[Cites 9, Cited by 0]
Gujarat High Court
Hareshbhai Karshanbhai Kakadiya ( ... vs State Of Gujarat on 18 March, 2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR QUASHING & SET ASIDE
FIR/ORDER) NO. 3273 of 2014
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
NO
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HARESHBHAI KARSHANBHAI KAKADIYA ( PATEL )
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR PARTH S TOLIA(5617) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MR BM MANGUKIYA(437) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MS BELA A PRAJAPATI(1946) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MS VRUNDA SHAH, ADDL.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Respondent(s)
No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER
Date : 18/03/2026
JUDGMENT
1. The present application is filed seeking quashment of
the FIR registered with Bapunagar Police Station
being I-C.R. No.373 of 2013 dated 24.12.2013 for the
offence punishable under Section 306 of the Indian
Penal Code, wherein the present applicant has been
arraigned as the sole accused. As per the recitals of
the FIR, the brother of the complainant had started a
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business with the accused by establishing a
partnership firm. Subsequently, the said partnership
firm was dissolved, and it is alleged that as the
brother of the complainant suffered losses in the said
business, he committed suicide. It is further stated
that a suicide note dated 27.09.2012 was found, on
the basis of which the impugned FIR came to be
lodged, which is the subject matter of challenge
before this Court.
2. Heard learned advocate Mr. Parth Tolia for the
applicant and learned APP Ms. Vrunda Shah for the
respondent-State. Though appearance has been filed
by learned advocate Mr. B.M. Mangukiya for the
complainant, he has not remained present.
3. Learned advocate Mr. Parth Tolia submits that, as per
the allegations made in the FIR, the deceased
committed suicide on 27.09.2012, however, the FIR
came to be registered after more than one year, i.e.,
on 24.12.2013. It is further submitted that by the
learned advocate Mr. Tolia, as per the recitals of the
FIR, the suicide note was sent to a handwriting
expert, and the opinion was received on 21.09.2013.
Despite the receipt of such opinion, the FIR was
lodged after a delay of about three months. Learned
advocate Mr. Tolia submits that even if the case of
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the prosecution is accepted as it stands, there is no
proximate link between the alleged acts attributed to
the applicant and the suicide committed by the
deceased. Placing reliance upon the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Prakash and Others vs.
State of Maharashtra and Another, arising out of
SLP (Cri.) No.1073 of 2023, learned advocate Mr.
Tolia submits that the impugned FIR is nothing but an
abuse of the process of law, and therefore the same
deserves to be quashed and set aside.
4. Per contra, learned APP Ms. Vrunda Shah submits
that though the FIR was lodged after more than one
year, the delay occurred because the suicide note
was initially sent for handwriting expert opinion,
which was received on 21.09.2013, and thereafter
the FIR came to be registered on 24.12.2013.
Learned APP Ms. Shah further submits that the
investigation is yet to be concluded, and therefore, at
this stage, the present application deserves to be
dismissed.
5. Considering the submissions made by the learned
advocates for the respective parties and upon
perusal of the recitals of the FIR, it emerges that the
FIR came to be lodged on 24.12.2013 alleging that
the deceased Gordhanbhai had committed suicide on
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27.09.2012. As per the allegations made by the
complainant, who is the brother of the deceased, the
deceased had started a business of embroidery with
the accused in the year 2007, and within a period of
one year the business was closed and the
partnership firm was dissolved. It further emerges
from the record that, as per the allegations, the
deceased suffered losses in the said business and
was unable to pay the instalments of the bank loan.
After the dissolution of the partnership firm in the
year 2008, the deceased committed suicide after
about four years, i.e., in the year 2012, and
thereafter the FIR came to be lodged after about one
year.
6. This Court has referred the decision rendered by the
Apex Court in the case of Prakash and others
(supra) wherein the Apex Court has held as under:
"23. In the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar (supra),
the appellant before this Court was charged with having
abetted the suicide by his brother-in-law (sister's
husband). The prosecution story was that there were
strained relations between the deceased and his wife
who at the material time was staying with the appellant
therein. On 25th July, 1998 the deceased went to the
appellant to bring back his wife. There was a quarrel
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between the appellant and the deceased who came back
alone. The deceased told his brothers and other
acquaintances that the appellant had threatened and
abused him by using filthy words. On 27th July, 1998
the deceased was found dead. The deceased left a
suicide note which showed his disturbed state of mind
but otherwise he blamed the appellant for the suicide.
The appellant's petition for quashing of the charge-sheet
filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was dismissed by the
High Court which led him to file an appeal before this
Court which came to be allowed. While taking note of
the disturbed state of mind of the deceased as was
evident from the suicide note and the lack of intention
on the part of the accused to abet the commission of
suicide by the deceased, the Court held that there was
a time gap of 48 hours between the abusive language
being used and the commission of suicide. As such,
owing to the passage of 48 hours, giving the deceased
enough time to reflect, there was no proximate link
between the words uttered and the act of suicide. This
Court observed as follows:
"8. In Swamy Prahaladdas v. State of M.P. [1995 Supp
(3) SCC 438: 1995 SCC (Cri) 943] the appellant
was charged for an offence under Section 306 IPC
on the ground that the appellant during the
quarrel is said to have remarked to the deceased
"to go and die". This Court was of the view that
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mere words uttered by the accused to the
deceased "to go and die" were not even prima
facie enough to instigate the deceased to commit
suicide.
9. In Mahendra Singh v. State of M.P. [1995 Supp (3)
SCC 731: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1157] the appellant was
charged for an offence under Section 306 IPC
basically based upon the dying declaration of the
deceased, which reads as under: (SCC p. 731,
para 1)
"My mother-in-law and husband and sister-in-law
(husband's elder brother's wife) harassed me. They
beat me and abused me. My husband Mahendra
wants to marry a second time. He has illicit
connections with my sister-in-law. Because of
these reasons and being harassed I want to die by
burning."
10. This Court, considering the definition of
"abetment" under Section 107 IPC, found that the
charge and conviction of the appellant for an
offence under Section 306 is not sustainable
merely on the allegation of harassment of the
deceased. This Court further held that neither of
the ingredients of abetment are attracted on the
statement of the deceased.
11. In Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh [(2001)
9 SCC 618] this Court was considering the charge
framed and the conviction for an offence under
Section 306 IPC on the basis of dying declaration
recorded by an Executive Magistrate, in which she
had stated that previously there had been quarrel
between the deceased and her husband and on
the day of occurrence she had a quarrel with her
husband who had said that she could go wherever
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she wanted to go and that thereafter she had
poured kerosene on herself and had set herself on
fire. Acquitting the accused this Court said: (SCC
p. 620)
"A word uttered in a fit of anger or emotion
without intending the consequences to actually
follow cannot be said to be instigation. If it
transpires to the court that a victim committing
suicide was hypersensitive to ordinary petulance,
discord and differences in domestic life quite
common to the society to which the victim
belonged and such petulance, a discord and
differences were not expected to induce similarly
circumstanced individual in a given society to
commit suicide, the conscience of the court should
not be satisfied for basing a finding that the
accused charged for abetting the offence of suicide
should be found guilty."
12. Reverting to the facts of the case, both the courts
below have erroneously accepted the prosecution
story that the suicide by the deceased is the direct
result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25-
7-1998 wherein it is alleged that the appellant
had used abusive language and had reportedly
told the deceased "to go and die". For this, courts
relied on a statement of Shashi Bhushan, brother
of the deceased, made under Section 161 CrPC
when reportedly the deceased, after coming back
from the house of the appellant, told him that the
appellant had humiliated him and abused him
with filthy words. The statement of Shashi
Bhushan, recorded under Section 161 CrPC is
annexed as Annexure P-3 to this appeal and going
through the statement, we find that he has not
stated that the deceased had told him that the
appellant had asked him "to go and die". Even if
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we accept the prosecution story that the appellant
did tell the deceased "to go and die", that itself
does not constitute the ingredient of "instigation".
The word "instigate" denotes incitement or urging
to do some drastic or inadvisable action or to
stimulate or incite. Presence of mens rea,
therefore, is the necessary concomitant of
instigation. It is knowledge that the words uttered
in a quarrel or on the spur of the moment cannot
be taken to be uttered with mens rea. It is in a
fit of anger and emotion. Secondly, the alleged
abusive words, said to have been told to the
deceased were on 25-7-1998 ensued by a quarrel.
The deceased was found hanging on 27-7-1998.
Assuming that the deceased had taken the abusive
language seriously, he had enough time in
between to think common over and reflect and,
therefore, it cannot be said that the abusive
language, which had been used by the appellant
on 25-7-1998 drove the deceased to commit
suicide. Suicide by the deceased on 27-7-1998 is
not proximate to the abusive language uttered by
the appellant on 25-7-1998. The fact that the
deceased committed suicide on 27-7-1998 would
itself clearly point out that it is not the direct
result of the quarrel taken place on 25-7-1998
when it is alleged that the appellant had used the
abusive language and also told the deceased to go
and die. This fact had escaped notice of the
courts below.
14. A plain reading of the suicide note would clearly
show that the deceased was in great stress and
depressed. One plausible reason could be that the
deceased was without any work or avocation and
at the same time indulged in drinking as revealed
from the statement of the wife Smt Neelam
Sengar. He was a frustrated man. Reading of the
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suicide note will clearly suggest that such a note
is not the handiwork of a man with a sound mind
and sense. Smt Neelam Sengar, wife of the
deceased, made a statement under Section 161
CrPC before the investigation officer. She stated
that the deceased always indulged in drinking
wine and was not doing any work. She also stated
that on 26-7-1998 her husband came to them in
an inebriated condition and was abusing her and
other members of the family. The prosecution
story, if believed, shows that the quarrel between
the deceased and the appellant had taken place
on 25-7-1998 and if the deceased came back to
the house again on 26-7-1998, it cannot be said
that the suicide by the deceased was the direct
result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25-
7-1998. Viewed from the aforesaid circumstances
independently, we are clearly of the view that the
ingredients of "abetment" are totally absent in the
instant case for an offence under Section 306 IPC.
It is in the statement of the wife that the
deceased always remained in a drunken condition.
It is common knowledge that excessive drinking
leads one to debauchery. It clearly appeared,
therefore, that the deceased was a victim of his
own conduct unconnected with the quarrel that
had ensued on 25-7-1998 where the appellant is
stated to have used abusive language. Taking the
totality of materials on record and facts and
circumstances of the case into consideration, it
will lead to the irresistible conclusion that it is
the deceased and he alone, and none else, is
responsible for his death."
(emphasis supplied)
24. It could thus be seen that this Court held that both the
courts below had erroneously accepted the prosecution
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story that the suicide by the deceased was the direct
result of the quarrel that had taken place on 25th July
1998 wherein it was alleged that the appellant therein
had used abusive language and had reportedly told the
deceased to go and die'. It was held that even if one
accepts the prosecution story that the appellant did tell
the deceased to go and die', that itself did not
constitute the ingredient of instigation'. This Court held
that it was common knowledge that the words uttered
in a quarrel or on the spur of the moment could not be
taken to be uttered with mens rea. It has been held
further that the alleged abusive words were said to
have been told to the deceased on 25th July 1998
during a quarrel and the deceased was found hanging
on 27th July, 1998. This Court held that if the deceased
had taken the abusive language seriously, he had
enough time in between to think over and reflect and
therefore, it could not be said that the abusive language
which had been used by the appellant on 25th July
1998 drove the deceased to commit suicide on 27th
July 1998. It has been held that the suicide by the
deceased was not proximate to the abusive language
used two days prior. Additionally this Court held that a
plain reading of the suicide note made it clear that the
deceased was in great stress and depressed and the
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suicide note also clearly suggested that it was not the
handiwork of a man with a sound mind and sense. As
such, this Court held. that there was no material to
establish that the accused had abetted the suicide
committed by the deceased.
25. Relying on the decision in the case of Sanju Sanjay
Singh Sengar (supra), this Court in the case of Gurjit
Singh (supra) set aside the conviction under Section 306
of the IPC as it was clear from the evidence on record
that there was a time gap of about two months between
the last visit of the deceased to her parents with regard
to the illegal demand for money by the accused-
appellant and the date of commission of suicide by the
deceased. As such, this Court held that there was
nothing on record to show that there was a proximate
nexus between the commission of suicide and the illegal
demand made by the accused-appellant, This Court
observed as follows:
"36. It could further be seen from the evidence on
record that the time gap between the last visit of
the deceased to her parents with regard to the
illegal demand and the date of commission of
suicide is about two months. As such, there is
nothing on record to show that there was a
proximate nexus between the commission of
suicide and the illegal demand made by the
appellant. In Sanju v. State of M.P. (Sanju v.
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State of M.P., (2002) 5 SCC 371: 2002 SCC (Cri)
1141] this Court found that there was time gap of
48 hours between the accused telling the deceased
"to go and die" and the deceased "committing
suicide". As such, this Court held that there was
no material to establish that the accused had
abetted the suicide committed by the deceased."
(emphasis supplied)
26. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view that
instigation or incitement on the part of the accused
person is the gravamen of the offence of abetment to
suicide. However, it has been clarified on many
occasions that in order to link the act of instigation to
the act of suicide, the two occurrences must be in close
proximity to each other so as to form a nexus or a
chain, with the act of suicide by the deceased being a
direct result of the act of instigation by the accused
person.
27. This Court in the case of Mohit Singhal (supra) reiterated
that the act of instigation must be of such intensity and
in such close proximity that it intends to push the
deceased to such a position under which the person has
no choice but to commit suicide. This Court held that
the incident which had allegedly driven the deceased to
commit suicide had occurred two weeks prior and even
the suicide note had been written three days prior to
the date on which the deceased committed suicide and
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further, there was no allegation that any act had been
done by the accused-appellant therein in close proximity
to the date of suicide. This Court observed as follows:
"11. In the present case, taking the complaint of the
third respondent and the contents of the suicide
note as correct, it is impossible to conclude that
the appellants instigated the deceased to commit
suicide by demanding the payment of the amount
borrowed by the third respondent from her
husband by using abusive language and by
assaulting him by a belt for that purpose. The
said incident allegedly happened more than two
weeks before the date of suicide. There is no
allegation that any act was done by the appellants
in close proximity to the date of suicide. By no
stretch of imagination, the alleged acts of the
appellants can amount to instigation to commit
suicide. The deceased has blamed the third
respondent for landing in trouble due to her bad
habits.
12. Therefore, in our considered view, the offence
punishable under Section 306IPC was not made
out against the appellants. Therefore, the
continuation of their prosecution will be nothing
but an abuse of the process of law." (emphasis
supplied)
28. This Court in the case of Naresh Kumar v. State of
Haryana, observed as follows:-
"20. This Court in Mariano Anto Bruno v. State
Mariano Anto Bruno v. State, (2023) 15 SCC 560:
2022 SCC OnLine SC 1387), after referring to the
abovereferred decisions rendered in context of
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culpability under Section 3061PC observed as
under:
45. It is also to be borne in mind that in cases
of alleged abetment of suicide, there must
be proof of direct or indirect acts of
incitement to the commission of suicide.
Merely on the allegation of harassment
without there being any positive action
proximate to the time of occurrence on the
part of the accused which led or compelled
the person to commit suicide, conviction in
terms of Section 306IPC is not sustainable."
(emphasis supplied)
29. Having discussed the law on the subject, we now
proceed to consider the facts of the present case in view
of the established principles.
30. As per the version of the complainant, the following
facts. have emerged:
I. Appellant No. 1 got married to the deceased on
19th November 2009.
II. Disputes arose thereafter, and the parties started
residing separately from 8th August 2013 with the
deceased residing at her paternal house with her
child.
iii.A mahalokadalat was held at the court in
Sangamner on 17th February 2015 during which
the appellants are alleged to have refused to
cohabitate with the deceased or accept her or her
child at her matrimonial house or settle the
proceedings initiated by the deceased.
iv. On 20th March 2015, the deceased committed
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suicide.
31. In the case of Sanju Sanjay Singh Sengar (supra). this
Court, under similar circumstances, had quashed the
chargesheet under Section 306 of the IPC against the
accused-appellant. A factor that had weighed with the
Court in the said case was that there was a time gap of
48 hours being the alleged instigation and the
commission of suicide. This Court held that the
deceased was a victim of his own conduct, unconnected
with the quarrel that had ensued between him and the
appellant, 48 hours prior to the commission of his
suicide.
32. In the case at hand, taking the allegations in the FIR at
face value, the incident at the mahalokadalat had
occurred on 17th February 2015, while the deceased
had committed suicide on 20th March 2015. There is a
clear gap of over a month between the incident at the
mahalokadalat and the commission of suicide. We
therefore find that the courts below have erroneously
accepted the prosecution story that the act of suicide by
the deceased was a direct result of the words uttered by
the appellants at the mahalokadalat.
33. We also find that the date of occurrence of the
mahalokadalat is disputed. The appellants have
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vehemently argued before the trial court and the High
Court that the mahalokadalat had not been held on the
17th February 2015 but instead had been held about a
year earlier, and that the date of the mahalokadalat as
mentioned in the FIR and in the statements of the
witnesses, is factually incorrect. If this submission is to
be accepted, the time gap between the two incidents
would widen even further.
34. However, we do not wish to go into that issue. Even if
we take the date of the mahalokadalat to be 17th
February 2015. to be the factually correct one, there is
enough gap between the two incidents to render the
instigation or incitement by the appellants, nugatory.
The cardinal principle of the subject-matter at hand is
that there must be a close proximity between the
positive act of instigation by the accused person and the
commission of suicide by the victim. The close
proximity should be such as to create a clear nexus
between the act of instigation and the act of suicide. As
was held in the case of Sanju @ Sanjay Singh Sengar
(supra), if the deceased had taken the words of the
appellants seriously, a time gap between the two
incidents would have given enough time to the deceased
to think over and reflect on the matter. As such, a gap
of over a month would be sufficient time to dissolve the
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nexus or the proximate link between the two acts.
35. Apart from that, although an Accidental Death Report
was lodged on the day of the incident by the deceased's
brother, there is no mention about any involvement of
the appellants in the suicidal death of the deceased.
Further, there is no mention about the incident that had
occurred at the mahalokadalat which had put the
deceased in a state of depression such that she
frequently spoke about committing suicide. These facts
are alleged for the first time in the FIR which was
lodged five days after the incident.
36. We are of the considered view that the reasoning given
by the High Court for refusal to discharge the
appellants is completely perfunctory. The High Court
observed that there is no allegation about any
harassment or cruelty meted out by the appellants to
the deceased in the Accidental Death Report, however,
held that the allegations in the FIR could not be
overlooked and the Accidental Death Report and the
statements made in the Accidental Death enquiry would
be a matter of trial. The High Court also took note of
the disputed date of the mahalokadalat but held that
incorrect mentioning of the date of the mahalokadalat
in the FIR would not be a ground to discharge the
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appellants, considering the state of mind of the
complainant, the deceased's mother.
37. We further find that the prosecution has failed to prima
facie establish that the appellants had any intention to
instigate or aid or abet the deceased to commit suicide.
No doubt that a young woman of 25 years has lost her
life in an unfortunate incident. However, in the absence
of sufficient material to show that the appellants had
intended by their words to push the deceased into such
a position that she was left with no other option but to
commit suicide, continuation of criminal proceedings
against the appellants would result in an abuse of
process of law and as such, we are inclined to allow
the appeal.
38. In the result, we pass the following order.-
I. The present appeal is allowed.
II. The impugned judgment and order of the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at
Aurangabad passed on 17th October 2022 in
Criminal Writ Petition No. 246 of 2021 and the
order of the Assistant Sessions Judge, Sangamner
dated 24th December, 2020 in Sessions Case No.
75 of 2015 are quashed and set aside; and
iii. The appellants are discharged from Sessions Case
No. 75 of 2015 on the file of Assistant Sessions
Judge, Sangamner. Their bail bonds, if any, shall
stand cancelled.
39. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed
of."
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7. Considering the aforesaid decision and applying the
same to the facts of the present case, it emerges
that there is no proximity between the two
occurrences, namely the closure of the business in
the year 2008 and the suicide committed in the year
2012. There is neither any proximity link nor any
nexus between the alleged acts and the suicide
committed by the deceased. A bare allegation that
the loss in the business caused by the applicant
resulted in the suicide cannot be accepted in the
absence of any proximity chain of events leading to
the suicide. In that background, continuation of the
criminal proceedings would amount to nothing but
harassment to the applicant. Therefore, the present
application deserves to be allowed and the impugned
FIR is required to be quashed and set aside.
8. Resultantly, present application is allowed. The FIR
registered with Bapunagar Police Station being I-
C.R.No.373 of 2013 dated 24.12.2013 as well as all
other consequential proceedings arising pursuant
thereto are hereby quashed and set aside. Rule is
made absolute accordingly.
(M. K. THAKKER,J)
M.M.MIRZA
