Gujarat High Court
Dharmendrasinh Laxmansinh Chavda vs State Of Gujarat on 26 June, 2025
Author: A. S. Supehia
Bench: A.S. Supehia
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/LPA/766/2025 ORDER DATED: 26/06/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 766 of 2025
In R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5398 of 2024
With
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 767 of 2025
In
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5548 of 2024
With
R/LETTERS PATENT APPEAL NO. 768 of 2025
In
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 5402 of 2024
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DHARMENDRASINH LAXMANSINH CHAVDA
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT
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Appearance:
MR NK MAJMUDAR(430) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MS SHRUTI R. DHRUVE, AGP for the RESPONDENT - STATE
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
Date : 26/06/2025
COMMON ORAL ORDER
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA)
1. At the outset, learned advocates appearing for the
respective parties have submitted that similar set of matters
are disposed of this Court vide order dated 11.07.2024 passed
in Letters Patent Appeal No.659 of 2024. It is submitted that
the present matters are left out because of non-removal of
office objections. It is urged that similar order may be passed
in the captioned appeals.
2. In view of the aforesaid submissions, the captioned
appeals are disposed of in terms of the order dated 11.07.2024
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/LPA/766/2025 ORDER DATED: 26/06/2025
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passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.659 of 2024 and allied
matters.
3. The operative part of the said order reads as under : -
"15. In our considered opinion, the date 01.01.2020 cannot be made
applicable in all the cases uniformly in wake of the fact that the date
of appointment of each of the employees and date of filing of the writ
petitions is also different.
16. We have heard on this issue. Before we may pass final orders, it
would be apposite to refer to the decision of the Apex Court in the
case of Shiv Dass (supra). While dealing with the issue of delay and
latches caused in filing the writ petitions challenging termination
orders, the Apex Court has held thus:
"10. In the case of pension the cause of action actually continues
from month to month. That, however, cannot be a ground to overlook
delay in filing the petition. It would depend upon the fact of each
case. If petition is filed beyond a reasonable period say three years
normally the Court would reject the same or restrict the relief which
could be granted to a reasonable period of about three years. The
High Court did not examine whether on merit appellant had a case. If
on merits it would have found that there was no scope for
interference, it would have dismissed the writ petition on that score
alone."
17. Thereafter, in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), where the issue
pertains to the claim of pension, the Apex Court has held thus:
"5. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be
rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought
by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an
application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to
the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service
related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted
even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the
date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing
wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception
to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or
administrative decision which related to or affected several others
also, and if the re-opening of the issue would affect the settled rights
of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if
the issue relates to payment or re-fixation of pay or pension, relief
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C/LPA/766/2025 ORDER DATED: 26/06/2025
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may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of
third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or
promotion etc., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale
and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. In so far as the
consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period, the
principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a
consequence, High Courts will restrict the consequential relief
relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the
date of filing of the writ petition."
18. The aforementioned both the judgements are considered by the
Supreme Court in the case of Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak vs.
Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation, JT 2022 (5) S.C. 470. It is held thus:
"12 In Tarsem Singh (supra), the delay of 16 years in approaching
the courts affected the consequential claim for arrears and thus, this
Court set aside the direction to pay arrears for 16 years with interest.
The Court restricted "the relief relating to arrears to only three years
before the date of writ petition, or from the date of demand to date
of writ petition, whichever was lesser". Further, the grant of interest
on arrears was also denied.
13 The aforesaid ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra) has been followed by
this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Yogendra
Shrivastava, (2010) 12 SCC 538 and Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life
Insurance Corporation of India., (2016) 13 SCC 797
14 In the facts of the present case, it is accepted that the
respondent-Corporation had accepted the interpretation rendered by
the High Court of Gujarat to the Scheme whereby the appellants, on
financial upgradation, would be entitled to the higher grade payscale
of the next promotional post, which is Rs.5,000-8,000/- in the present
case. As noted above, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench
accepts the said position and grants the appellants the said pay-scale
but restricts the benefit from the date of the judgment of the Single
Judge in the Writ Petitions filed by the appellants, that is, with effect
from 31st July 2018. The Division Bench should not have taken the
date of the decision/judgment of the Single Judge for grant of the said
benefit in view of the decision and ratio in Tarsem Singh (supra)
which has been followed in several other decisions. That apart, the
date of the decision of the Single Judge is a fortuitous circumstance.
Only the date of filing of the writ petition is relevant while examining
the question of delay and laches or limitation. The appellants would,
in consonance with the case law referred to above, be entitled to the
arrears for three years before the date of filing of the Writ Petition."
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C/LPA/766/2025 ORDER DATED: 26/06/2025
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19. The Apex Court has held that the claim which is related to service
benefits, one of the exceptions to the said rule of delay and latches
relating to a continuing wrong. It is held that where a service-related
claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if
there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on
which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong
creates a continuing source of injury. But there is exception to the
exception. Ultimately, it is held that the High Courts will restrict
consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of 3 years
prior to the date of filing of the writ petition. The Supreme court in
case of Rushibhai Jagdishchandra Pathak (supra) has held that the
High Court should not have taken the date of decision / judgement of
the learned Single Judge for grant of benefits in view of the decision
and ration in Tarsem Singh (supra), and further it is clarified that
"only the date of filing of the writ petition is relevant while examining
the question of delay and latches or limitation, and the arrears are to
be confined for three years before the date of filing of the writ
petition.".
20. Hence, the date of filing of the respective writ petitions becomes
very relevant while restricting the arrears for three years. In the
present group of appeals, the writ petitions have been filed after
considerable delay and hence, the grant of actual arrears to such writ
petitioners is governed as per the law enunciated by the Apex Court
in the aforementioned decisions. The arrears are required to be
restricted to the period of 3 years prior to the date of filing of each of
the respective petitions. The reliance placed on the decision of the
Apex Court in the case of Lekh Ram (supra) will not apply to the
present facts, since the issue with regard to delay in filing the writ
petitions by the employee was neither raised nor examined.
21. This directions will only be confined to those employees, who
have belatedly filed writ petitioners beyond three years questioning
the action of the State authorities in conferring the regular pay-scale
belatedly, and not from their initial date of appointment.
22. Hence, the directions issued by the learned Single Judges in the
respective writ petitions is altered and all the employees shall be
entitled to the actual arrears from a period of 3 years prior to the
date of filing of the respective writ petitions. It is clarified that since
we have not disturbed the decision with regard to the conferment of
the regular pay-scale from the initial date of appointment, the pay
fixation and other benefits to all the employees shall counted
notionally for the intervening period.
23. With these observations, the present appeals are disposed of. As
a sequel, the connected applications are also stand disposed of.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/LPA/766/2025 ORDER DATED: 26/06/2025
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Registry shall place a copy of this order in each of the connected
matters."
4. Registry shall place a copy of this order in each of the
connected matters.
Sd/-
(A. S. SUPEHIA, J)
Sd/-
(R. T. VACHHANI, J)
MAHESH/
