[Cites 8, Cited by 0]
Gujarat High Court
State Of Gujarat vs Vikrambhai Keshavbhai Patel on 5 December, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1008 of 2000
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
✔
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STATE OF GUJARAT
Versus
VIKRAMBHAI KESHAVBHAI PATEL & ORS.
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Appearance:
MR. ROHAN SHAH, ADDITIONAL PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the
Appellant(s) No. 1
MR. DAXAY PATEL FOR MR BHARAT T RAO(697) for the
Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 1,3
MR JV JAPEE(358) for the Opponent(s)/Respondent(s) No. 2
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
and
HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL
Date : 05/12/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
(PER : HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P. M. RAVAL)
The State has preferred the present appeal under the
provisions of Section 378(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 against the judgment and order dated 22nd August, 2000 of
acquittal passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge,
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Himmatnagar, camp at Modasa in Sessions Case no. 48 of 1999,
whereby the original accused came to be acquitted of all the
charges.
2. The case of the prosecution, in nutshell, is to the effect that
the deceased-Jigna was married with original accused
No.1/respondent No.1 herein approximately three years prior to
the date of incident, i.e. 17.01.1999. The respondent No.2 herein is
mother-in-law of the deceased, whereas respondent No.3 herein is
sister-in-law of the deceased. A child was born out of the said
wedlock namely Shrushti. Deceased Jigna was a teacher. Accused
No.1 was also a teacher. It is worth noting that the respondent
No.3 herein, i.e. sister-in-law of the deceased and sister of accused
No.1 is also a teacher. The father of the deceased and mother of
the deceased are also teachers. The marriage between the
deceased and the accused No.1 was solemnised at village Bayad.
After marriage, deceased Jigna was residing with her in-laws,
whereas the complainant used to reside at village Dhansura. At the
time of incident, the deceased was residing at village Dukhadi at
Devgadh Baria and was working as a primary teacher in that
village, whereas the accused No.1 was serving as a primary school
teacher in Saloni Primacy School, Taluka Sankheda, District
Vadodara. That the accused persons used to exert pressure upon
the deceased for bringing Rs. 50,000/- and that the accused No.1
used to beat the deceased demanding dowry and also used to inflict
cruelty, whereas accused Nos. 2 and 3 used to instigate the
accused No.1 for doing so.
3. It is the further case of the prosecution that to save the
married life of the deceased, an amount of Rs. 50,000/- was paid to
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the accused persons by the complainant and Bhalubhai. That
accused No.3 also pressurised the deceased for a Maruti car to be
given to the accused No.1. Since the complainant did not have any
money, did not succumb to the demands. It is also the further case
of the prosecution that the deceased was driven away from the
house and was asked to return only when she would come with
money. Thus, it is alleged that the deceased Jigna was physically
and mentally harassed by the accused persons and that during the
marriage life of three years, deceased was also inflicted injuries on
her private parts, for which treatment was taken at Bayad. It is
also the case of the prosecution that on 16.01.1999, deceased Jigna
informed his father on telephone that all the accused persons were
meeting her cruelty and were also beating her, and were also
demanding a Maruti car and for that purpose, she does not wish to
live any more and that on 17.01.1999, deceased alongwith her
daughter Shrushti left for her service in a bus from Modasa to
Pavagadh and at that time, Rameshbhai was present at the bus
stand before whom the deceased cried a lot and also informed that
he is not going to live any more and that he would not be able to
see her face and on the same date at about 1.30 pm at noon, the
complainant came to know that the bus in which Jigna was
travelling met with an accident and that she sustained injuries. On
hearing the said news, the mother, father and other relatives went
to the hospital at Balasinor, but could not find the deceased and
thus, went to Sevaliya hospital, where they saw dead bodies of
their daughter and Shrushti. That the complainant thereafter came
to know that her daughter Jigna had committed suicide by jumping
into the river. Seeing the dead bodies of her daughter Shrushti, he
fell unconscious. Pursuant to which, the complainant came to be
lodged before the Thesara police station, which came to be
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registered before the Bayad police station as CR(I) 8 of 1999.
4. After investigation, the chargesheet came to be filed before
the concerned jurisdictional Magistrate and having found that the
case is sessions triable, the Magistrate committed the same before
the concerned Sessions Court, which came to be numbered as
Sessions Case No. 48 of 1999.
5. Plea was recorded. Accused denied the charges and prayed
for trial. After framing of charges and completion of trial, learned
Sessions Judge recorded the statement of accused persons under
Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code and after hearing the
learned advocates for the respective parties, passed the impugned
judgment and order of acquittal. Hence, the present appeal.
6. Learned APP Mr. Rohan Shah appearing for the appellant
State would submit that the prosecution has proved its case beyond
reasonable doubt; that the alleged incident took place within seven
years of marriage span and the learned Judge ought to have
presumed as per the provisions of Section 113B of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 that the deceased was subject to cruelty; that
the Trial Judge has failed to appreciate the evidence of the
complainant namely Dhirubhai Patel, father of the deceased, who
has been examined at Exh. 20, of Shardaben Dhirubhai, mother of
the deceased, who has been examined vide Exh. 24 and of
Bhalubhai vide Exh. 33. Since all the three witnesses of the
prosecution have fully supported the case of the prosecution and
stated in their deposition that the deceased Jigna was subject to
cruelty by respondents on petty matters ; that the prosecution has
also proved its case beyond reasonable doubt that the deceased
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Jigna was subjected to cruelty on account of demand of Rs. 50,000/-
and also for the purpose of Maruti car from the deceased, however,
the Trial Judge has committed grave error in not believing the said
testimonies on the ground that there are no documentary evidences
to prove the aforesotated allegations; that the trial judge ought to
have appreciated that it was not possible for the prosecution to
bring on record any documentary evidence with regard to demand
of dowry or payment of Rs. 50,000/- or even for the demand of
Maruti car. However, from the deposition of these three witnesses,
prosecution proved the factum of payment of Rs. 50,000/- towards
dowry demand. That the Trial Judge has committed committed
serious error in holding that incident has taken place on
17.01.1999 and the complaint came to be lodged on 26.01.1999.
Thus, there was delay in filling the complaint, which is totally
erroneous because the complainant in his deposition clearly
deposed that there was mental disturbance due to death of his sole
daughter aged 22 years, the trial court ought not to have given
weightage to such delay. That the Trial Judge has also committed
an error in holding that the present case is a suicidal death. More
particularly, the Trial Judge has failed to appreciate the letters Exh.
26 and 27 which clearly indicated the deceased was subjected to
cruelty, which also gets corroborated by deposition of Parulben,
examined at Exh. 25.
7. To butress his arguments, learned APP has relied on the
decision of the Apex Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v/s. Janved
Singh [2025 (0) AIJEL-SC 76006].
8. Finally, it is argued that the prosecution having proved its
case beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court has committed
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serious error in acquitting all the accused persons and hence,
prayed to allow the present appeal.
9. Learned advocate Mr. Daxay Patel appeared for the learned
advocate Mr. B.T.Rao for the respondents, to submit that the Trial
Court has committed no error whatsoever in appreciating oral as
well as documentary evidences, since the Trial Judge has given
cogent and convincing reasons after appreciating both the oral and
documentary evidences available on record, and that the
prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt,
more particularly with regard to demand of dowry as also to the
cruelty mentally or physically, as alleged. Under such
circumstances, when the prosecution has failed to prove the basic
fundamental foundational facts to prove the demand of dowry, the
Trial Court not relying upon the section 113B of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872 is perfectly in accordance with law and does
not require interference at the ends of this Court and has prayed
for rejection of the present appeal.
10. Heard the learned advocates for the respective parties.
11. We have perused the impugned judgment and order dated
22.08.2000. We have also perused the depositions of the
complainant Dhirubhai Patel at Exh. 20, Shardaben Dhirubhai at
Exh. 24, Parulben at Exh. 25 and Bhalubhai at Exh. 33, who are
considered as material witnesses to prove the case of the
prosecution. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the
factum of deceased having died because of culpable homicide is not
in dispute and therefore, we do not find it necessary to discuss in
detail with regard to the deposition of Doctor, who has carried out
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the post-mortem of both the deceased Jigna and her daughter
Shrushtiben.
12. As far as the allegations of cruelty either physically or
mentally by the accused persons is concerned, we are in agreement
with the findings recorded by the Trial Judge, more particularly
when independent witnesses Parulben has been examined vide
Exh. 25 and has also placed on record letters written by her to the
deceased. However, none of these documents reflect anything to
suggest an iota of evidence with regard to any cruelty mentally or
physically meted out to the deceased. It is also worth noting that
vide Exh. 23, the deceased had written a letter dated 17th
September, 1998 to the respondent Nos.3/original accused No.3,
which on the contrary reflects a total different story than what has
been projected by the prosecution. It is also worth noting that the
person who has seen Jigna committing suicide, has also not
supported the case of the prosecution. It is also worth noting that
PW/8 namely Rameshbhai who has been examined vide Exh. 32 and
who is a close relative of the complainant Dhirubhai Patel, has also
not supported the case of the prosecution about the payment of
demanded dowry amount of Rs. 5000, more particularly when no
specific time, date or period is coming on record and there are
merely bare statements that the complainant had given a sum of
Rs. 50,000/- somewhere during the Diwali period, that too also in
which year is not coming on record. As far as the allegations of
cruelty, mental or physical, is concerned, not an iota of evidence
has come on record except the bare statements of witnesses, not
supported by any independent witness. It is pertinent to note at
this juncture that the deceased and accused No.1 were staying
separately at two different places and they used to meet each other
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only in the weekends. Considering the depositions of the
witnesses in its entirety, we are of the considered opinion that the
Trial Court has not committed any error whatsoever in acquitting
the accused persons.
13. Another glaring lacunae which the prosecution has failed to
explain is with regard to late lodging of the FIR. The incident is of
17.01.1999 whereas, the FIR-in-question came to be lodged on
26.01.1999, i.e. almost after a period of more than one week from
the date of alleged incident, for which no plausible explanation has
come on record, except a bare statement that the complainant was
unconscious without there being any concrete evidence to that
effect. Under the circumstances, the trial Court having not
believed the case of the prosecution, does not require interference.
14. At this stage, it is profitable to refer to the judgment of the
Apex Court in the case of State of Uttarakhand v/s. Sanjay Ram
Tamta @ Sanju@Prem Prakash [2025 (0) AIJEL-SC 74719],
wherein in paragraph No.8, the Supreme Court has, thus, held :-
"That the death was suicidal is very clear from the expert evidence,
which however would not absolve the accused under Section 304B
of the I.P.C. This Court in Surender Kumar Singh Vs. State of U.P.,
(2009) 17 SCC 243 considered the effect of Section 113B of the
Evidence Act on Section 304B of the I.P.C. It was held that Section
304B of the I.P.C. presupposes several factors for its applicability,
which are; (i) the death of a woman caused by burns or bodily
injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances; (ii) such
death having occurred within seven years from the date of the
marriage; (iii) soon before her death, the woman having been
subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative
of her husband and (iv) such cruelty or harassment being in
connection with the demand of dowry. It was, categorically held
that if one of the ingredients is absent, the presumption under
Section 113B of the Evidence Act would not be available to the
prosecution and the onus of proof would not shift to the defense."
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15. In view of the aforesaid, when the prosecution has failed to
prove the ingredients of demand of dowry as well as meeting out of
cruelty, presumption under Section 113B, cannot be drawn.
16. As far as the reliance placed by the learned APP on the
decision of the Apex Court in Janved Singh (supra) is concerned,
it would be evident from the reading of the said judgment that from
the statements of the parents of the deceased, the prosecution
tried to prove that the accused persons used to beat the deceased
and demand of dowry. However, from the evidence adduced by the
prosecution in the said case, it has established the complete chain
of circumstances, namely un-natural death of the deceased, which
was not accidental but homicidal as established from the medical
evidence. Under such circumstances, the Apex Court held that the
findings recorded by the High Court reversing the judgment and
order of the trial court, suffers from serious infirmity. However,
considering the facts in hand, the prosecution having miserably
failed to prove the basic ingredients of offence of cruelty, mental or
physical, the cited case is of no help to the appellant State.
17. In the case of Constable 907 Surendra Singh & Anr. v/s.
State of Uttarakhand [(2025) 2 SCR 239], with regard to scope
of interference in an appeal against acquittal, the Apex Court
observed and held in paragraph No.11 and 12 as under :-
"11. Recently, in the case of Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and
others v. State of Karnataka6, a Bench of this Court to which one of
us was a Member (B.R. Gavai, J.) had an occasion to consider the
legal position with regard to the scope of interference in an appeal
against acquittal. It was observed thus:
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"38. First of all, we would like to reiterate the principles laid down
by this Court governing the scope of interference by the High Court
in an appeal filed by the State for challenging acquittal of the
accused recorded by the trial court.
39. This Court in Rajesh Prasad v. State of Bihar [Rajesh Prasad v.
State of Bihar, (2022) 3 SCC 471 : (2022) 2 SCC (Cri) 31]
encapsulated the legal position covering the field after considering
various earlier judgments and held as below : (SCC pp. 482-83, para
29)
"29. After referring to a catena of judgments, this Court culled out
the following general principles regarding the powers of the
appellate court while dealing with an appeal against an order of
acquittal in the following words : (Chandrappa case [Chandrappa v.
State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 325] ,
SCC p. 432, para 42)
'42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following
general principles regarding powers of the appellate court while
dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:
(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and
reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is
founded.
(2) The Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction
or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on
the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on
questions of fact and of law.
(3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling
reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong
circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc.
are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in
an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the
nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of
an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the
power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own
conclusion.
(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of
acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused.
Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the
fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person
shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a
competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his
acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced,
reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court.
(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the
evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the
finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.' "
40. Further, in H.D. Sundara v. State of Karnataka [H.D. Sundara v.
State of Karnataka, (2023) 9 SCC 581: (2023) 3 SCC (Cri) 748] this
Court summarised the principles governing the exercise of appellate
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jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under
Section 378CrPC as follows : (SCC p. 584, para 8)
"8. ... 8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the
presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal,
is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal,
after reappreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether
the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have
been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot
overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was
also possible; and
8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal
only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be
recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt
of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other
conclusion was possible."
41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of
interference by an appellate court for reversing the judgment of
acquittal recorded by the trial court in favour of the accused has to
be exercised within the four corners of the following principles:
41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;
41.2. That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider
material evidence on record; and
41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view
consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the
evidence available on record."
12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the
interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned
trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the
judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same
is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on
record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the
view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the
evidence available on record.
18. It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeals, the
appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give
fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below
are found to be just and proper. Such a principle is laid down by
the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v/s.
Hemareddy (AIR 1981 SC 1417), wherein it is held as under :-
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"......This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi v. Bigendra
Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93 : (AIR 1967 SC 1124) that it is
not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the
narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the
trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given
by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily
suffice."
19. Considering the set of evidences on record as discussed
hereinabove, we are of the opinion that no error has been
committed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Himmatnagar,
camp at Modasa in Sessions Case no. 48 of 1999 (Trial Court) while
acquitting the respondents-accused persons, much less we do not
find any patent perversity or misreading or omission to consider
the material evidence on record. We also in line of the judgment of
the Apex Court in Hemareddy (supra), do not deem it fit to
reiterate the reasons given by the trial court, however, are in
complete agreement with the reasonings assigned by the trial court
while arriving at the decision of acquittal.
20. This appeal is found meritless, accordingly DISMISSED.
Resultantly, the impugned judgment and order of the Trial Court is
hereby confirmed.
21. Bail bond, if any, shall stand cancelled. Record and
proceedings, be sent back to the concerned Trial Court forthwith.
22. At this juncture, Mr. Daxay Patel would submit that the
accused No.2/respondent No.2 herein has expired. Be that as it
may. When this Court is concurring with the findings recorded by
the trial court, no purpose would be served calling for the report
from the police to verify the death of the respondent No.2/original
accused No.2.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J)
(P. M. RAVAL, J)
C.M. JOSHI
