Citation : 2021 Latest Caselaw 3420 HP
Judgement Date : 3 August, 2021
IN THE
HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA
Cr.MMO No.254 of 2021
Date of Decision: 03.08.2021
_______________________________________________________________
.
Anmol Dogra & another .........Petitioners
Versus
State of H.P & another ..........Respondents
Coram:
Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Sharma, Judge.
Whether approved for reporting1?
_________________________________________________________________
For the petitioners : Mr. Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate with Ms.
Aanandita Sharma, Advocate, for petitioner
No.1.
Mr. Amit Jamwal, Advocate, for petitioner
r No.2/complainant.
For the respondent : Mr. Sudhir Bhatnagar and Mr. Desh Raj
Thakur, Additional Advocate Generals with
Mr. Narinder Thakur, Deputy Advocate
General, for respondent No.1-State.
(through video conferencing)
Sandeep Sharma, J. (Oral):
By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C, prayer
has been made on behalf of the petitioners for quashing of FIR No. 479, dated
04.03.2019, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, registered at Police
Station, Barsar, Tehsil Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P. as well as consequent
proceedings pending adjudication before learned Judicial Magistrate-cum-Civil
Judge, Ist Class, Barsar, District Hamirpur, in Case No. 25-1-2019/47/19, on the
basis of compromise/amicable settlement (Annexure P-1) arrived inter se
parties.
1Whether reporters of the Local papers are allowed to see the judgment?
2. Averments contained in the petition, which are duly supported by
an affidavit as well as documents annexed therewith, clearly reveals that FIR,
sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings, came to be lodged against
.
petitioner No.1, Anmol Dogra, at the behest of complainant/petitioner No.2,
Lucky Debles, who alleged that on 04.03.2019, Scooty bearing No.HP21B-
6649, being driven by Anmol Dogra, came in high speed and rammed with his
Car bearing No.HP21B-1163, as a consequence of which, damage was caused
to his vehicle. After completion of investigation, police presented the challan in
the competent court of law, but before same could be taken to its logical end,
both the petitioners, have entered into compromise (Annexure P-1) and as
such, have jointly approached this Court in the instant proceedings praying
therein for quashing of FIR as well as consequent proceedings,if any, pending
in the competent Court of law.
3. On 12.07.2021, this Court while issuing notice to respondents,
deemed it necessary to cause presence of parties, especially, petitioner No.2,
at whose behest, instant FIR sought to be quashed, came to be instituted, so
that genuineness of the compromise placed on record, could be ascertained.
4. Besides above, this Court also directed learned Additional
Advocate General to verify the factum with regard to compromise, if any,
arrived at inter se the parties. Pursuant to aforesaid direction issued by this
Court, Mr. Desh Raj, learned Additional Advocate General, states that as per
instructions imparted to him by SHO, concerned, parties have resolved to
settle their dispute amicably inter se parties, by way of compromise placed on
record.
5. Petitioner No.2, Lucky Debles, has also come present in the
.
Court and is being represented by Mr. Amit Jamwal, Advocate. He, on oath,
states before this Court that he of his own volition and without there being any
external pressure, has entered into compromise with petitioner Anmol Dogra
(Annexure P-1), whereby both the parties have resolved to settle their dispute
amicably inter se them. He states that FIR sought to be quashed in the instant
proceedings is result of misunderstanding inter se him and the petitioner Anmol
Dogra and since, he has been duly compensated by the petitioner qua the loss
caused to his vehicle in the alleged accident, he shall have no objection, in
case prayer made in the instant petition for quashing of FIR as well as
consequential proceedings pending in the competent court of law are quashed
and set aside. Statement of petitioner No.2, is taken on record.
6. Mr. Desh Raj Thakur, learned Additional Advocate General, after
having heard the aforesaid statement of petitioner No.2, fairly states that that
in view of the amicable settlement arrived inter se parties, no fruitful
purpose would be served in case FIR as well as consequent proceedings
pending before the court below are allowed to sustain. He further states that
otherwise also, there are very remote/bleak chances of conviction of petitioner
No.1, on account of statement given by the complainant before this Court and
as such, State shall have no objection in case prayer made in the petition is
allowed.
7. Since the petition has been filed under Section 482 Cr.PC, this
Court deems it fit to consider the present petition in the light of the judgment
passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Narinder Singh and others versus State of
.
Punjab and another (2014)6 Supreme Court Cases 466, whereby Hon'ble Apex
Court has formulated guidelines for accepting the settlement and quashing the
proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with
the criminal proceedings. Perusal of judgment referred above clearly depicts
that in para 29.1, Hon'ble Apex Court has returned the findings that power
conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be distinguished from the power
which lies in the Court to compound the offences under section 320 of the
Code. No doubt, under section 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent
power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are not
compoundable, where the parties have settled the matter between themselves.
However, this power is to be exercised sparingly and with great caution. Para
Nos. 29 to 29.7 of the judgment are reproduced as under:-
"29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay
down the following principles by which the High Court would be
guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between
the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the
Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the
proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction
to continue with the criminal proceedings:
29.1Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to be
distinguished from the power which lies in the Court to
compound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. No
.
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court has
inherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even in those
cases which are not compoundable, where the parties have
settled the matter between themselves. However, this power is
to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that
basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the
guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court.
While exercising the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C the High
Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two
objectives.
29.3. Such a power is not be exercised in those prosecutions
which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity
or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not
private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly,
for offences alleged to have been committed under special
statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences
committed by Public Servants while working in that capacity are
not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between
the victim and the offender.
29.4. On the other, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly
.
and pre-dominantly civil character, particularly those arising out
of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial
relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the
parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine
as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak
and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to
great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be
caused to him by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category
of heinous and serious offences and therefore is to be generally
treated as crime against the society and not against the
individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its
decision merely because there is a mention of Section 307 IPC
in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would
be open to the High Court to examine as to whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the
prosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved,
would lead to proving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For
this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the
vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc.
Medical report in respect of injuries suffered by the victim can
.
generally be the guiding factor. On the basis of this prima facie
analysis, the High Court can examine as to whether there is a
strong possibility of conviction or the chances of conviction are
remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuse to accept the
settlement and quash the criminal proceedings whereas in the
later case it would be permissible for the High Court to accept
the plea compounding the offence based on complete
settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Court can also
be swayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties is
going to result in harmony between them which may improve
their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under
Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play a
crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at
immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the
matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal
in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal
proceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason that at this
stage the investigation is still on and even the charge sheet has
not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the charge is
framed but the evidence is yet to start or the evidence is still at
infancy stage, the High Court can show benevolence in
exercising its powers favourably, but after prima facie
.
assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above. On
the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost
complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at
the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain
from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in
such cases the trial court would be in a position to decide the
case finally on merits and to come a conclusion as to whether
the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly,
in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the
trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the
High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be
a ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender
who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge
is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already
recorded of a heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question
of sparing a convict found guilty of such a crime".
"32. We find from the impugned order that the sole reason
which weighed with the High Court in refusing to accept the
settlement between the parties was the nature of injuries. If we
go by that factor alone, normally we would tend to agree with
the High Court's approach. However, as pointed out hereinafter,
some other attendant and inseparable circumstances also need
to be kept in mind which compels us to take a different view.
.
33. We have gone through the FIR as well which was
recorded on the basis of statement of the complainant/victim. It
gives an indication that the complainant was attacked allegedly
by the accused persons because of some previous dispute
between the parties, though nature of dispute, etc. is not stated
in detail. However, a very pertinent statement appears on record
viz. "respectable persons have been trying for a compromise up
till now, which could not be finalized." This becomes an
important aspect. It appears that there have been some
disputes which led to the aforesaid purported attack by the
accused on the complainant. In this context when we find that
the elders of the village, including Sarpanch, intervened in the
matter and the parties have not only buried their hatchet but
have decided to live peacefully in future, this becomes an
important consideration. The evidence is yet to be led in the
Court. It has not even started. In view of compromise between
parties, there is a minimal chance of the witnesses coming
forward in support of the prosecution case. Even though nature
of injuries can still be established by producing the doctor as
witness who conduced medical examination, it may become
difficult to prove as to who caused these injuries. The chances
of conviction, therefore, appear to be remote. It would, therefore,
.
be unnecessary to drag these proceedings. We, taking all these
factors into consideration cumulatively, are of the opinion that
the compromise between the parties be accepted and the
criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No.121 dated 14.7.2010
registered with police station Lopoke, District Amritsar Rural be
8.
quashed. We order accordingly."
The Hon'ble Apex Court in case Gian Singh v. State of Punjab
and anr. (2012) 10 SCC 303 has held that power of the High Court in quashing
of the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent power
is distinct and different from the power of a Criminal Court for compounding
offences under Section 320 Cr.PC. Even in the judgment passed in Narinder
Singh's case, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that while exercising inherent
power under Section 482 Cr.PC the Court must have due regard to the nature
and gravity of the crime and its social impact and it cautioned the Courts not to
exercise the power for quashing proceedings in heinous and serious offences
of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc. However subsequently, the
Hon'ble Apex Court in Dimpey Gujral and Ors. vs. Union Territory through
Administrator, UT, Chandigarh and Ors. (2013( 11 SCC 497 has also held as
under:-
"7. In certain decisions of this Court in view of the settlement
arrived at by the parties, this Court quashed the FIRs though
some of the offences were non-compoundable. A two Judges'
.
Bench of this court doubted the correctness of those decisions.
Learned Judges felt that in those decisions, this court had
permitted compounding of non-compoundable offences. The
said issue was, therefore, referred to a larger bench.
The larger Bench in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10
SCC 303 considered the relevant provisions of the Code and
the judgments of this court and concluded as under: (SCC pp.
342-43, para 61)
61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a
criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent
jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a
criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320
of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory
limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline
engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases
power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or F.I.R
may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled
their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of
each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before
exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to
.
the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious
offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim
or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such
offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on
society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and
offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like
Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public
servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for
any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such
offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-
dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the
purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to
dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically
private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their
entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash
criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise
between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is
remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put
accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice
would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case
.
despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the
victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue
with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal
proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite
settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer
and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that
criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above
question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its
jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding." (emphasis
supplied)
8. In the light of the above observations of this court in Gian
Singh, we feel that this is a case where the continuation of
criminal proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of
law because the alleged offences are not heinous offences
showing extreme depravity nor are they against the society.
They are offences of a personal nature and burying them would
bring about peace and amity between the two sides. In the
circumstances of the case, FIR No. 163 dated 26.10.2006
registered under Section 147, 148, 149, 323, 307, 452 and 506
of the IPC at Police Station Sector 3, Chandigarh and all
consequential proceedings arising there from including the final
.
report presented under Section 173 of the Code and charges
framed by the trial Court are hereby quashed.
9. Recently Hon'ble Apex Court in its latest judgment dated 4th
October, 2017, titled as Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai Karmur
and others versus State of Gujarat and Another, passed in Criminal Appeal
No.1723 of 2017 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.9549 of 2016, reiterated the
principles/ parameters laid down in Narinder Singh's case supra for accepting
the settlement and quashing the proceedings. It would be profitable to
reproduce para No. 13 to 15 of the judgment herein:
"13. The same principle was followed in Central Bureau of
Investigation v. Maninder Singh (2016)1 SCC 389 by a bench of
two learned Judges of this Court. In that case, the High Court
had, in the exercise of its inherent power under Section 482
quashed proceedings under Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471
read with Section 120-B of the Penal Code. While allowing the
appeal filed by the Central Bureau of Investigation Mr Justice
Dipak Misra (as the learned Chief Justice then was) observed
that the case involved allegations of forgery of documents to
embezzle the funds of the bank. In such a situation, the fact that
the dispute had been settled with the bank would not justify a
recourse to thepower under Section 482:
"...In economic offences Court must not only keep in view that
.
money has been paid to the bank which has been defrauded but
also the society at large. It is not a case of simple assault or a
theft of a trivial amount; but the offence with which we are
concerned is well planned and was committed with a deliberate
design with an eye of personal profit regardless of
consequence to the society at large. To quash the proceeding
merely on the ground that the accused has settled the amount
with the bank would be a misplaced sympathy. If the
prosecution against the economic offenders are not allowed to
continue, the entire community is aggrieved."
14. In a subsequent decision in State of Tamil Nadu v R
Vasanthi Stanley (2016) 1 SCC 376, the court rejected the
submission that the first respondent was a woman "who was
following the command of her husband" and had signed certain
documents without being aware of the nature of the fraud which
was being perpetrated on the bank. Rejecting the submission,
this Court held that:
"... Lack of awareness, knowledge or intent is neither to be
considered nor accepted in economic offences. The submission
assiduously presented on gender leaves us unimpressed. An
offence under the criminal law is an offence and it does not
depend upon the gender of an accused. True it is, there are
.
certain provisions in Code of Criminal Procedure relating to
exercise of jurisdiction Under Section 437, etc. therein but that
altogether pertains to a different sphere. A person committing a
murder or getting involved in a financial scam or forgery of
documents, cannot claim discharge or acquittal on the ground of
her gender as that is neither constitutionally nor statutorily a valid
argument. The offence is gender neutral in this case. We say no
more on this score..."
"...A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for
that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent
in the financial health of the institutions, is not to be quashed on
the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when
the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the
load on the system..."
15.The broad principles which emerge from the
precedents on the subject may be summarized in
the following propositions:
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High
Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to
secure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer new
powers. It only recognizes and preserves powers which inhere
in the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court
.
to quash a First Information Report or a criminal
proceeding on the ground that a settlement has been arrived
at between the offender and the victim is not the same as the
invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding an
offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court
r to is governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under
Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or
complaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under
Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends of
justice would justify the exercise of the inherent power;
(iv) While the inherent power of the High Court has a
wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to secure
the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of
any court;
(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First
Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the
offender and victim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately
on the facts and circumstances of each case and no exhaustive
elaboration of principles can be formulated;
.
(vi) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while
dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High
Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
offence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental
depravity or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the
victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly
speaking, not private in nature but have a serious impact
upon society. The decision to continue with the trial in
such cases is founded on the overriding element of public
interest in punishing persons for serious offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be
criminal cases which have an overwhelming or predominant
element of a civil dispute. They stand on a distinct footing in so
far as the exercise of the inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similar
transactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriate
situations fall for quashing where parties have settled the
dispute;
(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal
.
proceeding if in view of the compromise between the
disputants, the possibility of a conviction is remote and the
continuation of a criminal proceeding would cause oppression
and prejudice; and
(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offences involving
the financial and economic well-being of the state have
implications which lie beyond the domain of a mere dispute
between private disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in
an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or
misdemeanour. The consequences of the act complained of
upon the financial or economic system will weigh in the
balance.
10. It is quite apparent from the aforesaid exposition of law that High
Court has inherent power to quash criminal proceedings even in those cases
which are not compoundable, but such power is to be exercised sparingly and
with great caution. In the judgments, referred hereinabove, Hon'ble Apex Court
has categorically held that Court while exercising inherent power under Section
482 Cr.P.C., must have due regard to the nature and gravity of offence sought
to be compounded. Hon'ble Apex Court has though held that heinous and
serious offences of mental depravity, murder, rape, dacoity etc. cannot
appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of the victim have
.
settled the dispute, but it has also observed that while exercising its powers,
High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote
and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great
oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not
quashing the criminal cases. Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that Court
while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C can also be swayed by the
fact that settlement between the parties is going to result in harmony between
them which may improve their future relationship. Hon'ble Apex Court in its
judgment rendered in State of Tamil Nadu supra, has reiterated that Section
482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent an abuse of the
process of any court or to secure the ends of justice and has held that the
power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even if the offence is non-
compoundable. In the aforesaid judgment Hon'ble Apex Court has held that
while forming an opinion whether a criminal proceedings or complaint should
be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the High Court
must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the
inherent power.
11. In the case at hand also, offences alleged to have been
committed by the petitioner do not involve offences of moral turpitude or any
grave/heinous crime, rather same are petty offences, as such, this Court
deems it appropriate to quash the FIR as well as consequential proceedings
thereto, especially keeping in view the fact that both the petitioners have
compromised the matter inter se them, in which case, possibility of conviction is
.
remote and no fruitful purpose would be served in continuing with the criminal
proceedings.
12. Since, the matter stands compromised between the parties and
petitioner No.2 is no more interested in pursuing the criminal proceedings
against petitioner No.1, Anmol Dogra, no fruitful purpose would be served in
13.
r to case proceedings initiated at the behest of petitioner No.2 are allowed to
continue, as such, prayer made in the petition at hand can be accepted.
Consequently, in view of the averments contained in the petition
as well as the submissions having been made by the learned counsel for the
parties that the matter has been compromised, and keeping in mind the well
settled proposition of law as well as the compromise being genuine, FIR No.
479, dated 04.03.2019, under Sections 279, 337 and 338 of IPC, registered at
Police Station, Barsar, Tehsil Barsar, District Hamirpur, H.P. as well as
consequent proceedings pending before the Court below, are ordered to be
quashed and set-aside.
14. The present petition is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending
application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(Sandeep Sharma) Judge 3rd August, 2021.
(reena)
.
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