Gujarat High Court
The State Of Gujarat vs Hitendrainh Vijaysinh Solanki on 6 June, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2278 of 2006
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THE STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
HITENDRAINH VIJAYSINH SOLANKI
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Appearance:
MS JIRGA JHAVERI, ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Appellant(s) No. 1
DHARAMVEERSINH J SOLANKI(7481) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s)
No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
Date : 06/06/2025
ORAL ORDER
1. The present Acquittal Appeal has been filed by the State
under Section-378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973,
challenging the judgment and order dated 15/09/2006 passed by
learned Presiding Officer, 6th Fast Track Court, Surat (hereinafter
referred to as "the Trial Court") in Special ACB Case No.13 of
2000. By way of the impugned judgment and order, the accused
has been acquitted of all the charges levelled against him under
Sections-7, 13(1)(d) and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988 (hereinafter referred to as "Corruption Act").
2. The short facts emerging from the record are read as
under:-
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2.1. It is the case of the prosecution that the complainant wants
to avail a loan to purchase five cows, for which necessary tagging
certificate was required to be obtained from medical officer.
Thereby, the complainant, who needed to avail a bank loan, was
already having five cows and was required to obtain the necessary
insurance and a veterinary doctor's certificate by tagging the rings
on ears of the cows. To avail such certificate, the complainant
visited the Government Dispensary at Village Orana, where he met
the accused - Dr. Hitendrasinh Vijajsinh Solanki.
2.2. It is the further case of the prosecution that the accused
visited the farm of the complainant on 10th July 1998 and applied
tags to the complainant's cows. Upon being asked about the
amount, the accused demanded Rs.300/- per cow, thereby asking
for a total Rs.1,500/- from the complainant. The complainant could
not pay this amount as he did not have it handy at the relevant
time, but he managed to pay Rs.450/-. The complainant was
advised to meet the accused after four to five days with the balance
amount to be paid by him.
2.3. In light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the
complainant approached the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) Office.
Upon receiving a formal written complaint, and completing all
requisite formalities, including preparing the panchas for the raid,
a trap was conducted by the raiding party. The complainant and
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the panchas met the accused, where he allegedly demanded and
accepted the bribe money from the complainant while issuing the
certificate to complainant. So, the accused was caught red-handed
by the Raiding Officer and after the completion of the panchnama,
he was arrested for the offences under Sections-7, 13(1)(d) and
13(2) of Corruption Act.
2.4. Upon completion of the investigation and after obtaining
sanction from the competent authority on 28th July 2000, the
accused was charge-sheeted and the Special Case was registered
against him before the Trial Court.
3. The prosecution has led the following oral and documentary
evidence in support of its case and to bring home the charges
against the accused.
Oral Evidences of Prosecution
P.W. Name and Particulars Exh.
No.
Documentary Evidences
Sr.No. Document Particulars Exh.
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connection with the trap of bribery
3. Panchnama of physical condition of the accused 22
and his detention
5. Copy of receipt given to the accused regarding 24
the items seized from them
regarding the items seized from him.
7. Copy of letter addressing the Director of Animal 36
Husbandry, Krishi Bhavan Paldi, to obtain
information regarding the record of the accused.
8. Information of the accused from the Director of 37
Animal Husbandry, Krishi Bhavan, Ahmedabad
and No. 37. Deputy Director of Animal
Husbandry, District Panchayat, Surat.
Agriculture and Cooperation Department, No.
38. Approval of the prosecution of the accused
from Gandhinagar
4. After conducting the Trial and appreciating the evidence on
record, the Trial Court has found that the prosecution has
failed to establish its case and was not able to prove the
charges beyond doubt, thereby acquitted the accused from all
the charges levelled against him.
5. I have heard learned Additional Public Prosecutor Ms. Jirga
Jhaveri for the State and Mr. Dharmendra Vijay Singh Solanki
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for the respondent. Both have taken me through various oral
as well as documentary evidence, which are on record of the
case. I have also independently examined and re-appreciated
evidence of witnesses examined by prosecution.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT-STATE
6. Learned APP Ms. Jhaveri would submit that the findings of
acquittal are contrary to law and evidence on record and the
findings recorded by the Trial Court are erroneous and based
on irrelevant material.
6.1 Learned APP Ms. Jhaveri would submit that Trial Court has
erroneously observed that accused has not demanded bribe
from complainant and erroneously came to the conclusion
that prosecution has failed to prove charges beyond doubt.
6.2 The learned APP Ms. Jhaveri would submit that the
prosecution has successfully proved the charges against the
accused by examining the complainant, the panch witness,
the raiding officer, as well as the investigating officer.
Despite overwhelming evidence on record, the Trial Court
has erroneously acquitted the accused.
6.3 The learned APP Ms. Jhaveri would further submit that the
accused had demanded and accepted a bribe from the
complainant while discharging his public duty as a veterinary
doctor; therefore, no leniency should be shown to the
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accused for committing such serious offence.
6.4 The learned APP Ms. Jhaveri would further submit that
merely because the complainant had not actually availed the
loan or, as the case may be, the insurance for which the
tagging certificate was required, cannot be a ground to
acquit the accused by giving him the benefit of the doubt.
6.5 The learned APP Ms. Jhaveri would further submit that as per
the panchnama prepared at the scene of the offence, coupled
with the fact that the complainant, as well as panch witness-
1, have supported the case of the prosecution, thereby, the
accused could not have been acquitted.
6.6 The learned APP Ms. Jhaveri would further submit that
merely because sanction was not granted by the authority on
two occasions, but when sanction was finally granted to
prosecute the accused, the Trial Court has erroneously
granted undue benefit to the accused for not getting sanction
by the prosecution at the first instance.
6.7 Learned APP Ms. Jhaveri would further submit that merely
there are some minor contradictions in preparing
panchnama, not examining any independent witness available
during course of raid, accused would not ipso facto entitled to
get benefit as otherwise, charges are duly proved beyond
doubt.
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6.8 Thus, the reasons assigned by the learned Trial Court while
acquitting the accused are unjust, improper, perverse and
unwarranted to the facts of the prosecution case and thereby,
has committed an error in acquitting the accused. It is
further submitted that the prosecution has established the
guilt of the accused and learned Trial Court has committed
an error both on law and facts.
6.9 Thus, the learned Trial Court has wrongly recorded the order
of acquittal, which deserves to be quashed and appropriate
sentences for the offences be passed against all the accused
and he urged this Court to allow the captioned appeal.
SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT-ACCUSED
7. Per contra, learned Advocate Mr. Solanki would submit that
considering entire set of evidence on record would establish
that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges beyond
doubt, which is sine qua non to hold an accused guilty for the
commission of crime.
7.1 The learned Advocate Mr. Solanki would further submit that
the basis of demand of bribe is falsified by the evidence of the
complainant, inasmuch as the complainant had never applied
for any loan or insurance, as the case may be. Consequently,
the question of obtaining a certificate and giving any bribe to
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the accused does not arise at all.
7.2 The learned Advocate Mr. Solanki would further submit that
the prosecution has failed to prove that the accused had
demanded and accepted bribe from the complainant in the
presence of the panchas.
7.3 Learned Advocate Mr. Solanki would further submit that
there are several discrepancies remain in the evidence of
prosecution and as such, no gross error committed by Trial
Court while giving the benefit of doubt to accused while
acquitting him.
7.4 Learned Advocate Mr. Solanki would further submit that
initially, the sanctioning authority had not granted any
sanctioned; rather, it had refused sanction, which indicates
that there was no substance in the case of prosecution.
However, due to any unforeseen reason and no material on
record to show that circumstances under which the
sanctioning authority finally granted sanction to prosecute
accused would definitely benefit the accused.
7.5 The learned Advocate Mr. Solanki would further submit that
the alleged incident took place in the year 1998, whereas
sanction was granted by the authority in the year 2000,
which is too late. While from this score, the sanction obtained
by the prosecution would not be considered valid or effective.
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7.6 Learned Advocate Mr. Solanki would further submit that, as
per the documentary evidence submitted by the accused on
record, it is indicated that the accused had visited the farm of
the complainant and applied the tags on his cows on 7th July
1998 and not on 10th July 1998 as alleged by the
complainant.
7.7 Learned Advocate Mr. Solanki would further submit that the
accused had provided medicine of calcium to be fed to the
animals of the complainant, for which the complainant was
required to pay Rs.1,500/- to the accused and this fact was
confirmed by the medical bill submitted on record.
7.8 Making the above submissions, the learned Advocate Mr.
Solanki for the respondent-accused prayed for the dismissal
of the appeal.
8. Before dealing with merit of the appeal, at this stage, I would
first like to remind myself the position of law propounded by
Supreme Court of India in its various decisions, whereby it
has laid down several criteria while deciding acquittal appeal
especially in Anti-Corruption cases.
9. It would be apt to refer and rely upon the decision of the
Constitution Bench of the Honourable Supreme Court of
India in a case of Neeraj Dutta V/s. State (Govt. of N.C.T.
of Delhi) reported in (2023) 4 SCC 731, wherein it held as
under:
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"88. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is summarised as under:
88.1 (a) Proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification by a public
servant as a fact in issue by the prosecution is a sine qua non in order to
establish the guilt of the accused public servant under Sections 7 and 13 (1)
(d) (i) and(ii) of the Act.
88.2 (b) In order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution has
to first prove the demand of illegal gratification and the subsequent
acceptance as a matter of fact. This fact in issue can be proved either by
direct evidence which can be in the nature of oral evidence or documentary
evidence.
88.3 (c) Further, the fact in issue, namely, the proof of demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification can also be proved by circumstantial
evidence in the absence of direct oral and documentary evidence.
88.4 (d) In order to prove the fact in issue, namely, the demand and
acceptance of illegal gratification by the public servant, the following
aspects have to be borne in mind:
(i) if there is an offer to pay by the bribe giver without there being any demand
from the public servant and the latter simply accepts the offer and receives
the illegal gratification, it is a case of acceptance as per Section 7 of the
Act. In such a case, there need not be a prior demand by the public servant.
(ii) On the other hand, if the public servant makes a demand and the bribe giver
accepts the demand and tenders the demanded gratification which in turn is
received by the public servant, it is a case of obtainment. In the case of
obtainment, the prior demand for illegal gratification emanates from the
public servant. This is an offence under Section 13 (1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the
Act.
(iii) In both cases of (i) and (ii) above, the offer by the bribe giver and the
demand by the public servant respectively have to be proved by the
prosecution as a fact in issue. In other words, mere acceptance or receipt of
an illegal gratification without anything more would not make it an
offence under Section 7 or Section 13 (1)(d), (i) and (ii) respectively of the
Act. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Act, in order to bring home the
offence, there must be an offer which emanates from the bribe giver
which is accepted by the public servant which would make it an offence.
Similarly, a prior demand by the public servant when accepted by the
bribe giver and inturn there is a payment made which is received by the
public servant, would be an offence of obtainment under Section 13 (1)(d)
and (i) and (ii) of the Act.
88.5 (e) The presumption of fact with regard to the demand and
acceptance or obtainment of an illegal gratification may be made by a
court of law by way of an inference only when the foundational facts have
been proved by relevant oral and documentary evidence and not in the
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absence thereof. On the basis of the material on record, the Court has the
discretion to raise a presumption of fact while considering whether the fact
of demand has been proved by the prosecution or not. Of course, a
presumption of fact is subject to rebuttal by the accused and in the absence
of rebuttal presumption stands.
88.6 (f) In the event the complainant turns 'hostile', or has died or is
unavailable to let in his evidence during trial, demand of illegal
gratification can be proved by letting in the evidence of any other witness
who can again let in evidence, either orally or by documentary evidence or
the prosecution can prove the case by circumstantial evidence. The trial
does not abate nor does it result in an order of acquittal of the accused
public servant.
88.7 (g) In so far as Section 7 of the Act is concerned, on the proof of the
facts in issue, Section 20 mandates the court to raise a presumption that the
illegal gratification was for the purpose of a motive or reward as mentioned
in the said Section. The said presumption has to be raised by the court as a
legal presumption or a presumption in law. Of course, the said presumption
is also subject to rebuttal. Section 20 does not apply to Section 13 (1) (d) (i)
and (ii) of the Act.
88.8 (h) We clarify that the presumption in law under Section 20 of the Act
is distinct from presumption of fact referred to above in point (e) as the
former is a mandatory presumption while the latter is discretionary in
nature."
(emphasis supplied)
9.1 It would be also appropriate to refer and rely upon the
decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in the case of
Mallappa and Ors. V/s. State of Karnataka reported in
(2024) 3 SCC 544, wherein scope of acquittal is succinctly
discussed and elaborated held thus:-
"24. We may firstly discuss the position of law regarding the scope of
intervention in a criminal appeal. For, that is the foundation of this
challenge. It is the cardinal principle of criminal jurisprudence that there is
a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, unless proven guilty.
The presumption continues at all stages of the trial and finally culminates
into a fact when the case ends in acquittal. The presumption of innocence
gets concretized when the case ends in acquittal. It is so because once the
Trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence on record, finds that the
accused was not guilty, the presumption gets strengthened and a higher
threshold is expected to rebut the same in appeal."
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"25. No doubt, an order of acquittal is open to appeal and there is no
quarrel about that. It is also beyond doubt that in the exercise of appellate
powers, there is no inhibition on the High Court to re-appreciate or re-visit
the evidence on record. However, the power of the High Court to re-
appreciate the evidence is a qualified power, especially when the order
under challenge is of acquittal. The first and foremost question to be asked
is whether the Trial Court thoroughly appreciated the evidence on record
and gave due consideration to all material pieces of evidence. The second
point for consideration is whether the finding of the Trial Court is illegal or
affected by an error of law or fact. If not, the third consideration is whether
the view taken by the Trial Court is a fairly possible view. A decision of
acquittal is not meant to be reversed on a mere difference of opinion. What
is required is an illegality or perversity."
"26. It may be noted that the possibility of two views in a criminal case is
not an extraordinary phenomenon. The 'two-views theory' has been
judicially recognized by the Courts and it comes into play when the
appreciation of evidence results into two equally plausible views. However,
the controversy is to be resolved in favour of the accused. For, the very
existence of an equally plausible view in favour of innocence of the accused
is in itself a reasonable doubt in the case of the prosecution. Moreover, it
reinforces the presumption of innocence. And therefore, when two views are
possible, following the one in favour of innocence of the accused is the
safest course of action. Furthermore, it is also settled that if the view of the
Trial Court, in a case of acquittal, is a plausible view, it is not open for the
High Court to convict the accused by reappreciating the evidence. If such a
course is permissible, it would make it practically impossible to settle the
rights and liabilities in the eyes of law. In Selvaraj v. State of Karnataka,
2015 10 SCC 230
"13. Considering the reasons given by the trial court and on appraisal of the
evidence, in our considered view, the view taken by the trial court was a
possible one. Thus, the High Court should not have interfered with the
judgment of acquittal. This Court in Jagan M. Seshadri v. State of T.N.,
2002 9 SCC 639 has laid down that as the appreciation of evidence made by
the trial court while recording the acquittal is a reasonable view, it is not
permissible to interfere in appeal. The duty of the High Court while
reversing the acquittal has been dealt with by this Court, thus:
"9. We are constrained to observe that the High Court was dealing with an
appeal against acquittal. It was required to deal with various grounds on
which acquittal had been based and to dispel those grounds. It has not done
so. Salutary principles while dealing with appeal against acquittal have
been overlooked by the High Court. If the appreciation of evidence by the
trial court did not suffer from any flaw, as indeed none has been pointed out
in the impugned judgment, the order of acquittal could not have been set
aside. The view taken by the learned trial court was a reasonable view and
even if by any stretch of imagination, it could be said that another view was
possible, that was not a ground sound enough to set aside an order of
acquittal.""
(emphasis supplied)
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In Sanjeev v. State of H.P., 2022 6 SCC 294 the Hon'ble Supreme Court
analyzed the relevant decisions and summarized the approach of the
appellate Court while deciding an appeal from the order of acquittal. It
observed thus:
"7. It is well settled that:
7.1. While dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the reasons which had
weighed with the trial court in acquitting the accused must be dealt with, in
case the appellate court is of the view that the acquittal rendered by the trial
court deserves to be upturned (see Vijay Mohan Singh v. State of Karnataka,
2019 5 SCC 436 Anwar Ali v. State of H.P., 2020 10 SCC 166)
7.2. With an order of acquittal by the trial court, the normal presumption of
innocence in a criminal matter gets reinforced (see Atley v. State of U.P.,
1955 AIR(SC) 807)
7.3. If two views are possible from the evidence on record, the appellate
court must be extremely slow in interfering with the appeal against acquittal
(see Sambasivan v. State of Kerala, 1998 5 SCC 412)"
(emphasis supplied)
9.2 The law on the issue germen in the present appeal has also
been succinctly discussed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of
India in its recent judgment in the case of State of
Lokayuktha Police, Devanagere V/s. C. B. Nagaraj
delivered on 19th May, 2005 in Criminal Appeal
No.1157/2015 [2025 INSC 736], wherein held as under:
"25. It is pertinent to note that till 05.02.2007, when the Respondent had conducted
the physical/spot inspection, there is not even a whisper of there being any demand of
bribe. Moreover, when the Complainant went back to the Respondent's office at 5:30
PM with the money, the prosecution case itself as per the deposition of its witnesses
makes it clear that the Respondent had informed the Complainant that he had
already forwarded the concerned file. Thus, if the same is accepted, there was no
occasion for the Complainant to go ahead with paying the amount, which he claims
to be in the nature of bribe demanded by the Respondent, after the work for which the
bribe was purportedly sought, had already been done. The observation of the High
Court to this extent is correct that just because money changed hands, in cases like
the present, it cannot be ipso facto presumed that the same was pursuant to a
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demand, for the law requires that for conviction under the Act, an entire chain -
beginning from demand, acceptance, and recovery has to be completed. In the case
at hand, when the initial demand itself is suspicious, even if the two other
components - of payment and recovery can be held to have been proved, the chain
would not be complete. A penal law has to be strictly construed [Md. Rahim Ali v
State of Assam, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1695 @ Paragraph 45 and Jay Kishan v
State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 296 @ Paragraph 24]. While we will advert to
the presumption under Section 20 of the Act hereinafter, there is no cavil that while a
reverse onus under specific statute can be placed on an accused, even then, there
cannot be a presumption which casts an uncalled for onus on the accused.
Chandrasha (supra) would not apply as demand has not been proven. In Paritala
Sudhakar v State of Telangana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1072, it was stated thus:
'21. As far as the submission of the State is that the presumption under
Section 20 of the Act, as it then was, would operate against the Appellant is
concerned, our analysis supra would indicate that the factum of demand, in
the backdrop of an element of animus between the Appellant and
complainant, is not proved. In such circumstances, the presumption under
Section 20 of the Act would not militate against the Appellant, in terms of
the pronouncement in Om Parkash v. State of Haryana, (2006) 2 SCC 250:
'22. In view of the aforementioned discrepancies in the prosecution
case, we are of the opinion that the defence story set up by the
appellant cannot be said to be wholly improbable. Furthermore, it
is not a case where the burden of proof was on the accused in
terms of Section 20 of the Act. Even otherwise, where demand has
not been proved, Section 20 will also have no application. (Union
of India v. Purnandu Biswas [(2005) 12 SCC 576: (2005) 8 Scale
246] and T. Subramanian v. State of T.N. [(2006) 1 SCC 401:
(2006) 1 Scale 116])"
(emphasis supplied)
10. Thus, it is now a well-settled legal position of law that a heavy
burden is cast upon the prosecution to prove that the accused
has demanded and accepted the bribe, and the same would
have to be recovered from the accused. In a case where any
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of these ingredients are missing, the charges levelled against
the accused under Section-7 read with Section-13 would not
be attracted.
11. Now, keeping in mind the aforesaid principles laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, it is first required to be
considered as to whether the accused had demanded bribe
from the complainant or not and whether any serious error of
law was committed by the Trial Court while acquitting the
accused?
12. After analyzing and scanning the evidence on record, it
appears that there are several discrepancies remain in the
evidence of the complainant and so also the other evidence
led by the prosecution in relation to the entire episode of
demand and acceptance of bribe by the accused.
13. As per the case of the complainant, in order to avail loan from
the Agriculture Bank to purchase cows, he was required to
obtain insurance for his existing animals (cows), for which he
needed tagging certificate from veterinary doctor. It has been
admitted by the complainant in his cross-examination that no
such loan application was ever submitted by him to any bank.
Furthermore, according to the complainant, the accused had
first visited and applied tags to his cows on 10th July 1998.
Whereas, the documentary evidence submitted by the
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accused, vide its list dated 25th May 2006, whereby
submitted register of tags applied by him, would indicate that
he had applied the tags to the complainant's cows on 7th July
1998. Both these facts would give reasonable doubt in the
mind of the Court about the genuineness of the case of
complainant.
14. Further, after re-appreciating the evidence of the
complainant as well as the panch witness, it is indicated that
as such, there was no demand by the accused at the time he
was allegedly caught red-handed by the Raiding Officer. It
appears from the evidence that upon receiving the certificate
from the doctor, the complainant voluntarily gave the money
to the accused. Although the complainant requested that the
accused count the money, the accused appears not to have
counted the money. This suggests that had there been a
demand for illegal gratification on the part of the accused, he
would have specifically asked about the balance amount of
Rs.1,050/- alleged to have been required to be paid by the
complainant as bribe. However, such a demand is missing in
the present case.
15. Furthermore, it is required to be observed that given point of
time, the sanctioning authority had denied sanction on two
occasions, but later on, for any compelling reasons, granted
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his sanction. Although the sanction order is available on
record, but in absence of any oral evidence from the
sanctioning authority to clarify the aspect under which
circumstances, the sanctioning authority was fully satisfied to
grant sanction when in past it had denied it to give
reasonable apprehension that the sanction order was passed
without proper application of mind.
16. Moreover, the incident in question was taken place in the
year 1998, whereas the sanction order came in the year
2000, after a delay of around two years. This delay, coupled
with the initial refusal, casts a shadow on the validity of the
sanction under Section-19 of the Corruption Act, as held by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mansukhlal Vithaldas
Chauhan V/s. State of Gujarat reported in (1997) 7 SCC
622, as under:
"18. The validity of the sanction would, therefore, depend upon the material
placed before the sanctioning authority and the fact that all the relevant facts,
material and evidence have been considered by the sanctioning authority.
Consideration implies application of mind. The order of sanction must ex
facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and
other material placed before it. This fact can also be established by extrinsic
evidence by placing the relevant files before the Court to show that all
relevant facts were considered by the sanctioning authority. (See also
Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1958 SC 124 : 1958 SCR 762] and
State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
192 : 1991 Cri LJ 1438] .)"
"19. Since the validity of "sanction" depends on the applicability of mind by
the sanctioning authority to the facts of the case as also the material and
evidence collected during investigation, it necessarily follows that the
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sanctioning authority has to apply its own independent mind for the
generation of genuine satisfaction whether prosecution has to be sanctioned
or not. The mind of the sanctioning authority should not be under pressure
from any quarter nor should any external force be acting upon it to take a
decision one way or the other. Since the discretion to grant or not to grant
sanction vests absolutely in the sanctioning authority, its discretion should be
shown to have not been affected by any extraneous consideration. If it is
shown that the sanctioning authority was unable to apply its independent
mind for any reason whatsoever or was under an obligation or compulsion or
constraint to grant the sanction, the order will be bad for the reason that the
discretion of the authority "not to sanction" was taken away and it was
compelled to act mechanically to sanction the prosecution."
(emphasis supplied)
17. In light of the aforesaid pronouncement of law by the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India and considering the fact that the
sanctioning authority denied sanction on two occasions but
granted it after about two years, which was not properly
explained by the prosecution (either by examining the
sanctioning authority and/or any other witness), to clarify the
fact that under which circumstances, sanctioning authority
has granted sanction. According to my view, considering
peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, there
was no valid sanction obtained by the prosecution to proceed
further with the trial against the accused.
18. So, in view of the aforesaid peculiar facts, the reasons
provided and the legal principles discussed hereinabove, I am
of the considered opinion that the view taken by the Trial
Court while acquitting the accused is just and reasonable and
there is no error committed by the Trial Court while
NEUTRAL CITATION
R/CR.A/2278/2006 ORDER DATED: 06/06/2025
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acquitting the accused.
19. Thus, after overall assessment of evidence and its re-
appreciation as well as reasons assigned by learned Trial
Court, I am in complete agreement with view taken by the
Trial Court having acquitted the accused by giving benefit of
doubt.
20. Considering these set of evidences on record and in light of
the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as
reproduced/referred hereinabove, which deals with the law
on acquittal so also issue germen in the appeal, I am of the
opinion that no error has been committed by the Trial Court
while acquitting the respondent.
21. Consequently, the appeal is DISMISSED. Resultantly, the
impugned judgment and order of the trial court is hereby
confirmed. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Record
and proceedings, called for, be sent back to the concerned
Trial Court forthwith.
(MAULIK J. SHELAT, J)
Nilesh
