is later in time.

35. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the earlier judgments, passed prior to aforesaid judgment by other Division Benches of this High Court in CWPOA No.5286 of 2020, titled as Mohinder Singh vs. State of H.P. & others, decided on 29.08.2023; CWPOA No. 5741 of 2020, titled as Dhanveer Singh vs. State of H.P. & others, decided on 29.08.2023; CWPOA No. 6217 of 2020, 13 2024:HHC:9782

titled Pawan Kumar vs. State, decided on 31.10.2023; and CWPOA No.2343 of 2020, titled as Vikram Singh vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation, and other connected matters, decided on 09.11.2023, could not be brought in the notice of the Co-ordinate Division Bench and, thus, judgment in Chatro's case (supra) has been passed without considering the earlier judgments dealing with the same issue.

36. In Ashok Kumar's and Chatro's cases, It has been observed that petitioner was a fence-sitter awaiting verdict of Rakesh Kumar's case and had not approached the Court in time. It is also apt to notice that this issue is squarely covered by judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Arvind Srivastava, (2015) 1 SCC 347, which has been affirmed by a Three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Chairman/Managing Director U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. And Ors. vs. Ram Gopal, (2021) 13 SCC 225.

37. Judgments in Arvind Kumar Srivastava's and Ram Gopal's cases (supra) have also not been brought to the notice of the Co-ordinate Division Bench in Chatro's case as well as Single Bench in Ashok Kumar's case and, therefore, have not been considered by the said Benches.

38. We are bound to follow the Supreme Court judgment and other judgments passed in consonance with the pronouncement of the Supreme Court and, therefore, judgment passed by the Co-ordinate Division Bench in Chatro's case (supra) relied upon by learned Additional Advocate General, cannot be relied upon in view of binding precedent of Supreme Court and thus it is of no help to the State.

39. In the facts and attending circumstances of present case, in terms of judgment reported in 1996 (5) SCC 54, titled as Shangrila Food Products Limited and another vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and another, in order to do complete and 14 2024:HHC:9782

substantial justice inter se the parties while exercising writ jurisdiction, the benefit of Rakesh Kumar's stated supra needs to be extended to the petitioner for the reasons stated herein below:-

"11. It is well settled that the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can take cognizance of the entire facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders to give the parties complete and substantial justice. This jurisdiction of the High Court, being extraordinary, is normally exercisable keeping in mind the principles of equity. One of the ends of the equity is to promote honesty and fair play. If there be any unfair advantage gained by a party priorly, before invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court, the Court can take into account the unfair advantage gained and can require the party to shed the unfair gain before granting relief. ...... ..."

40. Present case is squarely covered by Paras-22.1 and 22.3 of the judgment in Arvind Kumar Srivastava's case, because judgment in Rakesh Kumar's case was judgment in rem with intention to give benefit to all similarly situated persons whether they approached the Court or not. In such a situation obligation is cast upon the authorities to extend the benefit to all similarly situated persons. Therefore, in given facts and circumstances, petitioner would not be treated fence- sitter and laches and delay or acquiescence would not be a valid ground to dismiss his claim. On this ground also, view taken in Ashok Kumar's & Chatro's cases is contrary to the law laid down by the Supreme Court as well as directions issued by the Division Bench in Rakesh Kumar's case and, thus, the same is to be ignored.

15 2024:HHC:9782

41. The material on record reveals that the matter with respect to the conferment of work charge status on completion of eight years of continuous service stands adjudicated by this Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar (supra) and further reiterated in the case of Ashwani Kumar (supra). Based on these judgments, which are judgments in rem, the State Authorities have extended the benefit of judgments to many similarly placed employees in various departments, including the respondent department. Once the benefit of these judgments has been extended to similar persons then it does not behove the State Authorities to compel its employees to come to the Courts, for seeking similar benefits. Denial or defeating similar benefits by taking the plea of delay and latches certainly amounts to treating "equal as unequal", which is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, in view of the mandate of law laid down by the Constitutional Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in K.C.Sharma versus Union of India, (1997) 6 SCC 721.

42. Needless, to note, that the State Government notified Himachal Pradesh State Litigation Policy on 07.03.2011, with the object that claimants and litigants should act consistently and an endeavour should be made to avoid unnecessary litigation. Once the matter in issue with respect to the conferment of work charge status on completion of eight years of continuous daily wage service and regularization thereafter subject to availability of posts stands settled by this Court, which has been affirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, then the action of the State Authorities in filing appeals so as to delay the benefits as given to others and raising objections on claims filed by claimants being dehors the Litigation Policy has been deprecated by this Court in CWP No. 1314 of 2016 titled as Nigma Devi versus State of Himachal Pradesh and others also. Moreover, denial or 16 2024:HHC:9782

delaying the benefits despite having been extended to similar incumbents, defeats the objective of a welfare State.

43. Similar benefits have been extended to similarly situated employees. Thus, petitioner cannot be discriminated on the ground of delay and laches, particularly when it was duty of respondents to extend such benefits to the petitioner. State should act as a model employer and should extend benefits of its Policies to all eligible persons, in consonance with pronouncements of the Court(s) which have attained finality, without any discrimination particularly when identical objections have already been overruled by the Courts and such pronouncements have attained finality. Thus claim of the petitioner cannot be refuted only on the ground of delay and laches and for joining on regularization without protest.

44. Though, law of Limitation is not applicable, however principle of delay and laches is attracted for adjudication of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The petitioner may be ousted for delay and laches in appropriate case. For otherwise strong merit in the case, in order to prevent exploitation of victims for omission and commission on the part of mighty State, taking into consideration the circumstances of the petition and incapability of petitioner to approach the Court invariably, delay and laches may be ignored for adjudication of issue raised in the Writ Petition on merits. Therefore, we are of the considered view that petitioner, in present petition, is not liable to be ousted on the ground of delay and laches.

45. Regarding regularization of the petitioner from prospective dates of passing of order after issuance of fresh Policy of the Government and withholding regularization/grant of work-charged status to the petitioner for want of time gap between two Policies, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred pronouncement of this Court in CWP No. 17 2024:HHC:9782

2415 of 2012, titled as Mathu Ram Vs. Municipal Corporation and others, decided on 31.7.2014.

46. Judgment of Single Bench passed in Mathu Ram's case has been affirmed by a Division Bench in LPA No. 44 of 2015, titled as Municipal Corporation, Shimla & others vs. Mathu Ram, decided on 13.10.2015.

47. Conclusion of verdict of Mathu Ram's and Rakesh Kumar's cases, with respect to gap between issuance/formulation of two policies, is that previous policy/scheme shall remain in force till issuance/formulation/introduction of subsequent policy/scheme, but cut of date for completion of requisite number of years shall be redundant in subsequent years and benefit of policy/scheme shall be extended to employees immediately on completion of continuous service for requisite number of years with minimum prescribed number of working days in each calendar year. In case regularization is not possible for want of availability of vacancy, the work-charge status has to be conferred upon daily wage employee on completion of requisite number of years prescribed in the Policy/Scheme.

48. Despite having bestowed status of custodian of rights of its citizens, State or its functionaries invariably are adopting exploitative method in the field of public employment to avoid its liabilities, depriving the persons employed from their just claims and benefits by making initial appointments on temporary basis, i.e. contract, adhoc, tenure, daily-wage etc., in order to shirk from its responsibility and delay the conferment of work-charge status or extension of benefits of regularization Policy of the State by not notifying Policies in this regard in future. Present case is also an example of such practice.

49. The Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).3398/2024, titled as State of Rajasthan and ors. V. Gopal Bijhawat, decided on 16.2.2024, had imposed costs on the State for 18 2024:HHC:9782

having harassed a poor litigant for having engaged him in protracted litigation denying him fruits of his litigation.

50. In Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s).30326 of 2023, titled as The Special Land Acquisition Officer v. Vithal Rao, decided on 6.9.2023, the Supreme Court had imposed costs and had categorically observed that just because Officers of the State do not have to pay for litigation from their pocket does not mean that they can harass individuals by forcing them into uncalled for litigation.

51. In CWP No.1314 of 2016, titled as Nigma Devi v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 30.8.2022, this High Court had directed the State to pay compensation of ₹20,00,000/- to the petitioner therein and had ordered that the said amount shall be recovered from the erring Officers/officials on pro-rata basis."

15. Term "work-charge", in Himachal Pradesh, is used in different

context. A person, working on daily-waged basis, before his regularization, is

granted work-charged status on completion of specified number of years as

daily-wager and effect thereof is that thereafter non-completion of 240 days in

a calendar year would not result into his ouster from the service or debar him

from getting the benefit of length of service for that particular year. Normally,

workcharged status is conferred upon a daily- wager, on accrual of his right for

regularization, on completion of prescribed period of service, but for non-

regularization is for want of regular vacancy in the department or for any other

just and valid reason. Therefore, it is a period interregnum daily-wage service

and regularization, which is altogether different form the temporary

establishment of work-charge, as discussed in the judgment of the Apex Court 19 2024:HHC:9782

relied upon by the State and, for practice in Himachal Pradesh, work-charged

status is not conferred upon the person employed in a project but upon such

daily wage workers, who are to be continued after particular length of service

for availability of work but without regularization for want of creation of post by

Government for his regularization/regular appointment. Therefore, work is

always available in such cases and the charge of a daily-wager is created

thereon to avoid his disengagement for reasons upon which a daily-wager can

be dispensed with from service.

16. On conferment of work-charged status, sword of disengagement,

hanging on the neck of workmen, is removed on completion of specified period

of daily-waged service, as thereafter instead of daily-wage, the employee

would get regular pay-scale and would be entitled to other consequential

benefits for which a dailywaged employee is not entitled.

17. So far as regularization of petitioner is concerned, that may

depend upon the availability of post, but for conferring work charge status,

existence of post or existence of work charge establishment is not necessary

and, therefore, plea on this count to deny conferment of work charge status

upon the petitioner, on completion of 8 years, is also not tenable.

18. Learned Additional Advocate General, referring Jai Dev Gupta

vs. State of Himachal Pradesh, (1997) 11 SCC 13, has prayed for restricting

the arrears for three years prior to the filing of this petition. This issue had 20 2024:HHC:9782

already been dealt with by this Division Bench in CWPOA No.7502 of 2020,

titled as Nagender vs State of HP decided on 14.08.2024 and the same

reasons are mutatis mutandis applicable to the present case. Accordingly,

prayer for restricting the arrears is rejected.

19. Similar view has been taken by this High Court in CWPOA

No.7495 of 2020, titled as Gupat Nandan Versus State of Himachal

Pradesh and Others, decided on 14.8.2024; CWPOA No.7489 of 2020, titled

as Manohar Lal Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Others, decided on

20.8.2024; and CWPOA No.7485 of 2020, titled as Fateh Singh Versus

State of HP and others decided vide judgment of even date 20.08.2024.

20. In view of above observation, judgments referred by respondents

in support of their claim have no impact on the claim of the petitioner.

21. The issue involved in the present matter and claim of the

petitioner are squarely covered by the issue decided by the Supreme Court

and other judgments referred supra in favour of the similarly situated persons

like petitioner and, accordingly, respondents are directed to pass appropriate

order on or before 30.11.2024 with respect to the consequential benefits for

which the petitioner is entitled from the date of conferment of work charge

status i.e. 1.1.2008.

22. In view of delay in filing the petition, we are not granting any

interest on the delayed payment of arrears in case arrears are paid to the 21 2024:HHC:9782

petitioner within time granted by the Court hereinafter. However, thereafter

petitioner shall also be entitled for interest.

23. Respondents are further directed to extend all consequential

benefits to the petitioner including payment of arrears on or before 31.1.2025,

failing which respondents shall be liable to pay interest @ 5% per annum to

the petitioner on the amount payable from the date of passing of the judgment

till payment. In that eventuality, after payment of interest to the petitioner it

shall be recovered from the concerned officer responsible for delay in payment

and after recovery it shall be deposited in Treasury.

Petition is allowed and disposed of in aforesaid terms alongwith

pending applications, if any.

(Vivek Singh Thakur), Judge.

(Ranjan Sharma), Judge.

3rd October, 2024 (Keshav)

SUBHASH DN: C=IN, O=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, OU=HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA, Phone= 3418061207364d8c002725dfc58ff116f678c3d39289db29b9

CHAND 92cce875905119, PostalCode=171001, S=Himachal Pradesh, SERIALNUMBER= 5ce240fac0e1267843f29509683d09a9912af10edc4e6cd2e d5d4a8c30134c1b, CN=SUBHASH CHAND DHIMAN Reason: I am the author of this document

DHIMAN Location: