Gujarat High Court
State Of Gujarat vs Vinitkumar Jayantibhai Kachhiya Patel on 16 May, 2025
Author: Vaibhavi D. Nanavati
Bench: Vaibhavi D. Nanavati
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.A/672/1998 JUDGMENT DATED: 16/05/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 672 of 1998
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
VINITKUMAR JAYANTIBHAI KACHHIYA PATEL & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR. MANAN MEHTA, APP for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR JS PATEL(622) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
MR NITIN M AMIN(126) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 16/05/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI)
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and order of
acquittal dated 22.05.1998 passed by the learned Additional Sessions
Judge, Kheda Camp @ Anand in Sessions Case No.160 of 1997, whereby
the respondents accused came to be acquitted for the offences under
sections 498A, 304B, 306, 114 of the Indian Penal Code, the appellant -
State has preferred present appeal under section 378 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("the Code" for short).
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2. The brief facts leading to the filing of the present appeal reads as
under:
2.1 That, it is the brief case of prosecution that the daughter namely
Parmeshvari @ Payal (deceased) of the original complainant (PW No. 1-
Exhibit 12-page No. 63) was having love relation with the accused No. 1
namely Vinitkumar Jayantibhai Kachhiya Patel and was married to him
without the consent and permission of the family of the complainant and
parents on 04/12/1996 and after marriage, she was staying at her
matrimonial house.
2.2 It is the case of the complainant and prosecution in complaint that
before 2 and half months a telephone call was received from the daughter
namely deceased that her husband is physically torturing her and beating
her and she had requested to take her back to the parental home. Upon
such information, the complainant and her son Devang (PW no. 3 -
Exhibit 16-page no. 116) have gone to the matrimonial house of the
daughter - deceased however, since the husband vinit and maternal aunt
Induben, were present and hence they were not permitted to talk to the
deceased/daughter. Thereafter since the deceased and her husband -
accused No. 1 vinit come to the house of 1 of the relative on the day of
Uttarayan, at that point of time the deceased had seen the brother-in-law
of the complainant Jaydevabhai (PW no. 6 - Exhibit 21-page no. 135) and
she had conveyed to him that the deceased daughter was mentally and
physically tortured and beaten by the in-laws including husband, mother-
in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law and hence she pleaded that she
may be taken to the parental home. Upon receiving such information,
immediately the relatives namely sister-in-law of the complainant namely
Chandrikaben (PW no. 7 - Exhibit 22-page no. 141) and sister-in-law of
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the complainant namely Chandrikaben (PW no. 8 - Exhibit 23-page no.
145 and the Son Devang (PW no. 3 - Exhibit 16-page no. 116) have gone
to the matrimonial house of the deceased daughter however, her husband
and her mother-in-law had denied her access to the parental house and
parents and she was not permitted to go to the parental house. It was also
the case of the original complainant that before 2 days of the date of the
incident namely around on 13/03/1997 the deceased daughter had a
telephone call to the relative of the complainant and she conveyed on
telephone that she was being severely beaten and she pleaded to get her
back to the parental house. Thereafter on the same day at the evening
hours, when the deceased daughter was passing through the house of the
complainant, she had secretly thrown in note near the house of the
complainant and upon possession of the note, it was felt that she was
severely being beaten and tortured. On 15/03/1997, the son of the
complainant had informed that the deceased daughter was being taken in
the Rikshaw, she is constantly crying and accordingly the complainant
and her husband reached to the Dr. Pankaj Parikh, Dr. Ajay Kothivala
and Dr. Mahendra Shah that the government hospital where she could
gather the information that the deceased daughter was taken to the
hospital of Dr Bipin Vyas (PW no. 11 - Exhibit 30-page no. 175). On
reaching the said place, the complainant could see that the deceased
daughter was dead and lying on the bed and upon verifying from the
doctor, the complainant could know that the deceased daughter has taken
poisonous substance (celphos powder - a pesticide poisonous medicine).
Accordingly the complainant had lodged the complaint under section
304B, 306, 498 A and 114 of IPC against the accused persons.
2.3 It is also the case of the original complainant is prosecution that the
deceased due to mental and physical torture of the respondent accused
husband and respondent accused father-in-law and also by demand of
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dowry amount, had taken the last step of committing suicide, and that is
how the respondent accused persons had committed the offences
punishable under section 498 A, 304 B, 306, 114 of IPC and accordingly
the original complainant had lodged the complaint as FIR Exhibit 21,
page No. 207.
2.4 It is also the case of the prosecution - original complainant that
during the marriage span of the deceased daughter, the respondent
accused husband and the other in-laws was time and again mentally and
physically torturing to the deceased and raising the demands of dowry. It
is also the case of the original complainant and the prosecution that the
deceased was specifically tortured by saying that at the time of marriage,
she has brought nothing and that is how the demand of dowry was being
raised.
3. In pursuance of the complaint lodged by the complainant with the
Anand Rural Police Station for the offence under sections 498A, 304B,
306 and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, the investigating agency recorded
statements of the witnesses, drawn panchnama of scene of offence,
discovery and recovery of weapons for the purpose of proving the
offence. After having found sufficient material against the respondent
accused, charge-sheet came to be filed in the Court of learned JMFC
concerned. As said Court lacks jurisdiction to try the offence, it
committed the case to the Sessions Court, Ahmedabad as provided under
section 209 of the Code.
4. Upon committal of the case to the Sessions Court, Ahmedabad,
learned Sessions Judge framed charge at Ex.4 against the respondent
accused for the aforesaid offences. The respondent accused pleaded not
guilty and claimed to be tried. During the course of trial, the prosecution
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has examined in all 10 witnesses. The details of the aforesaid evidence
led by the prosecution is reproduced in the tabular form as under :-
~:: Oral Evidence ::~
Sr. no. Particular Exh.
PW-2
7. Chandrikaben Jayprakashbhai Brahmbhatt - 22
PW-7
11. Dr. Bipinchandra Gaurishankar Vyas - PW- 30
13. Hasmukhbhai Chandulal Brahmbhatt - PW-13 43
~:: Documentary Evidence ::~
Sr. no. Particular Exh.
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5. On conclusion of evidence on the part of the prosecution, the trial
Court put various incriminating circumstances appearing in the evidence
to the respondent accused so as to obtain explanation/answer as provided
u/s 313 of the Code. In the further statement, the respondents accused
denied all incriminating circumstances appearing against them as false
and further stated that they are innocent and false case has been filed
against them.
6. We have heard Mr. Manan Mehta, learned APP appearing for the
appellant - State. Mr. Manan Mehta, learned APP submitted that the trial
court gravely erred in failing to appreciate crucial evidence, particularly
the suicide note marked as Ex.29, wherein the deceased explicitly stated
that she was driven to commit suicide due to sustained mental and
physical torture by her husband (Accused No. 1), mother-in-law, and
sister-in-law. It was pointed out that this suicide note was duly proved
through the oral testimony of PW-10 Hemangini and corroborated by the
documentary evidence including the panchnama and its recovery,
supported by the panch witness PW-13 Hasmukhbhai. The learned APP
contended that the learned Sessions Court wrongly disregarded these
testimonies solely on the ground that the witnesses were close relatives of
the deceased, even though their statements were consistent and fully
supported the prosecution case. He further argued that as the marriage
had lasted less than seven years, the statutory presumption under Section
113B of the Indian Evidence Act squarely applied but was entirely
ignored by the court below. It was submitted that when a woman dies an
unnatural death within seven years of marriage and it is shown that she
was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives in
connection with dowry demands, the court must presume it to be a case of
dowry death. In the present case, the death occurred within one year of
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marriage and was a suicide, fulfilling all criteria under Section 304B IPC.
The learned APP outlined that the essential ingredients of Section 113B
were satisfied: the unnatural death of a woman within seven years of
marriage, proven harassment by the husband and his family, and its
proximity in time to the death. Hence, the burden of proof had shifted to
the accused to rebut the presumption, which they failed to do. Despite
this, the Sessions Court overlooked these vital aspects and legal
presumptions. Therefore, the acquittal was termed erroneous, unjustified,
and liable to be set aside by convicting the accused persons and awarding
them the maximum punishment under the applicable sections.
7. Heard Mr. Manan Mehta, learned APP for the appellant.
Considered the evidence, depositions and witnesses which are produced
on record. We have also considered the documentary evidence of the note
below Ex.29 and the impugned order passed by the competent court
which is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. In the light
of the aforesaid, in our opinion, the competent court has discussed in
detail, the main limb of evidence relied upon by the prosecution i.e., the
note below Ex.29 on which the prosecution has placed reliance. In the
said note below Ex.29, in which the deceased had stated that about
physical and mental cruelty being conducted upon her at her matrimonial
house, it emerges that the said note was written outside the matrimonial
house after a period of 2 days which was produced by the complainant
Madhuben after lodging of complaint. The competent court has
considered the fact that if the said note was available with the maternal
side of the deceased's family, the family never approached the police
authority to bring it to the notice or loadge a complaint. The said evidence
i.e., the note below Ex.29 has not been proved before the competent
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court. The oral testimony of PW-10 Hemangini below Ex.10 is also
considered by the competent court, wherein PW-10 Hemangini, in her
deposition stated that the deceased used to study with PW-10 Hemangini
in college and in view thereof, it is stated that the handwriting were of the
deceased. However, as discussed by the competent court, the same is not
proved whether the handwriting are that of the deceased. The competent
court hold that there is no other evidence to prove that the handwriting
were of the deceased and hence, the said note below Ex.29 is in our
opinion, on the basis of oral as well as documentary evidence so
discarded requires no interference. The competent court has held further
that the ingredient of offence punishable under Section 304B of the
Indian Penal Code are required to be independently examined to satisfy
the alleged offence punishable under Section 304B. Section Section 304B
of the Indian Penal Code reads as under:
"Section 304B - Dowry death
(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury
or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years
of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her
husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death
shall be called a "dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be
deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation - For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry" shall have
the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28
of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment
for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend
to imprisonment for life."
It is not in dispute that the marriage span of the deceased and
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Vinitbhai was less than one year, however, in our opinion, there is
nothing on record to show that there was any demand of dowry by the
husband's family. Once such basic ingredient is not proved upon reading
the same with Section 113B of the Evidence Act. The basic ingredient
that the deceased was subjected to cruelty or harassment for demand of
dowry before her death is not proved.
8. In the case of Bhupatbhai Bachubhai Chavda & Anr. v. State of
Gujarat [2024 INSC 295], Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as under :-
"6. It is true that while deciding an appeal against acquittal, the
Appellate Court has to reappreciate the evidence. After re-
appreciating the evidence, the first question that needs to be
answered by the Appellate Court is whether the view taken by the
Trial Court was a plausible view that could have been taken based
on evidence on record. Perusal of the impugned judgment of the
High Court shows that this question has not been adverted to.
Appellate Court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it
is satisfied after reappreciating the evidence that the only possible
conclusion was that the guilt of the accused had been established
beyond a reasonable doubt. The Appellate Court cannot overturn
order of acquittal only on the ground that another view is possible.
In other words, the judgment of acquittal must be found to be
perverse. Unless the Appellate Court records such a finding, no
interference can be made with the order of acquittal. The High
Court has ignored the well-settled principle that an order of
acquittal further strengthens the presumption of innocence of the
accused. After having perused the judgment, we find that the High
Court has not addressed itself on the main question.
7. The second error the High Court committed is found in
paragraph 23 of the impugned judgment. The High Court has gone
to the extent of recording a finding that the appellants have failed
to adduce evidence in their support, failed to examine the defence
witness and failed to establish falsity of the prosecution's version.
This concept of the burden of proof is entirely wrong. Unless,
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under the relevant penal statute, there is a negative burden put on
the accused or there is a reverse onus clause, the accused is not
required to discharge any burden. In a case where there is a
statutory presumption, after the prosecution discharges initial
burden, the burden of rebuttal may shift on the accused. In the
absence of the statutory provisions as above, in this case, the
burden was on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the High Court's finding on
the burden of proof is completely erroneous. It is contrary to the
law of the land.
9. It is to be observed that while dealing with the judgment of
acquittal, unless reasoning by the learned trial Court is found to be
perverse, the acquittal cannot be upset. It is further observed that High
Court's interference in such appeal in somewhat circumscribed and if the
view taken by the learned trial Court is possible on the evidence, the High
Court should stay its hands and not interfere in the matter in the belief
that if it had been the trial Court, it might have taken a different view.
10. In absence of such demand being proved in our opinion, the
impugned order passed by the court is such that it requires no
interference.
11. The present appeal is dismissed accordingly.
(VAIBHAVI D. NANAVATI,J)
(R. T. VACHHANI, J)
Mitesh/sompura
