[Cites 4, Cited by 0]
Gujarat High Court
Surat Municipal Employees (Staff) ... vs State Of Gujarat on 10 December, 2025
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/16605/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/12/2025
undefined
IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD
R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO. 16605 of 2025
FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:
HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE MAUNA M. BHATT
==========================================================
Approved for Reporting Yes No
NO
==========================================================
SURAT MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES (STAFF) UNION (SURAT SUDHARAI
KAMDAR (STAFF) MANDAL)
Versus
STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS.
==========================================================
Appearance:
MR AS ASTHAVADI(3698) for the Petitioner(s) No. 1
MS AISHWARYA CHAUDHARY ASST. GOVERNMENT PLEADER for the
Respondent(s) No. 1
MR KAUSHAL D PANDYA(2905) for the Respondent(s) No. 2,3
==========================================================
CORAM:HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE MAUNA M. BHATT
Date : 10/12/2025
ORAL JUDGMENT
1. Rule returnable forthwith. Learned Assistant Government
Pleader Ms. Aishwarya Chaudhary waives service of notice of
rule on behalf of respondent No. 1 and learned advocate Mr.
Kaushal Pandya waives service of notice of rule on behalf of
respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/16605/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/12/2025
undefined
2. This petition is filed challenging the notice dated
12.11.2025, whereby the petitioner - Union has been directed
to vacate the premises which is used as office. Under the said
notice, certain documents were called for.
The detail of the petition and the date of office allotment as
referred by the petitioner is stated hereunder: -
Sr. SCA No. Petitioner Name Office Page
No. Allotment Date No.
3. SCA/ SURAT 07.07.2015 40A
16605/2025 MUNICIPAL letter
EMPLOYEES
(STAFF) (SURAT
KAMDAR (STAFF)
MANDAL)
3. Brief facts as referred in the petition are as under: -
3.1 Petitioner herein is a registered trade Union under Indian
Trade Unions Act, 1926, having registration Number.
3.2 It is case of the petitioner that it is registered Union and
working for the benefits of current and retired
employees/workmen working with Surat Municipal Corporation.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/16605/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/12/2025
undefined
It is further case of the petitioner that since many years the
respondent - Surat Municipal Corporation has allotted an office
place as referred in the table above and despite such official
allotment, the action of vacation of office is undertaken by
issuance of notice dated 12.11.2025 followed by forceful
vacation of respective office, leading the petitioner to file this
petition.
4. Heard learned advocate Mr. Asthavadi for the petitioner,
learned Assistant Government Pleader Ms. Aishwarya
Chaudhary for respondent No. 1. and learned advocate Mr.
Kaushal Pandya for the respondent Nos. 2 and 3.
5. Learned advocate Mr. Asthavadi for the petitioner
submitted that the petitioner is allotee of the office premises,
in the building owned by Municipal Corporation and this fact
is evident from the communication dated 26.02.2015 (Annexure
H, Page No. 20). Referring to the said letter, learned advocate
submitted that, it is true that by said letter, the petitioner was
directed to shift at some other place, however the very letter
justifies, the petitioner's lawful occupation on their respective
offices and therefore, the action taken by directing it to vacate
the premises without following due process of law is contrary
to the settled legal position and deserves to be deprecated
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/16605/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/12/2025
undefined
solely on this ground. Further, pursuant to the communication
dated 12.11.2025, the petitioner was called upon to produce
certain documents. The petitioner by response, relied upon an
order dated 26.02.2015 to justify its lawful possession of the
premises in question owned by Surat Municipal Corporation.
Despite that, one more communication dated 18.11.2025 was
served upon the petitioner to vacate, followed by
communication dated 19.11.2025.
5.1. Learned advocate for the petitioner submitted that when
petitioner is in lawful possession, the respondent-Corporation
ought not to have directed to vacate the premises without
following the due process of law. Moreover, reference of any
provision is not made in the communication; therefore, it is
not clear that under which provision of law an action of
vacation of premises is undertaken when the premises was
lawfully given to the petitioner. Moreover, by communication
dated 26.02.2015, the petitioner was directed to shift to one
another building for the reasons stated therein. This itself
justifies the legal possession by the petitioner and therefore,
without following any due process of law, action taken by the
respondent - Corporation being illegal, deserves to be quashed
and set aside.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/16605/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/12/2025
undefined
5.2. In relation to maintainability of petition, under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, learned advocate submitted
that petitioner's case would not fall under Section 2(k) of the
Act, and, therefore, this may not be termed as Industrial
Dispute.
5.3. Learned advocate thus submitted that action taken of
eviction of the petitioner's premises being illegal, it deserves to
be declared as illegal and further to hold that the possession
over the premises of the petitioners is legal.
6. Opposing the petition, learned advocate Mr. Kaushal
Pandya for respondent Nos. 2 and 3 referred to the prayer
clause at Paragraph No. 14 and submitted that, 19.11.2025
order is sought to be quashed. The order dated 19.11.2025
refers to non-recognition of the documents submitted by the
petitioner. Another prayer seeks declaration of the premises in
possession of the petitioners as legal. The prayer sought of
declaration requires factual verification, and for such prayer
petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India would
not be maintainable. Further, the issue involved relates to
employees of the Surat Municipal Corporation and the same
would fall under Section 2(k) of the Act, and, therefore, the
petition would not be maintainable.
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/16605/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/12/2025
undefined
6.1. On merits, learned advocate submitted that under
communication dated 12.11.2025, the petitioner was directed
to produce certain documents. In response to the same, reply
dated 18.11.2025 was filed where reliance has been placed on
letter of allotment whereby the petitioner was directed to shift
to some other place. If the letter dated 26.02.2015 is perused,
it refers to dilapidated condition of some of the building of the
Municipal Corporation and therefore, need arose to shift those
offices to this premises. Despite that no shifting was done by
the petitioner of the premises of Respondent-Corporation.
6.2. Vide letter dated 26.02.2015, the petitioner was directed
to shift its office, and thereafter communication dated
12.11.2025 was served. Moreover, on 09.04.2015, the
Commissioner of Surat Municipal Corporation informed all
concern that on account of dilapidated condition of some of
the buildings of the Municipal Corporation, the offices situated
there are required to be shifted here, thus the petitioner was
aware of the situation. Further, the Corporation is not
collecting any rent from petitioners and even the electricity
and other incidental charges are paid by Surat Municipal
Corporation, therefore, the petitioner does not have any legal
right over the subject property. Thus, there being no legal
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/16605/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/12/2025
undefined
right over the property of Surat Municipal Corporation, these
petitions deserve to be rejected.
6.3. For maintainability of petition, learned advocate Mr.
Pandya relied upon decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
case of Premier Automobiles Limited, Bombay vs. Kamlekar
Shantaram Wadke Of Bombay reported in 1976(1) SCC 496
wherein the principle applicable to jurisdiction of Civil Court
in relation to an industrial dispute has been summarized.
7. Considered the submissions and the documents on record.
Admittedly, this petitions is filed challenging the action of
respondent - Corporation whereby the petitioner has been
directed to vacate the office it has occupied in the building
owned by Surat Municipal Corporation. This action was taken
after issuance of notice in the year 2015, followed by this
communication. By communication dated 12.11.2025, some
details were called from the petitioner and time was granted to
the petitioner to provide such documents. In response thereto,
the reply was filed and, in the reply, reliance was placed on
communication dated 26.02.2015, to submit that since the
subject premises was officially given to the petitioner, the same
cannot be vacated without following the due process of law.
However, if the communication dated 26.02.2015, is perused it
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/16605/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/12/2025
undefined
refers to shifting of the petitioner to some other place. The
said communication in the opinion of this Court cannot be the
ground to justify that the petitioner has legal right over the
premises. The premises given for usage cannot be termed as
having legal occupation rights particularly, when no rent or
charges are paid by the petitioner. Document of allotment is
not placed by petitioner and communication dated 26.02.2015
cannot be termed as an allotment letter.
8. Moreover, the submission canvassed on behalf of
respondent -Corporation that petition under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India would not be maintainable for the prayer
seeking declaration, merit acceptance.
8.1. Further, in relation to the submission canvassed on behalf
of the petitioners that the communication is bereft of any legal
provision and without any reason, this Court is of the opinion
that when the petitioners failed in making out a case that they
were allotted office by SMC, other prayers are not to be
considered.
8.2. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Premier
Automobiles Limited, Bombay (Supra) has held as under:-
NEUTRAL CITATION
C/SCA/16605/2025 JUDGMENT DATED: 10/12/2025
undefined
"23 To sum up, the principles applicable to the
jurisdiction of the Civil Court in relation to an
industrial dispute may be stated thus:
(1) If the dispute is not an industrial dispute
nor does it relate to enforcement of any other
right under the Act the remedy lies only in
the civil Court.
(2) If the dispute is an industrial dispute
arising out of a right or liability under the
general or common law and not under the
Act, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is
alternative, leaving it to the election of the
suitor concerned to choose his remedy for the
relief which is competent to be granted in a
particular remedy.
(3) If the industrial dispute relates to the
enforcement of a right or an obligation
created under the Act, then the only remedy
available to the suitor is to get an
adjudication under the Act.
(4) If the right which is sought to be enforced
is a right created under the Act such as
Chapter VA then the remedy for its
enforcement is either Section 33C or the
raising of an industrial dispute, as the case
may be."
9. In view of above, the petition is devoid of any merits
and accordingly the same is dismissed. Rule is discharged. No
Costs.
(MAUNA M. BHATT,J)
SHIVANI SHUKLA/04/SB-I
