Gujarat High Court
State Of Gujarat vs Paresh Shantilal on 27 June, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL (AGAINST ACQUITTAL) NO. 1029 of 2014
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY Sd/-
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS Sd/-
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
PARESH SHANTILAL & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR BHARGAV PANDYA, APP for the Appellant(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE CHEEKATI
MANAVENDRANATH ROY
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE D. M. VYAS
Date : 27/06/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY)
1. Assailing the judgment dated 28.5.2014 rendered in
Sessions Case No.8 of 2014 on the file of learned Additional
Sessions Judge, Morbi, whereby accused nos.1 to 3 in the said
case were acquitted of the charges under Sections 498-A, 306,
304-B and 114 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 read with
Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, the instant
appeal has been preferred by the State.
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2. Briefly stated, it is the case of the prosecution that
Ms.Harshaben (herein after called as "deceased") is the legally
wedded wife of accused no.1. Their marriage was solemnized
about four years prior to her death. They are blessed with a
son by name Vansh, aged about one and a half years, during
their lawful wedlock. The deceased was pregnant of two
months at the time of her death. There was strained
relationship between the deceased and her mother-in-law, who
is accused no.3. Accused no.1 used to harass her at the
instance of accused no.3. Even on the previous day of her
death, accused no.1 beat her at the instance of accused no.3.
Accused nos.1 to 3 used to harass her demanding additional
dowry from her. As she could not satisfy said demand, accused
no.1 called her mother to come to the house and take back his
wife. So her mother, who is examined as PW-1 in this case,
along with her son, PW-5, came to the house of the accused to
take her back. On 24.10.2013, it is stated, that there was a
quarrel between the deceased and her mother-in-law, who is
accused no.3, relating to the food that was prepared on that
day. Unable to bear said harassment, the deceased
immediately went into a room at about 11 a.m. on that day
and poured kerosene on her and set herself ablaze.
Immediately, her mother and brother, who are PW-1 and PW-5,
and her husband, who is accused no.1, took her to Vankaner
Hospital. After giving preliminary treatment, she was referred
to the Government Hospital of Rajkot. She was admitted in the
said hospital. On the requisition given by the concerned doctor,
PW-8, who is Executive Magistrate reached the hospital and
recorded statement of the injured at about 3.45 p.m. on that
day. She stated in her statement that both her husband, who is
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accused no.1, and mother-in-law, who is accused no.3 were
harassing her and on that day also that there was a quarrel
between her and her mother-in-law, accused no.3, and unable
to bear the harassment meted out by her at their hands that
she went into a room and poured kerosene and set herself
ablaze. Thereafter, she died on the same day i.e. 24.10.2013
at 5 p.m. in the evening. Postmortem examination was held
over her dead-body on the same day at about 07.45 p.m. and
the doctor, who conducted autopsy over her dead-body opined
that she died out of shock due to extensive burn injuries.
Postmortem report was issued to that effect.
3. On the next day i.e. 25.10.2023, her mother, PW-1
lodged report with police. Police registered a case for the
offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 306, 304-B and 114
of IPC read with Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
The case was investigated. Eventually, on completion of
investigation, charge-sheet was filed against accused no.1 to 3
for the aforesaid offences.
4. After the case was committed by the committal Court to
the Court of Sessions division, it was made over to learned
Additional Sessions Judge, Morbi, for trial. The trial Court
framed charges under Sections 498-A, 306, 304-B and 114 of
IPC read with Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
The accused denied said charges and claimed to be tried.
5. During the course of trial, ten witnesses were examined
and eighteen exhibits were marked to substantiate the case of
the prosecution against the accused.
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6. At the culmination of the trial, after considering the
evidence on record, and on appreciation of the same, learned
trial Judge found the accused not guilty for any of the charges
levelled against them and acquitted them of the said offences.
7. Aggrieved, State has preferred the instant appeal
questioning the legality and validity of the impugned judgment
of acquittal. When the appeal came up for hearing before this
Court, we have heard learned Additional Public Prosecutor,
Mr.Bhargav Pandya at length. Despite service of notice of rule
on respondent nos.1 to 3, for the reasons best known to them,
none appeared in this appeal. So, in order to give a fair
opportunity to them, on 23.6.2025, we have adjourned the
matter to this day for hearing. Even today also, none appeared
for them. As it is an old appeal of the year 2014 and it is listed
under the caption "critically old matters" before us for final
hearing, we are not inclined to adjourn the matter and we have
decided to dispose of the appeal, after going through the
material available on record, on merits.
8. We have meticulously gone through the record and the
evidence.
9. As regards the offence under Section 304-B is concerned,
it pertains to dowry death. Section 304-B reads thus:-
"Section 304B. Dowry death.-(1) Where the death of a woman is
caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under
normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is
shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in
connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called
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"dowry death", and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have
caused her death.
Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, "dowry"
shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).
(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven
years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.]
10. A bare perusal of the aforesaid Section makes it manifest
that in order to prove the offence of dowry death, the
predominant requirements to be established are (i) the death
of a woman should be caused by any burns or bodily injury, or
should occur otherwise than under normal circumstances, (ii)
the said death in the above circumstances shall take place
within seven years of the marriage, (iii) it must be shown that
soon before her death that she was subjected to cruelty or
harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband, (iv)
and the said cruelty or harassment must be for or in
connection with any demand for dowry. It is only upon proof of
the aforesaid requirements, it is to be held that an offence of
dowry death is committed. As per the explanation appended to
the aforesaid Section, the expression "dowry" shall have the
same meaning as defined in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition
Act.
11. Even to attract the presumption of Section 113-B of the
Indian Evidence Act to prove an offence of dowry death, as
contemplated under Section 304-B of IPC also, it must be
shown that soon before her death that such woman was
subjected to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with
any demand for dowry, then only a presumption that accused
caused dowry death can be invoked.
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12. Thus, a conjoint reading of both Sections 304-B of IPC
and Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act makes it
manifest that the prosecution has to invariably prove that
there was cruelty or harassment caused to the woman within
seven years of her marriage and, more particularly, that the
said cruelty or harassment was caused for or in connection
with any demand for dowry. Every harassment, which is not
relating to demand for dowry, will not come within the purview
of the offence of dowry death as contemplated under Section
304-B of IPC.
13. In the instant case, though PW-1, who is the mother of
the deceased lodged FIR stating that the accused has harassed
the deceased for additional dowry and unable to bear the said
harassment that the deceased committed suicide, it is
pertinent to note here that she did not support the said
prosecution version in her evidence given in the Court. In fact,
she has turned hostile and shown her volte-face to the
prosecution. As can be seen from her deposition, she did not
depose that any of the accused herein has harassed the
deceased with any demand for dowry or for any valuable
security or any property. Even PW-2, who is the father of the
deceased, PW-3, the brother of the deceased, PW-4, the
maternal uncle of the deceased, PW-5, the brother of the
deceased also turned hostile and they did not depose that the
accused herein have subjected the deceased to cruelty or
harassment by making any demand for dowry. Therefore,
there is absolutely not even an iota of evidence on record to
prove that the accused made any illegal demand for dowry or
that they have subjected the deceased to cruelty or
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harassment for or in connection with any such demand for
dowry. Therefore, the basic prerequisites that are essential for
the purpose of proving the offence under Section 304-B of IPC
are conspicuously absent in this case and they are not proved
by the prosecution against the accused. So no presumption
under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act can be invoked
in the given facts and circumstances of the case. So, we have
no hesitation to hold that the prosecution has failed to prove
the offence punishable under Section 304-B of IPC.
14. Learned APP has made an effort by strenuously
contending that there is a dying declaration of the deceased
available in this case and it was recorded by PW-8, who is
Executive Magistrate, and that she stated in her dying
declaration that as her mother-in-law, who is accused no.3, has
harassed her and quarreled with her that the deceased
committed suicide by setting herself ablaze and this dying
declaration is sufficient to prove that she was subjected to
harassment to prove the offence under Section 304-B or under
Section 306 of IPC.
14. We have meticulously gone through the dying declaration
of the deceased, which was recorded by the Executive
Magistrate, examined as PW-8. She has stated in her dying
declaration that there was a quarrel between her and accused
no.3, who is her mother-in-law, on that day relating to the food
prepared and she went to her room and poured kerosene on
herself and set herself ablaze and that, on the previous day
night her husband, who is accused no.1 beat her at the
instance of accused no.3. It is significant to note here that she
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did not say in her dying declaration that the accused
demanded any dowry from her and that they harassed her or
subjected her to cruelty for or in connection with any such
demand for dowry. Therefore, it is not at all the version of the
deceased, as can be seen from the dying declaration that she
was subjected to cruelty for or in connection with any demand
for dowry. Therefore, the predominant requirement, which is
essential to prove the offence under Section 304-B is not
established even from her dying declaration. Her statement in
dying declaration, at best, only proves that there are some
family bickerings between her and her mother-in-law and also
with her husband. Every petty instance and family bickerings,
which are common in any family life, cannot be construed as
harassment made in connection with demand for dowry. To
prove an offence under Section 304-B, as discussed supra,
there must be definite evidence relating to harassment caused
in connection with demand for dowry. As the same is not
established even from the dying declaration of the deceased, it
is of no any use to the prosecution to establish its case against
the accused for the offence under Section 304-B of IPC. There
is absolutely no whisper at all regarding harassment caused for
dowry in the dying declaration.
15. As regards the offence under Section 306 of IPC is
concerned, the facts of the case show that admittedly none of
the accused abetted her to commit suicide. It is the deceased,
who went into her room after a quarrel took place between her
and her mother-in-law, relating to the food prepared on that
day, and at the spur of the moment, she poured kerosene on
herself and set herself ablaze. So it is not a case where any of
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the accused has abetted her to commit suicide. The required
ingredients under Section 107 of IPC regarding intentional
instigation given by the accused to the deceased to commit
suicide or aid are not established in this case. Even though she
has committed suicide within seven years of her marriage, to
invoke even the presumption under Section 113-A of the Indian
Evidence Act, again the same requirements relating to
harassment said to have been caused in connection with any
demand for dowry, valuable security or property are to be
proved. A perusal of Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act
makes it clear that when a woman commits suicide within
seven years of her marriage, and if it is shown that her
husband or his relative has subjected her to cruelty then the
Court may presume having regard to all other circumstances
that such suicide was abetted by her husband or his relatives.
Explanation appended to Section 113-A of the Indian Evidence
Act also clearly mandates that the expression "cruelty" shall
have same meaning as in Section 498-A of IPC. Explanation to
Section 498-A says that any willful conduct which is of such a
nature as is likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to
cause grave injury or danger to her life or limb, or any
harassment of the woman, with a view to coerce her or any
person relating to her to meet any unlawful demand for any
property or valuable security would constitute an act of
cruelty. If the facts of the case are considered, even as per the
statement given by the deceased in her dying declaration, it
does not satisfy the definition of "cruelty" as envisaged in
Section 498-A of IPC. No such willful conduct of such kind
exhibited by the accused is establised in this case. If the
deceased, either because of her sensitive mind or of weak
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nature or emotional temperament, takes extreme decision of
putting an end to her life in the normal family bickerings that
took place in the house, accused cannot be attributed with said
conduct, so as to hold them responsible for the offence of
abetment to commit suicide, as required under Section 306 of
IPC. Therefore, the offence under Section 306 is also not
proved and established in this case by the prosecution.
16. For the same reasons assigned supra, as there is no
evidence of subjecting the deceased to any cruelty or
harassment, with demand for dowry, valuable security or
property, no offence under Section 498-A of IPC is also made
out from the facts of the case. For the same reasons, offence
under Sections 3 and 7 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is also not
established.
17. Therefore, the learned trial Court, after considering the
evidence on record and on proper appreciation of the same
arrived at a right conclusion and recorded a finding of acquittal
in favour of the accused. Upon considering the evidence and
on reappraisal of the same, we also found that no case is made
out for any of the charges levelled against the accused and
that the impugned judgment of the trial Court is perfectly
sustainable under the law. So it calls for no interference in this
appeal. Ergo, the appeal is liable to be dismissed.
18. Resultantly, the appeal is dismissed. The impugned
judgment dated 28.5.2014 rendered in Sessions Case No.8 of
2014 on the file of learned Additional Sessions Judge, Morbi,
acquitting the respondents-accused, is hereby confirmed.
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Record and Proceedings, be sent back to the trial Court
concerned forthwith.
Sd/-
(CHEEKATI MANAVENDRANATH ROY, J)
Sd/-
(D. M. VYAS, J)
R.S. MALEK
