[Cites 10, Cited by 0]
Gujarat High Court
Hargovanbhai Narayandas Patel vs State Of Gujarat on 27 January, 2026
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C/CA/5050/2025 ORDER DATED: 27/01/2026
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR CONDONATION OF DELAY) NO.
5050 of 2025
In F/MISC. CIVIL APPLICATION/37013/2024
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION/6080/2002
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HARGOVANBHAI NARAYANDAS PATEL
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR.
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Appearance:
MR JEET J BHATT(6154) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
MS FORUM SUKHADWALA, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR AR THACKER(888) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 27/01/2026
ORAL ORDER
1. Heard Mr.Jeet Bhatt, learned advocate for the applicant,
Ms.Forum Sukhadwala, learned AGP for the opponent State
and Mr.A.R.Thacker, learned advocate for opponent No.2.
2. The present application is filed seeking condonation of
delay of around 3800 days in filing the review application. It
appears that my predecessor had decided the main writ
petition being Special Civil Application No. 6080 of 2002
along with other writ petitions vide a common oral judgment
dated 03/07/2014, which is now sought to be reviewed in 2025
by the original petitioner; that too, after challenging the
aforesaid oral judgment before the Division Bench of this
Court by way of Letters Patent Appeal, wherein also there was
a delay, as the said appeal was filed in the year 2024.
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3. The Division Bench, upon request made by the learned
advocate for the applicant-petitioner, vide its oral order dated
23/09/2024 in Civil Application for condonation of delay being
Civil Application No.2428 of 2024, passed the following order:
"Learned advocate Mr. Jeet Bhatt appearing for the applicant has
submitted that after passing of the impugned judgment dated
3.7.2014 in the captioned writ petition which is under challenge in
LPA, there has been subsequent development. He has submitted
that the State authorities have passed some orders which are in
favour of the applicant. It is submitted that thus liberty may be
reserved in favour of the applicant to file a fresh writ petition
claiming benefit of pension.
Request is acceded to. The present CA along with LPA are permitted
to be withdrawn with a liberty reserved in favour of the applicant to
file appropriate proceedings including writ petition if he so desire
claiming pension on the premise of the subsequent development.
Accordingly, both CA and LPA are disposed of as withdrawn."
(emphasis supplied)
4. After passing of the aforesaid order, the original
petitioner-applicant thought it fit to prefer a review
application.
5. Mr.Bhatt, learned advocate for the applicant has
strenuously submitted that there were subsequent events that
happened post the said oral judgment passed by the learned
Single Judge of this Court in the aforesaid writ petition and as
such, the applicant was continuously engaged himself by
making several representations to the respondents, which
caused the delay.
5.1 Mr.Bhatt, learned advocate has also pointed out to this
Court that vide order dated 08/04/2022, the respondent has
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passed an office order whereby the applicant was treated to
be confirmed in service w.e.f. 01/04/1980. It is submitted that
due to the aforesaid facts, there was a delay in filing the
review application.
5.2 Mr. Bhatt, learned advocate for the applicant, would
submit that non-grant of pension can be considered to be a
continuous cause of action and as such no question of delay
would arise to decide the review application.
5.3 Making the above submissions, Mr.Bhatt, learned
advocate would urge this Court to allow the present
application.
6. Per contra, Ms. Forum Sukhadwala, learned AGP, would
vehemently oppose this application contending inter alia that
applicant has not made out any sufficient cause for delay in
filing review application and therefore the review application
may be dismissed. It is submitted that there is huge,
inordinate and unexplained delay on the part of the applicant
and as such, as per settled legal position of law, this Court
should not exercise its discretion in favour of the indolent
applicant.
6.1 Making the above submissions, learned AGP
Ms.Sukhadwala would request this Court to reject the present
application.
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6.2 Mr.Thacker, learned advocate for opponent No.2 has
adopted the arguments canvassed by learned AGP.
7. No other and further submissions are being made by the
respective learned advocates.
8. Having heard learned advocates for the respective
parties and after going through the averments made in the
application, it appears that the original writ petition came to
be decided by my predecessor on 03/07/2014, whereby it
dismissed the petition. It appears that the applicant waited for
about 10 years to challenge the aforesaid oral judgment as
filed the appeal in the year 2024 and without inviting an order
on merits, but at this stage of delay condonation, the aforesaid
order came to be passed by the Division Bench of this Court.
9. Having considered the entire set of events which have
taken place after the passing of the impugned judgment in
2014, it cannot be said that the applicant was bona fide
pursuing other remedies, inasmuch as, he preferred the
appeal in the year 2024, i.e., after 10 years as well as there
was no reason for the applicant to engage himself with the
respondent authority once his aforesaid writ petition got
dismissed by this Court on merits. Yet, if the applicant
engaged himself with the respondent authority and adverse
orders or some partial relief, as the case may be, came to be
granted by the respondent, if any, fresh cause of action arises
to the applicant, then in such situation, it is always open for
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the applicant to challenge it by way of appropriate
proceedings before the appropriate Court.
10. At this stage, it would be also apt to refer to recent past
decisions of the Hon'ble Apex Court whereby it has been held
that in a case of long and inordinate delay, in absence of any
sufficient cause made out, the Courts should not condone such
a huge delay.
10.1. It would be apt to first relied upon the decision of
Honourable Supreme Court of India in the case of K.B. Lal
(Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors., -
2024 (4) Scale 759, wherein, after revisiting the law on the
aspect of condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held as under:
"10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the discretionary power of
a Court to condone delay must be exercised judiciously and it is not
to be exercised in cases where there is gross negligence and/or
want of due diligence on part of the litigant (See Majji Sannemma @
Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18 SCC 384). The
discretion is also not supposed to be exercised in the absence of
any reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate explanation for the
delay (See P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7
SCC 556). Thus, it is apparent that the words 'sufficient
cause' in Section 5 of the Limitation Act can only be given a
liberal construction, when no negligence, nor inaction, nor
want of bona fide is imputable to the litigant (See Basawaraj
and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81).
The principles which are to be kept in mind for condonation
of delay were succinctly summarised by this Court in Esha
Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur
Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649, and are reproduced
as under:
"21.1. (i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-
oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an
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application for condonation of delay, for the Courts are not
supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove
injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause" should be understood
in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being
had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are
to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-
situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the
technical considerations should not be given undue and
uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate
causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking
condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict
proof should not affect public justice and cause public
mischief because the Courts are required to be vigilant so
that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of
justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate
the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a
totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction between inordinate
delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to
the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas
to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the
first one warrants strict approach whereas the second
calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a
party relating to its inaction or negligence are
relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so
as the fundamental principle is that the Courts are required
to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both
parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in
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the name of liberal approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is concocted, or the
grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the Courts
should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily
to face such a litigation."
(emphasis supplied)
10.2 It is also profitable to refer to and rely upon the decision
of Honourable Supreme Court of India in a case of Pathapati
Subba Reddy (Died) BY L RS & ORS V/S Special Deputy
Collector (LA) - 2024 INSC 286 : 2024 (4) SCR 241 :
2024 (4) Scale 846, wherein after referring to its previous
decisions, summarized the case law on the issue of limitation
vis-a-vis condonation of delay in context of "sufficient cause".
It has been so observed and held as under :
"[26] On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as
aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to
remedy rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of
for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed
period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be
construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed
in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed
liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal
approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial
justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to
defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section
3 of the Limitation Act;
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(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone
the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that
exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be
exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various
factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence
and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it
does not mean that others are also entitled to the same
benefit if the Court is not satisfied with the cause shown for
the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the
delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed,
tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision."
(emphasis supplied)
10.3 It is also profitable to rely upon the decision of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of case of
Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition
Officer - 2013 (14) SCC 81, wherein it is held as under:-
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that
where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation,
the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient
cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which
prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case a
party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his
part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to
have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot
be a justified ground to condone the delay. No Court could
be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by
imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be
decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in
regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient
cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning
the delay without any justification, putting any condition
whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the
statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard
to the legislature."
(Emphasis supplied)
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10.4 Even, very recently also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Shivamma (DEAD) By Lrs Vs. Karnataka
Housing Board & Ors. - 2025 INSC 1104, in clear terms
held that where there is delay/laches on the part of the
applicant in not prosecuting the legal remedy, in the absence
of any sufficient cause made out by the applicant, the Court
should not condone the delay while exercising its power under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the case of
Shivamma (Supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
thus:-
"258. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the
Court must take into consideration while considering
whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor
of the approach of the respondents, it appears that they want to fix
their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held
that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered
on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot
be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such
circumstances of the case, it cannot be heard to plead that
the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against
the technical considerations. While considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the Court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The Court owes a duty to first
ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the
party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause
assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is
equally balanced that the Court may bring into aid the merits of the
matter for the purpose of condoning the delay."
(emphasis supplied)
11. So far as the argument of Mr. Bhatt, learned advocate
that pension is a continuous cause of action is concerned,
once the lis between the parties was decided by my
predecessor by way of the judgement sought to be reviewed,
any subsequent event which might have taken place according
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to the applicant, maybe in relation to the pension, would not
be a ground to file a review application at the sweet will of the
applicant.
12. Thus, considering the aforesaid, I am not able to find any
sufficient cause made out by the applicant in this delay
application, inasmuch as, there is a gross, inordinate and
unexplained delay on the part of the applicant to prefer the
review application. I am not at all convinced with any of the
explanation forthcoming from the side of the applicant.
13. In light of the aforesaid and for the foregoing reasons, I
do not find any merit in the application, which requires to be
rejected. It is hereby rejected. There shall be no order as to
costs.
(MAULIK J. SHELAT, J)
GAURAV J THAKER
