Gujarat High Court
M J Indrekar vs State Of Gujarat - Through Secretary on 9 July, 2025
Author: A. S. Supehia
Bench: A.S. Supehia
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
Reserved On : 02/07/2025
Pronounced On : 09/07/2025
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 8467 of 2011
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA Sd/-.
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI Sd/-.
=============================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
3
=============================================
M J INDREKAR
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT - THROUGH SECRETARY & ANR.
=============================================
Appearance:
MR VAIBHAV A VYAS(2896) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MS SHRUTI R. DHRUVE, AGP for the Respondent(s) No. 1
LAW OFFICER BRANCH(420) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
MR PR ABICHANDANI(102) for the Respondent(s) No. 2
=============================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE R. T. VACHHANI
CAV JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. SUPEHIA)
1. The present writ petition is filed assailing the Notification
dated 06.05.2011 passed by the respondent No.1 on the basis of the
recommendation made by the respondent No.2-Gujarat High Court,
imposing the punishment of dismissal on the petitioner under the
provision of Rule 6(8) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Disciplinary and
Appeal) Rules, 1971.
BRIEF FACTS :-
2. The petitioner was appointed as a Civil Judge (Junior Division)
and Judicial Magistrate (First Class) in 1996. Thereafter, he was
promoted to the post of Civil Judge (Senior Division) in 2005. A
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
charge-sheet dated 23.10.2008 was issued to the petitioner, while
he was serving as an Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC, Anjar,
Gandhidham, District Kachchh at Bhuj inter alia alleging that the
petitioner had granted an ex-parte mandatory injunction on
27.08.2007 to the plaintiffs (owners of the tankers) of Special Civil
Suit No.46 of 2007 despite being fully aware that a criminal
complaint filed by one Mr.Rajesh Satyanarayan Chaudhary, Manager
of Jay Ambica Oil Carriers, regarding the theft of oil from two tankers
involving such tankers, was pending. It was further alleged that the
petitioner ignored an application (at Exh.14), filed by Mr.Vivek K.
Ramchandani, Partner of M/s. Jay Ambica Oil Carriers, seeking to be
joined as a party respondent, and instead, he compelled the
defendant of Special Civil Suit No.46 of 2007, i.e., Essar Oil Limited,
to hand over possession of the tankers to the plaintiffs, vide order
dated 10.09.2007 passed below Exh.19. Thus, it is alleged that the
petitioner has committed corrupt practice and dereliction of his
duty, which tantamount to grave misconduct unbecoming of a
Judicial Officer, in violation of the provisions contained in Rule 3 of
the Gujarat Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1971.
3. The charge sheet stems out from a complaint allegedly made
by complainant - Mr.Rajesh Satyanarayan Chaudhary, Manager of
M/s.Jay Ambica Oil Carriers, who was a contractor engaged by the
Essar Company for transporting the oil.
4. A regular Departmental Inquiry (being D.I. No.13 of 2008) was
conducted. After holding the Departmental Inquiry, a report dated
31.05.2010 was submitted to the respondent no.1-Gujarat High
Court. Interestingly, the Inquiry Officer divided the statement of
imputations into four charges, giving his independent findings to
each of them.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
Charge No.1, as carved out by the Inquiry Officer from the
charge-sheet, relates to passing of an ex-parte mandatory interim
injunction order dated 27.08.2007 in favour of the plaintiffs (truck
owners) by adopting corrupt practice is proved.
Charge No.4, is interconnected to the Charge No.1, however,
the Inquiry Officer has split the same. It is proved that the petitioner
assisted the plaintiffs in obtaining possession of the tankers through
an unreasoned and casually passed ex-parte ad-interim relief order.
However, Charges No.2 and 3 were not held to be proved.
Charge No.2, independently framed by the Inquiry Officer, pertained
to the application (Exh.14) filed by Mr.Vivek K. Ramchandani,
Partner of Jay Ambica Oil Carriers for impleading him as a party
respondent. The Inquiry Officer held that the order dated
19.09.2007 passed below Exh.14 by the present petitioner
dismissing the application for joining party was correct because
there was no dispute regarding ownership of the vehicles and no
damage or compensation was claimed but, the suit was mainly filed
for such declaration against the illegal detention of the vehicles.
Charge No.3, was found to be not proved since Mr.Rajesh
Satyanarayan Chaudhary, the complainant, denied having signed
the complaint levelling the allegations, as mentioned in the charge
sheet.
5. The Inquiry Officer's report was forwarded to the Registrar
(Law and Inquiry), High Court of Gujarat. On 09.08.2010, the High
Court, on its Administrative Side, disagreed with the Inquiry Officer's
findings in respect of Charges No.2 and 3 and issued a show-cause
notice to the petitioner. The petitioner, thereafter, submitted a
detailed reply. Nevertheless, by the impugned Notification dated
06.05.2011, issued by the Legal Department on the
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
recommendation of the High Court, the petitioner was dismissed
from service with immediate effect under Rule 6(8) of the Gujarat
Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971. The said
notification is under challenge in this writ petition.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER :
6. Learned advocate Mr.Vaibhav Vyas, appearing for the
petitioner, at the outset, has submitted that the petitioner has been
victim of the illegal departmental proceedings stemming out of
vague allegations. He has submitted that the entire departmental
inquiry collapses since the charge sheet originates from a complaint
dated 30.11.2007, allegedly filed by Mr.Rajesh Satyanarayan
Chaudhary to the Vigilance Officer of Gujarat High Court alleging
corrupt practice by the petitioner in passing the orders in the civil
suit, however, during the departmental inquiry, Mr.Rajesh S.
Chaudhary has categorically denied having written or signed any
such complaint. Therefore, it is submitted that the respondent failed
to establish the authenticity and authorship of the complaint that
formed the basis of the entire inquiry. On this ground alone, it is
submitted that the entire proceedings are vitiated.
7. It is contended by the learned advocate Mr.Vyas that the
charges primarily relate to order(s) dated 27.08.2007 passed in
Special Civil Suit No.46 of 2007, filed by the tanker owners against
Essar Oil Ltd. for the release of tankers seized illegally by the
company. Learned advocate Mr.Vaibhav Vyas has further submitted
that when the interim order dated 27.08.2007 was passed, the
tankers were not in the police custody, but the criminal complaint
was under investigation as per Section 202 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (in short, "the Cr.P.C."), since the tankers were
detained by a private party and not seized under the legal authority.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
It is submitted that in these circumstances, the temporary
mandatory injunction was lawfully granted. He has submitted that
upon learning that the tankers were being detained without legal
authority, the petitioner, in good faith, issued an interim direction
that the company should not obstruct the plaintiffs from taking
custody of the tankers, and Notices were issued to the defendant-
Company, and the matter was posted for hearing on 01.09.2007. It
is further submitted that with regard to Exh.14, an application filed
by Mr.Vivek K. Ramchandani for impleading him as a party
respondent, the petitioner issued a Notice to the opposite side and
allowed them an opportunity to file a reply. It is submitted that as
no reply was filed, the right to respond was closed and on
19.09.2007, the petitioner dismissed the application by noting that
there was no dispute regarding ownership of the tankers and the
criminal case mentioned therein was still at the preliminary stage
under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C.
8. Learned advocate Mr.Vaibhav Vyas, has submitted that the
order passed below application Exh.14 was never challenged before
the higher forum, and the suit was eventually withdrawn voluntarily.
He has submitted that neither party was compelled by the petitioner
to withdraw the case. He has submitted that importantly, no
challenge was ever made to any judicial order passed by the
petitioner. He has further emphasized that all the defence
witnesses, especially the advocates, who were parties in the suit,
testified that no undue pressure was exerted by the petitioner. It is
contended that the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority
have failed to consider or analyze this evidence. It is further
submitted by learned advocate Mr.Vaibhav Vyas, that even if the
orders passed by the petitioner were deemed to be legally incorrect,
such errors do not constitute misconduct, let alone corrupt practice,
and there is no material on record to indicate lack of integrity or any
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
improper motive hence, the conclusion of the disciplinary authority
that the petitioner adopted corrupt practice is without foundation. In
support of these submissions, learned advocate Mr.Vaibhav Vyas,
has relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of P.C.
Joshi vs. State of U.P., (2001) 6 S.C.C. 491, wherein the Supreme
Court has held that the judicial mistakes do not by themselves
amount to misconduct. He has further placed reliance on the
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of K.P. Tiwari vs. State of
M.P., 1994 Supp. (1) S.C.C. 540 and has submitted that the Supreme
Court has affirmed that the judicial independence must be
protected, and erroneous decisions do not amount to misconduct
absent mala fides or corrupt motive.
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RES-HIGH COURT :
9. In response to the aforesaid submissions, learned advocate
Mr.P.R.Abichandani, appearing on behalf of respondent No.2 - the
Registrar General, High Court of Gujarat, has submitted that the
impugned order of dismissal does not warrant any interference, as
the same has been passed appropriately, having regard to the grave
misconduct committed by the petitioner. It is submitted that, in
Special Civil Suit No.46 of 2007, the petitioner granted ex-parte
mandatory relief without assigning any reasons. Subsequent to the
passing of the said order, an application came to be filed by one
Mr.Vivek K. Ramchandani, Partner of Jay Ambica Oil Carriers and
contractor of Essar Oil Limited, however, the petitioner did not pass
any order on the said application, which was filed at Exh.14, and
kept the same pending and in the meantime, on 07.09.2007, the
plaintiffs, in Special Civil Suit No.46 of 2007, filed an application at
Exh.19 seeking police assistance for execution of the order dated
27.08.2007. It is further submitted that, on 10.09.2007, the
petitioner allowed the said application at Exh.19, and subsequently,
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
on 19.09.2007, rejected the application below Exh.14 for
impleadment filed by Mr. Vivek K. Ramchandani, Partner of Jay
Ambica Oil Carriers.
10. It is submitted by learned advocate Mr.Abichandani that the
petitioner was fully aware of the entire incident at the time when
the application below Exh.14 was filed by the contractor. Despite
being made aware of such developments, the petitioner proceeded
to allow the application below Exh.19, filed by the plaintiffs, seeking
police assistance for enforcement of the order dated 27.08.2007.
11. While pointing out the tentative decision of the Disciplinary
Committee, disagreeing with the findings recorded by the Inquiry
Officer, it is submitted by learned advocate Mr.Abichandani that the
Inquiry Officer erred in exonerating the petitioner from two of the
charges. Consequently, a show cause notice dated 17.09.2010 came
to be issued to the petitioner, calling upon him to show cause as to
why he should not be held guilty of the charges which were, in fact,
found to be proved by the Inquiry Officer.
12. Learned advocate Mr. Abichandani has further submitted that
the Disciplinary Authority, upon due consideration, held the charges
to be proved and, accordingly, issued a notice dated 15.11.2012 to
the petitioner. It is submitted that a meeting of the Standing
Committee was convened on 21.12.2010, wherein the entire record
of the departmental inquiry was placed for consideration.
Thereafter, on 02.02.2011, the Standing Committee recommended
the dismissal of the petitioner from service with immediate effect,
and the matter was placed before the Full Court (Chamber) for its
approval. It is further submitted that the Full Court (Chamber)
approved the said recommendation, pursuant to which, and based
on the recommendation of the High Court, the Legal Department of
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
the State Government issued a notification dismissing the petitioner
from service.
13. It is urged by learned advocate Mr.Abichandani that the
impugned order of dismissal does not warrant interference, as the
findings recorded by the Inquiry Officer, in respect of two of the
charges, were duly considered, and the Disciplinary Authority also
independently examined the findings of the Inquiry Officer in
respect of the remaining charges, wherein the petitioner was
exonerated. Upon a comprehensive and threadbare examination of
the facts and the manner in which the petitioner passed the order in
the Special Civil Suit, it is submitted that the penalty of dismissal
cannot be said to be disproportionate to the gravity of the proved
misconduct. He has also referred to a subsequent departmental
inquiry being D.I. No.13 of 2008, which has been kept in abeyance
with a condition that in case the petitioner is reinstated, the same
will get revived. Accordingly, it is urged that the writ petition
deserves to be dismissed.
14. We have heard the learned advocates appearing for the
respective parties, at length.
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION :-
15. The petitioner, who was serving as an Additional Senior Civil
Judge and Judicial Magistrate, First Class (JMFC) at Anjar,
Gandhidham, District Kachchh - Bhuj, during the period from
21.12.2005 to 15.06.2008, was issued a charge-sheet dated
23.10.2008 under the provisions of the Gujarat Civil Services
(Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971.
16. In the statement of imputations, it is inter alia alleged that the
petitioner adopted corrupt practices and failed to maintain absolute
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
integrity by favouring the plaintiffs in Special Civil Suit No.46 of
2007. The departmental proceedings arise out of the judicial orders
passed by the petitioner in the said civil suit.
17. The relevant facts pertaining to Special Civil Suit No.46 of
2007, which have a direct bearing on the outcome of the present
case, are as under :-
(A) A criminal complaint was filed by one Mr.Rajesh S. Chaudhary,
Manager of Jay Ambica Oil Carriers - Contractor of Essar Oil Ltd.,
before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Mundra, on 03.08.2007,
which came to be registered as Criminal Inquiry No.4 of 2007.
Learned Magistrate forwarded the said complaint to Police Sub-
Inspector, Mundra, for inquiry under Section 202 of the Cr.P.C. The
complaint pertained to the illegal detention of two tankers, bearing
registration No.GJ-12-W-6009 and No.GJ-12-Y-9418, which were
transporting diesel for Essar Oil Ltd. on 10.07.2007. It was alleged
that mischief had been committed during transportation by the
drivers of both tankers, who absconded after leaving the vehicles at
the depot. The complaint was filed against the tanker owners and
drivers for shortage of high-speed diesel entrusted for
transportation.
(B) The owners (plaintiffs) of the two tankers instituted Special
Civil Suit No.46 of 2007 before the petitioner's Court on 27.08.2007,
seeking a declaration and permanent injunction for release of the
detained tankers against Essar Oil Ltd. (The charge-sheet
specifically refers that the owners, by suppressing the fact of the
criminal complaint, instituted the special civil suit).
(C) The petitioner granted an ex-parte mandatory injunction
below application Exh.5 on 27.08.2007 and issued a notice to the
defendant - Essar Oil Ltd., to show cause as to why the said
injunction should not be made absolute.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
(D) The said temporary mandatory injunction restrained the
company and its employees from obstructing the plaintiffs (owners
of the tankers) from removing the subject tankers from the custody
of the company.
(E) The returnable date of the application at Exh.5 was
01.09.2007. On the same day i.e., 01.09.2007, an application below
Exh.14 came to be filed by Mr.Vivek K. Ramachandani, Partner of Jay
Ambica Oil Carriers, and contractor of Essar Oil Ltd, for impleadment
as a party in the suit. The said Exh.14 application was kept pending
by the petitioner.
(F) On 07.09.2007, the plaintiffs filed an application at Exh.19,
seeking action against the office-bearers, Chairman, and Directors
of Essar Oil Ltd. for the alleged disobedience of the order passed by
the Court.
(G) On 10.09.2007, the petitioner passed an order below Exh.19,
directing the respondent-Company to hand over possession of the
tankers to the plaintiffs. Thereafter, on 19.09.2007, the petitioner
rejected the application below Exh.14 seeking impleadment as a
party to the proceedings.
(H) Subsequently, the suit was withdrawn by the plaintiffs.
18. It is alleged that the petitioner compelled the respondent
company - i.e., the defendant in Special Civil Suit No.46 of 2007 - to
hand over possession of the tankers to the plaintiffs (owners of the
tankers), and thereby openly assisted the plaintiffs in obtaining
possession of the seized tankers, involved in the commission of a
crime of theft of high speed diesel. It is alleged that the petitioner,
for ulterior motive, did not pass any order on Exh.14 application for
joining party.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
19. In the charge-sheet, it is alleged that by such conduct, the
petitioner is guilty of :-
(a) dereliction of duty;
(b) indulging in corrupt practices;
(c) committing the aforesaid acts of misconduct; and
(d) acting in a manner unbecoming of a Judicial Officer.
20. It was the specific case of the petitioner before the Inquiry
Officer and the Disciplinary Authorities that he never compelled the
defendants to hand over possession of the tankers, and in fact, the
order passed below Exh.19 clearly indicates that the defendants
themselves had agreed to hand over possession of the said tankers.
21. It is the case of respondent No.2 that the charge of corrupt
practice and dereliction of duty emanates from the order dated
10.09.2007. The relevant extract of the order dated 10.09.2007
passed below Exh.19 reads as under: -
"4. Thereafter, today the defendant company appeared through their
advocate and filed their reply. The defendant has stated that they did not
want to violate the order of this court. But they have detained trucks due
to request of Mundra Police Station's police. They have no intention to
disobey the order of this court and they are ready and willing to give
possession of the suit vehicles to plaintiff. I have heard Mr. F.H. Khoja Ld.
Adv. for the defendant. He stated that specific direction should be given to
Mundra Police Station's police.
5. Looking to the above facts, it is admitted fact that suit vehicles are in
possession of defendant. It is also true that the defendant has kept said
vehicles due to the Mudra Police. But he Mundra police has not taken into
their custody the said vehicles. They have not shown it as muddamal
property of criminal case which is pending before Mundra court. The
police are investigating the matter under section 202 of Cr.P.C. and they
have no power to take vehicles in custody. They have only power to
investigate and submit report, to concern court. They have submitted their
report after investigation, to Mundra Court and Mundra Court has issued
summons under section 204 of Cr.P.C. Now there is no investigation is
pending for said vehicles should be detained in custody of defendant under
the written request of police.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
6. In such circumstances, compliance of interim order is necessary at this
time and no direction is required to be given to police.
Further the defendant is ready to comply with order of this court
and ready to give possession of vehicles to plaintiff after producing proper
authority or undertaking or receipt. Then help of police is not necessary.
Hence, I pass following final order.
::ORDER::
An application for the help of police is hereby disposed of with
following direction.
The defendant is hereby directed to give possession of suit vehicles
with attached things to plaintiff or his driver or servant or authorized
person.
The plaintiff is hereby order to give receipt to defendant after
receipt of vehicles and inform to this court.
No order as to costs.
Pronounced on this 10th September 2007 in open court."
22. A bare perusal of the findings recorded in the order dated
10.09.2007 reveals that the defendant - Essar Oil Ltd. had stated on
record that it had no intention to disobey the Court's order and was
ready and willing to hand over possession of the suit vehicles. The
petitioner also heard learned advocate Mr.F.S.Khoja, who appeared
on behalf of the defendant-Company, and who, in fact, suggested
that specific directions may be issued to Mundra Police Station. In
the said order, the petitioner has categorically recorded that the
Company had kept the vehicles and the police had not taken them
into custody, nor the tankers were treated as muddamal property in
the criminal proceedings pending before the Mundra Court. It was
also recorded that the police were investigating the matter under
Section 202 of the Cr.P.C., and thus, had no authority to seize the
vehicles. The investigation report was submitted, summons under
Section 204 of the Cr.P.C. were issued, and no further investigation
was pending in respect of the said vehicles. In these circumstances,
the petitioner concluded that no directions were necessary to be
given to the police, especially since the defendant had expressed
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
readiness to comply with the Court's earlier order and willingly hand
over possession of the tankers to the plaintiffs.
23. Thus, on a plain and simple reading of the order dated
10.09.2007 passed by the petitioner, it is explicit that it does not
even remotely suggest that the petitioner has coerced the
defendant-Company, to release the oil tankers lying at their depot.
24. We may further hasten to add that the case record does not
reveal any documentary or oral evidence to suggest that the
tankers were ever in the custody of the police. Upon a specific query
raised by us to learned advocate Mr.Abichandani, appearing for
respondent No.1, to point out any evidence showing that the
vehicles were seized by the police and were in the police custody,
nothing is pointed out to us. It is also not in dispute that the
investigation was merely at the stage of inquiry under Section 202
of the Cr.P.C., and, therefore, the police had no authority to seize or
retain custody of the vehicles. The vehicles in question, having been
detained by the defendant-Company, remained in their possession.
In fact, the Company agreed to release the vehicles and to hand
over possession to the plaintiffs.
25. As a matter of fact, learned advocate Mr. Khoja, appearing for
the defendant-Company before the Court below, had agreed that
possession of the tankers may be handed over to the plaintiffs and
that appropriate directions may be issued to the police. At this
stage, we may refer to the statement of learned advocate Mr.Khoja
recorded during the course of departmental proceedings, wherein
he was examined as Defence Witness No.2. He has specifically
deposed that, while deciding Exh.19, the Court neither compelled
nor pressurized the defendant to release the vehicles, and that a
voluntary statement has been made by him to that effect. In his
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
cross-examination, he has also admitted that there was no necessity
to hear the third party (i.e. the partner of Jay Ambica Oil Carriers),
as he had no legal interest in the subject matter and the plaintiffs
were the rightful owners of the tankers. He further admitted that the
vehicles were not under detention but were merely kept at the
depot of the Company, and thus remained in its possession.
Accordingly, the findings of the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary
Authority - that the petitioner had passed the order dated
10.09.2007 to favour the plaintiffs by exerting pressure on the
defendant-Company, stands contradicted by unparallel evidence on
record.
26. In nutshell, the evidence, both documentary and oral, establish
that the tankers were seized by Essar Oil Ltd. The contractor,
M/s.Jay Ambika Oil Carriers were not the owner of the tankers. The
plaintiffs were the owners of the tankers. The dispute was between
the plaintiffs and the Company, and not with the contractor. Thus,
the course adopted by the petitioner for not passing any order on
the application at Exh.14 on 01.09.2007 filed by the Contractor for
joining party, and subsequently rejecting the same vide order dated
19.09.2007 cannot be said to be unlawful. The company has
admitted before the Court, presided by the petitioner, that the
tankers were seized by it and was lying at their depot, and the
plaintiffs were rightful owners of the tankers. Hence, in wake of
clear and unambiguous judicial order, we fail to understand as to
how and in what manner, the petitioner has indulged in corrupt
practice.
27. It is also relevant to note that although a consolidated charge
memo was issued to the petitioner, the Inquiry Officer bifurcated the
same into four separate charges, of which only two were found to be
proved. The Disciplinary Authority concurred with the findings of the
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
Inquiry Officer with respect to the grant of ex-parte mandatory
injunction, and alleged that the delinquent, while dealing with the
said application, overlooked the well-settled legal principles and
unduly favoured the plaintiffs in gaining possession of the tankers.
28. It is significant to note that the civil suit was eventually
withdrawn unconditionally by the plaintiffs, and no objection to such
withdrawal was raised by the defendants. None of the judicial orders
passed by the petitioner were ever challenged before any higher
forum, and were accepted by all parties. At the most, it may be said
that the ex-parte interim relief granted was not in strict conformity
with the legal principles, but that by itself cannot be construed as a
corrupt practice. Considering the fact that the tankers remained
parked in the depot of the defendant-Company for considerable
period, the petitioner, in the exercise of his judicial discretion,
granted the interim relief restraining the officers of the defendant-
Company from preventing the plaintiffs from removing the tankers.
As mentioned hereinabove, the company later voluntarily agreed to
release of the vehicles, which were in its possession, and not that
with the police.
29. It is further alleged and a finding in this regard was recorded
by the Inquiry Officer that the petitioner had falsely claimed that he
was unaware of the criminal proceedings relating to the tankers,
while adjourning the application at Exh.14 (for impleadment). Even
assuming that the petitioner's explanation is incorrect, such inaction
or lapse, in the absence of any concrete evidence to establish an
ulterior motive, cannot give rise to a presumption of misconduct.
Even otherwise, the dispute was between the plaintiffs-owners and
the Company, which seized the vehicles. The allegation of theft of
oil was also levelled by the Company, which ultimately agreed to
hand over the vehicles to the plaintiffs. Accordingly, this allegation
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
too cannot be regarded as a grave or serious misconduct warranting
dismissal from service.
30. While disagreeing with the Inquiry Officer, the Disciplinary
Authority observed that although the plaintiffs had not disclosed the
pendency of the criminal case relating to the vehicles in their civil
suit, it was evident that the petitioner was aware of such
proceedings when he passed the order below Exh.19 on 10.09.2007.
Thus, the conclusion of the Disciplinary Authority holding that the
petitioner committed grave misconduct by adjourning and
subsequently dismissing the application at Exh.14, is premised
exclusively on assumptions (ipse dixit).
31. Interestingly, the Inquiry Officer held that the order dated
19.09.2007, rejecting the impleadment application of M/s.Jay
Ambica Oil Carriers (Exh.14), was proper in view of the fact that
there was no dispute regarding the ownership of the vehicles, and
no relief for damages or compensation was sought. The suit was
instituted merely for a declaration against illegal detention.
However, the Disciplinary Authority disagreed with this finding and
held that the petitioner had committed misconduct by adjourning
the impleadment application. An adverse inference was drawn
merely because the suit was later withdrawn and the application
had remained undecided. The conclusion by the disciplinary
authority in this regard is also premised on surmises and
conjectures.
32. However, both the Inquiry Officer and the Disciplinary
Authority have failed to consider the deposition of the Defence
Witnesses produced by the petitioner. The most material witness -
Mr.Rajesh S. Chaudhary, the complainant, whose complaint gave
rise to the entire episode - was examined as Departmental Witness
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
No.1. The Inquiry Officer has recorded that it is not proved that the
complaint was given by Mr.Rajesh S. Chaudhary on 30.11.2007 to
the Vigilance Officer, Shri B.U.Joshi, since Mr.Chaudhary has
specifically denied of giving any complaint against the petitioner. In
his deposition before the Inquiry Officer, he has unambiguously
deposed that both tankers were in the custody of the Company. He
also confirmed that he was serving as a Clerk in the Company and
never lodged any complaint against the petitioner.
33. The following facts have emerged from the record and stand
established in favour of the petitioner : -
(i) There is not even a speck of evidence on record in the entire
disciplinary proceedings to suggest that the petitioner has, for
extraneous consideration or for any personal benefit, passed the
orders in Special Civil Suit No.46 of 2007, and also in Exh.14 and
Exh.19 applications. No material has surfaced on record to establish
that the petitioner indulged in corrupt practice or acted with an
intent to favour the plaintiffs, or that he compelled the defendant-
Company to hand over the tankers detained in their depot to the
plaintiffs.
(ii) There is no evidence on record to suggest that the tankers were
in the custody of the police, nor is there any proof to indicate that
the petitioner was aware of such custody pursuant to the filing of a
criminal complaint. On the contrary, the material placed on record
shows that the vehicles remained in the depot of the defendant-
Company and were never seized by the police as muddamal
property.
(iii) The order dated 19.09.2007 passed below Exh.14, whereby the
petitioner rejected the application filed by M/s. Jay Ambica Oil
Carriers seeking impleadment, has not been challenged by any
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
party. The Inquiry Officer has, in fact, recorded a categorical finding
that the said order was just and proper, as there was no legal
dispute between the said contractor and the plaintiffs (owners of the
tankers). Therefore, no legal or procedural error can be attributed to
the petitioner in rejecting the said application.
(iv) The order passed below Exh.19 also does not reveal, in any
manner, that the petitioner had indulged in any corrupt practice.
Rather, the learned advocate appearing for the defendant-Company
has deposed in favour of the petitioner, stating that the Company
had no objection to the tankers being handed over to the plaintiffs.
The order dated 10.09.2007 specifically records a consensual
statement made on behalf of the Company, to the extent that there
is no evidence to suggest that the petitioner compelled either the
learned advocate or the Company to part with possession of the
vehicles. Significantly, the said order has not been challenged by
any of the parties to the suit.
(v) The Special Civil Suit was later withdrawn unconditionally, and
such withdrawal was not objected to by any party, including the
contractor who had earlier sought to join the proceedings. The
entire case of the Disciplinary Authority is thus founded on nebulous
factors. The findings recorded by the Disciplinary Authority, while
disagreeing with the well-reasoned conclusions of the Inquiry Officer
with respect to two charges, are based on no persuasive evidence
and does not inspire judicial confidence.
34. We shall now refer to the exposition of law on the issue
involved.
35. The Supreme Court, in the case of Abhay Jain vs. High Court of
Judicature for Rajasthan, 2022 (13) S.C.C. 1, after survey of array of
judgements, including the decision in case of P.C.Joshi (supra),
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
rendered in the cases of the judicial officers, who have passed
wrong orders or are found negligent in passing the judicial order,
has reiterated the approach to be adopted by the High Courts in the
disciplinary proceedings. The relevant extract of the judgement is
incorporated as under:
"63 A 3-Judge bench of this court in Ramesh Chander Singh vs High Court
of Allahabad [(2007) 4 SCC 247] has specifically held that:
This Court on several occasions has disapproved the practice of
initiation of disciplinary proceedings against officers of the
subordinate judiciary merely because the judgments/orders passed by
them are wrong. The appellate and revisional courts have been
established and given powers to set aside such orders. The higher
courts after hearing the appeal may modify or set aside erroneous
judgments of the lower courts. While taking disciplinary action based
on judicial orders, the High Court must take extra care and caution.
xxxxxxxx
We fail to understand as to how the High Court arrived at a decision to
initiate disciplinary proceedings solely based on the complaint, the
contents of which were not believed to be true by the High Court. If
the High Court were to initiate disciplinary proceedings based on a
judicial order, there should have been strong grounds to suspect
officer's bona fides and the order itself should have been actuated by
malice, bias or illegality.
xxxxxxx
64 xxxxxx
65 This court in P.C. Joshi vs State of U.P. [(2001) 6 SCC 491] held that:
"That there was possibility on a given set of facts to arrive at a
different conclusion is no ground to indict a judicial officer for taking
one view and that too for alleged misconduct for that reason alone.
The enquiry officer has not found any other material, which would
reflect on his reputation or integrity or good faith or devotion to duty
or that he has been actuated by any corrupt motive. At best, he may
say that the view taken by the appellant is not proper or correct and
not attribute any motive to him which is for extraneous consideration
that he had acted in that manner. If in every case where an order of a
subordinate court is found to be faulty a disciplinary action were to be
initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will be shaken
and the officers will be in constant fear of writing a judgment so as not
to face a disciplinary enquiry and thus judicial officers cannot act
independently or fearlessly. Indeed the words of caution are given in
K.K. Dhawan case [(1993) 2 SCC 56 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 325 : (1993) 24
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
ATC 1] and A.N. Saxena case [(1992) 3 SCC 124 : 1992 SCC (L&S) 861
: (1992) 21 ATC 670] that merely because the order is wrong or the
action taken could have been different does not warrant initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer. In spite of such
caution, it is unfortunate that the High Court has chosen to initiate
disciplinary proceedings against the appellant in this case."
66 We concur with the view of this Court in the aforesaid case that merely
because a wrong order has been passed by the appellant or the action
taken by him could have been different, this does not warrant initiation of
disciplinary proceedings against the judicial officer.
67 This court in Krishna Prasad Verma vs State of Bihar [(2019) 10 SCC
640], while setting aside the High Court's order, quashed the charges
against the officer therein and granted him consequential benefits while
holding that:
"No doubt, there has to be zero tolerance for corruption and if there
are allegations of corruption, misconduct or of acts unbecoming of a
judicial officer, these must be dealt with strictly. However, if wrong
orders are passed, that should not lead to disciplinary actions unless
there is evidence that the wrong orders have been passed for
extraneous reasons and not because of the reasons on the file.
xxxxxxxx
We would, however, like to make it clear that we are in no manner
indicating that if a judicial officer passes a wrong order, then no action
is to be taken. In case a judicial officer passes orders which are
against settled legal norms but there is no allegation of any extraneous
influences leading to the passing of such orders then the appropriate
action which the High Court should take is to record such material on
the administrative side and place it on the service record of the
judicial officer concerned. These matters can be taken into
consideration while considering career progression of the judicial
officer concerned. Once note of the wrong order is taken and they
form part of the service record these can be taken into consideration
to deny selection grade, promotion, etc., and in case there is a
continuous flow of wrong or illegal orders then the proper action
would be to compulsorily retire the judicial officer, in accordance with
the Rules. We again reiterate that unless there are clear-cut
allegations of misconduct, extraneous influences, gratification of any
kind, etc., disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely on
the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the judicial officer or
merely on the ground that the judicial order is incorrect."
(emphasis supplied)
68 Furthermore, this Court has recently held in Sadhna Chaudhary (supra)
that:
"20. We are also not oblivious to the fact that mere suspicion cannot
constitute 'misconduct'. Any 'probability' of misconduct needs to be
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
supported with oral or documentary material, even though the
standard of proof would obviously not be at par with that in a criminal
trial. While applying these yardsticks, the High Court is expected to
consider the existence of differing standards and approaches amongst
different judges. There are innumerable instances of judicial officers
who are liberal in granting bail, awarding compensation under MACT
or for acquired land, backwages to workmen or mandatory
compensation in other cases of tortious liabilities. Such relief-oriented
judicial approaches cannot by themselves be grounds to cast
aspersions on the honesty and integrity of an officer.
21. xxxxxxx
24. xxxxxxx
25. Had the charge been specific that the decision-making process was
effectuated by extraneous considerations, then the correctness of the
appellant's conclusions probably would not have mattered as much.
........
26. We can find no fault in the proposition that the end result of
adjudication does not matter, and only whether the delinquent officer
had taken illegal gratification (monetary or otherwise) or had been
swayed by extraneous considerations while conducting the process is
of relevance. Indeed, many-a-times it is possible that a judicial officer
can indulge in conduct unbecoming of his office whilst at the same
time giving an order, the result of which is legally sound. Such
unbecoming conduct can either be in the form of a judge taking a case
out of turn, delaying hearings through adjournments, seeking bribes to
give parties their legal dues etc. None of these necessarily need to
affect the outcome. However, importantly in the present case, a
necessarily need to affect the outcome. However, importantly in the
present case, a perusal of the chargesheet shows that no such
allegation of the process having been vitiated has been made against
the appellant.
27. There is no explicit mention of any extraneous consideration being
actually received or of unbecoming conduct on the part of the
appellant. Instead, the very basis of the finding of 'misbehaviour' is the
end result itself, which as per the High Court was so shocking that it
gave rise to a natural suspicion as to the integrity and honesty of the
appellant. Although this might be right in a vacuum, however, given
how the end result itself has been untouched by superior courts and
instead in one of the two cases, the compensation only increased, no
such inference can be made. Thus, the entire case against the
appellant collapses like a house of cards."
Conclusion
28. xxxxxxxx
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
69 In light of the above judicial pronouncements, we hold that the
appellant may have been guilty of negligence in the sense that he did not
carefully go through the case file and did not take notice of the order of
the High Court which was on his file. This negligence cannot be treated to
be misconduct. Moreover, the enquiry officer virtually sat as a court of
appeal picking holes in the order granting bail, even when he could not
find any extraneous reason for the grant of the bail order. Notably, in the
present case, there was not a string of continuous illegal orders that have
been alleged to be passed for extraneous considerations. The present case
revolves only around a single bail order, and that too was passed with
competent jurisdiction. As has been rightly held by this Court in Sadhna
Chaudhary (supra), mere suspicion cannot constitute "misconduct". Any
'probability' of misconduct needs to be supported with oral or
documentary material, and this requirement has not been fulfilled in the
present case. These observations assume importance in light of the
specific fact that there was no allegation of illegal gratification against the
present appellant. As has been rightly held by this Court, such relief-
oriented judicial approaches cannot by themselves be grounds to cast
aspersions on the honesty and integrity of an officer."
36. The note of the preceding observations of the Apex Court, the
legal position is summarized as under: -
a) The judicial officer cannot be subjected to disciplinary
proceedings merely because judgments/order passed by
him/her are wrong.
b) If the High Courts were to initiate disciplinary
proceedings based on a judicial order, there should have
been strong grounds to suspect officer's bona fides and
the order itself should have been actuated by malice,
bias or illegality.
c) In case a judicial officer passes orders which are against
settled legal norms but there is no allegation of any
extraneous influences leading to the passing of such
orders then the appropriate action which the High Court
should take is to record such material on the
administrative side and place it on the service record of
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
the judicial officer concerned, and can be taken into
consideration while considering career progression of
the judicial officer concered.
d) Unless there are clear-cut allegations of "misconduct",
extraneous influences, gratification of any kind, etc.,
disciplinary proceedings should not be initiated merely
on the basis that a wrong order has been passed by the
judicial officer or merely on the ground that the judicial
order is incorrect, or the judicial officer has been
negligent in ignoring any fact. The allegations of
extraneous influences, corrupt practice are required to
be proved by persuasive evidence, and not on surmises
and conjectures.
e) Mere suspicion cannot constitute "misconduct". Any
'probability' of misconduct needs to be supported with
oral or documentary material, even though the standard
of proof would obviously not be at par with that in a
criminal trial. While applying these yardsticks, the High
Court is expected to consider the existence of differing
standards and approaches amongst different judges.
f) Mere suspicion cannot constitute "misconduct". Any
'probability' of misconduct needs to be supported with
oral or documentary material, more particularly when,
there was no allegation of illegal gratification against the
judicial officer.
g) If in every case where an order of a subordinate court is
found to be faulty a disciplinary action was to be
initiated, the confidence of the subordinate judiciary will
be shaken and the officers will be in constant fear of
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
writing a judgment so as not to face a disciplinary
enquiry and thus such approach will have a deleterious
effect on their independence and boldness.
37. On the issue of departmental inquiry stemming out of a
complaint and the legal evidence to be adduced by the Inquiry
Officer in the inquiry proceedings, we also refer to the recent
decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Maharana Pratap Singh
vs. State of Bihar, 2025 INSC 554 :-
"42. We do not consider that the Inquiry Officer was justified in the
approach he adopted while conducting the inquiry. Findings had to
be returned by him neither on his ipse dixit nor surmises and
conjectures but on the basis of legal evidence. A Constitution Bench
of this Court, speaking through Hon'ble P.B. Gajendragadkar, J.,
in Union of India v. H.C. Goel AIR 1964 SC 364 pointed out that in
carrying out the purpose of rooting out corruption, mere suspicion
should not be allowed to take the place of proof even in domestic
enquiries. Although technical rules which govern criminal trials in
courts may not necessarily apply to disciplinary proceedings,
nevertheless, the principle that in punishing the guilty scrupulous
care should be taken to see that the innocent is not punished,
applies as much to regular criminal trials as to disciplinary enquiries
held under statutory rules. This has, thus, been the well-settled
position of law for decades and bearing such law in mind, we have
no hesitation to hold that the reason for which the Inquiry Officer
doubted the version of PW-2 in his cross-examination was not
available to be assigned without first returning a finding attributing
the fault for the delay to the appellant.
43. At this juncture, it is imperative to further underline that the
chargesheet against the appellant was issued based on the written
complaint of the informant. Law is again clear to the effect that
mere production of a document does not constitute proof. If
chargesheet is issued on the basis of a written complaint, the
author/complainant has to be produced. The decision of this Court
in Bareilly Electricity Supply Co. Ltd. vs. Workmen & Ors.30 is an
authority for this proposition. Notably, in the instant case, the
informant/complainant had not been examined. This, we hold is one
other glaring error in the decision-making process."
38. The foregoing authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme
Court, when applied to the facts of the present case, lead to only
one inescapable conclusion--that the impugned order of dismissal is
not founded on any legally admissible evidence and rests entirely on
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
the ipse dixit, conjectures, and surmises of the Disciplinary
Authority. In fact, this is a classic case of no evidence. None of the
parties to the proceedings were aggrieved by the orders passed by
the petitioner in the discharge of his judicial functions. However, we
may add a caveat, that the accusation of extraneous consideration
or corrupt practice emerging from anonymous complaint cannot be
ignored merely because all the parties to the proceedings have
accepted the decision of the Court. There may be cases, where the
parties to the proceedings may have acted in sync or in connivance
to obtain an order, and none of them may take risk to challenge the
order/decision. In such cases, the High Court cannot remain mute
spectator, and allow the misconduct to be perpetuated by sitting
idle on any complaint even anonymous, if the allegations prima
facie appear to be true. In the present case, we do not find these
elements emerging from the evidence. The Apex Court has held
that mere suspicion should not be allowed to take the place of proof
even in domestic inquiries.
39. Thus, after scaling the merits of the matter upon an overall
evaluation of the material on record, and having regard to the
settled principles of law as enunciated by the Supreme Court, we
are of the considered opinion that the initiation of disciplinary
proceedings, the findings in this regard, and impugned order of
dismissal, are unsustainable in law, and demands interference by
this Court.
40. However, it appears that at the relevant time, the petitioner was
also subjected to another Departmental Inquiry being D.I. No.12 of
2008, wherein it is alleged that he had taken Rs.1,50,000/- from the
builder and dismissed Civil Suit No.13 of 2001 instituted by the
victim of earthquake. The inquiry was closed by the respondent no.2
vide a decision dated 21.06.2011 with a clear understanding that, if
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
the petitioner is reinstated to the original post on the basis of any
order passed by the competent court, then, in that case, the
departmental proceedings will stand revived. It is settled legal
precedent, that in case, the delinquent is issued two different
charge sheets, and if he is dismissed after holding inquiry in one of
the charge-sheets; the inquiry in other charge-sheet has to be kept
in abeyance, and in the eventuality of relationship of the employer-
employee of being restored, in view of setting aside of the dismissal,
it is always permissible to proceed with the inquiry relating to
another charge-sheet. (Vide State of Maharashtra vs. Vijay Kumar
Aggarwal, 2014 (13) S.C.C. 198).
: FINAL ORDER :
41. We declare that the disciplinary proceedings initiated and
concluded vide charge-sheet dated 23.10.2008 against the
petitioner as unfair and unjust. As a sequel, we quash and set aside
the Notification dated 06.05.2011 imposing the punishment of
dismissal under Rule 6(8) of the Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline
and Appeal) Rules, 1971. Further directions are issued as under:
a) Respondent no.2 is directed to reinstate the petitioner as an
Additional Senior Civil Judge and JMFC and issue posting order
at any place, which may include the last place from where he
was dismissed. The petitioner shall not insist to be posted on
a particular place of his choice;
b) The Departmental Inquiry being D.I. No.12 of 2008 shall be
revived, and shall be continued from the stage, it was kept in
abeyance/ or closed;
c) Since both the charge-sheets (i.e. D.I. No.12 of 2008 and D.I.
No.13 of 2008) were co-extensive, the conferment of the
consequential benefits, on account of setting aside of the
dismissal order passed in D.I. No.13 of 2008, is made subject
to further orders, which may be passed in D.I. No.12 of 2008;
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/8467/2011 CAV JUDGMENT DATED: 09/07/2025
undefined
d) The petitioner is ordered to be reinstated for the purpose of
facing D.I. No.12 of 2008. It will be open for the respondent
no.2 to pass an order for reviving the Departmental Inquiry
D.I. No.12 of 2008 and any further order, if necessitated, may
be passed. Appropriate order of reviving D.I. No.12 of 2008
shall be passed within a period of 06 (six) weeks from the
date of receipt of the writ of the order of this Court;
e) In case, the respondent no.2 orders revival of D.I. No.12 of
2008, the same shall be completed expeditiously. The
petitioner shall fully co-operate with the said disciplinary
proceedings.
f) The petitioner shall be reinstated within a period of 06 (six)
weeks from the date of receipt of the writ of the present
order.
42. The writ petition is PARTLY ALLOWED. Rule is made absolute
to the aforesaid extent.
Sd/- .
(A. S. SUPEHIA, J)
Sd/- .
(R. T. VACHHANI, J)
MAHESH/1
