Gujarat High Court
Hingora Ibhrahim Aadam Husain vs Circle Officer on 17 November, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2023
In R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 510 of 2025
With
R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 510 of 2025
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HINGORA IBHRAHIM AADAM HUSAIN
Versus
CIRCLE OFFICER & ORS.
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Appearance:
TIRTH NAYAK(8563) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MS NIDHI VYAS, AGP for the Opponent(s) No. 1 to 6
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE J. C. DOSHI
Date : 17/11/2025
ORAL ORDER
ORDER IN CIVIL APPLICATION (FOR STAY) NO. 1 of 2023
Considering the averments made in the application,
present application is allowed and delay caused in filing the
aforesaid Second Appeal is hereby condoned.
ORDER IN R/SECOND APPEAL NO. 510 of 2025
1. This Second Appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code") is filed by
appellant - original plaintiff - Ibhrahim Aadam Husian Hingora
challenging the judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil
Appeal No.65 of 2018 by the learned Principal District Judge,
Bhuj-Kutch dated 15.02.2023, whereby the learned appellate
Judge by rejecting the Regular Civil Appeal confirmed the
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judgment and decree passed in Regular Civil Suit No.460 of
2008 by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Bhuj-Kutch, who has
dismissed the suit of the plaintiff.
1.1 The Second Appeal is filed on the various grounds stated
in the appeal memo raising the following questions of law as
substantial questions of law:-
"A. Whether the court below had any jurisdiction to
entertain the Appeal which challenges the order of the Ld.
Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, when the same should have only
been challenged before the Hon'ble High Court?
B. Whether the the Ld. Principal District Judge, Kachchh
has rightfully interpreted the doctrine of "approbate and
reprobate" in dismissing the suit of the Appellant - Original
Plaintiff?
C Whether the Ld. Principal District Judge, Kachchh has
interpreted Article 65 of the Limitation Act, 1963 correctly by
dismissing the contention of adverse possession of the
Appellant - Original Plaintiff?"
2. For convenience, the parties are referred to their original
status i.e. plaintiff and defendant.
3. The brief facts of the case leading to filing of Second Appeal
are as under:-
3.1 That the plaintiff had approached the Court of learned
Senior Civil Judge, Bhuj-Kutch seeking setting aside order of
revenue authorities and further a declaration that the suit
property is an ancestral property of the plaintiff and the same
was in the possession of the plaintiff by preferring Regular Civil
Suit No. 460 of 2008.
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3.2 That pursuant to the filing of Regular Civil Suit, the
learned Senior Civil Judge, Bhuj-Kutch vide final order dated
11.06.2018 dismissed the said suit of the plaintiff.
3.3 That the said order dated 11.06.2018 of the learned Senior
Civil Judge, Bhuj-Kutch was challenged in Regular Civil Appeal
filed by the plaintiff before the learned Principal District Judge,
Bhuj-Kutch, who has dismissed the same. Thus, the plaintiff
being aggrieved by the judgement and order dated 15.02.2023
passed by the learned Senior Civil Judge, Bhuj-Kutch is
challenging the said order by preferring this Second Appeal.
4. It is a case of the plaintiff that Hajihussain Hassan, i.e. the
grandfather of the plaintiff, had possession of land bearing old
Survey No.72 (new Survey No.1179), admeasuring 10 Acres in
Village-Vinzan, Taluka: Abdasa, District: Kutch and as he was
possessing the subject land since time immemorial, he was
inferred to be the owner of the 10 Acre land. Plaintiff inherited
the possession after the demise of his ancestor. It is the say of
the plaintiff that it was an Inamdar land and the grandfather of
the plaintiff was a tenant to the said land. However, it is the case
of the plaintiff that by Resolution No.6 dated 31.07.1978, the
Vinzan Gram Panchayat declared 30 Acres of new Survey
No.1179 as Gauchar land without hearing the plaintiff or his
grandfather. The order was confirmed by the Deputy Collector
vide order dated 03.09.1982. The plaintiff further averred that he
unsuccessfully preferred multiple revenue proceedings, but he
did not succeed there and thus, he preferred this suit.
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5. With the relief of declaration, permitting injunction
declaring him as the absolute owner of the 10 Acres land of new
Survey No.1179 with the further declaration that the State has
no whatsoever right, title or interest over the subject land. The
perpetual injunction was prayed to the effect that the orders
passed by the Deputy Collector dated 29.06.2002 and Revenue
Tribunal dated 01.05.2008 to be declared null and void and
defendants be restrained from interfering with the peaceful
possession of the plaintiff. The defendant No.3, who appeared
before the learned trial Court upon service of summons, filed
written statement with the contention that no statutory notice
under Section 80 of "the Code" was ever served before filing of
the suit, the suit was not maintainable. The Mamlatdar has
carried out the summary inquiry under Section 37 of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (Now Gujarat Land Revenue
Code, 1879) (hereinafter referred to as 'the Code, 1879') and
found the plaintiff as an encroacher upon the land.
6. It was further contended that, the land in question was
declared as Gauchar land and that the plaintiff has no
whatsoever right over the Gauchar land and plaintiff misused
the process of "the Code" to take away the possession of the
Gauchar land. Therefore, it was contended by the defendant
No.3 in his written statement to dismiss the suit. Learned trial
Court based upon the pleadings framed the issues and
ultimately, permitting both the parties to lead the evidence,
dismissed the suit.
7. Learned appellate Court in first appeal under Section 96 of
"the Code" having reappreciated the evidence by framing as
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many as 6 points of determination, was pleased to dismiss the
appeal. It is in aforesaid circumstances that the plaintiff -
appellant is before this Court by way of Second Appeal.
8. Learned advocate Ms. Spruha Joshi for Mr. Tirth Nayak
submits that learned trial Court as well as learned appellate
Court have seriously erred in not considering that 10 Acres land
was given by the State to the grandfather of the plaintiff as the
Inamdar land and since firstly, the grandfather of the plaintiff
and thereafter, the plaintiff is in possession of the 10 Acres land.
8.1 It is further submitted by learned advocate Ms. Spruha
Joshi that plaintiff is harvesting or making agricultural activity
upon the said land to support his family. The declaration of
Gauchar land by the Panchayat and confirmed by the Deputy
Collector was without hearing the plaintiff or his grandfather.
Therefore, looking to these aspects, the declaration of Gauchar
land, which includes the 10 Acres land is Void Ab Initio and does
not affect the rights, title and interest of the plaintiff over the 10
Acres land. Upon the above submission, learned advocate Ms.
Spruha Joshi having referred the questions of law stated
hereinabove to be substantial questions of law, submitted to
admit this Second Appeal and to pass interim order protecting
the possession of the plaintiff.
9. Ms. Nidhi Vyas, learned AGP in her fervent objection to the
arguments of learned advocate Ms. Spruha Joshi would submit
that State Government pursuant to the proceeding undertaken
by the Mamlatdar under Section 37 of 'the Code, 1879' declared
plaintiff as an 'Encroacher' of the Gauchar land.
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9.1 She would submit that the Resolution passed by the
Panchayat and confirmed by the Deputy Collector to declare the
land as a Gauchar land was unsuccessfully carried before
challenge up to the revenue authorities. Therefore, it establishes
that the plaintiff's possession over the 10 Acre land is illegal, he
has no right to possess the land and has no right to continue the
said illegal possession. Under instructions from Shri C.G.
Parkhiya, Mamlatdar, Abdasa, Kutch, learned AGP Ms. Nidhi
Vyas submits that as of now, the possession of the 10 Acre land
has been resumed under the State Government and now, it is a
Gauchar land, which is in possession of the State Government.
9.2 Upon the above submissions, she submits that now no
cause of action of the suit remains. Hence, she submits to
dismiss this Second Appeal at admission stage.
10. What infers from hearing learned advocates for both the
sides that, plaintiff had no independent right over the 10 Acre
land. Plaintiff claimed that it was an Inamdar land given to the
grandfather of the plaintiff but the City Survey, which took place
later on, does not support the case of the plaintiff.
11. The learned trial Court fixed the following issues to decide
the matter before it.
"(1) Whether the Plaintiff proves that he is owner of the suit
land and in possession of it, from time of his ancestors?
(2) Whether the Plaintiff proves that earlier "suit land" was of
revenue land of the Village-Khirsara, but subsequently it
was included in the revenue area of Village-Vinzad and
given new revenue survey number ?
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(3) Whether Plaintiff proves that his agricultural land of 10
Acre was given new survey No. 1179, but it does not
comprise the part of Village Pasture land as alleged?
(4) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to declaration and
permanent injunction against the Defendants as alleged?
(5) Whether the Plaintiff proves that the Civil Court 'has
jurisdiction to entertain this suit with respect to the order
passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal?
(6) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled for get any relief as
prayed for?
(7) What's order and decree?"
11.1 Later on, one more issue was added as under:-
"(3A) Whether Plaintiff proves that this suit is maintainable
without Statutory Notice against State and its officers U/s.
80 of Civil Procedure Code ?"
11.2 Except Issue Nos.3A and 5, all of the issues were
answered in the negative. Issue Nos. 3A and 5 were answered in
the affirmative by the learned appellate Court.
11.3 Plaintiff relied upon the Exhibit-65, a copy of the deed
dated 11.04.1951. However, it was addended to document and
the plaintiff failed to prove that document. From a close look at
the evidence on record during the revenue proceedings, it
appears that the plaintiff in cross-examination by the Circle
Officer before the Mamlatdar in a proceeding under Section 37 of
'the Code, 1879' categorically admitted that the land is a
Government land. All the revenue record also indicates that the
10 Acres land is a Government land. The plaintiff unsuccessfully
litigated the issue up to the Revenue Department, Gujarat State.
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In total, three rounds of litigation took place between the parties.
However, it ultimately remains that the land in question is a
Gauchar land. Para 7.8 and 7.9 of the judgment of learned trial
Court reads as under:-
"(7.8). Accordingly, 3rd round of litigation was initiated
before the Mamlatdar, Abdasa, in the matter and the case
No. 8/95 was registered and proceeded. After full fledge
inquiry, the Ld. Mamlatdar, Abdasa passed an order dated
23/10/1997 in case No. 8/95 at Exh.-57 and held that the
land admeasuring Acre-10 of Survey No. 1179 Paiki of
Village Vinzan is of the ownership of the Government and is
being marked as Gauchar Land and therefore, held the
ownership of the Panchayat. It was accordingly directed
that the necessary action for removing the encroachment be
carried out. Being aggrieved, the Plaintiff had preferred the
case No. 2/98 before the Deputy collector, Nakhatrana, who
was pleased to confirm the order of Mamlatdar, Abdasa, by
passing order dated 09/02/1999 in case No. 2/98 at Exh.-
58. Being further aggrieved, present Plaintiff had preferred
Appeal No. 61/2000 before the Collector, Kachchh. It is
observed on Page No.2 at Exh.-59 (last para) that the record
was called for and on verifying, it is made clear that the old
Kharda No. 31 to 34 Paiki were given new Survey No. 1179
and the land was total admeasuring Acre 48-24 Guntha and
as per the mutation entry No. 1544, the land admeasuring
Acre 30-00 Guntha was reserved and earmarked as
Gauchar Land and the land admeasuring Acre 16-00
Guntha was given to another person in Santhani and the
remaining land admeasuring Acre 2-24 Guntha is left out. It
is further observed that the present Plaintiff has made
encroachment upon the Gauchar land bearing Revenue
Survey No. 1179 paiki of Village Vinzan. It is the case of the
Plaintiff that his grandfather Hajihussain Hassan was
farmer of Bahadursinh of village Vinzan with mortgage right
of Rs.2,000/- and a deed was executed on dated
11/04/1951. The so called deed dated 11/04/1951 is not
produced in original but its xerox is produced at Exh.-65,
which is given tentative exhibit. It is observed by the
Collector on Page No.2 of his order dated 29/06/2002 at
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Exh.-59 that the land mentioned in the Deed dated
11/04/1951 at Exh.-65 (tentatively) was with regards to the
land bearing Survey No. 136/1 Paiki of village Khirasara
and the said Deed at Exh.-65 (tentatively) has no concern
with the suit property. It is further observed on Page No.3 at
Exh.-59 that the old Survey No. 72 was given a new Survey
No. 802 Paiki and old Kharda No. 31 to 34 Paiki was given
new Survey No. 1179 of Village Vinzan and part of it
admeasuring Acre 30 was earmarked as Gauchar land and
is reflected in revenue record having mutation entry No.
1544 and therefore, Panchayat is the owner of the suit
property. In light of such observation, the Collector was
pleased to dismiss the appeal of the present Plaintiff vide
order dated 29/06/2002 at Exh.-59.
(7.9) Being aggrieved by the said order at Exh.-59, the
present Plaintiff had preferred the Revision Application No.
4/2002 before the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad,
which was dismissed for default vide order dated
05/02/2007 at Exh.-60. Being aggrieved by the said order
for dismiss for default, the present Plaintiff had preferred
the Restoration Application No. 1/2007, which was allowed
vide order dated 20/06/2007 at Exh.-61 by the Gujarat
Revenue Tribunal at Ahmedabad and the Revision
Application No. 4/2002 was ordered to be restored. The
Plaintiff has not produced any other order passed in
Revision Application No. 4/2002 by the Gujarat Revenue
Tribunal, but if we go through the Para-11(3) of suit plaint,
then the Plaintiff has challenged the order dated
01/05/2008 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal and
being aggrieved by the said order, the Plaintiff has filed this
suit, but not produced the copy of the order dated
01/05/2008 passed by the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal, at
Ahmedabad."
12. One more argument canvassed before the learned trial
Court that the plaintiff's possession is adverse, as he is in a
possession of 10 Acre land since more than 80 years, the plea
itself is hopeless and bereft of merit and the necessary
ingredients of hostility are nec vi, nec clam, nec precario is not
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been pleaded by the plaintiff. Simultaneously, plaintiff cannot be
the title owner as well as the owner by adverse possession. These
two pleas are contradictory.
12.1 The learned appellate Court framed as many as 6 issues
and answered all of them in negative by ascribing following
reasons:-
"I0. If we peruse the plaint of Regular Civil Suit No.
460/2008, it was specifically pleaded by the plaintiff that
land situated at old Survey No. 72 (new Survey No.1179)
admeasuring 10 Acres was originally owned by his
grandfather in the capacity of tenant and plaintiff inherited
the suit property after demise of his grandfather and father.
It was further pleaded that the defendant No.3 was having
hand in glove with other defendants and just with a view to
snatch away the peaceful possession of the plaintiff,
defendant No.3 instigated other defendants to pass adverse
orders against the plaintiff. It is also required to be noted
that the only private party i.e. defendant No.3 had expired
during the pendency of the suit and no legal heirs of
defendant No.3 were brought on record and, therefore, the
suit against the defendant No.3 was ordered to be abated.
Thus, the only private party against whom the suit has been
preferred has been abated and, therefore, no decree as
prayed for can be passed against the defendant No.3. It is
also required to be noted that different revenue proceedings
were preferred by the plaintiff and if we peruse the details
of case No.15/84 which was registered before the
Mamlatdar, Abadasa at Nalia, plaintiff was the opponent in
the said case and his deposition was recorded on
04.04.1984. Wherein the plaintiff had deposed that he is
cultivating the suit land since last more than five to six
years. Meaning thereby, the plaintiff was cultivating the suit
land since 1979. He had further admitted that he had no
occasion to pay any taxes and he did not have any land
account. He has further deposed that the suit land is of the
ownership of the government and as per the statement
made by Talati of village Vinzan, plaintiff had encroached
upon "Gauchar" land and plaintiff is not owner of the suit
land. The deposition of the plaintiff which was recorded
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before the Ld. Mamlatdar, Abadasa at Nalia is sufficient
enough to come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is not the
owner of the suit land and in fact he had encroached upon
the "Gauchar" land which is basically owned by the
government. A reference is required to be made to Entry No.
1544 which was certified on 09.02.1983 and as per the said
Entry, the land situated at Survey No. 1179 was basically
the land owned by the government and in view of the
provisions contained under Section 10 of the Kachchh Inam
Abolition Act, name of the government was inserted vide
mutation entry No. 693. If we peruse the order passed at
Exh.52 i.e. the order passed by Mamlatdar, Abadasa, dated
26.04.1984, the grandfather of the plaintiff was cultivating
the suit land without the permission of the government and
he was taking water from the river by using the water
pump. Said order further depicts the fact that the plaintiff
had encroached upon the suit land and grandfather of the
plaintiff was cultivating the land without there being any
valid permission from the state government. The order
passed by the Mamlatdar, dated 26.04.1984 (Exh.52) has
attained finality when the said order was ultimately
confirmed by the Revenue Tribunal and the observation
made by the Mamlatdar was not interfered with.
11. It is also required to be noted that the plaintiff had
tried to misguide the Ld. Trial Court by stating misleading
and incorrect facts and it was contended before the Ld. Trial
Court that the old Survey No. 72 was given new Survey No.
1179 but if we peruse the revenue record it becomes clear
that old Survey No. 72 was renumbered as Survey No. 802
and as per old Kharda No.31 to 34, same were given new
survey No. 1179 of village Vinzan. Thus, from the revenue
record, it becomes clear that the old Survey No. 72 was
never renumbered as Survey No. 1179 but same was
renumbered as Survey No. 802. Thus, from the above
referred discussion, it becomes clear that the plaintiff had
not only suppressed the material fact before the Ld. Trial
Court but he tried to misguide the Ld. Trial Court by
projecting the misleading and incorrect facts. As such the
revenue record depicts the fact that the old Survey No. 72
was never renumbered as Survey No. 1179 but same was
renumbered as Survey No. 802.
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11.1. As discussed hereinabove, from the revenue
records, it becomes clear that the old Survey No. 72 was
never renumbered as Survey No. 1179 but same was
renumbered as Survey No. 802 of village Vinzan and,
therefore, the claim of the plaintiff that suit land was of
within the revenue limits of village Khirsara and not of
village Vinzad can not be accepted. Thus, in view of the
above referred discussion, I answer Points No.1 and 2 in the
negative accordingly."
13. In Narayanan Rajendran and Anr. v. Lekshmy Sarojini
and Ors., reported in (2009) 5 SCC 284, the Apex Court has
examined the scope of Second Appeal prior to amendment and
post amendment of Section 100 of "the Code", after referring to a
catena of judgments. The relevant paras 38 to 42 are reproduced
as under:-
"38. '66.The primary cause of the accumulation of arrears of
second appeal in the High Court is the laxity with which
second appeals are admitted without serious scrutiny of the
provisions of Section 100 C.P.C. It is the bounden duty of the
High Court to entertain second appeal within the ambit and
scope of Section 100 C.P.C.
67. The question which is often asked is why should a
litigant have the right of two appeals even on questions of
law? The answer to this query is that in every State there
are number of District Courts and courts in the District
cannot be final arbiters on questions of law. If the law is to
be uniformly interpreted and applied, questions of law must
be decided by the highest Court in the State whose decisions
are binding on all subordinate courts.'
Rationale behind permitting second appeal on question of
law:
39. '68. The rationale behind allowing a second appeal on a
question of law is, that there ought to be some tribunal
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having a jurisdiction that will enable it to maintain, and,
where necessary, re-establish, uniformity throughout the
State on important legal issues, so that within the area of
the State, the law, in so far as it is not enacted law, should
be laid down, or capable of being laid down, by one court
whose rulings will be binding on all courts, tribunals and
authorities within the area over which it has jurisdiction.
This is implicit in any legal system where the higher courts
have authority to make binding decisions on question of law.
69. The analysis of cases decided by the Privy Council and
this court prior to 1976 clearly indicated the scope of
interference under Section 100 C.P.C. by this Court. Even
prior to amendment, the consistent position has been that
the courts should not interfere with the concurrent findings
of facts.
70. Now, after 1976 Amendment, the scope of Section 100
has been drastically curtailed and narrowed down. The
High Courts would have jurisdiction of interfering under
Section 100 C.P.C. only in a case where substantial
questions of law are involved and those questions have been
clearly formulated in the memorandum of appeal. At the time
of admission of the second appeal, it is the bounden duty
and obligation of the High Court to formulate substantial
questions of law and then only the High Court is permitted
to proceed with the case to decide those questions of law.
The language used in the amended section specifically
incorporates the words as "substantial question of law"
which is indicative of the legislative intention. It must be
clearly understood that the legislative intention was very
clear that legislature never wanted second appeal to become
"third trial on facts" or "one more dice in the gamble". The
effect of the amendment mainly, according to the amended
section, was:
(i) The High Court would be justified in admitting the second
appeal only when a substantial question of law is involved;
(ii) The substantial question of law to precisely state such
question;
(iii) A duty has been cast on the High Court to formulate
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substantial question of law before hearing the appeal;
(iv) Another part of the Section is that the appeal shall be
heard only on that question.
71. The fact that, in a series of cases, this court was
compelled to interfere was because the true legislative
intendment and scope of Section 100 C.P.C. have neither
been appreciated nor applied. A class of judges while
administering law honestly believe that, if they are satisfied
that, in any second appeal brought before them evidence
has been grossly misappreciated either by the lower
appellate court or by both the courts below, it is their duty to
interfere, because they seem to feel that a decree following
upon a gross misappreciation of evidence involves injustice
and it is the duty of the High Court to redress such injustice.
We would like to reiterate that the justice has to be
administered in accordance with law.
72. When Section 100 C.P.C. is critically examined then,
according to the legislative mandate, the interference by the
High Court is permissible only in cases involving substantial
questions of law.
73. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council as early as
in 1890 stated that there is no jurisdiction to entertain a
second appeal on the ground of an erroneous finding of fact,
however, gross or inexcusable the error may seem to be and
they added a note of warning that no Court in India has
power to add to, or enlarge, the grounds specified in Section
74. The High Court seriously erred in interfering with the
findings of facts arrived at by the trial court and affirmed by
the first appellate court.
40. The scope of interference by the High Court in second
appeal under section 100 CPC after 1976 Amendment is
strictly confined to cases involving substantial questions of
law. The High Court would not be justified in dealing with
any second appeal without first formulating substantial
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question of law. The High Court would not be justified in
dealing with any second appeal without first formulating
substantial question of law. The legislative intention has
been clearly spelt out in a series of cases of this court.'
41. In Gurdev Kaur (supra), this court exhaustively dealt
with the cases before and after 1976 Amendment of CPC.
This court clearly observed that the scope and ambit of
section 100 CPC has been drastically changed after the
amendment.
42. It is a matter of common experience in this court that
despite clear enunciation of law in a catena of cases of this
court, a large number of cases are brought to our notice
where the High Court under section 100 CPC are disturbing
the concurrent findings of fact without formulating the
substantial question of law."
14. Recently in the case of Suresh Lataruji Ramteke v. Sau.
Sumanbai Pandurang Petkar & Ors., reported in 2023
LiveLaw (SC) 821, the Honourable Supreme Court has said
that, 'in save and in exceptional circumstances, the Court should
interfere with the finding of facts'.
15 In Kondiba Dagadu Kadam v. Savitribhai Sopan Gujar,
reported in (1999) 3 SCC 722, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed
following :-
"6. If the question of law termed as a substantial question
stands already decided by a larger Bench of the High Court
concerned or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or
by the Supreme Court, its merely wrong application on the
facts of the case would not be termed to be a substantial
question of law. Where a point of law has not been pleaded
or is found to be arising between the parties in the absence
of any factual format, a litigant should not be allowed to
raise that question as a substantial question of law in
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second appeal. The mere appreciation of the facts, the
documentary evidence or the meaning of entries and the
contents of the document cannot be held to be raising a
substantial question of law..."
16. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, this Court does not find any reason to entertain the Second
Appeal. The finding of the learned trial Court suffers from no
illegality. It was an attempt on the part of the plaintiff to grab the
Gauchar land, which was rightly rejected by the learned
appellate Court.
17. According to the learned AGP Ms. Nidhi Vyas, the land,
which was in possession of the plaintiff, has now been resumed
in the State Government as Gauchar land, I see no reason to
impose any cost for illegally and inappropriately possessing the
Gauchar land by the plaintiff.
18. For the reasons stated hereinabove, the Second Appeal is
dismissed at admission stage.
18.1 Collector, Bhuj is hereby directed to file the report
before this Court confirming that the Gauchar land has been
resumed to the State Government, within 10 days from the date
of receipt of this order.
18.2 Registry to accept the report from the Collector, as
and when received.
(J. C. DOSHI, J.)
Raj
