[Cites 13, Cited by 0]
Gujarat High Court
Vikramsinh Manubha Parmar vs State Of Gujarat on 4 December, 2025
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16815 of 2020
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J.SHELAT
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Approved for Reporting Yes No
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VIKRAMSINH MANUBHA PARMAR
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
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Appearance:
MS PRACHI UPADHYAY for MR VAIBHAV A VYAS(2896) for the
petitioner(s) No. 1
MS FORUM BIMAL SUKHADWALA, ASSISTANT GOVERNMENT PLEADER
for the Respondent(s) No. 1,2,3,4
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CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE MAULIK J. SHELAT
Date : 04/12/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. RULE returnable forthwith. Learned Assistant Government
Pleader Ms. Forum Bimal Sukhadwala waives service of notice
of Rule on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 to 4.
2. Heard learned Advocate Ms. Prachi Upadhyay for learned
Advocate Mr. Vaibhav A. Vyas for the petitioner and learned
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AGP Ms. Sukhadwala for the respondent Nos.1 to 4, at length.
3. With the consent of learned Advocates appearing for the
respective parties, the matter is taken up for hearing.
4. The present petition is filed under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, seeking the following reliefs:
"(A) Quash and set aside the punishment order dated 4.3.1999 and
27.8.2020 passed by the respondent No: 4, Annexure-A and Annexure-J
to this petition respectively, and
(B) Quash and set aside the order dated 11.8.1999 passed by the
appellate authority respondent No: 3, Annexure-B to this petition, and
(C) Quash and set aside the order dated 16.3.2020 passed by the
revisional authority respondent No: 2, Annexure-C to this petition, and
consequently direct the respondent authorities to grant all consequential
benefits to the petitioner,
(D) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition, the
Honourable Court may be pleased to stay the operation, implementation
and execution of the impugned orders dated 4.3.1999, 11.8.1999 and
16.3.2020, Annexure-A, B and C respectively to this petition, and/or
(E) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition, the
Honourable Court may be pleased to direct the respondent No: 4 to
forward the appeal/ revision of the petitioner dated 12.6.2020, Annexure-
I to respondent No: 1 for being decided on merits, and/or
(F) Award the cost of this petition, and/ or
(G) Grant any other relief or pass any other order which the
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Honourable Court may consider as just and proper in the facts and
circumstances of the case."
5. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONER:
5.1. Learned Advocate Ms. Upadhyay would submit that
respondent No. 2 herein - Revisional Authority, has committed
a serious error while not condoning the delay in preferring the
revision application by the petitioner and without appreciating
the material aspect and sufficient cause though made out,
rejected the revision of the petitioner on technical ground of
delay, instead of examined his case on merit. It is respectfully
submitted that the petitioner was removed from his services as
Armed Police Constable, State Reserve Police Force vide order
dated 4th March 1999 and the same was confirmed by the
Appellate Authority while dismissing his appeal on 11th
August 1999 and the same ought to have been revised by the
Revisional Authority while exercising its Revisional power.
5.2. Learned Advocate Ms. Upadhyay would respectfully submit
that as the petitioner was facing criminal trial wherein he was
found convicted by Session Court and thereupon, he had to
prefer Criminal Appeal No. 1447 of 2006 before this Court,
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which came to be allowed by the Division Bench of this Court
in favour of the petitioner on 22nd November 2017, thereafter,
petitioner having regained himself confidence and able to
prepare the revision, thereby, submitted before the Revisional
Authority. It is respectfully submitted that fact which are
narrated in the revision application requires to be considered
sympathetically by the Revisional Authority having wide
discretion to condone the delay in filing the revision
application, which is not at all appreciated in true letter and
spirit, resulted into miscarriage of justice.
5.3. Learned Advocate Ms. Upadhyay would respectfully submit
that as the petitioner was removed from his service, not
financially sound, having lost his elder brother as he was
murdered and as a counterblast, the petitioner was wrongly
implicated by the opposite group in a got-up offence of murder
of one of murderer of his brother and so also due to the ill-
health of his old-aged mother, the petitioner could not
approach the Revisional Authority within the stipulated time.
It is respectfully submitted that in past, the Revisional
Authority did condone such lapses by condoning the delay on
the part of other revisionist who approached belatedly before
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the Revisional Authority. It is respectfully submitted and
placed reliance upon some of the few instances, whereby, the
Revisional Authority, having exercised its discretion in favour
of other revisionist, not only condoned the delay, but in the
case of absence from the service where police personnel
dismissed from service, such punishment was modified by
awarding lesser punishment of stoppage of increment.
5.4. Learned Advocate Ms. Upadhyay would respectfully submit
that petitioner having good case on merit, inasmuch as,
punishment which was inflicted upon the petitioner not
sustainable in law as there is no provision under the Bombay
Police (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1965, whereby, police
personnel can be inflicted punishment of "deletion of his name"
from the department.
5.5. So, making above submissions, learned Advocate Ms.
Upadhyay humbly requests that this Court may exercise its
discretionary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, thereby, condone the delay in filing the revision
application and respondent No. 2 - Revisional Authority may
be directed to decide case of the petitioner on its merit.
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5.6. Making the above submissions, learned Advocate Ms.
Upadhyay would request this Court to allow the present
petition.
6. SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT NOS.1 TO 4:
6.1. Per contra, learned AGP Ms. Sukhadwala would vehemently
oppose this petition contending inter alia that petitioner having
not made out any sufficient cause in delay in filing revision
application, as such, there is no error committed by the
Revisional Authority when dismissed his revision on the
ground of delay.
6.2. Learned AGP Ms. Sukhadwala would respectfully submit that
there was ample opportunity available with the petitioner to
approach the Revisional Authority once his appeal came to be
dismissed in the year 1999, but for reasons best known to the
petitioner, he took almost 20 years to approach the Revisional
Authority when filed revision in year 2019. It is submitted that
such gross delay on part of petitioner is without any just and
reasonable cause, not condonable one. So, in that view of the
matter, no error of law committed by the Revisional Authority
when rejected his revision.
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6.3. Learned AGP Ms. Sukhadwala would further submit that at all
stages, respondents have observed principle of natural justice,
inasmuch as, the petitioner was served with the notice before
initiation of departmental inquiry against him wherein he
remained absent and as such, he was dismissed from his service
due to his unauthorized absence from service. It is respectfully
submitted that the tenor of the operative portion of impugned
order passed by the disciplinary authority which confirmed by
appellate authority may not be construed otherwise, as
ultimately, petitioner was in fact, dismissed from his services.
6.4. Learned AGP Ms. Sukhadwala would further respectfully
submit that as per the settled legal position of law, unless and
until, any sufficient cause made out by the revisionist, delay
cannot be condoned by the Revisional Authority, otherwise, it
may face with allegation of arbitrariness and misuse of its
discretionary power.
6.5. Learned AGP Ms. Sukhadwala would respectfully submit that
instances which are placed on the record of this matter by
petitioner in support of his submissions, would not be
applicable to the facts of the present case, inasmuch as, in
appropriate cases where sufficient cause made out and the
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Revisional Authority found substance in the submission of the
revisionist concerned, delay might have condoned and decided
the matter on its merits, which is not the case on hand.
6.6. Making the above submissions, learned AGP Ms. Sukhadwala
would request this Court to reject the present petition.
7. No other and further submissions are being made by the
respective learned advocates.
8. Having heard the learned Advocates appearing for the
respective parties, the following facts would emerge which are
as under:
(i). The petitioner appears to have been appointed on the
post of Armed Police Constable, SRPF on 21st
December 1983.
(ii). The elder brother of the petitioner came to be murdered
on 6th November 1997. Thereafter, it appears that one
FIR being C.R. No. I-319 of 1998 came to be registered
with Ghatlodiya Police Station, Ahmedabad against the
petitioner for alleged commission of offence punishable
under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, wherein, he
was found convicted by the Sessions Court. It may be
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noticed here that the aforesaid FIR was registered
against the petitioner for alleged murder of one of the
accused who alleged to have committed the murder of his
elder brother.
(iii). At the same time, the petitioner having remained
unauthorized absent from his service, subjected to
departmental inquiry by the Respondent Authority,
wherein found guilty, he was dismissed from his service.
Although, in the operative portion of the impugned
order dated 4th March 1999 passed by the Disciplinary
Authority would observe that the petitioner is deleted
from department. It may be poor expression by
disciplinary authority while passing order but in fact,
petitioner dismissed from his service.
(iv). The departmental appeal was also filed by the petitioner
but the same was not entertained by the Appellate
Authority, whereby, it dismissed such appeal vide its
judgment and order dated 11th August 1999.
(v). Likewise, the petitioner has also preferred Criminal
Appeal No. 1447 of 2006 before the Division Bench of
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this Court, which came to be allowed on 22nd November
2017. Whereby, he was acquitted from all charges leveled
against him in pursuance of the aforesaid FIR lodged
against him.
(vi). After that, only on 11th November 2019, the petitioner
thought it fit to approach the Revisional Authority by
way of revision challenging the aforesaid impugned order
dated 11th August 1999 and 4th March 1999 passed by
the Appellate Authority and Disciplinary Authority
respectively, wherein, there was huge delay found and
not satisfied with explanation coming forth from the side
of the petitioner, the Revisional Authority rejected the
revision vide its impugned order dated 16th March 2020
on the ground of delay itself.
9. Having gone through entire set of aforesaid facts and so also
impugned revision application preferred by the petitioner after
about 20 years from passing of order by the Disciplinary and
Appellate Authority as the case may be, no sufficient cause
made out by the petitioner in such revision application.
10. True, the power is available with the Revisional Authority to
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condone the delay, but only when good cause shown to it, it
will have to be exercised, otherwise not. The paramount
consideration of any Court/Authority having power to
condone the delay would be to satisfied itself that a sufficient
cause made out by applicant in the application. As per the
settled legal position of law, sufficient cause should be
construed liberally and in a case where it is made out on record
by the applicant, the Court/Authority normally condones the
delay, thereby, can decide the matter on its merit.
11. At the same time, it is also well-settled position of law that
when there is gross delay, inasmuch as, there is gross negligence
on the part of the applicant to approach the Court/Authority
by substantial delay, heavy burden cast upon such person to
explain the delay in a manner whereby the Authority can
satisfy itself that the applicant is prevented by a cause which
can be construed as sufficient cause.
12. Having appreciated the submissions so canvassed by learned
Advocate Ms. Upadhyay & learned AGP and so also
independently tried to find out as to whether any sufficient
cause made out and is there any legal handicap on the part of
the petitioner, whereby, he could not approach the Revisional
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Authority at given point of time. But, after appreciating the
submissions and so also after going through the pleadings of
petitioner made in his revision, this Court is unable to find out
any such legal disablement - handicap on the part of the
petitioner except bare words coming forth from side of the
petitioner that he was faced with aforesaid criminal case. It
requires to be noted here that all throughout, the petitioner was
either on bail and later on acquitted by this Court in the year
2017, there was nothing to show that he was prevented by any
cause which can be construed as sufficient cause thereby not
filed revision within reasonable time.
13. This Court cannot be oblivious of the recent past
decisions/judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court, wherein, it has
laid down certain criteria which require to be taken note by
every Court/Tribunal/Authority while adjudicating the delay
application or examining plea of condonation of delay. One of
such pertinent observation would be that where in a case of any
gross inordinate delay whereby applicant found negligent for
not initiating proceeding in time and non-observance of due
diligence, even though there may be a sufficient cause, such
delay should not be condoned on any condition.
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13.1. It would be apt to rely first relied upon the decision of
Honourable Supreme Court of India in the case of K.B. Lal
(Krishna Bahadur Lal) v. Gyanendra Pratap & Ors., reported in
2024 (4) Scale 759, wherein, after revisiting the law on the
aspect of condonation of delay, the Hon'ble Apex Court has
held as under:
"10. There is no gainsaying the fact that the
discretionary power of a Court to condone delay
must be exercised judiciously and it is not to
be exercised in cases where there is gross
negligence and/or want of due diligence on part
of the litigant (See Majji Sannemma @
Sanyasirao v. Reddy Sridevi & Ors. (2021) 18
SCC 384). The discretion is also not supposed
to be exercised in the absence of any
reasonable, satisfactory or appropriate
explanation for the delay (See P.K.
Ramachandran v. State of Kerala and Anr.,
(1997) 7 SCC 556). Thus, it is apparent that
the words 'sufficient cause' in Section 5 of the
Limitation Act can only be given a liberal
construction, when no negligence, nor inaction,
nor want of bona fide is imputable to the
litigant (See Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special
Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81). The
principles which are to be kept in mind for
condonation of delay were succinctly summarised
by this Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing
Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.,
(2013) 12 SCC 649, and are reproduced as under:
"21.1. (i) There should be a liberal,
pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic
approach while dealing with an application
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for condonation of delay, for the Courts
are not supposed to legalise injustice but
are obliged to remove injustice.
21.2. (ii) The terms "sufficient cause"
should be understood in their proper
spirit, philosophy and purpose regard
being had to the fact that these terms are
basically elastic and are to be applied in
proper perspective to the obtaining fact-
situation.
21.3. (iii) Substantial justice being
paramount and pivotal the technical
considerations should not be given undue
and uncalled for emphasis.
21.4. (iv) No presumption can be attached
to deliberate causation of delay but,
gross negligence on the part of the
counsel or litigant is to be taken note
of.
21.5. (v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a
party seeking condonation of delay is a
significant and relevant fact.
21.6. (vi) It is to be kept in mind that
adherence to strict proof should not
affect public justice and cause public
mischief because the Courts are required
to be vigilant so that in the ultimate
eventuate there is no real failure of
justice.
21.7. (vii) The concept of liberal
approach has to encapsulate the conception
of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed
a totally unfettered free play.
21.8. (viii) There is a distinction
between inordinate delay and a delay of
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short duration or few days, for to the
former doctrine of prejudice is attracted
whereas to the latter it may not be
attracted. That apart, the first one
warrants strict approach whereas the
second calls for a liberal delineation.
21.9. (ix) The conduct, behaviour and
attitude of a party relating to its
inaction or negligence are relevant
factors to be taken into consideration. It
is so as the fundamental principle is that
the Courts are required to weigh the scale
of balance of justice in respect of both
parties and the said principle cannot be
given a total go by in the name of liberal
approach.
21.10. (x) If the explanation offered is
concocted, or the grounds urged in the
application are fanciful, the Courts
should be vigilant not to expose the other
side unnecessarily to face such a
litigation."
(Emphasis supplied)
13.2. It is also profitable to refer to and rely upon ratio laid down by
recent past decision of Honourable Supreme Court of India in
a case of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) BY L RS & ORS V/S
Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 INSC 286 : 2024
(4) SCR 241 : 2024 (4) Scale 846, wherein after referring to its
previous decisions, summarized the case law on the issue of
limitation vis-a-vis condonation of delay in context of
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"sufficient cause". It has been so observed and held as under,
"[26] On a harmonious consideration of the
provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the
law laid down by this Court, it is evident
that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public
policy that there should be an end to
litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy
rather than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been
exercised or availed of for a long time must
come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed
period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have
to be construed differently, such as Section 3
has to be construed in a strict sense whereas
Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice,
though liberal approach, justice-oriented
approach or cause of substantial justice may be
kept in mind but the same cannot be used to
defeat the substantial law of limitation
contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion
to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been
explained, but that exercise of power is
discretionary in nature and may not be
exercised even if sufficient cause is
established for various factors such as, where
there is inordinate delay, negligence and want
of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in
similar matter, it does not mean that others
are also entitled to the same benefit if the
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Court is not satisfied with the cause shown for
the delay in filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be
considered in condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be
decided on the parameters laid down for
condoning the delay and condoning the delay for
the reason that the conditions have been
imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the
statutory provision."
(emphasis supplied)
13.3. It is also profitable to rely upon the decision of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India in the case of case of Basawaraj and
Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer reported in 2013
(14) SCC 81, wherein it is held as under:-
"15. The law on the issue can be summarised to
the effect that where a case has been presented
in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant
has to explain the Court as to what was the
"sufficient cause" which means an adequate and
enough reason which prevented him to approach
the Court within limitation. In case a party is
found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide
on his part in the facts and circumstances of
the case, or found to have not acted diligently
or remained inactive, there cannot be a
justified ground to condone the delay. No Court
could be justified in condoning such an
inordinate delay by imposing any condition
whatsoever. The application is to be decided
only within the parameters laid down by this
Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In
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case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a
litigant to approach the Court on time
condoning the delay without any justification,
putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to
passing an order in violation of the statutory
provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter
disregard to the legislature."
(Emphasis supplied)
13.4. Even, recently also, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of
Shivamma (DEAD) By Lrs Vs. Karnataka Housing Board &
Ors. reported In 2025 INSC 1104, in clear terms held that
where there is delay/laches on the part of the applicant in not
prosecuting the legal remedy, in the absence of any sufficient
cause made out by the applicant, the Court should not condone
the delay while exercising its power under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. In the case of Shivamma (Supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has held thus:-
"258. The length of the delay is a relevant
matter which the Court must take into
consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor
of the approach of the respondents, it appears
that they want to fix their own period of
limitation for instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of
limitation. Once it is held that a party has
lost his right to have the matter considered on
merits because of his own inaction for a long,
it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate
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delay and in such circumstances of the case, it
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial
justice deserves to be preferred as against the
technical considerations. While considering the
plea for condonation of delay, the Court must
not start with the merits of the main matter.
The Court owes a duty to first ascertain the
bona fides of the explanation offered by the
party seeking condonation. It is only if the
sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the
opposition of the other side is equally
balanced that the Court may bring into aid the
merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay."
(emphasis supplied)
14. Thus, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances and the
position of law as it stands as on date, when this Court does
not find any sufficient cause made out by the petitioner when
he filed the revision, no error much less any error of law, can be
found in the impugned order passed by the Revisional
Authority, when it has rejected the revision application on the
ground of delay.
15. In view of the foregoing reasons, having not found any merit in
the petition, the present writ petition is hereby dismissed. Rule
is discharged. No order as to costs.
(MAULIK J.SHELAT,J)
NILESH
