Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 8394 Guj
Judgement Date : 27 November, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 1263 of 2025
In
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 19207 of 2022
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE L. S. PIRZADA
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✓
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YOGESH MAFATLAL BAROT
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR LAKSHIT V PATEL FOR MR HB CHAMPAVAT(6149) for the
Appellant(s) No. 1
MR HS MUNSHAW(495) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MS SHRUTI DHRUVE, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE L. S. PIRZADA
Date : 27/11/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE BHARGAV D. KARIA)
1. Heard learned advocate Mr. Lakshit V.
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Patel for learned advocate Mr. H.B.
Champavat for the petitioner, learned
advocate Mr. H.S. Munshaw for respondent
no.2 and learned Assistant Government
Pleader Ms. Shruti Dhruve for the
respondent State.
2. Having regard to the controversy
involved which is in a narrow compass,
With the consent of the learned advocates
for the respective parties, the matter is
taken up for hearing at the admission
stage. Hence, Admit. Learned advocate Mr.
H.S. Munshaw waives service of notice of
rule on behalf of the respondent no.2
Corporation and learned Assistant
Government Pleader Ms. Shruti Dhruve
waives service of notice of rule on behalf
of the respondent State.
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3. Brief facts of the case are that the
appellant-original petitioner was working
with the respondent Corporation and
suffered heart problem due to which he was
admitted to Hetal Heartcare Hospital
wherein after treatment, he was discharged
on 02.06.2016. It is the case of the
appellant-petitioner that he was advised
for angiography and bypass as the future
course of action by the concerned doctor.
4. The appellant accordingly got admitted
in U.N. Mehta hospital on 07.06.2016 and
angiography was performed and was
discharged on 09.06.2016 with a report of
block artery.
5. Subsequently, the appellant petitioner
got admitted to SAL hospital, Ahmedabad on
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15.06.2016 for bypass surgery.
6. The appellant petitioner therefore,
incurred Rs.22,914/- for the medical
treatment at Hetal Heartcare Hospital,
Rs.7,868/- for treatment at U.N. Mehta
Hospital and Rs.1,83,108/- for bypass
surgery at SAL Hospital, totalling to
Rs.2,13,890/-.
7. The appellant petitioner submitted the
bills for reimbursement with the
respondent corporation. However, the
respondent partially cleared the bill on
02.09.2016 for meager amount of Rs.
69,925/- and amount of Rs. 1,45,965/- was
not cleared and paid to the appellant.
8. The appellant thereafter due to his
ill-health gave application for voluntary
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retirement after completion of notice
period and by office order dated
30.11.2016, the application for voluntary
retirement was accepted and the appellant
was deemed retired from 30.11.2016
onwards.
9. Thereafter, it is the case of the
appellant that several oral requests were
made for clearing the outstanding amount
of Rs. 1,45,965/-. However, the respondent
Corporation did not clear the same.
Therefore, notice dated 1.06.2017 was
issued through advocate calling upon the
respondent corporation to pay the
remaining amount of medical bills
submitted by the appellant.
10. The appellant thereafter preferred
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Recovery Application No.48/2017 before the
Labour Court at Mehsana under section
33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 for recovery of Rs. 1,45,965/- with
interest at the rate of 18% per annum from
the respondent authority.
11. The Labour Court after considering the
documents placed on record and providing
opportunity of hearing to both the sides,
by order dated 21.04.2022 rejected the
Recovery Application No. 48/2017.
12. The appellant therefore, being
aggrieved preferred Special Civil
Application before this Court challenging
the order of the Labour Court as the
Labour Court has relied upon resolution
dated 20.12.2005 issued by the respondent
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corporation for rejecting the recovery
claim made by the appellant.
13. Learned Single Judge by the impugned
judgment and order dated 31.01.2025
dismissed the petition on the ground that
the respondent corporation has followed
its policy for reimbursement of the
medical expenses and as per various
decisions of Hon'ble Apex Court, scope of
judicial review while examining the policy
of the Government is very limited and the
policy can be interfered if it violates
the fundamental rights of the citizen or
is opposed to provision of the
Constitution or is opposed to any
statutory provision or is manifestly
arbitrary.
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14. Being aggrieved, this appeal under
clause 15 of the Letters Patent is filed
by the appellant original petitioner.
15. Learned advocate Mr. Lakshit V. Patel
for learned advocate Mr. H.B. Champavat
for the appellant original petitioner
submitted that the respondent corporation
has not disputed that the appellant has
availed the treatment for his bypass
surgery from SAL hospital which is
admittedly a recognised hospital in the
approved list of the respondent
Corporation.
16. It was submitted that the reliance
placed by the respondent Corporation on
the policy dated 20.12.2005 in the year
2016 is unreasonable and the amount of
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Rs. 60,000/- stated in the said policy
cannot be applied in the year 2016 when
the appellant took the treatment in SAL
hospital for which medical bill of Rs.
1,83,108/- is issued by the Hospital which
is not in dispute.
17. In support of his submissions,
reliance was placed on the following
decisions of Hon'ble Supreme Court as well
as this Court:
1) In case of Shiva Kant Jha v. Union of
India reported in (2018) 16 Supreme Court
Cases 187.
2) In case of Chandrakant Kantilal Dave
v. State of Gujarat reported in 2019(1)
GLR 653.
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3) In case of KP Singh v. Union of India
reported in (2001) 10 SCC 167.
18. Per contra, learned advocate Mr. H.S.
Munshaw appearing for the respondent
Corporation reiterated the submissions
made before the learned Single Judge to
emphasize that as the policy suggests that
for the heart problem, the rules provide
medical reimbursement upto Rs.60,000/-,
and therefore, respondent Corporation
following such policy has cleared such
amount and paid to the appellant. It was
submitted that the respondent corporation
is bound by its own policy and therefore,
could not pay the amount of actual medical
expenses incurred by the appellant
petitioner because as per the circular
dated 20.12.2005, the appellant was
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entitled to Rs. 60,000/- only which is
released towards Coronary Artery Bypass
Grafting treatment. It was submitted that
the respondent corporation has also
sanctioned the bill for medicines and
accordingly, sum of Rs.67,925/- is paid to
the appellant.
19. It was submitted that learned Single
Judge has not committed any error in view
of decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
in case of Ugar Sugar Works Ltd. v. Delhi
Administration and others reported in
(2001) 3 Supreme Court Cases 635 wherein
it is held that in exercise of powers
under Articles 226 and 227 of the
Constitution, the Courts would not
ordinarily interfere in the policy matters
and in view of decision in case of
Directorate of Film Festivals and others
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v. Gaurav Ashwin Jain and others reported
in (2007) 4 Supreme Court Cases 737 as
referred to and relied upon by the learned
Single Judge. It was therefore, submitted
that no interference is called for in the
impugned judgment and order passed by
learned Single Judge dismissing the
petition filed by the petitioner upholding
the order of the Labour Court in Recovery
Application No.48/2017.
20. Having heard the learned advocates for
the respective parties and considering the
facts of the case, it is not in dispute
that the appellant petitioner has
undergone the bypass surgery in the month
of June, 2016 after suffering heart attack
on getting preliminary treatment on
02.06.2016 at Mehsana from Hetal Heartcare
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Hospital. The appellant thereafter has
undergone angiography at U.N. Mehta
hospital and bypass surgery at SAL
hospital, as both the hospitals are
recognised and approved by the respondent
corporation for reimbursement of the
medical expenses.
21. The respondent corporation has also
not disputed the veracity of the medical
bills of Rs.2,13,890/- submitted by the
appellant petitioner.
22. Therefore, the questions which arise
for consideration by this Court is whether
the respondent corporation could have
referred to and relied upon the policy of
20.12.2005 in the year 2016 and whether
reliance on such policy would be a
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reasonable criteria for clearing the
medical bills by denying the actual
reimbursement of the medical expenses
incurred by the appellant petitioner for
bypass surgery in the year 2016.
23. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Ugar
Sugar Works Ltd.(supra) with regard to
policy decision has held as under:
"18. The challenge, thus, in effect, is to the executive policy regulating trade in liquor in Delhi. It is well settled that the Courts, in exercise of their power of judicial review, do not ordinarily interfere with the policy decisions of the executive unless the policy can be faulted on grounds of mala fide, unreasonableness, arbitrariness or unfairness etc. Indeed, arbitrariness, irrationality, perversity and mala fide will render the policy unconstitutional. However, if the policy cannot be faulted on any of these grounds, the mere fact that it would hurt business interests of a party, does not justify
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invalidating the policy. In tax and economic regulation cases, there are good reasons for judicial restraint, if not judicial deference, to Judgement of the executive. The Courts are not expected to express their opinion as to whether at a particular point of time or in a particular situation any such policy should have been adopted or not. It is best left to the discretion of the State.
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21. In the present case the executive policy regulating the sale of liquor in the territory of Delhi is sought to be challenged by the petitioner on the ground that it is 'unfair' and 'unreasonable' besides being 'authority' and has no nexus with the object sought to be achieved. We are unable to agree.
22. The State has every right to regulate the supply of liquor within its terrotorial jurisdiction to ensure that what is supplied is 'liquor of good quality' in the interest of health, morals and welfare of the people. One of the modes for determining that the quality of liquor is a 'good' is to ascertain whether that particular brand of liquor has been tested and tried
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extensively elsewhere and has found its acceptability in other States. The manner in which the Government chooses to ascertain the factor of higher acceptability, must in the very nature of things, fall within the discretion of the Government so long as the discretion is not exercised mala fide, unreasonably or arbitrarily. The allegations of mala fide made in the writ petition are totally bereft of any factual matrix and we, therefore, do not detain ourselves at all to consider challenge on that ground. In fairness to learned counsel for the petitioner we may record that challenge to notification on grounds of mala fide was not pressed during arguments. Laying down requirement of achieving minimum sale figures of a particular brand of liquor in other States, as a mode for determination of the "acceptability" of that brand of liquor, is neither irrelevant, nor irrational or unreasonable. It appears that prescription of MSF requirement is aimed at allowing sale of only such brands of liquor which have been tested, tried and found acceptable at large in other parts of the country.
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25. Though, we are not required to test the correctness of the
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'reason' for increase of MSF over the previous years' figures, but it is relevant to point out that increase of sale from 60,000 cases to 75,000 cases in respect of 'lowest price tag' brand of liquor does not appear to be arbitrary and on the other hand it appears to have a rational basis. Economic mechanism is a highly sensitive and a complex matter. With inflation every year, it goes without saying, that the brand which has the "lowest price tag"
this year, was perhaps not the brand which had the "lowest price tag last year". It is possible that the brand 'with lowest price tag' this year may not be of that good quality as the brand with identical price tag last year, even though it may conform to ISI standards. It was, therefore, reasonable for the State to find out whether that particular brand with the lowest price tag this year, had been tested and tried elsewhere and had been accepted largely by the public in other parts of India to determine if that particular brand of liquor can be considered to liquor of good quality keeping the health and welfare of the public in view. The impugned notification in our opinion furthers the object of providing good liquor having larger acceptability. The policy
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is made in the interest of health, welfare and morals to benefit all citizens of Delhi and not the big industrial houses as alleged. Determination of wide scale acceptability on the basis of revised national sales figures (MSF) does not strike us as being unreasonable let alone irrational, arbitrary or unfair. Under these circumstances there is no justifiable reason warranting interference with the impugned notification. The Writ Petition accordingly fails and is dismissed but without any order as to costs."
24. On perusal of the above dictum of law
as enunciated by the Hon'ble Apex Court we
have to examine whether the policy relied
upon by the Corporation can be faulted on
the ground of unreasonableness or not.
Admittedly, the policy is of year 2005
which is applied by the respondent
Corporation in the year 2016 and
therefore, on face of it, it is
unreasonable to apply the rates fixed in
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the year 2005 in 2016.
25. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further
observed that the respondent has every
right to regulate and frame the policy,
however such policy can be considered only
on the ground of unfairness and
unreasonableness. It is also pertinent to
note that in facts of the case before the
Hon'ble Apex Court, the policy of sale of
liquor was in question and not a policy of
reimbursement of medical expenses which is
in nature of a benevolent policy and
therefore, reliance placed by the
petitioners on the decisions of Hon'ble
Apex Court would not be applicable to the
facts of the case, which clearly
stipulates that when the policy is
unreasonable, same can be interfered by
the Court. Similarly, in case of
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Directorate of Film Festivals and
others(supra), while considering the scope
of judicial review in policy matters, the
Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:
"16. The scope of judicial review of governmental policy is now well defined. Courts do not and cannot act as Appellate Authorities examining the correctness, suitability and appropriateness of a policy. Nor are courts Advisors to the executive on matters of policy which the executive is entitled to formulate. The scope of judicial review when examining a policy of the government is to check whether it violates the fundamental rights of the citizens or is opposed to the provisions of the Constitution, or opposed to any statutory provision or manifestly arbitrary. Courts cannot interfere with policy either on the ground that it is erroneous or on the ground that a better, fairer or wiser alternative is available. Legality of the policy, and not the wisdom or soundness of the policy, is the subject of judicial review. vide :
Asif Hameed V/s. State of J&K, 1989 Supp2 SCC 364; Shri Sitaram Sugar Co. Ltd., V/s. Union of India, 1990 3 SCC 223; Khoday
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Distilleries V/s. State of Karnataka, 1996 10 SCC 304, Balco Employees Union V/s. Union of India, 2002 2 SCC 333, State of Orissa V/s. Gopinath Dash, 2005 13 SCC 495 and Akhil Bharat Goseva Sangh V/s. State of Andhra Pradesh, 2006 4 SCC 162.
17. The Government's policy for National Film Awards is to restrict entry to only those films which have been certified by the Board for exhibition, that is films intended for public exhibition. The government is not interested in evaluating or giving an award to a film which may never be seen by the public, or at all events never be seen in an 'uncensored' form. Its object is to select the best from among those which the public can see and enjoy or gain knowledge. The said policy neither relates to nor interferes with the right of a film maker either to make films, or to apply for certificate or to exhibit the films. There is nothing illogical, unreasonable or arbitrary about a policy to select only the best from among films certified for public exhibition.
We cannot, in judicial review, change that policy by requiring the Government to select the best from among 'films made' instead of 'films made and certified for public exhibition'. We, therefore,
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hold that the requirement that films should have been certified by the Central Board of Film Certification between 1.1.2005 and 31.12.2005 for entry for the 53rd National Film Awards is not an unreasonable restriction of any fundamental right of the respondents or other film makers."
26. In facts of the case before Hon'ble
Apex Court, it was found that Film
Certification process of the Central Board
of Films was not an unreasonable
restriction on fundamental rights. In such
circumstances, scope of judicial review is
described by Hon'ble Apex Court.
27. Learned Single Judge of this Court in
case of Chandrakant Kantilal Dave (supra)
has also referred to the decision in case
of Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of Shiva
Kant Jha (supra). In case of Shiva Kant
Jha (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held
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as under:
"13. Further, the writ petitioner was admitted in emergency condition with complaint of breathlessness on 11.11.2013 in Fortis Escorts Health Institute, which was a non-empanelled hospital at the relevant time. He underwent angiography on 12.11.2013 which revealed diffused disease in left anterior descending coronary artery 50-60%. He had been implanted the CRT-D device (Combo) as part of cardiac resynchronization therapy (CRT) on 12.11.2013. The hospital charged an amount of Rs. 11,56,293/- for the said treatment, out of which, an amount of Rs. 10,70,000/- was for the cost of the unlisted cardiac implant (CRT-D) and an amount of Rs. 3,19,950/- was paid by the Insurance company directly to the hospital.
14. A Special Technical Committee meeting was held on 29.04.2014 to consider the case of the petitioner. However, on examining the same, the Committee did not find any justification for the implant of CRT-D device of the petitioner. On a further request by the petitioner, the Special Technical Committee again did not find any justification for the implant of CRT-D device on
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10.07.2014. On a request for reconsideration by the petitioner, on 15.01.2015, the case of the petitioner was again reconsidered by the Special Technical Committee which denied the claim of CRT-D. xxx
17. It is a settled legal position that the Government employee during his life time or after his retirement is entitled to get the benefit of the medical facilities and no fetters can be placed on his rights. It is acceptable to common sense, that ultimate decision as to how a patient should be treated vests only with the Doctor, who is well versed and expert both on academic qualification and experience gained. Very little scope is left to the patient or his relative to decide as to the manner in which the ailment should be treated.
Speciality Hospitals are
established for treatment of
specified ailments and services of Doctors specialized in a discipline are availed by patients only to ensure proper, required and safe treatment. Can it be said that taking treatment in Speciality Hospital by itself would deprive a person to claim reimbursement solely on the ground that the said Hospital is not included in the Government Order. The right to medical claim cannot
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be denied merely because the name of the hospital is not included in the Government Order. The real test must be the factum of treatment. Before any medical claim is honoured, the authorities are bound to ensure as to whether the claimant had actually taken treatment and the factum of treatment is supported by records duly certified by Doctors/Hospitals concerned. Once, it is established, the claim cannot be denied on technical grounds. Clearly, in the present case, by taking a very inhuman approach, the officials of the CGHS have denied the grant of medical reimbursement in full to the petitioner forcing him to approach this Court.
18. This is hardly a satisfactory state of affairs. The relevant authorities are required to be more responsive and cannot in a mechanical manner deprive an employee of his legitimate reimbursement. The Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS) was propounded with a purpose of providing health facility scheme to the central government employees so that they are not left without medical care after retirement. It was in furtherance of the object of a welfare State, which must provide for such medical care that the scheme was
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brought in force. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be denied that the writ petitioner was admitted in the above said hospitals in emergency conditions. Moreover, the law does not require that prior permission has to be taken in such situation where the survival of the person is the prime consideration. The doctors did his operation and had implanted CRT-D device and have done so as one essential and timely. Though it is the claim of the respondent-State that the rates were exorbitant whereas the rates charged for such facility shall be only at the CGHS rates and that too after following a proper procedure given in the Circulars issued on time to time by the concerned Ministry, it also cannot be denied that the petitioner was taken to hospital under emergency conditions for survival of his life which requirement was above the sanctions and treatment in empanelled hospitals."
28. In facts of the case before the
Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Shiva Kant
Jha (supra), medical treatment was taken
in emergency condition and thereafter
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reimbursement was not made citing that the
rates mentioned in the Central Government
Health Scheme did not permit the payment
of the medical bills and in such
circumstances, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
granted the reimbursement of the medical
expenses incurred by the employee.
29. Considering the above conspectus of
law, it appears that the respondent
Corporation could not have relied upon the
policy of 2005 in the year 2016, as it
would be absolutely unreasonable on part
of the respondent corporation to refer to
and rely upon the decade year old policy
for limiting the reimbursement of medical
treatment. We are of the opinion that in a
medical ailment like heart bypass surgery
relating to the heart diseases, the
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respondent corporation is required to
revise its policy so as to reimburse the
entire medical expenses incurred by its
employees.
30. In facts of the present case, the
appeal is allowed directing the respondent
corporation to pay the remaining amount of
medical bills amounting to Rs.1,45,965/-
within a period of 90 days from the date
of receipt of a copy of this order,
failing which, the interest at the rate of
6% shall be paid to the appellant by the
respondent corporation.
(BHARGAV D. KARIA, J)
(L. S. PIRZADA, J) RAGHUNATH R NAIR
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