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J.K.P. Agro Foods Pvt Ltd Through ... vs Mahindarpur Balaji Trading (Opc) ...
2023 Latest Caselaw 7971 Guj

Citation : 2023 Latest Caselaw 7971 Guj
Judgement Date : 1 November, 2023

Gujarat High Court
J.K.P. Agro Foods Pvt Ltd Through ... vs Mahindarpur Balaji Trading (Opc) ... on 1 November, 2023
Bench: Nisha M. Thakore
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    R/CR.MA/3191/2022                                 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/11/2023

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             IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD

R/CRIMINAL MISC.APPLICATION (FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL) NO. 3191 of
                            2022

                        In R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 335 of 2022

                                       With
                         R/CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 335 of 2022

FOR APPROVAL AND SIGNATURE:


HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE NISHA M. THAKORE
==========================================================

1     Whether Reporters of Local Papers may be allowed
      to see the judgment ?

2     To be referred to the Reporter or not ?

3     Whether their Lordships wish to see the fair copy
      of the judgment ?

4     Whether this case involves a substantial question
      of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution
      of India or any order made thereunder ?

==========================================================
     J.K.P. AGRO FOODS PVT LTD THROUGH DIRECTOR KALPESH
                           PRAJAPATI
                             Versus
    MAHINDARPUR BALAJI TRADING (OPC) CO. PVT. LTD., THROUGH
                DIRECTOR GIRIRAJ S. MAHESHWARI
==========================================================
Appearance:
MS ANUSHREE M SONI(11431) for the Applicant(s) No. 1
NOTICE SERVED for the Respondent(s) No. 1
MR RC KODEKAR ADDIL. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR for the Respondent(s)
No. 2
==========================================================

    CORAM:HONOURABLE MS. JUSTICE NISHA M. THAKORE

                                  Date : 01/11/2023

                                 ORAL JUDGMENT

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1. Rule. Learned APP waives service of Rule on behalf of the

respondent No.1 - State.

2. This is an application filed by the applicant - original

complainant under Section 378(4)(3) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure challenging the judgment and order dated 10.12.2021

passed by the learned 2nd Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Anand, in Criminal Case No.3043 of 2018. By the said judgment

and order, the learned Magistrate has proceeded to record the

acquittal of the present respondent No.1 for the offence punishable

under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

3. Brief facts leading to filing of the present appeal are summarized

as under:

3.1 The respondent No.1 has been arraigned as an accused in his

capacity as Director of Mahindarpur Balaji Trading (OPC) Co. Pvt.

Ltd. The complainant is a Company registered under the

Companies Act, 2013 and has filed the complaint through its

Director - Kalpesh Prajapati. It is the case of the complainant that

the respondent - accused has purchased the goods worth

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Rs.14,47,400/-, which was reflected as outstanding amount in its

account. The complainant has produced the bilty issued by Surya

Logistic Services as well as All India Road Transport Company in

support of alleged delivery of the goods to the respondent -

original accused. Hence, according to the complainant the legally

enforceable debt to be realized from the accused is to the tune of

Rs.14,47,4000/-.

3.2 The complainant has further contended that the respondent -

accused had issued a cheque of the aforesaid Mahindarpur Balaji

Trading (OPC) Co. Pvt. Ltd. towards the payment of the aforesaid

outstanding amount on 29.05.2018. The said cheque was issued

under the signature of the original accused. It is further contended

that the respondent - accused had assured the complainant about

realization of the aforesaid amount. Thus, the complainant had

become the holder in due course of the said disputed cheque.

3.3 The complainant had presented the said cheque dated

29.05.2018, however, the said cheque was not realized pursuant

to the instructions issued by the drawer for stop payment. The

aforesaid fact of non-realization was communicated to the

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complainant by the concerned bank on 01.06.2018. Hence, the

cause had arisen for the complainant to proceed for issuance of

statutory notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments

Act.

3.4 The aforesaid legal notice dated 18.06.2018 raising demand of

outstanding amount was sent through RPAD as well as by Speed

Post at the known address of the respondent - accused. Such

notice, according to the complainant, was duly served upon the

accused on 22.06.2018 as well as through Speed Post on

21.06.2018. The respondent - accused had given vague reply

dated 25.06.2018 and had avoided the payment of the outstanding

amount. This gave cause for the complainant to proceed for

lodging of the complainant before the Court of 2nd Additional Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Anand. On 17.07.2018, such a complaint was

registered as Criminal Case No.3043 of 2018.

4. Learned Magistrate upon recording the verification of the

complainant had proceeded to issue summons upon the

respondent - accused. The respondent - accused had appeared

before the learned Magistrate and his plea was recorded vide

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Exhibit 23, wherein he had denied the alleged offence. In such

circumstances, the learned Magistrate has proceeded with

summary trial of the aforesaid Criminal Case. After framing issues

and upon recording the evidence led by the respective parties as

well as taking into consideration the statement of the respondent -

accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, the learned Magistrate proceeded to record the

acquittal of present respondent - accused by holding that the

complaint itself was not maintainable.

5. I have heard learned advocate Ms. Anushree Soni, who has

appeared on record for the applicant and learned APP Mr. R.C.

Kodekar has appeared on behalf of the respondent - State.

6. This Court vide order dated 09.02.2022 had issued notice upon

the respondent - accused. Such notice issued by the Court has

been duly served, however, the respondent - accused has chosen

not to contest this application seeking special leave to appeal by

entering his appearance. In such circumstances, noticing the issue

involved, this Court has proceeded for final adjudication of this

application seeking special leave to appeal along with appeal.

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7. Learned advocate for the applicant at the outset has assailed

the order of acquittal mainly on the ground that the learned

Magistrate though initially after recording on verification, having

satisfied with the compliance of basic ingredients under Section

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act issued summons upon the

respondent - accused however later on proceeded to dismiss the

complaint on erroneous ground by holding the complaint itself

being not maintainable. She, therefore, submitted that the special

leave to appeal requires consideration, more particularly, the

erroneous determination of non-maintainability of the complaint

has entailed acquittal of the respondent - accused on technical

ground, which is required to be examined closely after admission

of the appeal.

8. Learned advocate has invited attention of this Court to the cause

title of the original complaint and has contended that in fact, the

complaint was filed against the drawer i.e. Mahindarpur Balaji

Trading (OPC) Co. Pvt. Ltd. as well as authorized signatory

namely Giriraj S. Maheshwari, who is Director of the said

Company. She further submitted that in the cause title, since the

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description of the respondent - accused was narrated as

Company through its Director, the learned Magistrate ought to

have appreciated the fact that both the drawer as well as

authorized signatory were represented and joined as accused. She

further contended that the learned Magistrate wrongly disbelieved

the case of the complainant by applying the principle laid down by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Anita Handa Vs.

Godfather Travels and Tours Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2012) 5

Supreme Court Cases 661 in the facts of the present case. At this

stage, the learned advocate has placed on record the Company

Master Data, wherein the details of the said Company goes to

indicate that the respondent - accused is the sole Director of the

Company and thus, the said Company is categorized as Private

(one person) Company. Learned advocate has placed reliance

upon Section 2(62) of the Companies Act, 2013 and has argued

that the Company can be incorporated with one Director also. In

fact, in such a category of the Company, the compliance

requirements are much lesser than that of private Company. By

referring to the aforesaid provisions, she further contended that

once it had been established that there is no another Director in

the Company except present respondent - accused, who is also

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authorized signatory of the Company, there was sufficient

compliance of the provisions of the Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act. By referring to the various documents including

certificate of incorporation of the aforesaid Company (Exhibit 25),

disputed cheque (Exhibit 26), cheque return memo (Exhibit 27),

legal notice issued by the complainant to the accused (Exhibit 28),

RPAD slip as well as postal slip (Exhibit 29), tracking consignment

report (Exhibit 30), speed post slip (Exhibit 31), tracking

consignment report of speed post (Exhibit 32), copy of supplied

bills to the accused (Exhibit 33 to 36), transport bills (Exhibit 37 to

40), reply given by the accused (Exhibit 41) and extract of account

maintained by the complainant (Exhibit 42) , she has further invited

attention of this Court to the findings recorded by the learned

Magistrate. She submitted that upon appreciation of the aforesaid

documents, the learned Magistrate at one stage, had drawn

presumption in favour of the complainant in terms of Sections

118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. She further

submitted that though the complainant had offered himself for

cross-examination, the respondent - accused had failed to cross-

examine the complainant nor any evidence was led by the

respondent - accused. She submitted that only defence, which

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has emerged on record, is in the form of a statement of the

accused recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure. The only response is in the form of denial of questions

put to the respondent accused. She therefore submitted that in

absence of any contradictions being brought on record by the

respondent - accused, the presumption drawn by the learned

Magistrate in favour of the complainant has remained intact. In

such circumstances, the learned Magistrate ought to have

convicted the respondent - accused for the offence punishable

under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

9. I have heard learned advocate for the applicant and having

perused the record as well as the authorities placed on record, the

only question which poses for consideration is whether the learned

Magistrate committed any error in dismissing the complaint by

holding that non-joinder of drawer of the disputed cheque i.e.

Company is fatal to the proceedings under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act.

10. The aforesaid issue being the question of law is no longer res

integra. The similar had question arose for consideration before

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three Judges Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of

Anita Handa (Supra) as to whether the complaint under Section

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and Section 141 thereto

against the Director or authorized signatory of the cheque without

arraigning the company as accused, was maintainable? Initially,

the matter was notified before two Judges Bench, which due to

diversion of opinion, was referred to the three Judges bench. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court had upon analysis of relevant provisions of

the Negotiable Instruments Act, held that Section 141 uses terms

``person" and refers it to a company. The Company is treated as a

juristic person in the eyes of law and the concept of corporate

criminal liability is attracted to a corporation and company. The

said provisions of the Act invariably held in offences by the

Company, certain categories of officers in certain circumstances

are deemed to be guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act.

11. Learned advocate for the applicant has tried to distinguish the

aforesaid judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court by making much

emphasize on the fact that invocation of Section 141 would come

into play in case where the Company and group of persons guiding

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the business of the Company, have any criminal intent, then that

would be imputed to the body or the Corporation. Whereas in the

facts of the present case, the Company is solely guided by one

person i.e. sole Director, who is at the same time authorized

signatory of the disputed cheque. To examine the aforesaid

argument of the learned advocate, it would be relevant to first take

into consideration the cause title of the original complaint. Close

examination of the description of cause title of the complaint,

suggests narration of the sole accused as under:

"Giriraj Maheshwari, Director of Mahindarpur Balaji Trading

(OPC) Co. Pvt. Ltd."

It is evident from the aforesaid narration that only person,

who has been arraigned as accused in the complaint is Giriraj

Maheshwari, who has been joined in his capacity as Director of the

said Company. Thus, it is evident that the Company has not been

separately joined as accused in the aforesaid complaint. It would

be appropriate to look into the aspect of significance of existence

of the Company in cases related to the offence committed by the

Company. The Company is a separate "legal person" or "legal

entity" in common law with a unique identity from its members.

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Generally, the Company upon incorporation under the provisions

of Act becomes a unit of legal entity and it is under control of its

Board of Directors. In such circumstances, evidently no crime can

be committed by the Company unless it is projected by the

Director's decision. In such a set of facts, the theory of law of

attribution comes into play which mandates that the persons, who

are companies "directing mind" are held liable along with its

business. The issue arose for consideration in the case of Maksud

Saiyed Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. reported in 2007 (14)

Company Cases 590 (SC), whereby the Court ruled out that the

liability of the Managing Director and Director would arise provided

any provision exists in that behalf in the statute. The best instance

where the statute provides for certain provisions for vicarious

liability, based on the existence of Legislation intention responding

to vicarious liability in the criminal case committed by the

Corporate body, is available in the form of Section 141 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 141 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act reads as under:

"Section 141: Offences by companies. --

(1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is

a company, every person who, at the time the offence was

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committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the

company for the conduct of the business of the company, as

well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the

offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and

punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this

sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if

he proves that the offence was committed without his

knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to

prevent the commission of such offence:

22 [Provided further that where a person is nominated as a

Director of a company by virtue of his holding any office or

employment in the Central Government or State Government

or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central

Government or the State Government, as the case may be,

he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter.]

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1),

where any offence under this Act has been committed by a

company and it is proved that the offence has been

committed with the consent or connivance of, or is

attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director,

manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such

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director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be

deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be

proceeded against and punished accordingly. Explanation.--

For the purposes of this section,--

(a) "company" means any body corporate and includes a firm

or other association of individuals; and

(b) "director", in relation to a firm, means a partner in the

firm.]"

12. Thus, on plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it curled out

the Legislation intention which drew the vicarious responsibility of

the Director for the violation committed by the Corporate body by

virtue of his role as Director. Later on, the aforesaid view was

reiterated in the case of Sunil Bharti Mittal Vs. Central Bureau

of Investigation reported in 2015(4) SCC 609. The Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Pepsi Foods Ltd. and Another v.

Special Judicial Magistrate and Others reported in (1998) 5

SCC 749 held that Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is

a serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion as a

matter of course. It further held that while issuing summons, it was

for the learned Magistrate to record satisfaction about prima facie

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case against the accused, who is a Managing Director, Company

Secretary and / or Director of the Company and the role played by

the Company in their respective capacity. Thus, the aforesaid

compliance was held sine qua non for initiating summary

proceedings. Same view was followed by and much emphasis was

put on proceedings against the Director as a consequence of

creation of legal fiction in the case of Kirshna Texport & Capital

markets Ltd. vs. Ila A. Agrawal & Ors., reported in 2015 (8) SCC

28. In light of the aforesaid authorities, undoubtedly putting

criminal proceedings in motion is a serious affair where strict

adherence of statutory provisions is expected.

13. Apart from the aforesaid authorities, if one looks at strict

adherence of section 141 of the NI Act is concern, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Anita Handa (Supra) noted that if a

group of persons that guide the business of the companies have

the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body corporate

and in this backdrop, Section 141 of the Act was analyzed. The

legal position which emerges from the aforesaid authority and plain

reading of Section 141 of Negotiable Instruments Act, invariably

suggests the legislative intent about the constructive liability of the

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Director on behalf of the Company was created by the legal fiction.

At this stage, it would be relevant to revisit the charging section

under the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 138 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act read as under:

"Section 138: Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of

funds in the account. -- Where any cheque drawn by a

person on an account maintained by him with a banker for

payment of any amount of money to another person from

out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of

any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid,

either because of the amount of money standing to the

credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or

that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that

account by an agreement made with that bank, such person

shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall,

without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be

punished with imprisonment for 19 [a term which may be

extended to two years], or with fine which may extend to

twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that

nothing contained in this section shall apply unless--

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(a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a

period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or

within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier;

(b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as

the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the

said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the

drawer of the cheque, 20 [within thirty days] of the receipt of

information by him from the bank regarding the return of the

cheque as unpaid; and

(c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of

the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may

be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen

days of the receipt of the said notice."

14. Aforesaid provisions have been dealt with by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Anita Handa(Supra). The relevant

observations are as under:

"19. The main part of the provision can be segregated into

three compartments, namely, (i) the cheque is drawn by a

person, (ii) the cheque drawn on an account maintained by

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him with the banker for payment of any amount of money to

another person from out of that account for the discharge, in

whole or in part, of a debt or other liability, is returned unpaid,

either because the amount of money standing to the credit of

that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or it exceeds

the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an

arrangement made with the bank and (iii) such person shall

be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without

prejudice to any other provision of the Act, be punished with

imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years or

with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque

or with both. The proviso to the said section postulates under

what circumstances the section shall not apply. In the case at

hand, we are not concerned with the said aspect. It will not be

out of place to state that the main part of the provision deals

with the basic ingredients and the proviso deals with certain

circumstances and lays certain conditions where it will not be

applicable. The emphasis has been laid on the factum that the

cheque has to be drawn by a person on the account

maintained by him and he must have issued the cheque in

discharge of any debt or other liability.

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20. Section 7 of the Act defines 'drawer' to mean the maker of

a bill of exchange or a cheque. An authorised signatory of a

company becomes a drawer as he has been authorised to do

so in respect of the account maintained by the company.

22. On a reading of the said provision, it is plain as day that if

a person who commits offence under Section 138 of the Act is

a company, the company as well as every person in charge of

and responsible to the company for the conduct of business of

the company at the time of commission of offence is deemed

to be guilty of the offence. The first proviso carves out under

what circumstances the criminal liability would not be

fastened. Sub-section (2) enlarges the criminal liability by

incorporating the concepts of connivance, negligence and

consent that engulfs many categories of officers. It is worth

noting that in both the provisions, there is a 'deemed' concept

of criminal liability.

32. We have referred to the aforesaid authorities to highlight

that the company can have criminal liability and further, if a

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group of persons that guide the business of the companies

have the criminal intent, that would be imputed to the body

corporate. In this backdrop, Section 141 of the Act has to be

understood. The said provision clearly stipulates that when a

person which is a company commits an offence, then certain

categories of persons in charge as well as the company would

be deemed to be liable for the offences under Section 138.

Thus, the statutory intendment is absolutely plain. As is

perceptible, the provision makes the functionaries and the

companies to be liable and that is by deeming fiction. A

deeming fiction has its own signification.

38. From the aforesaid pronouncements, the principle that can

be culled out is that it is the bounden duty of the court to

ascertain for what purpose the legal fiction has been created.

It is also the duty of the court to imagine the fiction with all real

consequences and instances unless prohibited from doing so.

That apart, the use of the term 'deemed' has to be read in its

context and further the fullest logical purpose and import are

to be understood. It is because in modern legislation, the term

'deemed' has been used for manifold purposes. The object of

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the legislature has to be kept in mind.

39. The word 'deemed' used in Section 141 of the Act applies

to the company and the persons responsible for the acts of

the company. It crystallizes the corporate criminal liability and

vicarious liability of a person who is in charge of the company.

What averments should be required to make a person

vicariously liable has been dealt with in SMS Pharmaceuticals

Ltd. (supra). In the said case, it has been opined that the

criminal liability on account of dishonour of cheque primarily

falls on the drawee company and is extended to the officers of

the company and as there is a specific provision extending

the liability to the officers, the conditions incorporated in

Section 141 are to be satisfied.

43. A contention was raised before this Court on behalf of the

State of Madras that the conviction could be made on the

basis of Section 10 of the 1955 Act. The three-Judge Bench

repelled the contention by stating thus: -

"3. Learned counsel for the appellant, however, sought

conviction of the two respondents on the basis of Section

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10 of the Essential Commodities Act under which, if the

person contravening an order made under Section 3

(which covers an order under the Iron and Steel Control

Order, 1956), is a company, every person who, at the time

the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and

was responsible to, the company for the conduct of the

business of the company as well as the company, shall be

deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be

liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.

It was urged that the two respondents were in charge of,

and were responsible to, the Company for the conduct of

the business of the Company and, consequently, they

must be held responsible for the sale and for thus

contravening the provisions of clause (5) of the Iron and

Steel Control Order, the two respondents could not be

held responsible. The actual contravention was by Kamdar

and Vallabhadas Thacker and any contravention by them

would not fasten responsibility on the respondents.

(emphasize supplied)

The aforesaid paragraph clearly lays down that the first

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condition is that the company should be held to be liable; a

charge has to be framed; a finding has to be recorded, and

the liability of the persons in charge of the company only

arises when the contravention is by the company itself.

53. It is to be borne in mind that Section 141 of the Act is

concerned with the offences by the company. It makes the

other persons vicariously liable for commission of an offence

on the part of the company. As has been stated by us earlier,

the vicarious liability gets attracted when the condition

precedent laid down in Section 141 of the Act stands satisfied.

There can be no dispute that as the liability is penal in nature,

a strict construction of the provision would be necessitous

and, in a way, the warrant.

56. We have referred to the aforesaid passages only to

highlight that there has to be strict observance of the

provisions regard being had to the legislative intendment

because it deals with penal provisions and a penalty is not to

be imposed affecting the rights of persons whether juristic

entities or individuals, unless they are arrayed as accused. It

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is to be kept in mind that the power of punishment is vested in

the legislature and that is absolute in Section 141 of the Act

which clearly speaks of commission of offence by the

company. The learned counsel for the respondents have

vehemently urged that the use of the term "as well as" in the

Section is of immense significance and, in its tentacle, it

brings in the company as well as the director and/or other

officers who are responsible for the acts of the company and,

therefore, a prosecution against the directors or other officers

is tenable even if the company is not arraigned as an

accused. The words "as well as" have to be understood in the

context.

58. Applying the doctrine of strict construction, we are of the

considered opinion that commission of offence by the

company is an express condition precedent to attract the

vicarious liability of others. Thus, the words "as well as the

company" appearing in the Section make it absolutely

unmistakably clear that when the company can be

prosecuted, then only the persons mentioned in the other

categories could be vicariously liable for the offence subject to

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the averments in the petition and proof thereof. One cannot

be oblivious of the fact that the company is a juristic person

and it has its own respectability. If a finding is recorded

against it, it would create a concavity in its reputation. There

can be situations when the corporate reputation is affected

when a director is indicted.

59. In view of our aforesaid analysis, we arrive at the

irresistible conclusion that for maintaining the prosecution

under Section 141 of the Act, arraigning of a company as an

accused is imperative. The other categories of offenders can

only be brought in the dragnet on the touchstone of vicarious

liability as the same has been stipulated in the provision itself.

We say so on the basis of the ratio laid down in C.V. Parekh

(supra) which is a three-Judge Bench decision. Thus, the view

expressed in

Sheoratan Agarwal (supra) does not correctly lay down the

law and, accordingly, is hereby overruled. The decision in Anil

Hada (supra) is overruled with the qualifier as stated in

paragraph 51. The decision in Modi Distilleries (supra) has to

be treated to be restricted to its own facts as has been

NEUTRAL CITATION

R/CR.MA/3191/2022 JUDGMENT DATED: 01/11/2023

undefined

explained by us hereinabove."

15. In view of the aforesaid analysis drawn by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, this Court is of the view that non-joinder of the

Company as accused, which otherwise is treated as principal

offender being drawer of the cheque, the Director of the Company

joined as sole accused representing the company as well as

authorised signatory, would not served the provisions of Section

141 of the Act. Thus, no arguable case is made out to grant this

application seeking special leave to appeal. Hence, present

application is hereby dismissed. Rule is discharged.

In view of the dismissal of the application seeking leave to

appeal, the Criminal Appeal No.335 of 2022 hereby stands

disposed of.

(NISHA M. THAKORE,J) Y.N. VYAS

 
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