Gujarat High Court

Sanjaybhai Mohanbhai Dodiya vs Range Forest Officer on 9 July, 2025

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                             C/SCA/649/2020                                           JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025

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                                     IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

                                       R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 649 of 2020


                       FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


                       HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER

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                                    Approved for Reporting                          Yes             No
                                                                                     
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                                                 SANJAYBHAI MOHANBHAI DODIYA
                                                            Versus
                                                 RANGE FOREST OFFICER & ANR.
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                       Appearance:
                       MR AMAR D MITHANI(484) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
                       MR YV VAGHELA(2450) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
                       MR.DHAVAL PARMAR, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
                       RULE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 2
                       ==========================================================

                          CORAM:HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE M. K. THAKKER

                                                                Date : 09/07/2025

                                                            ORAL JUDGMENT

1. This petition is filed under Article 226 and 227 of the

Constitution of India challenging the award passed by

learned labour court, Junagadh in Reference (L.C.J.)

No.63 of 2015 dated 07.05.2019 whereby, learned

reference court has awarded the lump sum

compensation of Rs.10,000/- towards full and final

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settlement of the award.

2. The gist of the case is that the petitioner was appointed

to the post of Sweeper on 08.10.2005 on a contractual

basis, drawing monthly wages of Rs. 5,500/-. On

15.04.2015, as per the allegations made by the

petitioner, his services were terminated without

following the due procedure prescribed under the

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as

the "ID Act"). This termination was challenged before

the learned Reference Court by filing a reference,

wherein relief was sought for reinstatement along with

consequential benefits. The learned Reference Court,

upon concluding the proceedings in favour of the

petitioner and holding that there was a breach of

Sections 25(F), 25(G), and 25(H) of the ID Act, awarded

lump sum compensation instead of ordering

reinstatement. This award is now under challenge by the

petitioner through the present petition.

3. Heard learned advocate Mr.Mithani for the petitioner

and learned AGP Mr.Dhaval Parmar for the respondent.

4. Learned advocate Mr.Mithani submits that, indisputably,

the petitioner had been serving with the respondent

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employer since 2005. Allegations were made against the

petitioner regarding the recording of a video of lion cubs

in a cage, which is prohibited under the Wild Life

Protection Act, 1972. Based on this allegation, the

services of the petitioner were terminated. Learned

advocate Mr.Mithani submits that though learned

reference court did not believe the alleged misconduct

on the ground that taking a video has not been proved

through a CD as well as by producing the certificate

required under section 65(B) of the Indian Evidence Act,

and, though learned reference court has held in favour

of the petitioner with regard to section 25(F), 25(G) and

25(H) of the ID Act has awarded lump sum

compensation. Learned advocate Mr.Mithani submits

that, as on date, the work is available, and as observed

by the learned Reference Court, the said work has been

carried out through other employees while the petitioner

was not called back to work. Hence, there is a clear

breach of Sections 25(G) and 25(H) of the Industrial

Disputes Act. In the event of such a breach, the only

appropriate remedy is reinstatement. However, the

learned Reference Court has awarded only a meager

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amount as lump sum compensation. Learned advocate

Mr.Mithani has relied on the decision rendered by this

Court in the case of Rameshbhai Bhatibhai Pagi

Versus Deputy Executive Engineer in Special Civil

Application No.1443 of 2022 wherein, in an identical

situation, this Court has granted relief of reinstatement

by holding that in breach of section 25(F), 25(G) and

25(H) of the ID Act, learned labour court ought to have

awarded reinstatement rather than compensation.

Learned advocate Mr.Mithani submits that without

considering the above aspect, impugned award is

passed, hence the same is required to be set aside and

the petition deserves to be allowed.

5. On the other hand, learned AGP Mr.Parmar has

submitted that the appointment of the present petitioner

was purely contractual in nature, and the last contract,

executed on 01.12.2014, came to an end on 31.03.2015.

Learned AGP Mr.Parmar He submits that upon

completion of the said contract, and in the absence of

any further extension, particularly in light of the incident

that occurred on 09.03.2015, the petitioner's services

were terminated. Learned AGP Mr.Parmar submits that

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the contention with regard to the continuous service was

not believed by the learned reference court and it is held

that the petitioner has not completed 240 days except in

the year 2012-13 and though in the preceding year

requirement of section 25 (B) of the ID Act has not been

satisfied, learned reference court has granted lump sum

compensation. Learned AGP Mr.Parmar further submits

that since the petitioner's services were terminated

upon the expiry of a fixed-term contract, it would not

amount to "retrenchment" as defined under Section

2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act. Consequently, the provisions of

Sections 25(G) and 25(H) of the Act would not apply in

the present case. Learned AGP Mr.Parmar has relied on

the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the case of

Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation Versus

Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri reported on 2013 (14)

SCC 456 and submitted that in an identical case, Apex

Court has held that in absence of extension of contract,

the reinstatement cannot be awarded. Learned AGP

Mr.Parmar submits that as learned reference court,

without considering the evidence placed on record, has

not granted the relief of reinstatement, no interference

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is required and petition deserves to be dismissed.

6. Having considered the arguments advanced by the

learned advocate for the respective parties and on

referring the records, it emerges that the appointment

of the present petitioner was made on contractual basis

from year 2005. It is undisputed fact that the evidence

below mark 17/1 which is the muster roll as well as the

attendance register suggests that the petitioner did not

work for the period from 07.01.2006 to 06.07.2008 i.e.

around two years and six months, similarly from

07.11.2008 to 02.07.2009 i.e. around eight months,

12.09.2009 to 07.06.2010 i.e. around six months and in

the year 2010-11 for not a single day. It further emerges

from the record that, except for the year 2011-12, the

petitioner did not complete 240 days of work in any

given year, as alleged. Reference to the contractual

documents on record, marked as Exhibits 17/2 to 17/8,

reveals that the last contract was executed for a period

of four months, from 01.12.2014 to 31.03.2015..

6.1. It was the case of the respondent before the learned

Labour Court, as stated in the written statement, that

the petitioner's services were terminated upon the

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conclusion of the contract. It was also contended by the

respondent before the learned Labour Court that, prior

to the completion of the contract on 09.03.2015, an

incident was reported in the newspaper concerning the

petitioner taking a video clip of lion cubs inside the

cage. Consequently, in view of this incident and the

terms of the contract, the petitioner's contract was not

extended further. Clause 11 of the contract, produced at

Exhibit 17/8, clearly states that the contract was

temporary in nature, and upon completion of the

contract, the employee would not be entitled to any

further extension or permanency benefits. Learned

reference court has held that there is a continuous

service of 240 days, on relying on the contract for the

period of 2012-13, however, if one would refer the

provision of section 25(F) of the ID Act which suggests

the continuous service of 240 days mandates the

continuous service of 240 days in the preceding year,

then the preceding year would be for the period of 2013-

14. As per the muster roll and attendance register in the

year 2013-14, the petitioner has worked only for a

period of 180 days. In that background in the considered

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opinion of this Court, violation of section 25(F) of the ID

Act has not been provided. In addition to that when the

appointment was purely on contractual basis that would

exclude from the definition of retrenchment provided

under section 2(oo)(bb) of the ID Act. For better

understanding it is reproduced herein below:-

"2(oo) "retrenchment" means the termination by the employer of the service of a workman for any reason whatsoever, otherwise than as a punishment inflicted by way of disciplinary action but does not include-

(a)voluntary retirement of the workman; or

b)retirement of the workman on reaching the age of superannuation if the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned contains a stipulation in that behalf;

2(bb) termination of the service of the workman as a result of the non-renewal of the contract of employment between the employer and the workman concerned on its expiry or of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein; or]"

7. In the considered opinion of this Court, since the

termination of the petitioner's service was due to non-

renewal of the contract, it cannot be treated as

retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the

Industrial Disputes Act.

8. At this stage, the reference of judgment of the Apex

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Court in the case of Bhavnagar Municipal

Corporation Versus Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri

(supra) is required to be made, relevant paragraph of

the said judgment is reproduced herein below:-

"7. We are of the view that the Labour Court as well as the High Court have completely misunderstood the scope of Section 2(oo), (bb), as well as Section 25G and H of the ID Act. The contract of employment and the terms and conditions contained therein are crucial in the application of the above-mentioned provisions. Facts would clearly indicate that the respondent had worked only for 54 days in two fixed periods and on expiry of the second term his service stood automatically terminated on the basis of the contract of appointment. A reference to the contract would be useful to understand the nature of appointment of the respondent.

9. The above order was signed by the respondent and, therefore, bound by the terms and conditions of the office order. The question is, termination of the service of the respondent on the expiry of the periods mentioned above would amount to retrenchment? Facts in this case clearly show, so found by the Labour Court itself that the respondent had not worked continuously for 240 days in an year to claim the benefit of Section 25F, G and H of the ID Act. Therefore, the only question to be considered is whether termination of service of the respondent on the basis of the contract of appointment would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 25H of the ID Act so as to claim reinstatement.

12. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the respondent is entitled to the benefit of Section 25G & H,

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the same are extracted herein below:

"25G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman.

25H. Re- employment of retrenched workmen.- Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity 2[ to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re- employment and such retrenched workman] who offer themselves for re- employment shall have preference over other persons."

13. Section 25H will apply only if the respondent establishes that there had been retrenchment. Facts will clearly indicate that there was no retrenchment under Section 2(oo) read with Section 2(bb) of the ID Act. Consequently, Section 25H would not apply to the facts of the case. Similar is the factual and legal situation in the civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.5387 of 2012 as well.

14. We are sorry to note that the Labour Court, learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not properly appreciated the factual and legal position in this case. When rights of parties are being adjudicated, needless to say, serious thoughts have to be bestowed by the Labour Court as well as the High Court. For the above-mentioned reasons we allow both the appeals, set aside the

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award passed by the Labour Court and confirmed by the High Court. However, there will be no order as to costs."

9. As there is no retrenchment, the provisions of Sections

25(G) and 25(H) of the Industrial Disputes Act would not

apply, as held by the Apex Court in the aforementioned

case. However, since the State has not challenged the

impugned award, this Court is not in a position to set it

aside. In that background, this Court declines to

interfere with the impugned award.

10. The decision relied upon by the learned advocate in the