Gujarat High Court
Lakshmiben Premjibhai Vaja vs State Of Gujarat on 4 November, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 10364 of 2017
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LAKSHMIBEN PREMJIBHAI VAJA
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR SALIL M THAKORE(5821) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MR SIDDHARTH DESAI AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
NOTICE SERVED BY DS for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3,4
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE
Date : 04/11/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. By the present Special Civil Application, the petitioner is
impugning the order dated 22.08.2013 passed by the respondent
No.2 Collector, Amreli in Revision Case No.107 of 2012, which has
been upheld by the order dated 29.01.2016 passed by the learned
Secretary (Appeals), Revenue Department in Revision Application
No.90 of 2013.
2. It is the case of the petitioner that the petitioner has
purchased the agricultural land bearing survey Nos.33/1, 34/1, 34/2
and 35/2 admeasuring 97812 sq.mtrs, situated at Village Timbi,
Taluka Jafarabad, District Amreli for valuable consideration by way
of registered sale deed dated 16.01.2009. On the basis of the said
sale deed, the revenue entry No.2660 came to be effected in favour
of the petitioner on 08.04.2009, which came to be certified on
26.08.2009. That thereafter, by way of revenue entry No.2767, the
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names of the legal heirs of the petitioner also came to be added in
the revenue record and this mutation entry also came to be certified
by the competent authority on 07.06.2010. That thereafter, the
respondent No.2 Collector exercised suo motu revisional powers
under Rule 108(6) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code Rules and
initiated the proceedings being Revision Case No.107 of 2012. The
notice came to be issued to the petitioner on 07.08.2012. By the
order dated 22.08.2013, the learned Collector, Amreli was pleased
to set aside the mutation entry Nos.2660 and 2767 in favour of the
petitioners holding that the petitioners are not the agriculturists and
therefore, were not entitled to purchase and hold the agricultural
land in question. Aggrieved, the petitioners challenged the said
order in the revision proceedings before the learned Secretary
(Appeals), who, by the order dated 29.01.2016, was pleased to
uphold the order dated 22.08.2013 passed by the learned Collector
and rejected the Revision Application No.90 of 2013 preferred by
the petitioners.
3. The learned counsel Mr. Salil M. Thakore appearing for the
petitioners submits that the suo motu revisional powers have been
exercised by the learned Collector after a period of more than 3½
years. He submits that by catena of decisions, this Court has held
that such suo motu revisional powers have to be exercised within a
reasonable period of time. He submits that the petitioners are the
agriculturists and they are holding and cultivating the land in
question even as on today. He submits that the proceedings
initiated by the learned Collector are barred by limitation and hence,
the same is invalid in law. The learned counsel submits that the
impugned orders, therefore, be quashed and set aside.
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4. Per contra, the learned AGP Mr. Siddharth Desai appearing for
the respondent authorities submits that though the revisional
powers have been exercised after a period of more than 3½ years,
the learned Collector has rendered a categorical finding that the
petitioner was not an agriculturist and the mutation entries were
certified on the basis of the statement that the petitioner was a
daughter of an agriculturist. He submits that the said statement was
later on found to be false statement and therefore, the learned
Collector was justified in initiating the suo motu proceedings since
the sale of the land in question was contrary to the provisions of the
Act as the petitioner was not an agriculturist. He submits that the
proceedings, therefore, were justified in law and the petitioner has
not been able to prove that she was an agriculturist before the
authorities below. He, therefore, submits that no interference is
called for and the Special Civil Application be dismissed.
5. Head the learned counsels for the parties, perused the
documents and considered the submissions.
6. By a catena of decisions, it is well settled that the revenue
authorities have to exercise suo motu powers in respect of
cancellation of mutation entries within a reasonable period of time.
The Division Bench of this Court in the judgment reported in 2024(4)
GLH 410 - The State of Gujarat & Ors. v. Hussainbhai Satarbhai
Meman has held as under:-
"104. Moreover, the proceedings for eviction had been initiated after a
long lapse of time, which would raise a question with regard to the
validity of the action taken by the Collector for summary eviction of the
transferees, who are in settled possession of the lands-in-question for a
sufficient long time. The question before us is as to whether it was
reasonable on the part of the Collector to initiate proceedings for
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summary eviction of the transferees, who are the holders of the lands
in the area for considerably long period of time and who are admittedly
carrying on agricultural operations. There is a categorical submission of
the petitioners in the bunch of the writ petitions that the lands-in-
question have been put to agricultural use since after the date of
transfer and are also in agricultural use till date. The status or nature of
the lands has not been changed by the transferees, who may not fall
within the meaning of agriculturists under Section 2(c) of the
Saurashtra Gharkhed Ordinance, 1949. The vehement submission of
the learned counsels appearing for the petitioners is that the notices
issued by the office of the Collector/Deputy Collector are ex facie
barred by delay.
105. This issues has been considered by the Division Bench of this
Court in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.
[(2016) 2 GLH 1021] wherein dispute was pertaining to the provisions
of Section 54 and 75 of the Saurashtra Gharkhed Ordinance' 1949. In
the said case, the first transfer was of the year 1970, mutation of which
was entered in the year 1973. The land had exchanged many hands
and no dispute was raised by the executant of the original sale deeds.
However, a private respondent, thereafter, had intervened by filing a
separate writ petition inter alia praying for a direction to complete the
inquiry. In the proceedings initiated under the Ordinance, show cause
notice was challenged by the occupants of the land on the ground that
after 37 years from the date of revenue entry, the proceedings initiated
under the Ordinance were ex facie barred by delays. The Division
Bench of this Court examined three aspects of the matter; firstly the
question of reasonable period for initiation of action of issuance of the
show cause notice under the Ordinance; the second was as to whether
initiation of action is without jurisdiction and the third aspect was about
the locus of the respondent therein whose father had executed sale
deed and received consideration and by his volition parted with the
possession, seeking for invalidation of transfer after death of his father,
who did not raise any grievance during his life time.
106. On the question of reasonable period, the Division Bench has
considered the decision of the Apex Court in Patel Raghav Natha which
pertains to the revisional powers under Section 211 of the Bombay
Land Revenue Code, to note that the "revisional powers must be
exercised in a reasonable time and the length of reasonable time must
be determined on the facts of the said case and the nature of the order
which is being refused".
107. The Division bench judgment of this Court in Chandulal
Gordhandas Ranodriya was noted, wherein the question was of delay in
initiation of the action under Section 84C of the Bombay Tenancy and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The relevant observations in paragraph
Nos. '12' and '13' whereof are noted hereinunder :-
"12. Indisputably, the land in question is a new tenure land, to
which the provisions of Section 43 of the Act are applicable. It is
also well settled that if a person wants to get the land converted
from new tenure to old tenure, then as per the Government
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Resolutions passed from time to time and other provisions of the
Act, the Collector has to determine the amount of premium due
and payable by the person who seeks conversion and as per the
guidelines laid down such amount determined by the Collector if
is paid, then necessary orders are being passed by the
authorities converting the land from new tenure to old tenure
thereby lifting the restrictions as imposed under Section 43 of
the Act. It is also well settled that question is if the land is
transferred in violation of the provisions of Section 43 of the Act,
then such transactions could definitely be termed as void
transactions. However, the question is whether such void
transactions could be annulled at any point of time and whether
the authorities could be justified in taking over the possession of
the land for the purpose of vesting in the Government at any
point of time.
13. In our opinion, it is well settled that even though void
transaction if is allowed to remain effective for considerable long
period, the authority named therein will be precluded from
initiating proceedings to annul it. It can remain effective and in
existence till it is invalidated and set aside. If its existence is
allowed for a considerable period and by a passage creating
valuable rights in favour of a considerable section of people, like
the appellants in the present case, it is difficult to accept the
proposition that despite the change the competent authority
under the Act would be entitled to exercise powers under
Section 84(C) of the Act at any point of time."
108. What would be the reasonable time as explained by the Apex
Court in Employees State Insurance Corporation v. C.C. Santhakumar
was taken note of in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya in the following
manner in paragraph No. '16' as under :-
"16. In the case of Employees State Insurance Corporation v.
C.C. Santhakumar reported in 2007(1) SCC 584, the Supreme
Court has elaborately explained this principle of action to be
taken within a reasonable period of time. It would be appropriate
for us to quote paragraph Nos.35, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40.
"35. A "reasonable period" would depend upon the factual
circumstances of the case concerned. There cannot be any
empirical formula to determine that question. The
court/authority considering the question whether the period is
reasonable or not has to take into account the surrounding
circumstances and relevant factors to decide that question.
36. In State of Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha (1969 (2) SCC
187) it was observed that when even no period of limitation was
prescribed, the power is to (2007) 1 SCC 584 be exercised within
a reasonable time and the limit of the reasonable time must be
determined by the facts of the case and the nature of the order
which was sought to be varied. This aspect does not appear to
have been specifically kept in view by the Division Bench.
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Additionally, the points relating to applicability of the Andhra
Pradesh Assigned Lands (Prohibition of Transfers) Act, 1977, and
even if it is held that the Act was applicable, the reasonableness
of the time during which action should have been initiated were
also not considered. It would be hard to give an exact definition
of the word "reasonable". Reason varies in its conclusions
according to the idiosyncrasy of the individual and the times and
circumstances in which he thinks. The reasoning which built up
the old scholastic logic stands now like the jingling of a child's
toy. But mankind must be satisfied with the reasonableness
within reach; and in cases not covered by authority, the decision
of the Judge usually determines what is "reasonable" in each
particular case; but frequently reasonableness "belongs to the
knowledge of the law, and therefore to be decided by the
courts". It was illuminatingly stated by a learned author that an
attempt to give a specific meaning to the word "reasonable" is
trying to count what is not a number and measure what is not
space. It means prima facie in law reasonable in regard to those
circumstances of which the actor, called upon to act reasonably,
knows or ought to know. (See: Municipal Corpn. of Delhi v. Jagan
Nath Ashok Kumar (1987 (4) SCC 497) and Gujarat Water Supply
& Sewerage Board v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. (1989 (1)
SCC 532). As observed by Lord Romilly, M.R. in Labouchere v.
Dawson (41 LJ Ch 472) it is impossible a priori to state what is
reasonable as such in all cases. You must have the particular
facts of each case established before you can ascertain what is
reasonable under the circumstances. Reasonable, being a
relative term is essentially what is rational according to the
dictates of reason and not excessive or immoderate on the facts
and circumstances of the particular case.
37. These aspects were highlighted in Collector and Others v.
P.Mangamma and Others (2003 (4) SCC 488).
38. As observed in Veerayee Ammal v. Seeni Ammal (2002
(1) SCC 134), it is "looking at all the circumstances of the case; a
"reasonable time" under ordinary circumstances; as soon as
circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under
the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract
requires should be done; some more protracted space than
'directly'; such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and
reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature
of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these
convey more or less the same idea".
39. According to Advanced law Lexicon by P.Ramanatha Aiyar
3rd Edition, 2005 reasonable time means as follows:
"That is a reasonable time that preserves to each party the
rights and advantages he possesses and protects each party
from losses that he ought not to suffer.
"Reasonable Time" is defined to be so much time as is
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necessary, under the circumstances, to do conveniently what
the contract or duty requires should be done in a particular
case.
If it is proper to attempt any definition of the words "reasonable
time", as applied to completion of a contract, the distinction
given by Chief Baron Pollock may be suggested, namely, that a
"reasonable time" means as soon as circumstances will permit.
In determining what is a reasonable time or an unreasonable
time, regard is to be had to the nature of the instrument, the
usage or trade or business, if any, with respect to such
instrument, and the fact of the particular case.
The reasonable time which a passenger is entitled to alighting
from a train is such time as is usually required by passengers in
getting off and on the train in safety at the particular station in
question.
A reasonable time, looking at all the circumstances of the case;
a reasonable time under ordinary circumstances; as soon as
circumstances will permit; so much time as is necessary under
the circumstances, conveniently to do what the contract
requires should be done; some more protracted space than
"directly" such length of time as may fairly, and properly, and
reasonably be allowed or required, having regard to the nature
of the act or duty and to the attending circumstances; all these
convey more or less the same idea.
Reasonable time always depends on the circumstances of the
case. (Kinney)
It is unreasonable for a person who has borrowed ornaments for
use in a ceremony to detain them after the ceremony has been
completed and the owner has demanded their return. (AIR 1930
Oudh 395).
The expression "reasonable time" means so much time as is
necessary under the circumstances to do conveniently what the
contract or duty requires should be done in a particular case".
[See: Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew (2005(7) SCC 667)]
40. In all these cases at hand the factual aspects have not been
examined, because the grievance appears to have been focused
on the applicability of Section 77 (1A)(b)."
109. In paragraph No. '19' in Chandulal Gordhandas Ranodriya, it was
concluded that:-
"19. It must be fairly said that if the statute does not
prescribe time limit for exercise of revisional powers, it does not
mean that such powers can be exercised at any point of time
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even if there is a breach of Section 43 of the Act, which is a
provision which relates to a new tenure land, rather it should be
exercised within a reasonable period of time. It is so because the
law does not expect a settled thing to be unsettled after a long
lapse of time. It is clear from various judgments of the Supreme
Court that where a statutory provision for exercise of any suo
motu powers of revision does not prescribe any limitation, the
powers must be exercised within a reasonable period of time
even in the case of transaction which would be termed as void
transaction."
110. Taking note of the law discussed in Chandulal Gordhandas
Ranodriya, the Division Bench of this Court in Bharatbhai Naranbhai
Vegda has further proceeded to note another Division Bench judgment
in Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar, which also pertains to Section 54 of the
Ordinance, 1949 and the question wherein was of reasonable time to
initiate action under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949 for summary
eviction of the occupant, transfer in whose favour was alleged to be
invalid. While dealing with various contentions about the validity of the
transaction and the effect of the same due to the delay, it was noted
therein that at the time when the transaction was executed and the
entry was mutated in the revenue record, the petitioner had merely
submitted a certificate issued by the Talati of village certifying that the
petitioner was preparing agri-tools. However, at that stage, the
authority did not demand any other details or clarification from the
petitioner and/or did not initiate any action. The State authorities
allowed the transaction to operate for years. Subsequently, when the
action to annul the transaction came to be initiated after 17 years, the
petitioner raised objection on the ground that the action was
unsustainable because of the inordinate delay and that since the time
when the transaction was entered into, he had put the land-in-
question to the agricultural use only, and further the status and the
nature of the agricultural land had been retained and maintained by
the transferee. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of that case,
considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter specifically that the
transferee had not changed the nature or status of the land and also
has incurred expenditure to improve the quality of soil, it was held
therein that the aforesaid factors would be relevant and would deserve
due consideration. It was, thus, observed in paragraph No. '20' as
under :-
"20. Even if the concept that the void action cannot be
validated on the ground of belated action is applied in present
case, then also, in view of the special facts and circumstances of
present case it would be appropriate to take into account the
peculiar facts of present case which emerge from the record
viz:-
(a) during the entire period of 17 years the vendor has not
taken out any action in law against the transaction and any suit
or proceeding for declaration or for any other relief does not
appear to have been filed by the vendor.
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(b) the petitioner was an agricultural labourer at the time
when the transaction was executed and was tiling and
cultivating various agricultural lands.
(c) The petitioner was also artisan i.e. engaged in the activity
of preparing agri-tools.
(d) more important is the fact that even after purchasing the
land in question the petitioner has, as claimed by him, continued
to use the land for agricultural purpose and the status or nature
of the land in question as agricultural land is not changed and it
continues to be agricultural land (said factual assertion by the
petitioner has not been disputed by the respondents and any
contrary evidence is not placed on record)
(e) the petitioner has also claimed that he has incurred
substantial expenditure in improving quality of soil.
(f) another important factor which, in the facts of present
case, has emerged is that in view of the orders of the authorities
it is only the vendor who will stand to gain/benefit since the
land, even after the orders, will not vest in the government in
absence of any provision providing for such consequential."
111. While holding so, though it was found by the Division Bench in
Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda that the decision of the competent
authority in holding the transaction-in-question as void is in
consonance with the provisions of the Ordinance and cannot be
faulted, but it was concluded that in the interest of justice and equity, it
cannot be overlooked that the impugned action in exercise of powers
under Section 75 of the Ordinance to summarily evict the petitioner
after having allowed the transaction to remain alive for 17 years,
cannot be justified. It was held that the eviction order completely
overlooked that the petitioner has continued to put the land to use for
agricultural purposes and has not changed the status and the nature of
the land, rather he has invested further amounts for betterment of the
agricultural land. The reasons for delay of 17 years has remained
unexplained and unjustified and the only defence was that the
transaction is statutorily void.
112. Taking note of the above decisions in Chandulal Gordhandas
Ranodriya and Bhanji Devshibhai Luhar, it was, however, observed by
the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda in paragraph No.
'10' as under:-
"In our view, the above referred well considered two decisions of
this Court makes the position abundantly clear that if the action
is to be initiated for setting aside of a transaction under the
Ordinance by invoking section 54 read with section 75 of the
Ordinance, it has to be within reasonable period. The above
referred two decisions are in respect of the cases wherein the
powers were exercised and proceedings were initiated after 5
years and 17 years respectively, whereas in the present case, it
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is after more than 35 years. Hence, we find that the initiation of
the action itself can be said as beyond reasonable period and
the bar of delay and laches could operate against the authority
in initiation of the action. The aforesaid aspect is coupled with
two additional circumstances, one is that the land has changed
hands further during the period of delay and the ownership is
transferred by the purchaser to the another person and the
second is that the revenue entries were mutated. Thereafter,
they were also certified by the competent authority and in spite
of that, no action was taken for cancellation of such entry or
otherwise or even for declaration of the transaction as invalid
within reasonable period. If during the period of delay, the rights
of the parties in the properties are altered, the delay would
operate as a bar with more gravity and when the ownership is
changed during the period of delay, the bar for not taking action
within reasonable period would also operate with more gravity
against the authority in initiation of the action."
126. As noted by the Division Bench in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda
the settled position cannot be unsettled in a belated action taken by
the revenue authorities. The notices issued to the petitioners to show
cause for invalidating the transactions under Section 54 of the
Ordinance and the action for eviction as contemplated under Section
75, having been initiated after a long lapse of time and in most cases
after the death of both the original transferees and even the original
transferor, cannot be said to be justified from any angle.
127. For the above discussion, we do not find any good ground to
deviate from the legal position settled with the Division Bench
judgments of this Court in Bharatbhai Naranbhai Vegda and Bhanji
Devshisinh Luhar where belated actions taken for eviction of the
transferee under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949, were found to be
inequitable and unjustified. Exercise of powers in a reasonable time
where the legislature does not fix the time limit for exercise of such
powers is a well settled position of law, which cannot be unsettled on
the submissions of the learned Additional Advocate General that the
decision in Patil Raghav Natha was rendered while making scrutiny of
the exercise of revisional powers under Section 211 of the Bombay
Revenue Code, 1879 and hence is not applicable to the proceedings
initiated under Section 75 of the Ordinance, 1949 for summary
eviction.
128. At the cost of repetition, it may be reiterated that a declaration
of the sale deed as invalid was required to be made after an inquiry
which must have been conducted within a reasonable time before the
Summary eviction. The sale deeds remained valid for considerable long
period of time and moreover, they are binding on the vendors. The
inquiry into the status of the predecessor-in-title of the petitioners or
the petitioners herein after such a long lapse of time, can not be
permitted, as it may not be possible to bring on record all the relevant
documents in such an inquiry(s). A transaction hit by Section 54 is not
void ab initio, but may be invalidated and hence remains valid till it is
declared invalid. The settled position of law that the transaction which
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remained valid and effective for a considerable period of time cannot
be unsettled, is not to be deviated. Further, there is no vesting
contemplated under the Ordinance, 1949 and as noted hereinbefore,
the show cause notices are prescribing for not only eviction of the
transferees, but resumption of the land in favour of the State
Government by directing for entry of the name of the State in the
revenue records after deletion of the entries, even of the original
landholders while deleting the name of the transferees, which is wholly
without jurisdiction."
7. In the present case, the mutation entry has been effected on
08.04.2009 and certified on 26.08.2009. Thereafter, the names of
the legal heirs of the petitioner have also been added on 05.04.2010
by mutation entry No.2767, which came to be certified on
07.06.2010. In the present case, the notice came to be issued on
08.07.2012 and the suo motu revision proceedings have been
initiated after a period of 3 years, which cannot be said to have
been initiated within a reasonable period of time. The petitioners are
even as on date cultivating the agricultural land in question.
8. In view of the settled legal position, the impugned order dated
29.01.2016 passed by the learned Secretary (Appeals), Revenue
Department in Revision Application No.90 of 2013 as well as the
order dated 22.08.2013 passed by the respondent No.2 Collector,
Amreli in Revision Case No.107 of 2012 are quashed and set aside.
The Special Civil Application is allowed to the aforesaid extent and
disposed of accordingly.
No order as to costs.
(ANIRUDDHA P. MAYEE, J.)
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