Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 8728 Guj
Judgement Date : 4 December, 2025
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C/FA/2806/2006 JUDGMENT DATED: 04/12/2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/FIRST APPEAL NO. 2806 of 2006
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVAN M. DESAI
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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REGIONAL DIRECTOR
Versus
XAVIER NOYAL AUGUSTAIN FERNAN-DES
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Appearance:
MR HEMANT S SHAH(756) for the Appellant(s) No. 1
MR SUBRAMANIAM IYER(2104) for the Defendant(s) No. 1
RULE SERVED for the Defendant(s) No. 1
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE DEVAN M. DESAI
Date : 04/12/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. The present Appeal is filed under Section 82(2) of the
Employee's State Insurance Act, 1948 (hereinafter, referred to as
'the ESI Act'), by the appellant - original opponent, challenging the
judgment and order dated 20.10.2005 passed by Employee's State
Insurance Court, Vadodara, in ESI Second Appeal No.2 of 2002.
2. Heard learned advocate Mr. Hemant Shah for the appellant
and learned advocate Mr. Subramaniam Iyer for the respondent.
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3. The brief facts of the case are as under:
3.1 The employee, Noyal Augastain Fernandes was
working at Alembic Glass Industries Ltd., Vadodara since
last 20 years. In the spice department, where the employee
was working, Soda Ash, Silica Sand, Quartz Sand, Feldspar,
Lime Stone, Dolomite, etc. were being filtered. Its particles fly
in large quantities in the air. This particles entered the lungs
of the employee. Due to which the employee developed a
disease called silicosis. The Medical Board of the appellant
assessed disability at 10%. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied
by the decision of the Medical Board, the employee filed the
Second Appeal under Section 54(a) and Section 55 of the
Act and asserted that the disability be assessed at 100%, as
there is no medicine for silicosis disease and he has been
suffering from such disease. The appeal was filed with an
application for condonation of delay, being Misc. Application
(ESI) No.5 of 2000. Pending Application for condonation of
delay, Noyal Augustain Fernandes expired and therefore, the
learned ESI Court directed the heirs of deceased employee
to be impleaded as appellants within thirty days. Delay was
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condoned by the learned ESI Court on 05.09.2002. The
present respondent, Xavier Noyal Augustain Fernandes, was
impleaded in the appeal as appellant - as dependant of
original appellant. The Corporation contested the appeal by
filing reply and denied the liability. The denial of liability was
mainly based upon a ground, that, the deceased - employee
has died on 04.11.2000, and the appeal is preferred by
Xavier Noyal Augustain Fernandes on 09.12.2002. The
appeal is filed by a person who is not falling within the
definition of dependant as defined under the ESI Act. After
hearing the parties, the learned ESI Court allowed the appeal
and assessed disability of deceased, Noyal Augustain
Fernandes, at 100%.
3.2 Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and
order, the Corporation has filed the present appeal.
4. Learned advocate for the appellant contended that the injury
sustained to the deceased - employee is in the year 1988, and
assessment of disability by Medical Appellate Tribunal was
completed on 03.11.1989. Deceased - employee ought to have
filed an application in accordance with Rule 20-B of the
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Employee's State Insurance (Central) Rules, 1950 (hereinafter,
referred to as 'the ESI Rules'). The period of limitation to appeal to
the ESI Court is three months from the date of communication of
the decision of the Medical Board or the Medical Appeal Tribunal.
The employee preferred an appeal before the learned ESI Court in
the year 2002, and therefore, it is time-barred. It is contended that
Section 77 of the ESI Act, prescribes period of limitation of three
years from the date on which the cause of action arose. It is
contended that when the appeal was filed, the deceased -
employee had already expired and the present respondent, so-
called, adopted son, does not fall within the definition of dependant
as contemplated under Section 2(6A) of the ESI Act which is
reproduced hereunder:
[(6A) "dependant" means any of the following relatives of a deceased insured person, namely:--
[(i) a widow, a legitimate or adopted son who has not attained the age of twenty-five years, an unmarried legitimate or adopted daughter,] [(ia) a widowed, mother;]
(ii) if wholly dependent on the earnings of the insured person at the time of his death, a legitimate or adopted son or daughter who has attained the age of [twenty-five years] and is infirm;
(iii) if wholly or in part dependent on the earnings of the insured person at the time of his death,--
(a) a parent other than a widowed mother,
(b) a minor illegitimate son, an unmarried illegitimate daughter or a daughter legitimate or adopted or illegitimate if married and a minor or if widowed and a minor,
(c) a minor brother or an unmarried sister or a widowed sister if a minor,
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(d) a widowed daughter-in-law,
(e) a minor child of a pre-deceased son,
(f) a minor child of a pre-deceased daughter where no parent of the child is alive, or
(g) a paternal grand-parent if no parent of the insured person is alive;"
The definition of dependant, as contemplated under the
aforesaid provision means, adopted son who has not attained the
age of 25 years. In the present case, the so-called, adopted son,
was aged about 40 years on the date of deposition. The following
substantial questions of law have been proposed by learned
advocate for the appellant for consideration:
(A) Whether the heirs of the deceased injured person can file an application for enhancement of disability assessed by Medical Appellate Tribunal in view of Section 54 A(2) of ESI Act?
(B) Whether the applicant is entitled to file such application after a prescribed period of limitation contrary to Rules 20-B of ESI Rules?
(C) Whether the question of estoppel will be applied?
Except above, no other submissions were canvassed by
learned advocate for the appellant.
5. Per contra, learned advocate for the respondent, original
appellant, has supported the judgment and order. Learned
advocate for the respondent has placed on record a certified copy
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of the order dated 05.09.2002, passed by the learned ESI Court in
Misc. Application (ESI) No.5 of 2000, which is taken on record.
Learned advocate for the respondent contended that the
employee, Noyal Augustain Fernandes, had preferred the appeal
with an application for condonation of delay. However, during the
pendency of the application, the employee died on 04.11.2000.
Pursuant to the order passed by the learned ESI Court on
05.09.2002, the present respondent was impleaded as appellant in
the aforesaid application. It is further contended that the order
dated 05.09.2002, condoning delay and, directing the present
respondent to be impleaded as appellant was never assailed by
the Corporation. It is further contended that the original application
for condonation of delay with a memo of appeal was filed by the
employee, Noyal Augustain Fernandes himself, and, pending the
proceedings, employee expired. Being a dependant of deceased,
Xavier Noyal Augustain Fernandes was impleaded as appellant.
Therefore, it is not the case that the adopted son, Xavier Noyal
Augustain Fernandes, initiated the proceedings at the first
instance. The respondent here, is representing the estate of the
deceased and therefore, the objection raised by the Corporation
that the appeal is preferred by the respondent herein, is not
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sustainable. Except above, no other submissions were canvassed
by learned advocate for the respondent.
6. Having considered the submissions canvassed by learned
advocates for the parties, and on perusal of the record and
proceedings, the questions which are required to be addressed are
on the issues of limitation and dependency of the deceased -
employee, Noyal Augustain Fernandes. So far as other aspects of
the matter are concerned, none of the learned advocates for the
parties have submitted their submissions. So far as the question of
limitation is concerned, Section 77(1A) of the ESI Act prescribes a
period of limitation of three years and the period would start
running from the date on which the cause of action arose. Section
77(1A) of the ESI Act is reproduced hereunder:
"Section 77. Commencement of proceedings.
(1) The proceedings before an Employees' Insurance Court shall be commenced by application.
[(1A) Every such application shall be made within a period of three years from the date on which the cause of action arose. Explanation.--For the purpose of this sub-section,--
(a) the cause of action in respect of a claim for benefit shall not be deemed to arise unless the insured person or in the case of dependants' benefit, the dependants of the insured person claims or claim that benefit in accordance with the regulations made in that behalf within a period of twelve months after the claim became due or within such further period as the Employees Insurance Court may allow on grounds which appear to it to be reasonable]"
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On a meaningful reading of the aforesaid provision, though
prescribed period limitation is mentioned as three years,
explanation - (a), gives a power to allow the claim for benefits on
grounds which may appear to be reasonable to the Employees
Insurance Court. The word "shall" which has been inserted in Sub-
Section 1(A) of Section 77, therefore, is not mandatory and in
cases where the Court finds the grounds reasonable, the period of
three years may be condoned. Coming back to the question
paused before this Court, on the question of limitation and
dependency, it appears from the record that the employee, Noyal
Augustain Fernandes had assailed the order of the assessment of
10% disability arrived at by the Medical Board of the Corporation
by way of an appeal under Section 54A and 55 of the Act, along
with an application for condonation of delay, being Misc.
Application (ESI) No.5 of 2000. During the pendency of the
application for condonation of delay, the employee expired on
04.11.2000. The rojkaam of the proceedings indicate that vide
Exhibit - 5, Xavier Augustine Fernandez, present respondent, filed
an application to be impleaded as dependant - appellant in place
of original appellant. On 05.09.2002, the application of present
respondent came to be allowed and the present respondent was
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impleaded as dependant of deceased employee. The application
for condonation of delay was allowed by the learned ESI Court on
05.09.2002 with a direction to implead the heirs of deceased -
employee on record in the appeal proceedings. On scrutinizing the
record, it appears that the present respondent has not assailed the
order dated 29.07.2004 of the Medical Board of Corporation. The
present respondent being an adopted son of appellant was
impleaded as a dependant due to the pendency of the
proceedings. The present respondent was representing the estate
of deceased employee. Had the case been, the respondent, after
the death of employee, himself has initiated the appeal
proceedings with an application for condonation of delay assailing
the order of the Medical Board of the Corporation, the question of
dependency and the maintainability of the application would be
relevant and important. As noticed, the employee himself assailed
the order of Medical Board and during pendency of proceedings,
employee died.
7. Since the present appeal is assailing the question of
limitation and dependency, in my view, the learned ESI Court has
not committed any error of law in interpreting the provisions of
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Section 2(6A) of the ESI Act, as well as, Section 77(1A) of the ESI
Act read with Rule 20-B of the ESI Rules. At this stage, it would be
apposite to refer Rule 20-B of the ESI Rules, which is reproduced
hereunder:
"20-B. Appeals to Employees' Insurance Court. --
(1) The insured person or the Corporation may appeal to the Employees' Insurance Court by presenting an application within three months of the date of communication of the decision of the medical board or of the medical appeal tribunal to the insured person or the Corporation as the case may be : Provided that the Employees' Insurance Court may entertain an application after the period of three months, if it is satisfied that the appellant had sufficient reasons for not presenting the application within the said period.
(2) The rules made by the State Government in respect of the form and manner to be followed in presenting applications to the Employees' Insurance Court, shall be applicable to the applications presented under this rule."
The Rule prescribes a period of limitation of three months for
filing an appeal to Employee's Insurance Court against a decision
of Medical Board or of Medical Appeal Tribunal. Again, the proviso
to the said Rule, prescribes that the learned ESI Court may
entertain an application after the period of three months if it is
satisfied that the applicant had sufficient reason for not presenting
the application within the said period. The learned ESI Court, while
exercising its power to condone the delay, found the reasons
assigned by the applicant to be sufficient. The Corporation
accepted the order condoning the delay and is, therefore,
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estopped from contending that the appeal is time-barred under
Section 77 of the Act. Once Corporation has accepted the order of
learned ESI Court condoning delay, and respondent being
impleaded as party appellant, as dependant - adopted son of
deceased employee, the order dated 05.09.2002 has attained its
finality. And under the principle of estoppel appellant - Corporation
cannot raise a contention that application is not maintainable on
the ground of limitation and dependency. Therefore, the questions
which are proposed as substantial questions of law under Section
82(2) of the ESI Act, are not questions of law, much less,
substantial questions of law. Therefore, in my opinion, the appeal
lacks merit and the same is dismissed.
8. Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent back to the
concerned Court / Tribunal, forthwith.
9. At this stage, learned advocate for the appellant prays for
stay of the order for two months. Learned advocate for the
respondent objects.
10. Considering the submissions of learned advocates for the
parties, the request of learned advocate for the appellant, as
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prayed for, is granted. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.
(D. M. DESAI,J) MUSKAN
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